Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (35 page)

U.S. forces battle down an Aachen street.
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A pillbox hidden inside of what looks like a German house near Ottenfeld.
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U.S. infantry moves through streets of North Bardenberg.
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After heavy fighting, a Würselen street is empty as the 119th Infantry closes the gap.
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American tank fires down an Aachen street.
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Aachen state theater.
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American soldiers fire down Monheims Allee.
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Gaunt skeletons of Aachen ruins.
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German graves in Aachen.
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Oberst
Gerhard Wilck and staff during surrender.
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Surrender of Germans at Aachen. Nazi half-track armored vehicles filled with soldiers ready to quit, and bearing white surrender flags, are taken into custody.
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Guess the only way to do it is to send up some engineers, eh Captain? No, I wouldn't ask a man to commit suicide. I told you I'd do it myself.

CAPT. BOBBIE E. BROWN, COMPANY C, 18TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

T
he events at Alsdorf on 7 October convinced the American commanders that it was time to force the issue in Aachen. When the 30th Infantry Division's General Hobbs urged that VII Corps launch its part of the encirclement maneuver, General Hodges quickly agreed. Fortunately, the broad outlines for the endeavor were determined before First Army approached the German border back in mid-September. Thus General Huebner, in his small, brick, three-story forward command post in the little town of Hauset, had been afforded the time he needed to refine his scheme of operations, and as such he was able to order the attack that very night.

Huebner's plan actually called for a multiphase strike. The first task in the initial phase, assigned to Colonel Smith's 18th Infantry Regiment, would focus on encircling the city by capturing Verlautenheide; the village's topography permitted excellent fields of fire for the Germans to the northeast, over toward the regiment's second objective, commanding and pillbox-studded Hill 239, christened “Crucifix Hill” by the Americans. A quick rise on the western part of the hill, surmounted at almost 800 feet by a huge 60-foot stone cross, gave Hill 239 its dramatic name; with
360-degree visibility for miles, the Germans had been using the cross as an artillery outpost. The next phase of Huebner's bold plan was to seize Ravelsberg Hill.

The Ravelsberg, a wooded mass arrayed with more pillboxes along its rolling heights, was located another 1,500 yards to the northwest of Crucifix Hill. Observation from atop the 231-meter-high Ravelsberg overlooked the Aachen-Würselen Road, the main supply route into Aachen, and the Aachen Weiden Road, another avenue of approach into the city from Jurlich. The Ravelsberg also commanded views over the railroad line that ran into the city from Würselen; from atop the hill the gritty factory district in the northeast section of the Aachen, with its foundry, rolling mills, and pillboxes, could also be seen on a clear day. Thus, the Ravelsberg position was important for several reasons. If the Germans retained it,
Oberstleutnant
Maximilian Leyherr's 246th Division would enjoy a secure resupply route into Aachen. Observation from the hill also enabled the Germans to direct artillery fire into the flank and rear of the positions held by the 16th Infantry on the ridge outside of Verlauntenhide where the men here were actually protecting the entire 1st Division from a counterattack. Moreover, as long as the defenders retained control of the Raveslberg, they would be able to prevent any American thrust into Aachen during daylight hours.

Huebner's final phase portended another challenge if it became necessary. Once Ravelsberg Hill succumbed to the 18th Infantry,
Oberstleutnant
Leyherr would be given a twenty-four-hour ultimatum demanding surrender. If he failed to agree unconditionally, Colonel Seitz's 26th Infantry Regiment would follow a targeted artillery and tactical airstrike and launch an immediate ground attack into the city.

As the first major urban center in Germany threatened with capture by Allied troops, Aachen was now symbolic for far more than its military value. Hitler, who could not afford the propaganda defeat that would be handed to his regime if Aachen fell to the Americans, had repeatedly ordered the city to be defended to the last man and bullet. The veteran Big Red One, now being given the honor to demonstrate to the world that the demise of the Third Reich was inevitable, eagerly looked forward to demoralizing Hitler and all of Germany with Aachen's surrender.

Capt. Robert Botsford of the 1st Division G-2 Section put the situation at the time in this perspective:

During the month of October, the eyes of all Germany were on Aachen. The enemy had to solve a problem that was far more than a purely local operation. On the political side, the enemy had to decide whether to minimize the importance of Aachen and prepare the homefront for its loss, or to face the fact that it was the ancient imperial German city, the testing ground for the Wermacht's determination not to yield a foot—or at least a conspicuous foot—of sacred German soil.
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By this time most of Aachen's prewar population of 165,000 had fled, and as the Americans were planning their attack it was estimated that not over 15,000 to 20,000 civilians remained in the city. Capt. Edward W. McGregor, the S-3 of the 18th Infantry's 1st Battalion, cautiously noted, “The 246th Division [defending Aachen] now included a conglomeration of naval personnel, physical misfits, deferred defense workers and new recruits. The static defense units were a bit better. Owing to the poor quality of the personnel and the limited training they experienced, the combat efficiency and morale of these units were quite low. However, they were defending well-prepared fortifications and many of their leaders were skilled Wehrmacht officers. These defenses were constantly being improved and backed up with more and more artillery as each day went by.”
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Colonel Smith's plan called for the night attack ordered by General Huebner to be led by Lieutenant Colonel Williamson's 2nd Battalion. His companies would first filter behind the positions being held by the 16th Infantry on the ridge outside of Verlautenheide before seizing the main village. They would then establish blocking positions to the north and farther east to prevent any counterattacks. Once they accomplished this, Lieutenant Colonel Learnard's 1st Battalion would move up and then swing to the northwest to take Crucifix Hill. Lieutenant Colonel Peckham's 3rd Battalion would also launch an attack to seize barren-ridged Hill 192, just northwest of Haaren, thus diverting attention from the regiment's main effort against Crucifix Hill.

The mood of the officers and men in the attacking combat teams was best described at the time by Captain McGregor:

The men faced the Aachen offensive with mixed feelings. In as much as the division had achieved a series of outstanding successes along the historic path from Normandy to Aachen and the gates of Germany, they were battle veterans with a sense of destiny—a feeling that they were always selected for important tasks because they had always accomplished their mission. Thus, esprit de corps was excellent.

On the other hand, there were causes for personal misgivings concerning the forthcoming operations. The rapid dash across France and Belgium and the apparent destruction of the German Army in the west had raised hopes of final victory and a sudden end to the war. These hopes had been shattered by the abrupt increase of resistance on German soil. The Siegfried defenses, although manned by troops with low morale and poor combat efficiency, were proving difficult to reduce and it was apparent the enemy intended to defend his homeland by waging a fierce war of attrition against the invader. Casualties were mounting, and morale, while good on the whole, was a factor that varied with the comparative success or failure of each day's operation.
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The steps taken by the 1st Battalion in preparing for the upcoming attack reflected the wisdom gained by two long years of combat experience. Nearly all of the current senior officers had first waded ashore together in North Africa, and they honored Big Red One's motto: “No mission too difficult, no sacrifice too great—duty first!” The Aachen fight would be no exception. After being relieved by Lt. Col. Hershel E. Linn's 237th Engineering Battalion back on 2 October, McGregor and the S-3 of the 2nd Battalion—Maine-raised Capt. Robert E. Murphy, who served as a heavy weapons company commander from November of 1942 until the Saint-Lô breakthrough—as well as the 3rd Battalion's former rifle company commander Henry R. Sawyer, met at the regimental command post to start planning for the upcoming battles. Later that night, McGregor, himself a former rifle company captain, returned to his post to discuss the plan with his boss, Lieutenant Colonel Learnard, a thin, intense, pipe-smoking commander who parted his thick hair in the middle and kept a German shepherd close by for company. Joining them were the battalion's 32nd Field Artillery liaison officer, Harvard-educated Capt.
Malcolm Marshall. The trio huddled together well into the night, studying maps, aerial photographs, and overlays of the German positions on Crucifix Hill and the surrounding area; before bedding down, they made plans for a detailed reconnaissance of the attack zone the following day.

McGregor and Learnard, who often sported a walking stick, joined with their heavy weapons company commander, Capt. Robert E. Bowers, to visually reconnoiter Verlautenheide and Crucifix Hill that morning. They could see that the ridge between the village and the hill was crowned with bunkers, especially on its southern slope facing Eilendorf. Large pillboxes studded the crest of distant Crucifix Hill; with their binoculars they could see that the firing ports of the boxes were overlooking their intended avenue of attack. Together they counted as many as forty separate pillboxes on the hill. There was no way to tell if the slopes were mined, but belts of barbed-wire entanglements protecting communication trenches that ran from pillbox to pillbox were slightly visible. Learnard whispered that it was quite evident the Germans had excellent visibility from the hill, and fearsome looking fields of fire. McGregor waved his finger toward Verlautenheide and then westward to Crucifix Hill, underscoring the fact that there was little to no cover from the village edge to the trenches at the foot of the hill. Marshall, with his eye for calling in positions for artillery strikes, surmised that the best approach to first reach Verlautenheide appeared to be along a road that curved out of the northeast end of Eilendorf and snaked its way up to the village; this route provided some protection from direct fire for about half the distance between the villages.

There were other drawbacks. Little information was known about the enemy dispositions, but their probable strength had been estimated; intelligence reports had indicated that Replacement Battalion 453 occupied Verlautenheide, and that a reinforced reserve company of Grenadier Regiment 352, composed of hand-picked men—the supposed best in the regiment and recently rushed up from Weiden—was manning the fortifications on Crucifix Hill. When McGregor returned with Learnard and Marshall to their battalion command post later that afternoon, they met with all their officers, and again used their maps, aerial photographs, and overlays to facilitate a detailed briefing with the knowledge gained from that day's reconnaissance mission.

The next day brought further preparation; this time all of the rifle company commanders participated. The approach to Verlautenheide recommended by Captain Marshall was agreed upon. Later, Lieutenant Colonel Learnard closed the follow-up briefing back in the CP by directing each company commander to continue reconnoitering the following day, this time with all of their platoon leaders, noncoms, and individual squad leaders. This was appreciated through the ranks. After viewing the terrain and plans for the attack, one noncom expressed the value of Learnard's thoroughness in preparing them for the upcoming fight:

Every bit of enemy activity was noted and recorded; every pillbox closely watched; every likely approach studied; every discernible fold in the ground was tucked away in our memories. Not deeming it sufficient to permit each man to rely on the evidence of his own eyes, we later critiqued the operation until we were certain that we were getting the best and fullest and most reliable information possible. The importance of the mission was drilled into us. No stone was left unturned to ensure that this operation would be a complete success with the fewest possible casualties.
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A pilot from the Ninth Air Force reported to Lieutenant Colonel Learnard the next morning. The pilot's role as air liaison officer was to direct fighter bombers to targets requested by the 1st Battalion during the attack. Again, Learnard and McGregor returned to Eilendorf, not just with the air liaison officer, but also with platoon leaders from the supporting tank and tank destroyer companies, as well as the Regimental antitank company. McGregor then made plans to return in the morning for one last reconnaissance, this time with just the company commander who would lead the assault on Crucifix Hill.