Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (28 page)

Captain McBride requested the two flamethrowers he needed from Lieutenant Colonel Herlong to solve this problem; Herlong quickly agreed to find these men. McBride then briefed his platoon leaders and reinforced the plan of attack he had developed. He reiterated that rapid, simultaneous movement forward with maximum fire on enemy positions was essential to the success of the plan. Timing would be everything. The flamethrowers were to be as far forward as possible so they could blast the pillbox embrasures early in the assault.

At 1130 an engineer platoon leader with two men arrived at McBride's command post. There was a new problem, however. When the Company B captain explained the plan, the platoon leader told him General Hobbs had decreed that engineers could no longer be used to operate flamethrowers since they had suffered too many casualties and had to be saved to construct bridges and do other work. McBride answered by withdrawing four of his own riflemen; the engineers gave them hasty instructions on how to operate a flamethrower.

Shortly afterward, Captain McBride's two platoon leaders came back to his location and reported their men were briefed and ready. When the newly trained flamethrowers appeared a few minutes later, McBride gave the order to attack.

The sudden fury coupled with the psychological effect caused by flames licking at his positions startled the enemy, and before he could regain his balance the assault troops were overrunning his position. The effect of the flamethrowers was increased when one German who had been set on fire ran screaming through the area before he was finally burned to death. Satchel charges
placed against the rear doors of the pillboxes and hand grenades dropped down their ventilators encouraged the rest of the Germans occupying the pillboxes to surrender.
¹⁶

Company B even managed to attack another 200 yards southward before they were stopped. During this advance, McBride's left platoon, which had initially overrun the high ground in front of Company C, turned south and moved back into their own company area to help mop up. Throughout the remainder of the afternoon, however, neither company was able to advance any farther. Replacements were badly needed, so Herlong ordered both companies to dig in at 1700 hours. Later that evening, he received seventy-four new men. Twenty-two went to Captain Simmons's Company A, bringing his strength to fifty-five men. Captain McBride got another twenty-two; he would have seventy-five soldiers for the next day's attack.
¹⁷
Company C added eighteen men, bringing their fighting strength to eighty, and twelve others replaced the lost machine gunners and mortar men in the heavy weapons company. At normal strength a company had almost two hundred men; none came up to half of a full roster, but the war went on. Lieutenant Colonel Herlong received instructions from Colonel Sutherland to resume the attack at 0700 the next morning and to clean out the remainder of the woods. There were still several hundred yards left before these men could step onto the Rimburg-Merkstein-Hofstadt road, head farther south, and finally be freed from the surly bonds of the Rimburg woods.

The 2nd Armored Division's CCB achieved mixed results in its efforts to build up the beachhead to the east and north on 5 October. Colonel Disney's Task Force 1 was stopped short of its objective—Beggendorf—after crossing the Geilenkirchen-Aachen highway; a gain of only a few hundred yards was made. During the afternoon, the 404th Regiment of the 246th Division arrived in the area and by nightfall these new forces sealed off the German line from Muthagen to the western outskirts of Beggendorf.
¹⁸

Task Force 2 under Colonel Hinds made more progress toward Geilenkirchen that day; Frelenberg and Zweibruggen were the objectives. The 41st Armored Infantry Regiment's Lieutenant Smith was able to quickly move his assault team over to Zweibruggen before turning south
and taking thirteen pillboxes that were still in enemy hands east of the Wurm. “Tactics that were successful the previous day were used again,” a report detailing the day's actions noted. “The team had no difficulty, as the enemy seemed thoroughly cowed by the attack of the day before.”
¹⁹
Lieutenant Levitsky's assault team had also made quick work of the Frelenberg phase of the attack, mopping up eight pillboxes before 0900 and taking the crossroads in town shortly thereafter.

During the latter part of the morning, Captain Hastings's Company B moved to the village and set up a defensive line to prevent reoccupation of the captured boxes. This enabled Levitsky's infantrymen, engineers, and tanks to sweep the area as far south as Zweibruggen. They encountered a minefield on the road immediately north of this village, and they cleared it before they made contact with Lieutenant Smith's forces. It was only noontime at this point, so Major Finnell decided to capitalize on the rapid advance and keep the drive moving. The 2nd Battalion of the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment displaced his 1st Battalion in Frelenberg, enabling a thrust toward the high ground north of the Frelenberg-Breil road. Lieutenant Levitsky's assault team, with Lieutenant Harper's mop-up men assisting, attacked at 1600, secured this line by nightfall, and dug in. Lieutenant Colonel Wynne's 2nd Battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment had reported that Breil was cleared by this time, but enemy fire still came into Finnell's newly won positions through the night.

The Americans had taken 25 pillboxes during the day. The armored infantry suffered just 9 casualties; 5 German officers and 150 of their enlisted personnel were made prisoners. The entire 67th Armored Regiment was heavily engaged on 5 October. Observed direct and indirect artillery fire had hit Lt. Col. Clifton B. Batchelder's 1st Battalion when they crossed the Marienberg bridge and moved up to Frelenberg; six tanks were lost and although personnel casualties were small, one officer—Company H's CO, Lt. Philips T. Bixby—was wounded in the leg.
²⁰

Very interesting intelligence about the German mindset on 4 October later emerged. A member of the G-2 section of XIX Corps was inside a captured pillbox in Palenberg trying to determine the extent of its damage when, to his surprise, he heard the deep gonging of the box's telephone. He picked it up and heard the occupants of two other enemy-held pillboxes openly discussing their present conditions. It turned out that several pillboxes were wired together such that they could all communicate
simultaneously; Pvt. Siegfried F. Brand of the 117th Infantry's Headquarters Company and T/5 Earnest A. Pokel of IPW Team 42 of the 30th Infantry Division were quickly tasked with writing up the subsequent conversations.

Late-night exchanges between the pillboxes first revealed the German passwords “Gold” and “Silver.” “Gold” was the challenge word. A fellow soldier identified himself as a German comrade by responding with “Silver”; failure to answer the challenge could result in being shot. One pillbox reported it was out of rations; another identified six casualties—Hagen, Wallentag, Hoeflen, Schmidt, and Fredlen, plus the caller himself with a face wound. One reported two men by name missing, one of whom took a heavy machine gun with him; yet another pillbox reported four more casualties and that a dead man had been brought to their bunker. Finally
Leutnant
Hofner, commander of 3Co of the 330th Regiment's 1st Battalion, called from his bunker and told
Unteroffizier
Janovsky in another pillbox “if you see any tanks coming from Frelenberg, call me immediately and ring four times.”
²¹

At 0910 Janovsky rang and reported—“Sir, we sighted two tanks on the road Marienburg-Frelenberg.” The line fell silent until 1030, but then a nervously excited Janovsky called Hofner again and stated, “Sir, we have sighted 80 tanks coming over the bridge.” Hofner, seeking clarification, replied, “Did you say eight tanks?” Janovsky replied back, “No sir, eighty. They came over the bridge in close column.” Hofner's reaction: “Himmel Donnerwetter [God dammit]!! I'll request artillery barrage immediately.”

Then, at 1200 Janovsky reported to Hofner: “Sir, the Americans shoot smoke shells along the whole line. I believe they prepare to attack.” Another bunker confirmed this and then at 1230 a jittery voice stated, “Sir, the Americans also shoot incendiary shells and move towards the coal mine.” Ten minutes later, Jankovsky called Hofner and yelled, “We receive enemy fire! Three of my men are badly hurt. Two are shell shocked and one passed out. My strength is now two or three men. We hold the bunker as long as possible and then…? There is no way of retreat any more.” Hofner's response: “We'll
see if we can evacuate your wounded man after dark. Stay inside from now on. Heil!”

By 1555 Hofner was in a different bunker; he had vacated his because it was being overrun. Over the open line he asked, “Is there any news?” Someone answered: “They are firing at us with machine guns now.” A few minutes later conversation from one bunker to another was overheard, this time saying, “I can't get connected with the CP [Hofner's pillbox] anymore. How about you?” The answer: “Hell, we can't get in touch with them either. That son of a bitch beat it, without notifying us. Ten tanks are now approaching the power station. What the hell are we going to do?”

Combat Command A (CCA) was ordered to cross the Wurm and add even more armored weight to the bridgehead on 5 October. Two columns were formed; the left column was commanded by the 66th Armored Regiment's CO, Colonel Stokes; the right column was under the command of his 1st Battalion's Lieutenant Colonel Parker.

At 0930 the 3rd Battalion of the 29th Infantry Division's 116th Regiment arrived at the assembly area for attachment to Stokes's left column, and then at 1000 hours these forces were placed on thirty-minute alert for movement. At noon the column rolled out, but as it approached Marienberg, heavy enemy artillery rounds started coming in. This fire continued as the column crossed the bridge and moved through Palenberg, eventually causing Stokes's forces to stop short of Beggendorf for the night. Lieutenant Colonel Parker's right column, following Stokes, had the mission of securing the high ground near the village of Oidtweiler, located less than a thousand yards southeast of Baesweiler; establishing security here would cut off the main roadway to Alsdorf, an extension of the Aachen-Settrich highway and one of the supply routes into Aachen. While Parker advanced farther than Stokes's left column, he was unable to reach his objective, instead coiling past ancient Roman roads about one mile to the west of Baesweiler for the night. Enemy resistance was heavy all day long, but both columns suffered just eight casualties, with two killed in action. Stokes lost two tanks while Lieutenant Colonel Parker's force captured thirty-five Germans during their advance.
²²

With constant pressure by the 2nd Armored and 30th Infantry Divisions in clear evidence, concern in the German command grew throughout the afternoon on 5 October. While the 404th Regiment of the 246th Division held the line from Muthagen to the western edges of Beggendorf, preventing CCB's advance in the direction of Geilenkirchen was dependent upon the arrival of the German NCOs from Juelich and Dueren. Heavy American artillery had thwarted this move, and it was only accomplished by way of infiltration. Delayed until later that night, this new force finally connected to the 404th Regiment and was deployed in a northwesterly direction up to the
Westwall
about one kilometer north of Frelenberg. During the night, German attempts to regain this village failed.

LXXXI Corps noted:

On 5 October, the enemy continued his attacks to expand the penetration area. In an easterly direction, he advanced to the western outskirts of the village of Beggendorf; however he was not able to capture it. The attack to the north and northeast along the road Ubach-Geilenkirchen and to the northeast of it, after repeated unsuccessful attempts, led to a breakthrough with tanks and infantry in the direction of Breil and pushed our troops back to the line—southern outskirts-Breil-southern outskirts-Waurichen.
²³

Clearly, the German High Command still expected XIX Corps to continue their attack to the east. It would take another day before more reinforcements arrived to address the American penetrations to the south and the line Merkstein-Herbach-Hofstadt defended. It would be too late. As the Army official historian noted:

The Americans were now getting set to exploit their bridgehead; the Germans would have to go to extraordinary measures to assemble sufficient strength to push them back to the Wurm. Although Field Marshall Model could not have known it at the time, any counterattack he might devise at this point would be directed more toward preventing a link between XIX and VII Corps northeast of Aachen than eliminating the XIX Corps’ bridgehead. Successes on 6 October clearly indicated that the fight for a Westwall
bridgehead was nearing an end.
²⁴

But it did not appear as evident to the U.S. soldiers attacking through the Rimburg woods when first light started peeking through shell-smashed trees that morning. Lieutenant Colonel Herlong's 1st Battalion of the 119th Infantry Regiment began its attack at 0700. Captain McBride's Company B was to the right of Lieutenant Bons's Company C at the start, and both companies initially advanced slowly—too slowly. McBride, like he had the day before, again made aggressive command decisions and soon got his men moving. By midmorning Company B had reduced the last pillbox in its zone and cleared out the entire woods right down to the Rimburg-Merkstein-Hofstadt road.

Bons's Company C had again not managed to advance on line with Company B, so Herlong ordered Captain Simmons's Company A to move down and protect the flank and rear of McBride's platoons. This took a while, but by late morning Simmons's men were in these positions, at which time McBride's men crossed the road and began advancing south. By 1210 they had reduced four additional pillboxes and cleaned out 900 more yards of woods. Captain McBride reported his new location to Lieutenant Colonel Herlong by 300 radio and the battalion commander told him to hold in place until they had put in telephone wires; he had further instructions, and wanted to assure operational security before giving them to McBride. A wire team had followed Company B all morning, so the line was available in less than five minutes.