Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (2 page)

Brig. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, commander of the 3rd Armored Division's Combat Command A (CCA), had also ordered a second task force commanded by 1927 West Point graduate Lt. Col. Leander L. “Chubby” Doan to probe the
Westwall
just south of Oberforstbach and to the east of the Eupen-Eynatten road on 12 September. In this area, hurriedly being reinforced by the 9th Panzer Division, the fortifications ran in a northeast to southwest direction, approximately 1,000 yards inside the Reich border. These defenses, however, were in open, moderately rolling terrain that was also faced with dragon's teeth, and there were indeed pillboxes with favorable fields of fire beyond these tank barriers. But the high ground Task Force Doan occupied later in the day without a fight afforded observation of the entire area; a gentle ridge crisscrossing in an east-west direction looked promising. This terrain allowed for a quick flanking movement to the east and an attack on the fortifications from the south. Lieutenant Colonel Doan remembered, “These factors were to vitally affect the action of the next day.”
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Yet still unknown was the actual resistance he would face when the morning dawned. The 9th Panzer Division's
Oberst
Mueller later offered this commentary on the cobbled, hastily arrayed defenses then at his disposal opposite Task Force Doan.

Thirty-six stationary (88mm) antitank guns, which for the most part were without sighting mechanisms, were located at Ober Forstbach and were just being emplaced by caterpillar tractors; for each piece there were only three men for service of the guns and only five armored and high explosive shells each. The pillboxes,
which were connected with one another by subterranean cables, were neither equipped with telephones nor were there any plans for linking them up, nor experts well acquainted with local conditions, so that not even the command bunkers, for which telephones could have been made available, could establish communication. The division depended on the overburdened public telephone lines by way of the telephone exchange of Aachen.

The two assigned battalions were distributed amongst the local replacement and instruction battalions, neither of which were coherent units welded closely together. On the other hand, we had the advantage that the command remained [under] troop commanders who had a fair knowledge of the region.
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A third 3rd Armored Division task force under the command of Lt. Col. Rosewell H. King had also set out on the morning of 12 September 1944. After receiving his orders from the commander of Combat Command B (CCB), Col. Truman E. Boudinot, Task Force King sent a reconnaissance in force through Kettenis, skirting Eupen at Oberstheide before moving via a heavily wooded area through Schoenefeld into the Raerener Woods before Schmidthof. The reconnaissance force was commanded by Capt. Kenneth T. McGeorge and was led by M5 light tanks, followed by medium Shermans and then a company of infantry mounted on half-tracks, with engineers in their own vehicles at the rear of the column.

At approximately 1630, when Task Force Lovelady was crossing the railroad tracks to enter Roetgen, Task Force King encountered a crossroad in the Raerener Woods where teller mines had been cleverly camouflaged, resulting in one tank falling victim to an explosion and an immediate halting of the remainder of the force. The surviving light tanks hurried toward machine-gun positions observed about 100 yards away and mopped them up, and then the engineers worked forward and cleared the remaining mines from the crossroad. The column reformed and continued on its mission eastward to the Reich border.

At 1700 the column finally hit the main road from Raeren to Roetgen, turned southeast, and passed through friendly elements of Task Force Lovelady before abruptly wheeling northward toward Schmidthof. At a bend in the upcoming roadway, Captain McGeorge's lead reconnaissance
force found that the column was positioned at the top of a hill before a long, straight stretch of continued gently sloping roadway that was plainly open for what appeared to be the next two miles. Perceiving the excellent fields of fire that enemy troops would have along this road, McGeorge halted his men. Infantry then came forward along the edge of the road while light tanks were sent ahead to draw fire if the enemy chose to attack. Fortunately, no hostile action materialized.

While making reconnaissance on the top of the next hill, however, the point of the column ran into a rope chain of mines that the enemy forces had dragged across the road before retiring to the nearby Koenigsburg hills.
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From here the dragon's teeth of the
Westwall
also came into view, along with two sets of concrete blocks with wire stretched across the road between them. Fifteen yards north of these obstacles stood a steel swinging gate much like the one Task Force Lovelady faced near the Dreilagerbach reservoir outside of Roetgen. A crater had been blown in the road at the point where the dragon's teeth began, and another gate lay beyond this. Rows of additional concrete obstacles in haphazard but effective patterns and shapes also lined these
Westwall
defenses. Another and larger iron-domed pillbox, some 75 yards northeast of this line, appeared to observers to have the area zeroed in. Even a dirt road that branched into these defenses from another direction was blocked with a rugged iron gate.

Securing the ground beyond this was the immediate mission of the infantrymen, all attached to the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment, so that the engineers of the 2nd Platoon, Company B, 23rd Armored Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lt. Robert M. Eells, could work unhindered on the tank obstacles, thus permitting the rest of the task force through the
Westwall
.
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It was about dusk when the infantry went straight up the sides of the roadway, trying to maintain some cover. Behind them were two of Eells's leading scouts and the rest of his squad of engineers. Then things went downhill quickly. As these men approached the first obstacles, an enemy pillbox on the right opened up with deadly machine-gun fire, killing both of the scouts and wounding others. Just five engineers survived.

Suddenly American tanks started shooting at the pillbox in support, scoring hits but not knocking it out. The remaining infantry tried to work their way up, but vicious fire was now coming in from both sides of
the roadway and darkness had all too quickly set in. “The column was also strung out back to Roetgen,” Eells explained. “Orders came to pull back and leaguer.”
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By this time a platoon of three tank destroyers under the command of Lt. Heril L. Brown had put in a roadblock, covering the rear of the task force.
¹⁹
The contemplated attack on Schmidthof was canceled. Instead, Task Force King coiled for the night.

Generalleutnant
Schack wasted little time and ordered the 9th Panzer Division to immediately reinforce the positions in the area. Remembering this, Schack later said:

Our thin line of security had disintegrated in several places. To consolidate, we had to fall back a little, increasing the possibilities for concentration and reorganization. The 9th Panzer Division concentrated its units around Eynatten while the 353rd Division manned the Westwall as a security force.

We had no illusions about the condition of the Westwall. But its dragon's teeth and permanent fortifications, visible from a distance, might arouse the enemy's respect and make them cautious. Perhaps their cautious approach would allow our exhausted forces breathing time. These serious questions, and the anxiety resulting, absorbed the attention of every commander at the close of this fateful day. It was clear that perhaps the next day there would be a fight for the Westwall positions.
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By this time the first units of the American XIX Corps had arrived just to the south of Maastricht, an important rail and river transportation point 30 kilometers west of Aachen in Holland. On 11 September the 113th Cavalry Group, commanded by Col. William S. Biddle, had made a sweeping 35-mile end run from the Albert Canal to the south, crossing the Meuse River at Liege near Belgium's eastern border. With 1933 West Point graduate Lt. Col. Anthony F. Kleitz's 125th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the right flank and Lt. Col. Allen D. Hulse's 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the left, the Group continued moving to the north along the east bank of the river on 12 September. The 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry Regiment of Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs's 30th Infantry Division had also crossed the Meuse River at Vise,
20 kilometers northeast of Liege, during the night of 11–12 September. They were moving northward by midday on 12 September.
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Maastricht was also Hobbs's next objective.

Severely weakened elements of the 275th Infantry Division, under the command of
Generalleutnant
Hans Schmidt, defended the positions around ancient and culture-rich Maastricht. His division was one in name only, as many of its units had been destroyed a week earlier while rushing to escape from the Mons pocket.
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At the time Schmidt, a stern-faced officer with piercing eyes, reported his total remaining division strength at only two thousand men, of which just four hundred were considered combat worthy. He later explained:

I succeeded in obtaining officers, non-commissioned officers and men [and] was able to put up some formations with more or less tolerable fighting power. I was supplied with a limited number of heavy infantry weapons and ammunition. As complete formations, one security battalion and one regional defense battalion—the bulk of which consisted of men over 30 years of age with poor training, the remaining portions of an anti-aircraft battalion with two batteries of 20 and 50mm guns, as well as one light anti-aircraft battery manned of labor service men, were subordinated to me. In addition to these, a task force of three companies put up of stragglers and motorized in a makeshift way, arrived in personal carriers under the command of Major Riedel. From remnants of my own division and from stragglers I formed two infantry battalions. On about 10 September I moved into position a battery of four light field howitzers, which was placed at my disposal by a SS formation proceeding to Germany for reorganization. In a makeshift way, the battery was mobile by means of truck and was ready for action on 12 September.
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By this time, many of the military and administrative officers had already evacuated Maastricht. Even the town commandant had disappeared. Schmidt, on the other hand, had just received a personal telegram from Hitler ordering that the Maastricht bridgehead be defended to the last cartridge.
²⁴
Schmidt recalled:

In the beginning, the enemy pursued but slowly and with weak forces. Besides, we ascertained that the preceding night [11 September], the enemy had crossed the Meuse near Vise. These enemy forces were estimated to comprise one battalion, but apparently they were stronger and they soon commenced to attack in the direction to Fouron le Comte. With the spearhead of this American force, I had a very disagreeable encounter. I made a trip along the foremost front line. West of Fouron le Comte, we in a hurry took a wrong road, and suddenly from a distance of about 80 meters we were sighted and taken under fire by an enemy patrol of some 10 to 15 men who were about to cross the road from the south. Our situation was rather hopeless. First of all, we succeeded in getting out of our car. When working back along the sunken road we were on, my officer was wounded by a shot into his upper thigh and was later taken prisoner. Also, my driver was shot at and remained lying on the spot. When getting out of my car, I was hit in my left hip. Despite the wound, I did not give up, but with all the energy and force I could command, springing up and crawling on all fours—all the time under fire—I worked back along the road in the direction of the town.

Upon reaching a road bend, I observed another American patrol which apparently was a flank security. I was thus endangered from the front and rear alike. Now I had no other choice, but using every available cover I eventually succeeded by forcing my way back in a northeasterly direction. My attempt to rescue my comrades by a counterattack with our forces I met there failed. The intensified enemy fire inflicted losses and soon tied us down.
²⁵

Schmidt was correct in assessing that American forces were attacking in strength larger than one battalion on 12 September. After being in contact with his forces all of the previous night, two battalions of the U.S. 30th Division's 119th Infantry Regiment were now also advancing northward toward Maastricht. The regiment's 3rd Battalion, under the command of the experienced and capable Lt. Col. Courtney P. Brown, jumped off at 0800 and reached its first objective at Dalhem
shortly afterward. By 1000 hours, the 1st Battalion was going through Longchamp while Brown's forces moved through Bombays toward thinly populated Warsage. At 1125 hours, the leading patrols of the 1st Battalion were near mixed Dutch- and French-speaking Fouron le Comte and were receiving 20mm and rifle fire from Schmidt's forces. A full company finally pushed into the town at 1245 hours, only to find itself delayed when the 275th Division's few light field howitzers delivered some incoming fire from a ridgeline east of the town.
²⁶

Artillery attached to the 30th Infantry Division crossed over the Meuse late in the afternoon of 12 September behind the 119th Infantry's regimental combat trains and weapon carriers. Schmidt's Regiment 984, under the command of
Oberst
Heinz, had one of its battalions located on both sides of Fouron le Comte by this time. Schmidt, however, had even larger problems to contend with. His officer who was wounded in the ambush earlier that day had with him orders issued that very morning for the 275th Infantry Division's defensive positions. As Schmidt remembered, “Now it was essential to take all countermeasures before the enemy could avail himself of the knowledge gained by capturing this order. Despite my wounding, I remained with the troops to retain the command of the division in this critical situation. But as the day wore on the enemy succeeded in gaining more ground near Fouron le Comte, where he concentrated his main effort. The town was lost.”
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