A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (15 page)

"The South has no limit and yet has a limit. "The South has no limit' was a common saying of the day. At that time, the South was a little known land very much like the West of America two hundred years ago. For the early Chinese, the South was not limited by sea as was the East, nor by barren desert as were the North and West. Hence it was popularly regarded as having no limit. Hui Shih s statement may thus perhaps be merely an expression of his superior geographical knowledge, that the South is, eventually, also limited by the sea. Most probably, however, it means to say that the limited and the unlimited are both only relatively so.

"I go to the state of Ytich today and arrived there yesterday. " This states that "today" and "yesterday" are relative terms. The yesterday of today was the today of yesterday, and the today of today will be the yesterday of tomorrow. Herein lies the relativity of the present and the past.

"Connected rings can be separated." Connected rings cannot be separated unless they are destroyed.

But destruction may, from another point of view, be construction. If one makes a wooden table, from the, point of view of the wood, it is destruction, but from the point of view of the table, it is construction. Since destruction and construction are relative, therefore connected rings can be separated '

without destroying them.

I know the center of the world. It is north of Yen and south of Yiieh. Among the states of the time, Yen was in the extreme north and Yiieh in the extreme south. The Chinese regarded China as being the world. Hence it was a matter of common sense that the center of the world should be south of Yen and north of Yiieh. HuiShih s contrary assertion here is well interpreted by a commentator of the third century A.U., Ssu-ma Piao, who says: "The world has no limit, and therefore anywhere is the center, just as in drawing a circle, any point on the line can be the starting point.

"Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one body." In the preceding propositions, Hui Shih argues that all things are relative and in a state of flux. There is no absolute difference, or absolute separation among them. Everything is constantly changing into something else. It is a logical conclusion, therefore, that all things are one, and hence that we should love all things equally without discrimination. In the Chuang-tzu it is also said: "If we see things from the point of view of their difference, even my liver and gall are as far from each other as are the states of Ch' u and Yiieh. If we see things from the point of view of their similarity, all things are one. (Ch. 5.)

140 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

L

Kung—sun Lung s Theory of Universals

The other main leader of the School of Names was Kung-sun Lung (fl. 284-259), who was widely known in his day for his sophistic arguments. It is said that once when he was passing a frontier, the frontier guards said: "Horses are not allowed to pass." Kung-sun Lung replied: "My horse is white, and a white horse is not a horse."And so saying, he passed with his horse.

Instead of emphasizing, as did Hui Shih, that actual things are relative and changeable, Kung-sun Lung emphasized that names are absolute and permanent. In this way he arrived at the same concept of Platonic-ideas or universals that has been so conspicuous in Western philosophy.

In his work titled the Kung—sun Lung—tzu, there is a chapter called Discourse on the White Horse."

Its main proposition is the assertion that "a white horse is not a horse. This proposition Kung—sun Lung tries to prove through three arguments. The first is: The word horse denotes a shape; the word 'white denotes a color. That which denotes color is not that which denotes shape. Therefore I say that a white horse is not a horse. In terms of Western logic, we may say lhal this argument emphasizes the difference in the intension of the terms "horse," "white," and "white horse." The intension of the lirst term is one kind of animal, that of the second is one kind of color, and that of the third is one kind of animal plus one kind of color. Since the intension of each of the three terms is different, therefore a white horse is not a horse.

The second argument is: "When a horse is required, a yellow horse or a black one may be brought forward, but when one requires a white horse, a yellow or a black horse cannot be brought forward....Therefore a yellow horse and a black horse are both horses. They can only respond to a call for a horse but cannot respond to a call for a white horse. It is clear that a white horse is not a horse. And again: The term horse neither excludes nor includes any color; therefore yellow and black ones may respond to it. But the term white horse both excludes and includes color. Yellow and black horses are all excluded because of their color. Therefore only a white horse can fit the requirements.

That which is not excluded is not the same as that which is excluded. Therefore I say that a white horse is not a horse." In terms of Western logic, we may say that this argument emphasizes the difference in the extension of the terms "horse" and "white horse." The extension of the term "horse" includes all horses, with no discrimination as to their color. The extension of the term ' white horse, however, includes only white horses, with a corresponding discrimination of color. Since the extension of the term "horse" and "white horse" is different, therefore a white horse is not a horse.

The third argument is: "Horses certainly have color. Therefore there are white horses. Suppose there is a horse without color, then there is only the

I4i THE SCHOOL

OF NAMES

horse as such. But how then, do we get a white horse? Therefore a white horse is not a horse. A white horse is 'horse' together with 'white.' 'Horse with 'white' is not horse. In this argument, Kung-sun Lung seems to emphasize the distinction between the universal, "horseness," and the universal, while—horseness. The universal, horseness, is the essential attribute of all horses. It implies no color and is jusl "horse as such. Such "horseness" is distinct from "white-horseness. " That is to say, the horse as such is distinct from the white horse as such. Therefore a white horse is not a horse.

Besides horse as such, there is also white as such, that is, whiteness. In the same chapter it is said: "White Las suchj does not specify what is white. But 'white horse specifies what is while. Specified white is not white." Specified white is the concrete white color which is seen in this or that particular white object. The word here translated as specified is ting, which also has the meaning of "determined." The white color which is seen in this or that white object is determined by this or that object. The universal, whiteness, however, is nol determined by any one particular white object. It is the whiteness unspecified.

The Kung-sun Lung-tzu contains another chapter entitled "Discourse on Hardness and Whiteness. The main proposition in this chapter is that "hardness and whiteness are separate." Kung-sun Lung tries to prove this in two ways. The first is expressed in the following dialogue: "[Supposing there is a hard and white stone I, is it possible to say hard, white, and stone are three? No. Can they be two? Yes. How? When without hardness one finds what is white, this gives two. When without whiteness one finds what is hard, this gives two. Seeing does not give us what is hard but only what is while, and there is nothing hard in this. Touching does not give us what is white but only what is hard, and there is nothing white in this."

This dialogue uses epistemological proof to show that hardness and whiteness arc separated from each other. Here we have a hard and white stone. If we use our eyes to see it, we only get what is while, i.e., a white stone. But if we use our hands to touch it, we only get what is hard, i.e., a hard stone. While we are sensing that the stone is white, we cannot sense that it is hard, and while we are sensing that it is hard, we cannot sense that it is white. Epistemologically speaking, therefore, there is only a white stone or a hard stone here, but not a hard and white stone. This is the meaning of the saying: "When without hardness one finds what is white, this gives two. When without whiteness one finds what is hard, this gives two.

Kung-sun Limjr s second argument is a metaphysical one. Its general idea is that both hardness and whiteness, as universals, are unspecified in regard to what particular object it is that is hard or that is white. They can be manifested in any or a l l white or hard objects. Indeed, even if in the physical world there were no hard or white objects at all, none the less, the universal, hardness, would ol necessity remain hardness, and the universal, whiteness,

144 THE SCHOOL OF

NAMES

would remain whiteness. Such hardness and whiteness are quite independent of the existence of physical stories or other objects that are hard and white. The fact that they are independent universals is shown by the fact that in the physical world there are some objects that are hard but not white, and other objects that are white but not hard. Thus it is evident that hardness and whiteness are separate from each other.

With these epistemological and metaphysical arguments Kung-sun Lung established his proposition that hardness and whiteness are separate. This was a famous proposition in ancient China, and was known as the argument for "the separateness of hardness and whiteness."

In the Kung-sun Lung-tzu there is yet another chapter entitled "Discourse on Chih and Wu." By wu Kung-sun Lung means concrete particular things, while by chih he means abstract universals. The literal meaning of chih is, as a noun, "finger or "pointer," or, as a verb, "to indicate." Two explanations may be given as to why Kung—sun Lung uses the word chih to denote universals. A common term, that is, a name, to use the terminology of the School of Names, denotes a class of particular things and connotes the common attributes of that class. An abstract term, on the contrary, denotes the attribute or universal.

Since the Chinese language has no inflection, there is no distinction in form between a common term and an abstract one. Thus, in Chinese, what Westerners would call a common term may also denote a universal. Likewise, the Chinese language has no articles. Hence, in Chinese, such terms as horse, the horse, and a horse are all designated by the one word ma or "horse." It would seem, therefore, that fundamentally the word ma denotes the universal concept, horse, while the other terms, "a horse,"

"the horse, ' etc., are simply particularized applications of this universal concept. From this it may be said that, in the Chinese language, a universal is what a name points out, i.e., denotes. This is why Kung—sun Lung refers to universals as chih or pointers.

Another explanation of why Kung-sun Lung uses chih to denote the universal, is that chih (finger, pointer, etc.) is a close equivalent of another word, also pronounced chih and written almost the same, which means idea or "concept." According to this explanation, then, when Kung-sun Lung speaks of chih (pointer), he really means by it "idea" or "concept." As can be seen from his arguments above, however, this "idea" is for him not the subjective idea spoken of in the philosophy of Berkeley and Hume, but rather the objective idea as found in the philosophy of Plato. It is the universal.

In the final chapter of the Chuang-lzu we find a series of twenty—one arguments attributed without specification to the followers of the School of Names. Among them, however, it is evident that some are based upon the ideas of Hui Shih, and others upon those of Kung-sun Lung, and they can be explained accordingly. They used to be considered as paradoxes, but they cease to be such once we understand the fundamental ideas of their authors.

I46 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES

Significance oj the Theories of Hui Shih and Kung—sun Lung

Thus by analyzing names, and their relation with, or their distinction from, actualities, the philosophers of the School of Names discovered what in Chinese philosophy is called "that which lies beyond shapes and features." In Chinese philosophy a distinction is made between "being that lies within shapes and features, and ' being that lies beyond shapes and features." "Being that lies within shapes and features' is the actual, the shih. For instance, the big and the small, the square and the round, the long and the short, the white and the black, are each one class of shapes and features. Anything that is the object or possible object of experience has shape and feature, and lies within the actual world.

Conversely, any object in the actual world that has shape and feature is the object or possible object of experience.

When Hui Shih enunciated the first and last of his series of "points," he was talking about what lies beyond shapes and features. The greatest, he said, has nothing beyond itself. This is called the Creat One. This defines in what manner the greatest is as it is. "Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one." This defines of what the greatest consists. This last statement conveys the idea that all is one and one is all. Since all is one, there can be nothing beyond the all. The all is itself the greatest one, and since there can be nothing beyond the all, the all cannot be the object of experience. This is because an object of experience always stands in apposition to the one who experiences. Hence if we say thai the all can be an object of experience, we must also say that there is something that stands in apposition to the all and is its experiencer. In other words, we must say that that which has nothing beyond itself at the same time has something beyond itself, which is a manifest contradiction.