A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (20 page)

l86 . THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANC TZU

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said Confucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said: 'I have made some progress. What do you mean? asked Confucius. 1 sit in forgetfulness,' replied Yen Hui.

"At this Confucius changed countenance and asked: 'What do you mean b y s i t t i n g i n f o r g et f u ln es s? To wh i ch Yen Hu i r ep l i ed : M y l i mb s ar e nerveless and my intelligence is dimmed. I have abandoned my body and discarded my knowledge. Thus I become one with the Infinite. This is what I mean by sitting in forgetfulness. Then Confucius said: If you have become one with the Infinite, you have no personal likes and dislikes. If you have become one with the Great Evolution [of the universe], you are one who merely follow its changes. If you really have achieved this, I should like to follow your steps.

Thus Yen Hui achieved "sageliness within" by discarding knowledge. The result of discarding knowledge is to have no knowledge. But there is a difference between "having-no knowledge" and "having no-knowledge. The state of "having-no knowledge" is one of original ignorance, whereas that of "having no-kno wl edge" co mes only aft er one has p ass ed through a prior stage of having knowledge.

The former is a gift of nature, while the latter is an achievement of the spirit.

Some of the Taoists saw this distinction very clearly. It is significant that they used the word forget t o express th e ess enti al idea of t heir method. Sages are not persons who remain in a state of original ignorance. They at one time possessed ordinary knowledge and made the usual distinctions, but they since forgot them. The difference between them and the man of original ignorance is as great as that between the courageous man and the man who does not fear simply because he is insensible to fear.

But there were also Taoists, such as the authors of some chapters of the Chuang-tzu, who failed to see this difference. They admired the primitive s t a t e o f s o c i e t y a n d mi n d , a n d c o mp a r e d s a g e s w i t h c h i l d r e n an d t h e ignorant. Children and the ignorant have no knowledge and do not make distinctions, so that they both seem to belong to the undifferentiable one. Their belonging to it, however, is entirely unconsciousness. They remain in the undifferentiable one, but they are not conscious of the fact. They are ones who h ave-no knowl edge, but not who hav e no-knowl edge. It is th e latter acquired state of no -knowledge that the Taoists call that of the knowledge which is not knowledge.

l88 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM:CHUANG TZU

CHAFfER 11

THE LATER MOHISTS

J.N the Mo-lzu, there are six chapters (chs. 40-45) which differ in character from the other chapters and possess a special logical interest. Of these, chapters forty to forty-one are titled "Canons" and consist of definitions of logical, moral, mathematical, and scientific ideas. Chapters forty -two to forty —three are titled Expositions of the Canons, and consist of explanations of the definitions contained in the preceding two chapters. And chapters forty—four and forty—five are titled Major Illustrations and Minor Illustrations respectively. In them, several topics of logical interest are discussed. The general purpose of all six chapters is to uphold the Mohist point of view and refute, in a logical way, the arguments of the School of Names. The chapters as a whole are usually known as the "Mohist Canons."

In the last chapter we have seen that in the Ch'i Wu Lun, Chuang Tzu discussed two levels of knowledge. On the first level, he proved the relativity of things and reached the same conclusion as that of Hui Shih. But on the second level, he went beyond him. On the first level, he agreed with the School of Names and criticized common sense from a higher point of view. On the second level, however, he in turn criticized the School of Names from a still higher poinl of view. Thus the Taoists refuted the arguments of the School of Names as well, but the arguments they used are, logically speaking, on a higher level than those of the School of Names. Bolh their arguments and those of the School of Names require an effort of reflective thinking to be understood. Both run counter to the ordinary canons of common sense.

The Mohists as well as some of the Confucianists, on the other hand, were philosophers of common sense. Though the two groups differed in many ways, they agreed with one another in being practical. In opposition to the arguments of the School of Names, they developed, almost along similar lines of thought, epistemological and logical theories to defend common sense. These theories appear in the Mohist Canons and in the chapter titled On The Rectification of Names" in the Hsun-lzu, the author of which, as we

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shall see in chapter thirteen, was one of the greatest Coniucianists of the early period.

Discussions on Knowledge and Names

The epistemological theory set forth in the Mohist Canons is a kind of naive realism. There is, it maintains, a knowing faculty which "is that by means of which one knows, but which itself does not necessarily know. (Ch. 42..) The reason for this is that, in order to have knowledge, the knowing faculty must be confronted with an object of knowledge. "Knowledge is that in which the knowing [faculty]

meets the object and is able to apprehend its form and shape." (Ch. 42-) Besides the sensory organs for knowing, such as those of seeing and hearing, there also exists the mind, which is that by means of which one understands the object of knowledge." (Ibid.) In other words, the mind interprets the impressions of external objects which are brought to it by the senses.

The "Mohist Canons" also provide various logical classifications of knowledge. From the point of view of its source, knowledge is to be classified into three types: that derived through the personal experience of the knower; that transmitted to him by authority (i.e., obtained by him either through hearsay or written records); and knowledge by inference (i.e., obtained through making deductions on the basis of what is known about what is unknown). Also from the point of view of the various objects of knowledge, it is to be classified into four kinds: knowledge of names, that of actualities, that of correspondence, and that of action. (Ch. 4°) it will be remembered that names, actualities, and their relationships to one another, were the particular interest of the School of Names. According to the "Mohist Canons," "a name is that with which one speaks about a thing," while "an actuality is that about which one speaks." (Ch. 42.) When one says: "This is a table, "table is a name, and is that with which one speaks about "this," while "this"

is the actuality about which one is speaking. Expressed in terms of Western logic, a name is the predicate of a proposition, and an actuality is the subject of it.

In the "Mohist Canons," names are classified into three kinds: general, classifying, and private. Thing is a general name. All actualities must bear this name. 'Horse' is a classifying name. All actualities of that sort must have that name. 'Tsang' [the name of a person] is a private name. This name is restricted to this actuality.' (Ch. 42.)

The knowledge of correspondence is that which knows which name corresponds to which actuality.

Such kind of knowledge is required for the state—

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ment of such a proposition as: "This is a table." When one has this kind of knowledge, one knows that "names and actualities pair with each other." (Ch. 41.)

The knowledge of action is the knowledge of how to do a certain thing. This is what Americans call "know-how."

Discussions on Dialectic

Of the chapter titled "Minor Illustrations," a large part is devoted to the discussions of dialectic. This chapter says: "Dialectic serves to make clear the distinction between right and wrong, to discriminate between order and disorder, to make evident points of similarity and difference, to examine ihe principles of names and actualities, to differentiate what is beneficial and what is harmful, and to remove doubts and uncertainties. It observes the happenings of all things, and investigates the order and relation between the various judgments. It uses names to designate actualities, propositions to express ideas, statements to sel forth causes, and taking and giving according to classes."(Ch.45-) The first part of this passage deals with the purpose and function of dialectic; the second part with its methodology. In another part of the same chapter, it is said that there are seven methods of dialectic: A particular judgment indicates what is not all so. A hypothetical judgment indicates what is at present not so. Imitation consists in taking a model. What is imitated is what is taken as a model. If the cause is in agreement with the imitation, it is correcl. If it is not in agreement with the imitation, it is not correct.

This is the method of imitation. The method of comparison consists in using one thing to explain another.

The method of parallel consists in comparing two series of propositions consistently throughout. The method of analogy says: You are so. Why should I alone not be so? The method of extension consists in attributing the same to what is not known as to what is known. When the other is said to be the same [as thisj, how can I say that it is different?" (Ch. 45.)

The method of imitation in this passage is the same as that of "using slale-ments to set forth causes" of the preceding quotation. And the method of extension is the same as the "taking and giving according to classes" of the preceding passage. These are the two most important of the methods, and correspond roughly to the deductive and inductive methods oi Western logic.

Before giving further explanation of these two methods, something may be said regarding what in the "Mohist Canons" is called a cause. A cause is defined as "thai with which something becomes," and is also classified into

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two kinds, the major and minor. (Ch. 4°) "A minor cause is one with which something may not necessarily be so, but without which it will never be so. "A major cause is one with which something will necessarily be so, and without which it will never be so." (Ch. 42..) It is evident that what the "Mohist Canons" call a minor cause is what in modern logic would be called a necessary cause, while what the "Mohist Canons" call a major cause is what modern logic would describe as a necessary and sufficient cause. In modern logic there is the distinction of yet another kind of cause, the sufficient cause, which is one with which something will necessarily be so, but without which it may or may not be so. This distinction the Mohists failed to make.

In modern logical reasoning, if we want to know whether a general proposition is true or not, we verify it with facts or experiment. If, for example, we want to make sure that certain bacteria are the cause of a certain disease, the way to verify the matter is to take as a formula the general proposition that the bacteria A are the cause of the disease B, and then make an experiment to see whether the supposed cause really produces the expected result or not. If it does, it really is the cause; if not, it is not.

This is deductive reasoning and is also what the "Mohist Canons" call the method of imitation. For to take a general proposition as a formula is to take it as a model, and to make an experiment with it is to make an imitation of it. That the supposed cause produces the expected result, means that the cause is in agreement with the imitation. And that it does not, means that the cause is not in agreement with the imitation." It is in this way that we can distinguish a true from a false cause, and determine whether a cause is a major or minor one.

As regards the other form of reasoning through extension, it may be illustrated through the dictum that all men are mortal. We are able to make this dictum, because we know that all men of the past were mortal, and that men of today and of the future are the same in kind as those of the past. Hence we draw the general conclusion that all men are mortal. In this inductive reasoning, we use "the method of extension.' That men of the past were mortal is what is known. And that men of today and of the future are and will be mortal is what is not known. To say that all men are mortal, therefore, is ' to attribute the same to what is not known as to what is known. We can do this because "the other is said to be the same [as this]."We are "taking and giving according to class.

Clarification of All-embracing Love

Versed in the method of dialectic, the later Mohists did much in clarifying I96 THE LATER MOHISTS

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and defending the philosophical position of their school.

Following the tradition of Mo Tzu s utilitarianistic philosophy, the later Mohists maintain that all human activities aim at obtaining benefit and avoiding harm. Thus in the Major Illustrations we are told: When one cuts a finger in order to preserve a hand, this is to choose the greater benefit and the lesser harm. To choose the lesser harm is not to choose harm, but to choose benefit....If on meeting a robber one loses a finger so as to save one's life, this is benefit. The meeting with the robber is harm.

Choice of the greater benefit is not a thing done under compulsion. Choice of the lesser harm is a thing done under compulsion. The former means choosing from what has not yet been obtained. The latter means discarding from what one has already been burdened with." (Ch. 44-) Thus for all human activities the rule is: "Of the benefits, choose the greatest; of the harms, choose the slightest." (Ibid.) Both Mo Tzu and the later Mohists identified the good with the beneficial. Beneficialness is the essence of the good. But what is the essence of beneficialness? Mo Tzu did not raise this question, but the later Mohists did and gave an answer. In the first 'Canon, it is said: "The beneficial is that with the obtaining of which one is pleased. The harmful is that with the obtaining of which one is displeased. (Ch.