A History of the Roman World (78 page)

12
T
HE PEACE OF APAMEA
. See Polybius, xxi, 16–17, 24, 45: Livy, xxxvii, 45. Appian,
Syr.
, 38, includes the surrender of the fleet and elephants in the preliminaries, but Polybius’ silence is preferable. Cf. De Sanctis,
SR
, IV, i, 205 ff. On the territorial limits imposed on Antiochus by land and sea, see A. H. McDonald,
JRS
, 1967, 1 ff. (the Taurus frontier to lie along the river Calycadnus in Cilicia Tracheia), and McDonald and Walbank,
JRS
, 1969, 30 ff. (for the naval clauses and types of ships involved). Contrary to the widely accepted view that Scipio’s terms were more generous than those finally established by the Senate, E. Badian (
Foreign Clientelae
, 81 ff.) believes (partly because Polybius’ account of Scipio’s terms is incomplete) that ‘the spirit of the Scipios’ armistice is the same as that of the Senate’s peace treaty’. But would Scipio have approved of the handing over to Eumenes of some Greek cities in the final settlement? We do not know, but the friendly letters that he wrote to some cities (see p. 520 n. 15) and his lack of prejudice against kings (as shown in his letter to Prusias, as well as in his personal relations with Philip) may suggest that he would not have liked the Senate’s terms.

1
C
ALLICRATES
. New era: Polybius, xxiv, 10. E. Badian,
Foreign Clientelae
(1958, 91) assesses Callicrates more favourably.

2
D
EMETRIUS
. For this judgement see De Sanctis (
SR
, IV, i, 255) who compares Philip’s fortunes with Hannibal’s. Demetrius was probably used as an unwitting tool by the Senate and Flamininus against the Macedonian royal house: as a future king he would become a pawn of Rome. Flamininus is said to have alleged in a letter to Philip that Demetrius was plotting not only to oust Perseus but also to remove Philip himself: the letter may have been a forgery, as Livy suggests (lx, 23). See Walbank,
Philip V
, 251, Badian,
Foreign Clientelae
, 94.

3
P
ERSEUS
. See P. Meloni,
Perseo
(1953). On the causes of the war see A. Giovannini,
Bulletin de correspondence hellénique
, 1969, 853 ff.; L. Raditsa,
ANRW
, I, i, 576 ff. E. S. Gruen (
Amer. J. Anc. Hist.
, 1976, 29 ff.) has argued that Greek attitudes towards Rome or Macedon were not determined by class membership or social status during the Third Macedonian War.

4
E
UMENES
. His charges against Perseus included the expulsion of a Thracian chief, now Rome’s ally; the harbouring of the murderers of an Illyrian chief; intrigues with Carthage and Byzantium and in Greece, etc. The charges are listed in the accusation of Perseus before the Delphic Amphictiony (Dittenberger,
Sylloge
, 643; translation in Lewis and Reinhold,
Rom. Civ.
, i. 184 f.).

5
Q.
MARCIUS PHILIPPUS
. See F. W. Walbank,
JRS
, 1941, 86 ff., J. Briscoe,
JRS
, 1964, 66 ff. His diplomatic methods offended some of the more old-fashioned senators. The sources mention four diplomatic contacts between Rome and Macedon after Eumenes’ visit. These are discussed by J. W. Rich,
Declaring War in the Roman Republic
(1976), 88 ff., who concludes that only two are authentic, namely Philippus’ interview with Perseus at Tempe and the Macedonian embassy to Rome in early 171; he also concludes that at no point did the Romans deliver an ultimatum and discusses the chronological problems involved.

6
T
HE BATTLE OF PYDNA
. This battle presents many difficulties. Polybius’ account (xxix, 15–17) is very fragmentary, while there is a large lacuna in Livy’s (xliv, 33–42). See Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, II, 294 ff.; criticism by E. Meyer,
Kleine Schriften
, II, 465 ff.; reply by Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, iv, 601 ff., and
Atlas
, col. 48 ff.; De Sanctis, IV, i, 322 ff.; W. K. Pritchett,
Studies in Greek Topography
, ii (1969), 145 ff. The date is fixed by an eclipse of the moon on the night of 21 June (cf. De Sanctis, pp. 369–76). This date (rather than the autumn) is confirmed by an inscription, discovered in the Agora at Athens, which contains the earliest known reference to the battle: see
Hesperia
, 1934, 18 ff.; 1936, p. 389 ff., n. 17. Livy (xliv, 37) dated the eclipse to 3 September; hence it has been argued (cf. De Sanctis) that the calendar was at this time some 2 months out of line with the solar year, i.e that 3 September on the contemporary calendar = 21 June (Julian calendar). This view has been challenged by S. I. Oost,
Cl. Phil.
, 1953, 217 ff., but defended by P. Meloni,
Latomus
(1954), 553 ff.
    Kromayer places Perseus’ camp eight miles south of Pydna between the Pelikas and Mavroneri. He supposes that the Romans as well as the Macedonians withdrew to their camp at midday before the battle, because otherwise their advance guard by the river would be unnecessary. Yet it may have been necessary to protect their right wing from the possibility of being outflanked. Meyer’s view is that the Romans remained in battle array all day and that Perseus succeeded in attacking them suddenly in this position. Even if the first statement is admitted, the second can hardly withstand Kromayer’s criticism; the
Romans were not taken by surprise when Perseus attacked. More recently Kromayer has changed his ground by suggesting that the Roman army did not advance from its camp into battle line at all in the morning; and it is certainly easier to support this by absence of reference in our sources than it is to find definite reference to a Roman advance.

7
T
HE SETTLEMENT OF MACEDONIA
. See T. Frank,
Roman Imperialism
(1914), 208 ff.; A. Aymard,
Cl. Ph.
1950, 97 ff.; J. A. O. Larsen,
Greek Federal States
(1968), 295 ff. E. Badian (
Foreign Clientelae
, 97) notes that the settlement involved ‘for the first time the dissociation of
libertas
and
immunitas
’: the states were free but paid taxes.

8
T
HE SETTLEMENT OF EPIRUS
. See S. I. Oost,
Roman Policy in Epirus
(1954), 68 ff.; N. G. L. Hammond,
Epirus
(1967), 629 ff. For the part played by the Epirote traitor Charops see H. H. Scullard,
JRS
, 1945, 55 ff.

9
R
OMAN POLICY
. On Roman policy in the east, 168–146
BC
, and the factions in the Roman Senate that formulated it see J. Briscoe,
Historia
, 1969, 49 ff. For a general survey of this period see E. Will,
Hist. pol. du monde hellénistique
, ii (1967), 301 ff.

10
P
TOLEMY’S TESTAMENT
. See
SEG
, ix, 7, with literature cited there and in
JHS
, 1933, 263 f.

11
D
EMETRIUS
. Polybius, Demetrius’ friend, helped him to escape and has given a vivid account of the adventure (xxxi, 19 ff.). Perhaps the Senate, or part of it at any rate, turned a blind eye to this escapade; cf. H. Volkmann,
Klio
, 1925, 382 f.

12
J
EWISH TREATY
. This treaty, which was granted by the Senate and not ratified by the Comitia, never became operative, but its existence has been doubted without adequate reason. See 1
Maccab.
8; Josephus,
Antiqu.
xii, 10, 6 (414–19). Cf. E. Schürer,
The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ
, vol. 1 (revised by G. Vermes and Fergus Millar, 1973), 171 ff.

13
M
ACEDONIA AS PROVINCE
. M. G. Morgan (
Historia
, 1969, 422 ff.) argues that Macedonia was formally established as a Roman province by Mummius in 146 rather than (as is usually believed) by Metellus Macedonicus.

14
T
HE ACHAEAN WAR
. On its social aspects see A. Fuks,
JHS
, 1970, 78 ff. The lower classes supported the war effort against Rome, but although various measures taken by the League (e.g regarding payment of debts and freeing of slaves) had serious social and economic implications, the war was essentially a national struggle for independence, irrespective in the main of class differences. Cf. W. W. Tarn,
Hellenistic Civilization
, edn 3 (1952), 38; when the League voted to go to war with Rome ‘it could do nothing else, unless a small country has no right to fight for its liberties against a big one’. E. S. Gruen (
JHS
, 1976, 46 ff.) has made a further attempt to disentangle the motives which led to the war, which he believes was caused neither by Roman imperialism nor by Greek mob hysteria: rather it ‘stemmed from understandable miscalculation on both sides. Rome expected that a combination of intimidating demands and generous proposals would prevent conflict in the Peloponnese. Achaean leaders assumed that coercion of dissident communities in the League could continue – as it had in the past – with impunity. The peculiar circumstances of 146 undermined those expectations. In the end, Rome would not endure a conflagration in Greece when she was about to establish a stable order in Macedon… The result was calamity, unplanned and unanticipated’ (p. 69).

15
T
HE SETTLEMENT OF 146
. See J. A. O. Larsen,
Econ. Survey of Anc. Rome
, iv, 306 ff.;
Greek Federal States
(1968), 498 ff.; S. Accame,
Il dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto
(1946).

1
C
ISALPINE GAUL
. As ancient historians were more interested in Rome’s expansion in the east, the dreary wars in the north were ill-recorded by authoritative writers: this
afforded an open field for the patriotic imagination of the Roman annalists, and some modern writers have not been slow to seek doublets of events. Thus, e.g., Livy’s account of the campaign of 200–199 (xxxi, 10; 21–2; 47–9) is sometimes regarded as merely a doublet of those of 197–196. But while confusion and duplication of many details may have occurred, such radical criticism is scarcely needed: see, e.g., J. Briscoe,
Commentary on Livy, xxxi–xxxiii
(1973), 82 ff. On these northern campaigns see also A. J. Toynbee,
Hannibal’s Legacy
(1965), 268 ff. and (for 201–191) A. H. McDonald,
Antichthon
, 1974, 44 ff.

2
N
EW ROADS
. This Via Flaminia from Arretium to Bononia is to be distinguished from the old Via Flaminia from Rome to Ariminum (of which the Via Aemilia was a continuation) built by the consul of 223. On the development of Cisalpine Gaul see U. Ewins,
PBSR
, 1952, 54 ff. and for its population and resources see P. Brunt,
Manpower
, ch. xiii.

3
M
INUCIUS THERMUS
. Livy’s account (xxxv, 3, 11, 21; xxxvi, 38) of Thermus’ exploits is confused and untrustworthy.

4
L
UCA, LUNA
. See E. T. Salmon,
Cl. Qu.
, 1933, 30 ff.,
JRS
, 1936, 47 ff. and A. J. Toynbee,
Hannibal’s Legacy
(1965), ii, 532 ff. It remains uncertain whether or not references in the sources to a colony at Luca should be emended to Luna, and that thus Luca should be eliminated from the list of colonies; Salmon is against retaining it, Toynbee in favour. See now P. Sommella and C. F. Giuliani,
La pianta di Lucca romana
(1974), in favour.

5
C
ENTURIATION
. Traces of the division of land into plots have been found in northern Italy. On this centuriation as revealed by aerial photography see J. Bradford,
Ancient Landscapes
(1957), esp. 157 ff., 261 ff.; P. Fraccaro,
Opuscula
(1957), III, i, ii.

6
M
ANLIUS
. On the topography, see Veith,
Atlas
, cols. 49, 50; De Sanctis,
SR
, IV, i, 431.

7
D
ALMATIAN CAMPAIGNS
. See J. J. Wilkes,
Dalmatia
(1969), 30 ff.

8
T
HE SPANISH WARS
. The account of these wars, which belong to the Great Age of Conquests, partly exceeds the strict chronological limit of this volume (146
BC
). The Lusitanian War lasted from 154 to 138, the First Celtiberian from 181 to 179, the Second from 153 to 151 and the Third (or Numantine War) from 143 to 133; Polybius treats the last two as one twenty years’ war, 153–133. The sources (mainly Polybius, Livy, Appian and Diodorus: Polybius wrote a monograph on the Numantine War, now lost), are collected in
Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae
, iii (1935), iv (1937), edited by A. Schulten.

9
R
OMAN SPAIN
. See A. Schulten,
CAH
, viii, 306 ff., C. H. V. Sutherland,
The Romans in Spain
(1939). The ancient sources are collected in
Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae
, ed. A. Schulten, P. Bosch Gimpera and L. Pericot.

10
ROMAN CAMPS. Camps dating from this campaign have been found near Emporiae, Segontia (at Aguilar and Alpanesque) and near Numantia (at Renieblas I).
    The survival of many camps, particularly at and around Numantia, throws an interesting light on these wars. Our knowledge of them derives mainly from the work of A. Schulten (see especially his four monumental volumes,
Numantia: die Ergebnisse der Ausgraben
, and more briefly,
Geschichte von Numantia
(1933)). Literary information about Republican camps derives chiefly from Polybius’ detailed description (vi, 27 ff.); though the camps of Scipio at Numantia do not quite conform to Polybius’ description, that of Nobilior at Renieblas does. Though the Romans did not excel in certain branches of art, the Roman camp, no less than the Roman constitution in the civil sphere, was a work of art, and as early as 280
BC
king Pyrrhus could exclaim in wonder, ‘The camps of the barbarians are not barbarian’, and his remark is now shown to be true.
    It may be convenient to list a number of camps which belong to this period: