A History of the Roman World (73 page)
Read A History of the Roman World Online
Authors: H. H. Scullard
3
W
AR ON SARDINIA
. On the adaptation of the fetial procedure for the declaration of war against overseas enemies see F. W. Walbank,
Cl. Phil.
, 1949, 15 ff. and J. W. Rich,
Declaring War in the Roman Republic
, Collection Latomus, vol. 149 (1976).
4
R
OMAN PRETEXT
. Cf. Appian,
Lib.
, 5;
Iber.
, 4 and Polybius, iii, 28, 3; this tradition may derive from Fabius, while the censure of Rome which Polybius repeats may come from the writer who continued the work of Philinus.
5
R
EFORM OF THE COMITIA CENTURIATA
. This reform is described by Cicero (
de rep.
, ii), Livy (i, 43, 12) and Dionysius (iv, 21, 3), but much remains obscure, especially regarding its nature, purpose and date.
- (a)
Nature
. Either the centuries remained at 193 or else
all
5 classes were made into 70 centuries, giving (with equites, etc.) 373 centuries. Mommsen, who believed in 373 centuries, thought that they were grouped into 193
ad hoc
voting units. His view has received some support from the discovery of the Tabula Hebana, which shows that such a system
could
work (cf. G. Tibiletti,
Athenaeum
, 1949, 223 ff.); this document, a
rogatio
of AD 19 in honour of Germanicus, found at Heba (Magliano) in Etruria, shows that under Augustus temporary voting groups called centuries were formed from 33 tribes in an assembly of senators and equites which took part in the electoral process for appointing consuls and praetors. But that is not to say that the reformed Comitia in the third century
did
work in the way that Mommsen envisaged: see E. S. Staveley (
AJPhil.
, 1953,
Historia
, 1956, 112 ff,
Greek and Roman Voting and Elections
(1972), 126 ff.) who rejects the 373 centuries, discusses recent views and argues that the coordination of centuries with tribes was neither confined to the first class nor extended to all five classes, but was applied in the first and second class, with the abolition of the distinction between
seniores
and
iuniores
in the second class. J. J. Nichols and L. R. Taylor (
AJPhil
, 1956, 225 ff., 1957, 337 ff.,
Roman Voting Assemblies
(1966), 87 ff.), however, have supported Tibiletti and Mommsen’s general position. For a brief summary of the evidence see Walbank,
Polybius
, i (1957), 683 ff. - (b)
Purpose
. This has been regarded by many as democratic: thus Mommsen saw the hand of Flaminius behind it (cf. E. Schönbauer,
Historia
, 1953–4, 31 ff.). But if this was the purpose, the result was not democratic (cf. De Sanctis, III, i, 344), since
inter alia
the Fasti show that in the later third century the
nobilitas
strengthened rather than relaxed its hold upon affairs. Thus some would argue that the reform was promoted by the nobility to restrict the influence of the wealthy trader who was enrolled in the urban tribes (so E. S. Staveley,
A J A
, 1953). Cf. L. R. Taylor (
AJPhil.
, 1957), who believes that the nobility found the tribes easier to manipulate than the centuries: hence the reform in their interest. - (c)
Date
. Fresh light may be afforded by an inscription from Brindisi, an
elogium
which records the achievements of someone who ‘
primus senatum legit et comiti [a ordinavit]
,’ apparently in the consulship of Aemilius Barbula (and Iunius Pera) in 230; if so, the subject may be Q. Fabius Maximus who was censor in 230 (cf. G. Vitucci,
Riv. Fil.
, 1953, 42 ff.), and the reference may be to the reform of the Comitia Centuriata. There is, however, the possibility that the subject was a local magistrate of the Latin colony of Brundisium who was concerned with the local constitution (so E. Gabba,
Athenaeum
, 1958, 90 ff.; cf. T. R. S. Broughton,
MRR
, Suppl., 1960, 2) and that therefore the inscription has no bearing upon the Comitia at Rome.
6
F
LAMINIUS
. On his career see K. Jacobs,
Gaius Flaminius
(1938, written in Dutch), and Z. Yavetz,
Athenaeum
, 1962, 325 ff. De Sanctis (
SR
, iii, i, 334) argued that Flaminius was responsible for a law limiting the amount of public land to be held by an individual and that the agrarian Lex Licinia of 367 was merely an anticipation of this. But see p. 479 n. 1.)
7
T
ELAMON
. For the site of the battle and finds in the district see P. Sommella,
Antichi campi di battaglia in Italia
(1967), 11 ff.
8
M
ARCELLUS
. Polybius’ account (ii, 34) is pro-Scipionic and the danger which Scipio incurred is minimized; for the part played by Marcellus see Plutarch,
Marcell.
, 7. Was Scipio’s advance any less dangerous than that of Flaminius which the aristocratic tradition so heartily condemns?
9
R
OME AND GREECE
. Polybius, ii, 12, 8. The alleged Roman treaty with Rhodes in 306, her alliance with Apollonia in 266, and her intervention on behalf of Acarnania in 239 may all be dismissed as fictitious. See M. Holleaux,
Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques
(1921) and
CAH
, vii, 822 ff. General contacts had of course existed intermittently since Etruscan times, but not specific political commitments. See F. W. Walbank,
JRS
, 1963, 2 f.
10
I
LLYRIA
. See Polybius, ii, 2–12; iii, 16, 18–19 and Walbank,
Polybius
, i,
ad loc
. On Illyrian piracy see H. J. Dell,
Historia
, 1967, 344 ff. On Roman policy, Holleaux, op. cit. above, E. Badian,
PBSR
, 1952 (=
Studies in Greek and Roman History
(1964), 1 ff.), N. G. L. Hammond,
JRS
, 1968, 1 ff., K. E. Petzold,
Historia
, 1971, 199 ff., P. S. Derow,
Phoenix
, 1973, 118 ff.
11
T
HE ILLYRIAN SETTLEMENT
. The legal position of the Greek towns is doubtful. They were not
dediticii
, enjoying
libertas precaria
, as Holleaux (
CAH
, vii, 836). De Sanctis (
SR
, iii, i, 301) believed that Issa, Dyrrhachium and Apollonia were recognized as allies, Issa having a
foedus aequum
, and Corcyra being
immunis et libera
. But see E. Badian,
PBSR
, 1952, 72 ff.: all were free
amici
, with no treaties, and extra-legal
clientela
of Rome.
12
R
OMAN POLICY
. Holleaux (
CAH
, vii, 837 ff.) has rejected the view that the Romans formed an imperialistic policy against Macedon or even that they negotiated in Greece as a precaution against Macedon. His views have been widely accepted. However, N. G. L. Hammond (
JRS
, 1968, 1 ff.) has revived the view of Rome as imperialistic and anti-Macedonian: at the end of the first war Roman control in Illyria was not dictated
by revenge or anti-piratical desires, but to gain power there, and Rome was careful to send embassies to Macedon’s enemies, the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues and not to Macedon; a cold war was developing. It is hardly to be expected that Macedon would smile on Rome’s intervention in the Balkans, but Roman policy in 228 is scarcely likely to have envisaged the idea of dominating or destroying Macedon.
13
M
ASSILIA
. T. Frank (
CAH
, vii, 810) assumes that a trilateral treaty was signed by the two parties and a willing Massilia. But A. Schulten, (ibid., 788) believes that Massilia would not welcome Rome’s concessions. Yet had it not been for her alliance with Massilia Rome might have been content to fix the limit of Hasdrubal’s aggressions at the Pyrenees. On Massilian diplomacy see F. R. Kramer,
AJPhil.
, 1948, 1 ff. The further implications of this treaty are discussed on pp. 198 ff.
14
S
IEGE OF SAGUNTUM
. Polybius, iii, 17. Livy’s account is highly coloured and cannot be trusted in detail. His statements regarding the embassies to Hannibal are confused, because his source (Coelius?) has tried to justify Rome’s lack of support to Saguntum. The assault on Sagunto (Murviedro) by Marshal Suchet in 1811 confirms the probability that resistance weakened in the west.
15
A
SENATORIAL DEBATE
? Dio (Zon., viii, 22) says that on the fall of Saguntum there was a senatorial debate in which L. Cornelius Lentulus proposed an immediate declaration of war, Fabius the sending of an embassy. Polybius (iii, 20) ridicules this tradition which derives from Chaereas and Sosylus ‘whose compositions are more like the gossip of the barber’s shop than history…. There was no debate on the question of war’. De Sanctis, however, has shown (III, ii, 197) the probability that this tradition is reliable. Prompt action might have been wiser, for the embassy merely succeeded in showing up the weakness of Rome’s juridical position (unless the embassy did not reach Carthage until after Hannibal had actually crossed the Ebro, as W. Hoffmann,
Rhein. Mus.
, 1951, 77 ff.; cf. H. H. Scullard, ibid., 1952, 212 ff. both reprinted in
Hannibal
, ed. K. Christ (1974). 134 ff., 156 ff.). The leader of the embassy was more probably M. Fabius than Q. Fabius Maximus. J. W. Rich (
Declaring War in the Roman Republic
, Collection Latomus, vol. 149 (1976), 28 ff., 109 ff.) attributes the Senate’s hesitation even after the fall of Saguntum to a practice, which he believes obtained, namely that it regarded itself as entitled to postpone wars until the new consuls entered office (
ad novos consules
).
16
W
AR GUILT
. For the immense literature on this topic prior to 1930 see
CAH
, viii, 724. For more recent discussions of the sources and modern views see Walbank,
Polybius
, i (1957), esp. 168 ff., 310 ff., 327 ff. and F. Cassola,
I gruppi politici romani
(1962), 250 ff. Five more recent discussions are G. V. Sumner,
Harvard Stud. Cl. Ph.
, 1967, 204 ff.,
Latomus
, 1972, 469 ff., A. E. Astin,
Latomus
, 1967, 577 ff., R. M. Errington,
Latomus
, 1970, 26 ff, F. Hampl,
ANRW
, I, i, 427 ff. Two well-known older papers, by W. Otto and G. De Sanctis, are reprinted in
Hannibal
(ed. K. Christ, 1974).
17
T
HE SAGUNTINE ALLIANCE
. This has long been regarded as a formal alliance based on a treaty (
foedus
): thus Polybius refers to the Saguntines as
σύμμαχοι
of the Romans. But he also says that they placed themselves in the
fides
of the Romans. Thus it has been suggested (see J. S. Reid,
JRS
, 1913, 179 ff.; E. Badian,
Foreign Clientelae
, (1958), 49 ff., 293; Errington,
Latomus
, 1970, 41 ff.) that the action was a
deditio in fidem
(rather than a formal treaty) which imposed moral but no legal obligations on Rome (cf. T. A. Dorey,
Humanitas
, 11, 12, 1959–60, 2 f.), while A. E. Astin (
Latomus
, 1967, 589 ff.) goes even further in supposing that there was not even a formal
deditio
but a looser acceptance into Roman
fides
. Equally controversial is the date of the agreement. The early date implied by Polybius is rejected by E. Groag (
Hannibal als Politiker
(1929), 17 ff.) who assigns the alliance to 221–220: the Saguntines appealed to Rome while Hannibal was campaigning in central Spain. A late date is also proposed by R. M.
Errington (
Latomus
, 1970, 43 f.), reviving the idea of J. S. Reid (
JRS
, 1913, 178 ff.) that the agreement was reached when the Romans arbitrated in the internal quarrel at Saguntum, but this does not seem very probable. Against a late date (which would make the alliance an infringement of the Ebro treaty) is the fact that the Romans were eager to discuss the treaty, but the Carthaginians refused (Polybius, iii, 21; 29). For an analysis and discussion of modern views see also F. Cassola,
I gruppi politici romani nel iii sec.a.C
(1962), 244 ff.
18
P
ERSONAL VENDETTAS
. For Polybius’ three reasons see iii, 9, 6–10. He also says that Fabius Pictor gave two causes for the war: Saguntum and the imperialist ambitions of Hasdrubal (whose policy was rather, as we have seen, pacific). Livy on the other hand has little to say about the arguments of Polybius or Fabius: for him Hannibal is the villain, ‘
non dux solum, sed etiam causa belli
’ (xxi, 21, 1).
19
R
OMAN POLICY
. Agrarian versus capitalist: E. Meyer,
Kleine Schriften
, ii, 375 ff. Modern views continue to fluctuate: thus G. V. Sumner (see n. 16 above) believes that the Romans were entirely concerned with curbing Carthaginian expansion, while at the other extreme Errington dismisses the ‘wrath of the Barcids’ as unknown to Fabius Pictor and thinks that Roman policy to Spain was essentially apathetic.
1
H
ANNIBAL’S FORCES
. Polybius (iii, 33) quotes the figures for the Spanish and African armies. He himself saw at the Lacinian promontory in Bruttium a bronze tablet on which Hannibal had inscribed these particulars. The same source (iii, 56) guarantees the numbers with which Hannibal arrived in Italy, but the numbers assigned to him on his departure from Spain are exaggerated by Polybius or his source: cf. De Sanctis;
SR
, III, ii, 83 ff.
