A History of the Roman World (69 page)

13
F
ALERII
. The one fact that emerges from the story of the Faliscan schoolmaster (Livy, v, 27; Dion. Halic., xiii, 1–2) is that Falerii was not stormed (despite Diod., xvi, 96). It was saved by its precipitous position.

14
S
UTRIUM, NEPETE, VOLSINII
. Diodorus (xix, 98): Sutrium, 390; Nepete, 383 (cf. Livy, vi, 3, 2; 21, 4). But Velleius (i, 14) gives: Sutrium, 383, Nepete, 373. ‘To go to Sutrium’ remained a proverbial phrase meaning ‘to be ready for war’. It was an exposed outpost. Cf. Plautus,
Casina
, 524. The tradition (Livy, v, 3–2; Diod. xiv, 109) of a Roman war against Volsinii (392–391) is hardly reliable: at most it represents a frontier raid. Rejected by De Sanctis (
SR
, ii, 149), it is accepted by E. Meyer,
Gesch. d. Altertums
, v, 816.

15
R
OME AND LATIUM
. On their relations see De Sanctis,
SR
, ii, 151 ff., A. J. Toynbee,
Hannibal’s Legacy
(1965), i, 115 ff.

16
B
ATTLE OF ALLIA AND THE SACK OF ROME
. The Gauls advanced not perhaps down the Tiber valley, which was too swampy, but round through Sabine territory to Reate and thence by the Via Salaria: see Kromayer and Veith,
Atlas, Röm. Abt.
, Blatt. 1. The numbers are also given as 70,000, against 40,000 Romans (cf. Diod., xiv, 113, 114; Plut.,
Camillus
, 18). The battle is placed on the left or eastern bank of the Tiber by all ancient writers except Diodorus who places it on the right bank. The main objections to the right bank are (1) the Allia which gave its name to the battle is on the left bank, (2) a flight to Veii would be unlikely if the Romans were forced back on the right bank, (3) it is
a priori
probable that the Gauls would advance on the Roman side of the Tiber. Mommsen, followed by E. Meyer, argued for the right bank. See Kromayer,
Schlachtfelder
, iv, 449 ff. and Schachermeyr,
Klio
, 1929, 277 ff. who support the left bank. O. Skutsch,
JRS
, 1953, 77 f. and 1978, 93 f., has drawn attention to traces of a tradition (observable perhaps in Ennius,
Annales
, frg. 164, Tacitus,
Ann.
, xi, 23, and in Silius Italicus,
Pun.
, i, 525 f.; iv, 150 f.; vi, 555 f.) that the Capitol actually fell to the Gauls. This tradition, however, must be rejected. For traces of the devastation see L. G. Roberts,
Mem. Amer. Acad. Rome
, 1918, 55 f. and E. Gjerstad,
Early Rome
, vol. iii (1960), index,
s.v.
Gallic invasion; they include a layer of roof-tiles on the site of the Comitium in the Forum. Livy (v, 40, 9 f) tells how in the evacuation of the
sacra
the Vestals had been helped by a certain Lucius Albinus, while Plutarch (
Camill.
, 22, 4) says that Aristotle mentions a Lucius as the man who saved Rome. This is important both as confirming the tradition and also as showing that it is earlier than the later building up of Camillus as the saviour-hero of Rome.

17
S
OME LEGENDS OR FACTS
. As to the story of the senators, Ogilvie (
Livy
, 725 f.) is inclined to accept it as a deliberate act of
devotio
. He also points out that although geese were not sacred to Juno, birds were kept on the Capitol for purposes of divination (hens, used later, may only have been imported in the fourth century). The real reason for the withdrawal of the Gauls was probably a report that the Veneti were attacking Cisalpine Gaul (Polybius, ii, 18, 3), while Livy (v, 48, 1) refers to pestilence among the Gauls. Diodorus (xiv, 117, 7) records that the Gauls were defeated not by the Romans but by the Caeretans in Sabine territory and the gold was thus recovered. Livy, however, had no difficulty in turning Rome’s disaster to Rome’s glory: after Brennus’ insolence, Camillus appeared as a
deus ex machina
and routed the enemy. Livy puts in his mouth a fine speech (v, 51–4) appealing for the preservation of Rome and its glory; this may
reflect fears at the end of the Republic that the capital of the Empire might be transferred from Rome either by Julius Caesar or Mark Antony, fears which Augustus finally allayed. Lastly, we may note that according to one tradition, Hellenic perhaps in origin, the friendly Greeks of Massilia had advanced the ransom money (Justin, xxiv, 4, 3).

18
T
HE ‘SERVIAN’ WALL
. T. Frank (
Roman Buildings of the Republic
, 1924) had supposed that it was built by the Roman army with Veientane captives serving as quarrymen. But see G. Säflund,
Le mura di Roma repubblicana
(1932); Nash,
Pict. Dict. Anc. Rome
, ii, 104 ff. (with bibliography);
Roma Medio Repubblicana. Aspetti culturali di Roma e del Lazio nei secoli iv e iii a.C.
(1973). However, the quarry-marks on the wall seem now to be archaic Latin and not Greek: see F. Castagnoli,
Stud. Rom.
, 1974, 431, n. 14, J. Reynolds,
JRS
1976, 177.

19
T
HE WARS
. Accepted in general by e.g. L. Homo,
CAH
, vii, ch. xviii; rejected by Beloch (
Röm. Gesch.
, 319).

20
E
TRUSCAN CONTACTS
. In
I rapporti romano-ceriti
(1960) M. Sordi, who has tried to distinguish traces of Etruscan historiography in the surviving tradition, finds strong Etruscan influences in Rome in these years, arising from friendship with Caere. This friendship is placed in a wider setting: it helped to counter Rome’s weakness in Latium, to check the expansionist policy of Dionysius of Syracuse into Italy, to contain Gallic threats, to support Rome’s expeditions to Sardinia and Corsica, and to promote friendship with Massilia and the Carthaginian treaty of 348, while internally in Rome a pro-Etruscan plebeian group was strengthened and supported the Licinian reforms. Such a reconstruction, even if the evidence is too weak to give it full support, at least emphasizes the widening horizon that Rome was being forced to face (though Etruscan influence on Roman politics at home is much less likely). But some of the items in Rome’s alleged overseas interest at this time are somewhat suspect: attempts to found colonies in Corsica (attested by Theophrastus,
Hist. Plant.
, v, 8, 2, at some unnamed date, but before he wrote in the late fourth century) and in Sardinia
c.
377
BC
(Diod., xv, 27, 4), and the treaty of alliance with Massilia which Justin (lxiii, 5, 10) set as early as 386. Rome’s supposed growing Mediterranean interests, arising from her friendship with Etruscan Caere, as expounded by M. Sordi, are taken seriously by J. Heurgon,
Rise of R.
183 ff.

21
V
OLSCIAN DEFEATS
. Beloch (
Röm. Gesch.
, 315 ff.) regards the victory of 389 as a fictitious counterblast to the battle of Allia, and those of 386 and 381 as reduplications of that of 389.

22
C
AERE
. See A. N. Sherwin-White,
Rom. Cit.
, edn 2, 53 ff.; De Sanctis,
SR
, ii, 256 ff.; Beloch,
Röm. Gesch.
, 363 ff. For a defence of a grant in 386 see M. Sordi,
I rapporti romano-ceriti
(1960), 36 ff.; W. V. Harris,
Rome in Etruria and Umbria
(1971), 45 ff. A. J. Toynbee,
Hannibal’s Legacy
(1965), i, 410 ff. and P. A. Brunt,
Italian Manpower
(1971), 515 ff. give full discussions and follow Beloch in dating
civitas sine suffragio
to 274–273. For the wider implications of Rome’s relations with Caere see n. 20 above.

23
F
URTHER GALLIC RAIDS
. Polybius (relying on Fabius Pictor) records that in 357 some Gauls reached the Alban Mount unopposed and that in 346 or 345 they returned to the attack but withdrew when challenged by the Roman army; Livy (drawing upon later annalists) attributes a Roman victory to Camillus’ son in 349 when the picturesque incident of the intervention of the raven (
corvus
) on behalf of M. Valerius Corvus took place. Perhaps the events recorded in 349 and 346 refer to one affair, while Livy’s raid of 360 may be equated with the Polybian incident of 357.

24
S
ABELLIAN CAMPANIA
. For the occupation of Campania by the Sabellians see T. J. Cornell,
Museum Helveticum
, 1974, 193 ff.

25
R
AIDS ON CENTRAL ITALY
. In 384 Dionysius I raided Pyrgi and sacked the rich Etruscan temple of Leucothea or Eileithyia (Diodorus, xv, 14). Traces of his raid survive: see
Arch. Class
1957, 213. There seems no good reason to doubt Livy’s references (vii, 25, 4; 26, 13) to raids in Latium in 349.

26
T
HE SAMNITES
. On their culture and history see E. T. Salmon’s standard work,
Samnium and the Samnites
(1967). M. Sordi,
Roma e i Sanniti nel IV secolo A.C.
(1969) takes full note of the ‘international’ background, but is speculative, not least in chronological reconstruction (cf. J. Pinsent,
JRS
, 1971, 271 f.).

27
R
OMAN VICTORIES
? The capture of Sora on the Upper Liris and the victory over the Aurunci attributed to 345 (Livy, vii, 28) are probably anticipations of the events of 314: see De Sanctis,
SR
, ii, 266.

28
T
HE FIRST SAMNITE WAR
. F. E. Adcock, who rejects the war, writes (
CAH
, vii, 588) that to accept it one would have to postulate ‘folly in the Romans, blindness in the Latins, a short memory for benefits in the Campanians and a short memory for injuries in the Samnites’. De Sanctis (ii, 269 ff.), however, accepts the war as historical in outline; though rejecting the alleged
deditio
of the Campanians to Rome, he believes in a Romano-Campanian alliance and in the two Roman victories at Suessula and Mt Gaurus, but he rejects the battle at Saticula as an anticipation of Caudium. If the war is accepted, Rome’s motives may include a desire to get a foothold in the rear of the Volsci, Aurunci and discontented Latins, to win control of one of the wealthiest cities in Italy and to prevent the Samnites from strengthening their position in Campania: so S. W. Spaeth,
The Causes of Wars, 343–265
(1926), 20. The historicity of the war is also defended by E. T. Salmon,
Samnium and the Samnites
(1967), 195 ff. (cf. also A. Bernardi,
Athenaeum
, 1943, 21 ff.) and E. S. Staveley,
Historia
, 1959, 419 ff. Staveley believes that behind Rome’s desire to extend her influence southwards into Campania lay a growing interest in trade and industry, and that this Campanian policy was promoted by a group of men who included Q. Publilius Philo, M. Valerius Corvus, Sp. Postumius Albinus, C. Maenius and later the great Appius Claudius. On the other hand Salmon finds the advocates of this southern policy in a group of patricians, though with the support of some plebeian leaders (
Samnium
, 203 ff.). While it is clear that a group of senators successfully continued to advocate a more active policy towards Campania, the extent to which military motives were reinforced by commercial interests must remain doubtful.

29
C
AMPANIAN POLICY
. If the First Samnite War and the Roman-Campanian alliance are accepted, this sudden change in the Campanians has to be explained. De Sanctis (
SR
, ii, 274) suggests that as they were allies of the Roman-Latin alliance they had to choose between the two and chose to support the weaker side because they could thus hope to preserve their independence in the event of being victorious. The relations of Rome and Capua between 343 and 338 are discussed by A. Bernardi,
Athenaeum
, 1942, 88 ff., 1943, 21 ff. On early Capua see J. Heurgon,
Capoue préromaine
(1942). (On Republican Capua see M. Frederiksen (
PBSR
, 1954, 80 ff.), who also discusses the (Greek) origin of the Campanian cavalry,
Dialoghi di Archeologia
, 1968, 3 ff.)

30
T
HE LATIN WAR
. Livy, viii, 3–14. See F. E. Adcock,
CAH
, vii, 589 ff. Livy’s account (vii, 42–viii, 1) of how the consul of 341 defeated the Volscians of Privernum who had raided Setia and Norba is probably an anticipation of the incident of 329. Manlius’ route in 340 is uncertain (cf. Salmon,
Samnium
, 207, n. 3); the route mentioned in the text is supported by Adcock (
CAH
, vii, 590), but rejected by De Sanctis (
SR
, ii, 276). The battle of Trifanum (whose precise site is unknown) was clearly fought not far from Capua. Diodorus (xvi, 90, 2) puts it near Suessa. Livy (vii, 6, 8; 11, 8) gives two battles, which should be reduced to one. Since Trifanum is unknown, perhaps the battle should be called that of Suessa. After the battle in 338 near Antium, the prows (
rostra
) of the ships of Antium were taken to adorn the Comitium in the Forum at Rome.

1
A
LAND BILL IN 367
? this is rejected by de sanctis,
sr
, ii, 216 ff. and Beloch,
Röm. Gesch.
, 344, but defended by Münzer,
PW
, xiii s.v. Licinius Stolo, by H. Last,
CAH
, vii, 58 ff., by T. Frank,
Econ. Survey
, i 27 f. and by De Martino,
St. d. cos. rom.
1, 396 ff. A clause limiting the number of sheep and cattle which could be kept on public pastures may have been included. The provision of a certain proportion of free labour is obviously an anticipation. G. Tibiletti in his discussion of
possessio
of
ager publicus
(
Athenaeum
. 1948, 173 ff., 1949, 1 ff., 1950, 245 ff.) accepts a Licinian law
de modo agrorum
but argues that it admitted plebeians to
possessio
; it is doubtful, however, whether this right was hitherto restricted by law to patricians. He also believes that a law establishing 500
iugera
and limiting pasturage was passed after the Hannibalic War.