A Fortunate Life (67 page)

Afghanistan appreciation, 15 December 2007

1. We do not have enough troops, aid or international will to make Afghanistan much different from what it has been for the last 1,000 years – a society built around the gun, drugs and tribalism. And even if we had all of these in sufficient quantities, we would not have them for sufficient time – around 25 years or so – to make the aim of fundamentally altering the nature of Afghanistan achievable.

2. In 5–10 years time it seems very probable that troop numbers and aid in Afghanistan will, at best, be half what they are now. The international community will have other priorities, and Afghanistan will no longer be at the top of its agenda.

3. So our task now is to shape our actions towards the kind of Afghanistan which can be managed on these diminished resources.

4. This will be an Afghanistan in which:

• Guns will, especially in the south, probably still be a greater factor in the exercise of power than the ballot box.

• There will still be tension, especially in the south, between governance through tribal democracy and government through formal Western-style democratic structures, with the former being more influential than the latter, unless we can find a way to synergise the two

• War lords, especially in the south, will still be a feature of Afghan governance and government.

• Drugs, especially in the south, will still be a feature of Afghan life and the Afghan economy.

• Corruption will still be deeply embedded in government.

• The Taliban will still exist as an armed force, especially in the south. Because here the insurgency is actually
not
about Al Qaeda but about deeply conservative Islamic Pashtun nationalism, with most locals preferring the Taliban, even if they do nasty things to them, to foreign troops, even if they do nice things for them.

5. We may, if we are really successful, be able to diminish the effects of the above, but we will not be able to eradicate them.

6. Progress in diminishing the insurgency will require a two-pronged strategy. On the military side we will need to be ruthless about attacking their structures, even at the risk of collateral damage. They need to know that we will do whatever is necessary, and for however long, to defeat them. On the political side we will need to be equally focused on providing a
better alternative that can deliver improvements in Afghan lives. Very bad cop to all insurgents, very good cop to all those who aren’t, is our motto.

7. So, politically, governance is the key. But it has to be governance with the grain of Afghan traditions and in tune with what is achievable. Under-promising and over-delivering is a shining virtue;
vice versa
, a mortal sin. So we have to abandon the notion that we can make Afghanistan into a well-governed state, with gender-aware citizens and European-standard human rights. It raises expectations we cannot fulfil and wastes resources better deployed elsewhere. A better-governed state is the limit of the achievable.

8. On the military side we also need to understand that we probably cannot defeat the Taliban – probably only the Afghan people can do this. And at present, especially in the south, they do not seem ready to do so. Nor can we force them. They change their mind on this in their own time, not ours. The best we can do is give them the space, help where we can and hope for the best.

9. To expect to do more than 5, 7 and 8 above, is to set ourselves up for defeat.

10. These truths will be deeply shocking to the politicians and their publics who initiated and still, mostly, support this operation. But that does not make them less true.

11. So one of our tasks is, gently, to lower expectations in the Western world and bring our ambitions back into the range of the achievable. This will certainly be difficult and may well make those who attempt it, unpopular.

12. There is one thing we have achieved, however, and, with skill and a ruthless prioritisation of resources, ought to be able to continue to achieve even with diminished resources. That is denying the Islamic jihadists the use of Afghanistan for the kind of activities they conducted there prior to 9/11. Islamic jihadist fighters may be taking part in the insurgency in Afghanistan, but they are no longer using the country for bases, recruitment and training. These activities are now taking place over the border in Pakistan.

13. So the realistic aim in Afghanistan, with current resources, is not victory, but containment. Our success will be measured not in making things different but making them better; not in final defeat of the jihadists, but in preventing them from using Afghanistan as a space for their activity. These two aims will be difficult enough to achieve; but they are at least achievable.