The Whale Has Wings Vol 1 - Rebirth (18 page)

This proved of considerable interest to Canada. It fell in with their existing ideas, yet also showed Canada was capable of more than just producing a
few small ships. As a result, four sets of machinery were to be shipped to Canada before Christmas, along with all the necessary plans, and they would lay down the two ships in March of 1940, expecting them to be complete around September of 1941; the Canadian corvettes were expected earlier, but the RN thought it would be possible to allocate Canada two of the converted merchant carriers now being constructed early to allow them to become familiar with the use of a carrier as part of an escort force. The RN had six fast liners being converted into simple carriers; this had originally been expected to take around six months per ship, but the heavy load of merchant conversions at the start of the war, and a few problems, meant that they would not be coming available until June-July 1940, 10-11 months. They would carry 12 Swordfish for reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrol, plus 2 fighters to shoot down any enemy planes trying to locate the convoy. While it was hoped later to fit them with radar, the shortage of sets meant that would not happen for some time. However as yet, the air threat in the Atlantic was seen as negligible, only the Condor having the range to operate there. Operationally however it was hoped that by the time they came into service at least one radar-equipped ship would be available in each convoy.

The Admiralty had also been pressing for more of their own escort carriers, but due to the load on the shipyards (and the need to finish trials of Audacity), these were not planned before the Spring of 1940
.

The Australian Carriers
.

The Australian light carrier HMAS Melbourne had been working up in the West indies in the autumn of 1939. She then sailed for Australia
through the Panama Canal, arriving in Sydney on the 20th December to an impressive reception. Minor defects would be fixed in Australia over the next month. The Australian production line for the Goshawk had been delayed to allow it to start off with the Mk II (although as yet the variable-pitch props and a few other items still had to be shipped out from the UK), but it was expected to get the first planes off the production line in March 1940. Originally plans had only allowed for a small production (around five planes per month, just barely enough for Australia), but as war became more certain, this had been increased until the new production line would be producing 15 planes a month, with the option to increase this to 20. There was also the possibility of selling some production to the Dutch, who had evaluated the Mk I with intense interest, especially since the plane and (hopefully by the end of the year) all its parts would be made in Australia, close to the DEI which was where they intended to use them.

The RAN cruisers and destroyers were already being used in coordination with the Royal Navy, particularly in the
Mediterranean, but two carrier escort destroyers were building in Australia, and would be ready to join the carrier by the end of 1940. In the meantime, the RAN concentrated on how to use the carrier in the peculiar conditions of the Pacific, and also in learning how to conduct larger operations with the RN carrier assigned to the Far East (in January 1940 this was HMS Eagle). This was considered especially important for two reasons; Melbourne was the first Australian ship to be equipped with radar, and in the event of anything happening with Japan, the two carriers would be in the forefront of any actions against the IJN. While the Australian government had paid for the ship, its arrival was seen as a large and visible sign that Britain had not forgotten about Australia (and to be honest, the RN could at present spare a light carrier rather more than the cruisers and destroyers it was controlling in exchange)

One conclusion drawn from Operation Chastise was the importance of radar. While this had long been known in the Navies technical departments, the use of it during the raid, and the difference it had made in the fleet defence (even with the mistakes made) had brought this home to the Admiralty. Without the lessons of the raid, it might well have taken much longer for the need for effective radar and control of it to be realised.

Accordingly the program of fitting the larger warships with radar would be given a very high priority, as would the ongoing program of improvements to the radar systems themselves.

The 279 set (long range air warning) was being fitted as fast as possible; this set also had some surface detection ability, and it is fitted to all the fleet carriers. Work on fitting the light carriers continues. The set is also being developed for better performance.

The ASV Mk I had been developed by the team working at the R
oyal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough (they had moved there at the outbreak of war at the instigation of the FAA, who were desperately waiting for a working version). The Mk I set was a disappointment, but Hanbury Brown, who had been in the field helping Coastal Command get ASV.I working, helped another researcher, Gerald Touch of the Farnsworth company, get started on an improved ASV set. An order was placed for 4,000 ASV.II sets in the winter of 1939, but AI was the production priority, and ASV deliveries were delayed. A small number of sets were handmade to give the FAA enough sets to conduct field trials, and pressure was kept on to get the sets in full production as soon as possible.

Touch's "ASV Mark II" was still not everything that was needed, but was a big step forward. On patrol, beams were shot out in the direction of the wingtips to scan a track 40 kilometres (25 miles) wide. If the radar operator picked up a positive contact off a wingtip, the pilot pivoted the aircraft in that direction, with the radar beams sent forward, using lobe switching to pin down the target.
The hope of the FAA was that a radar with these capabilities would greatly aid the ability of its search planes to find the enemy in poor weather and particularly at night. The ability to make night attacks had been partially revealed in the Wilhelmshaven raid, but the fact that the FAA could also attacks ships at sea during the night was still a close secret.

The Type 286 radar (a 1.5m system)
was being superseded by a new system, the Type 281 (a 3.5m system). This had been developed following work in South Africa and the ongoing development of radar systems for the army. A prototype set was installed on HMS Illustrious during her refit in early 1940. This system offered considerable range and resolution improvements over the Type 279, and a different version (to be fitted to HMS Sheffield in the late summer) would also have surface search capability.

In order to help control the carriers planes (something which had been found difficult to do properly in the action after Wilhelmshaven), the planes were being fitted with by "IFF Mark II", which had been development for some time. Mark II could respond not only to Chain Home
(the RAF land-based radar system) signals, but also to 7 meter (42.9 MHz) signals from the MRU and Type 279, the 1.5 meter (200 MHz) signals of Chain Home Low and Navy sets, and the 3.5 meter (86.7 MHz) signals. Unfortunately, though it worked better than IFF Mark I, Mark II was overly complicated and still required in-flight adjustments which made it unpopular with the pilots, although the inconvenience was better than being shot down accidentally by your own fighters.

The navy had also been working on a 50cm system for fire control; this was being developed in two versions, one for surface fire control and one to help control AA fire. It was expected to have this available for service before the end of 1940.

The success of the raid also caused the Admiralty to review its carrier programme. Before his replacement, Admiral Pound had been keen on reducing the current building program in favour of escorts. After the requirements for these had been filled, he had intended to then build more battleships. His replacement was not so fixed on this, and indeed the First Lord, Winston Churchill, was very keen on the carriers as they seemed to be the only really effective way of going on the attack, rather than just responding to German threats. It was also pointed out that while indeed escorts were urgently needed, a more flexible escort group, centred around a carrier, was more effective and that continuing the carrier program would in fact lead to less losses to U-boats over the next couple of years. As a result of this, the carrier program would have second priority after the escorts (which in any case used smaller slipways), and the cruiser program would be slowed while the battleships would be halted indefinately.

The Carrier building program as of 1/1/1940 was as follows :

Fleet Carriers

HMS Implacable (April 1940) ,HMS Indefatigable (June 1940), HMS Bulwark (July 1941).

It was hoped to keep to this schedule, although it was realised there might be some slippage; it would also depend on the pilot training programme continuing on schedule, although if necessary carriers could come into service with reduced air groups.

HMS Audacious (Jun 42) ,HMS Irresistible (Aug 42)

The navy would like to order additional Audacio
us class carriers, but there were issues as to fitting them into the building program. Discussions are ongoing; the FAA wants more carriers at the expense of the Lion class battleships (which have barely been started, and are currently on hold), the surface ship Admirals want the battleships, as they point out the number of carriers building compared to five replacement battleships.

Light Fleet carriers

HMS Ocean (June 1940), HMS Edgar (July 1940), HMS Theseus (Sep 1940).

HMS Unicorn (
carrier repair ship) was originally expected in Aug 1940 , but due to the pressure of other, more urgent, work, is now not expected until Nov 1940.

The navy wants more light carriers to release the fleet carriers for more offensive roles. The Colossus class has proved very successful, and a modified, larger version has been under design for some time. This will incorporate some improvements, and allow the carriers to continue to operate the same size air group with the newer, larger planes. The arrangements are also being altered in the assumption that (by the time they are complete), deck parks will be much more prevalent, as it is already acknowledged that their main failing is lack of aircraft.

Three ships are authorised to start building in Dec 1939; HMS Magnificent, HMS Terrible and HMS Majestic. They are expected to complete in Feb-April 1942

Escort carriers

The Admiralty wanted additional purpose-built escort carriers to the recently-completed HMS Audacity, to allow the faster, better quipped light carriers to be used more with the fleet, and in the Far East. The building program, while heavily loaded, had sufficient capability to allow 4 more Escort carriers to be started in December 1939, completion expected around May 1941. Fortunately these ships did not suffer from the equipment bottlenecks already affecting the build of the surface fleet, and the machinery was already available for them.

Converted merchant ships

Pre-war plans had provisionally allocated 5 liners for conversion to escort carriers (Winchester Castle, Warwick Castle, Dunvegan Castle, Dunottor Castle and Reina del Pacifica). These were retained for that purpose, although there was pressure for these to be converted to auxiliary cruisers; however as nearly 40 ships were already allocated to that role it was felt that additional light carriers would be more useful and flexible.

In addition two ships, Athene and Engadine, has been taken up for conversion to aircraft transport ships. When the FAA looked at the proposals, they pointed out that if these ships were also converted to Escort carriers, in addition to that role they could carry nearly as many planes (on the hanger deck and flight deck) as the dedicated transport ships, and would be far more flexible.

As a result, all 7 ships were taken up for conversion; the time to convert varied considerably due to the individual ships, but the first conversion was expected in Oct 1940, with the rest to follow soon after (having the plans ready before the war had helped, but the shipyards were rather busier with early war work than had been anticipated). These ships will be slower than the escort carriers, and are intended to work with the slower convoys, allowing the faster purpose-built ships to be reserved for the fast convoys.

Chapter 14

16th January.

Three British submarines, HMS Seahorse, HMS Undine and HMS Starfish, are lost after penetrating the Heligoland bight. This attempt to keep pressure on the German fleet and its training grounds shows that the area is currently too dangerous for ships, and that any attacks should be made by air. The problem is that Bomber command seems unable to find anything much smaller than a country at night, and if the carrier force is to be kept at a reasonable distance, there is a problem with the range. The problem of an attacks will be i
nvestigated assuming the new TBR planes are fully in service, with a view to a possible future raid

The German freighter Nordmark, who had replaced the sunk Altmark as the Graf Spee's supply ship during her brief raiding career in the South Atlantic, is intercepted by British destroyers in Norwegian waters thanks to British intelligence on her movements. The ship was supposed to have been searched by the Norwegians (the transport of captured seamen through a neutral territory being forbidden), but they had apparently been 'missed'. Captain Vian of HMS Cossack boarded the Nordmark, and released the prisoners with subsequent publicity. Both the Norwegian government and the German government protested the boarding of a ship in neutral waters; the British government simply pointed to the released prisoners.