The Whale Has Wings Vol 1 - Rebirth (31 page)

An hour later, the British warships were visited by the first of 72 bombers. These were making high level attacks from about 12,000ft. The bombers were not escorted (presumably the carrier had not been spotted by the seaplanes before they had been driven off). The Goshawks thus found them fairly easy to intercept once a raid had been detected, however the constant stream of raids made the managing of the CAP very difficult. In order to avoid having fuelled and armed planes on the hangar deck (a dangerous situation which the British wanted to avoid, especially when under air attack), the replacement fighters had to be rearmed and refuelled on deck. This was a slower operation than doing it in the hangar. As a result the fight
ers only managed to shoot down nine of the bombers, although a number were damaged (the fleet AA shot down one more bomber).The cruiser HMS Gloucester was hit by one bomb on the bridge, which caused serious damage. Although many other ships (including HMS Malaya, Cunningham's flagship) received close misses, no other ships were damaged.

At dawn the C
ourageous flew off a search of three Swordfish. During the morning these planes, and the seaplanes still searching from Malta, confirmed an Italian fleet of at least two battleships, 12 cruisers and 'many' destroyers was some 50 miles off Cape Spartivento, some 100 miles to the west of the British fleet. Admiral Cunningham, although hampered by the slow speed of his old unmodernised battleships, altered course to engage. The Courageous, which had been alerted as soon as the first sighting report came in, had already spotted a full strike of 15 Swordfish and 12 Cormorants ,with four Goshawks as escort (this was the maximum she could spot for a single strike, and it was hoped to catch the Italians by surprise)

At 1200 the strike saw the Italian ships moving south, in good weather. First to attack were the Swordfish, their target the battleships Cesare and Cavour. Attacking in flights of three, the planes managed two torpedo hits on Cesare and one on the Cavour, in the
face of fierce AA fire - two Swordfish were shot down. Sadly none of these were decisive hits (the Courageous had not yet received the newer, heavier torpedoes as she was still operating Swordfish), although both ships were slowed. However even with torpedo damage, they could still make 21 knots, which was faster than Admiral Cunningham's old battleships could do.

The Cormorant attack was more successful. As they were using 1,000lb bombs, they had not targeted the battleships as it was felt they would not be able to penetrate their deck armour, so they had targeted two of the heavy cruisers. Diving down as the torpedo attacks were still going in agai
nst the battleships, the first six planes benefitted from the distraction, and indeed the first three released their bombs before any defensive fire was aimed in their direction. As a result they made a textbook attack, three of their six bombs hitting the cruiser, which slewed to a halt, belching flames and obviously in serious trouble. Seeing this, the second six planes attacked a different ship, but by now the defences were fully alerted and although none of the planes were shot down, only one bomb hit.

The strike recovered to the carrier, now well behind the battleships, and landed on around 1330. Meanwhile Cunningham
's cruiser screen had met the Italian cruisers, and exchanged fire. The Italian reaction was somewhat confused, possibly due to lack of orders from the damaged flagship, and although the Italian ships outnumbered the British, the exchange of fire did little damage. The battleships finally got into range at 1500, and started to exchange fire with the two Italian battleships, Although the Italian ships outranged the old British battleships, they stayed close to a cruiser in obvious difficulty (this was the one hit by the single bomb in the earlier raid; the first cruiser, hit by three 1,000lb bombs, had sunk some time earlier.

The Italian gunnery was not the most effective, and eventually the Malaya landed a hit on one of the battleships (the Cesare). This proved the final straw for the Italian admiral, who then withdrew using his superior speed to the north, abandoning his damaged cruiser. Even slowed by torpedo damage, they had no difficulty disengaging from the British fleet. A second strike was ordered from the Courageous, this time 12 Swordfish (some planes had been damaged in the previous attack) and
eight Cormorants, escorted by six Goshawks. Due to increasing cloud, the planes had some difficulty finding the fleeing Italians, and as a result rather hurried the attack. A heavy cruiser was misidentified as a battleship, and as a result all 12 Swordfish attacked it; more agile than a battleship, the cruiser managed to dodge all 12 torpedoes by some superlative shiphandling. The dive bombers had a little more success; one heavy cruiser was hit, incapacitating her two forward turrets, and the final two Cormorants, who had gotten separated from the other planes, made a speculative attack on a destroyer, which took a 1,000lb bomb near the stern, and was obviously sinking as the planes left.

By the time the planes had been recovered there was no time for any further attacks, and the Italian fleet was able to make its escape from the British force.

10th July.

HMS Ark Royal, escorted by four destroyers, left Gibraltar, her destination Alexandria via the Cape.

Believing the Italian
Fleet has returned to Augusta, nine
Swordfish from HMS Courageous delivered a torpedo attack on the Augusta roads. The destroyer Leone Pancaldo was hit and sunk in shallow water (it was later salvaged) and a motor ship was damaged.

In the English channel, the newly-relocated Luf
twaffe began its attacks on the convoys using the Straights of Dover. 20 Dive bombers attack a convoy off Dover

The R
oyal Navy report on the possibility of invasion is handed to the War Cabinet. It makes interesting reading. The report considers three types of possibilities for invasion.

(1) Some sort of fast, improvised attack on the East Coast. This has been mooted by a number of people. The Navy's considered opinion is that these are the stuff of poor fiction rather than anything believable. A successful invasion
requires far more that just landing unsupported troops with no resupply on beaches or even ports. They point out Norway as an example of what an invasion actually requires. While such a landing MIGHT be possible, it would first require absolute air superiority (the attack by surprise used in Norway is obviously out of the question), and also no possibility of local counter-strikes. The Admiralty rule these options out unless RAF Fighter Command is completely destroyed.

(2) A long distance invasion by steamer from Germany or, more likely, the low countries, aimed at East Anglia. This is considered possible. However in order to achieve it there are a number of prerequisites for Germany to fulfil. A sufficient force of ships, for both the initial invasion plus its supply, must be mustered in ports in Northern Germany and the Low Countries. The ships will require escorts, and since the Kriegsmarine is basically non-existent at the moment, this means again complete control of the air sufficient to prevent the Royal Navy from destroying the convoys.

The Navy suggests a number of responses to minimise this threat, and to give adequate warning if it is attempted. First, reconnaissance is needed of the northern German ports, the Low Countries ports, and ideally as far west as western Poland. This will enable any build-up of ships (and possibly troops) to be detected and plans amended accordingly. Assuming such a build-up is seen, sufficient forces need to be in place to sink the invasion convoys before they reach the coast.

The first need is for some means of conducting reliable reconnaissance so far east. Currently the RAF is trying to use the Blenheim bomber as a long range recon plane, a task for which it is not suited, delivers poor results and causes high loss rates. The FAA has therefore been talking to some of the aeroplane companies to see if there are any other alternatives. There is indeed one. The Westland company has been manufacturing for some time the Mk2 version of its Whirlwind twin engined fighter. The Mk1 used the R
olls-Royce Peregrine engine, but some time ago it was clear that this engine would have a low priority, and as a result they modified the plane (making it somewhat larger) to take two R-R Merlin engines and more fuel (the original smaller design wasn't a long ranged plane, the new one carried more fuel). This had flown in the spring of 1939, and a contract had been placed for a limited number of them, The first ones were ready, and it had been expected to form a squadron later this year.

After listening to the RN requirements, the company had suggested modifying (on an urgent basis) some of the first batch as a reconnaissance plane. A large drop tank would extend the range, and taking out the guns and cleaning up the plane would increase its speed. The original design had achieved around 380mph with the Merlin XII, and one of the trial aircraft had managed over 400mph with the new Merlin XX. They promised at least 425mph with a reconnaissance version. This would enable it to basically fly away from any current Luftwaffe fighter, thus making successful reconnaissance flights over defended targets practical. Only a small number of the aircraft were currently available, but only a few were required for reconnaissance.

In addition to this, the FAA has suggested putting a temporary fuel tank in a few SeaLance TBR planes, ones already fitted with the AS MkII radar. This was by no means perfect yet, but they now had considerable operational experience. With the aid of a team from the manufacturer, and some tlc (tender loving care) by specially selected maintenance crews, they could put planes out along the enemy coast, at night, for a considerable distance. This would make it much more difficult for the Germans to sneak convoys out under cover of night, and give the RN more warning time. It was considered that with these two methods of reconnaissance, ample warning would be available for Home Fleet and local units, as well as FAA aircraft, to devastate any attempted invasion convoy. There was a strike squadron of TBR planes and one of divebombers available as their carrier was currently under repair. These could be moved to East Anglian bases; if the invasion occurred these would be supplemented either by more planes flying from airfields, or the Home Fleet carriers.

(3) A short invasion route across the channel. This was in fact considered the most likely, however it still required certain prerequisites. Air superiority was needed. In view of the fact that there were few suitable ports on the channel (and the ones that existed were defended and prepared for demolition), the most like form of invasion would be by small craft, probably assisted by small steamers. This meant that this type of invasion was possible without full control of the air, as a mass of smaller landing craft could accept a percentage of losses more easily (and the number
s would require more effort to destroy an equal number of troops to larger shipping)

Such an invasion force would require the small craft and shipping to be built up in France. As this type of craft was relatively slow, it would probably be based in the French Channel ports, and maybe also in the Low Countries. These were all well in range of surveillance, and so any build-up would be impossible without detection.

The Royal navy intended to saturate the channel at night with light craft to give warning. This type of invasion would be best countered at sea by destroyers (who, while not invulnerable, had shown at Dunkirk that they were difficult to sink from the air). These would be held ready at a suitable distance. The heavy units of the Home Fleet would be kept ready in case Kriegsmarine heavy units were encountered (the Navy was not certain that some of the heavy units attacked off Norway were easily repairable or not), but if not it was felt unnecessary to risk them. The night-capable SeaLance planes would also be used (if this type of attack was seen to be in preparation); although the radar performance was not good against smaller ships, the numbers needed for a successful invasion should be clearly seen.

This type of invasion was also limited by weather. The Channel is a rough piece of sea, and it was considered unlikely this type of invasion would be practical after October due to the unpredictable winter storms

The net result of the report was that the Royal Navy considered an invasion possible, but that if prudent measures (as given in the report) were taken, no surprise invasion was possible. An invasion must defeat the RAF to have any chance of success, so as long as Fighter Command was in being any invasion would either have to be postponed or would fail. In addition to the direct means discussed, it was also assumed all possible intelligence sources would be used to help clarify the situation.

While it was realised that the German Army had a massive superiority over the forces available, they pointed out that what the Germans could invade with was severely limited by shipping, something the Germans did not have ample supplies of. Defeat the shipping, and the German Army was helpless on the Continent.

While there was of course considerable discussion over this report, the general theme was accepted. Anti-invasion preparations continued at full speed, of course, and Lord Beaverbrook tasked with getting the maximum number of fighters available, as this was clearly the best means of rendering an invasion impossible. The confidence of the Royal Navy to stop the invasion, with the help of the RAF and the precautions mentioned, did help to reduce the incipient panic in some departments at the thought of invasion.

Force H, which had
put to sea on receiving reports of the Italian fleet, was now returning to Gibraltar, when screening destroyer HMS Escort was attacked by the Italian submarine Marconi north of Algiers. The Escort sank around an hour later after all her crew had been transferred to HMS Forester. There were no casualtie
s
.