Tank Tracks to Rangoon (33 page)

With the discovery that Cheduba Island had been deserted by its garrison, all of General Christison’s original objectives had been attained, and he decided to continue with his policy of landings aimed at the An and Taungup passes, which, it will be recalled, provided a back door to Prome and the Irrawaddy.

For the Japanese, these two locations were obviously of the most critical importance, and must be held whatever the cost. It was not surprising, therefore, that when 74th Brigade carried out a landing at Ruywa, they were subjected to frantic counterattacks, and had to be substantially reinforced. Part of the reinforcements consisted of a one-troop group from A Squadron 19th Lancers.

The Lancers’ tanks came ashore on 28th February, the Navy again incurring some wrath as a result of the temporary stranding of one tank and the D8, but were not heavily engaged until 2nd March, when they supported a battalion of 10th Baluch Regiment.

During this action, the tank of Major Wright, now commanding A Squadron, received four hits on the front armour and suspension from an enemy 37-mm anti-tank gun. This was spotted by a sapper, and blown to bits by Lt Billimoria.

On 4th March 74 Brigade began to advance to the north.

‘A brigade advance, leap-frogging, followed, with tanks and FTO, Lt Skinner, joining each unit as it came through. The infantry looked after the hill features, while the tanks went ahead in the open paddy. For the first time four tanks were able to deploy in open country. The Ox and Bucks led the move, followed by 3/2 Gurkhas, followed by 7/16 Punjab Regiment, led as usual by Lt-Colonel McHarg.

‘The move was non-stop, chaungs formed no obstacle, and Tamandu village was passed. Just before nightfall we had the satisfaction of waving to the Africans on the other side of the Dalet Chaung. Our task appeared to have been completed—thirty-eight Japs in all were killed, nine by the tanks.’

Further progress towards An was barred by a particularly well defended feature appropriately called ‘Strong’. The tanks were unable to assist in the capture of this feature, which cost the Punjabis a week’s hard fighting; the track was completely un-tankable, and the one tank which tried lost both tracks.

On 12th March the Navy lifted the tanks round to the other side of ‘Strong’, thus eliminating the bad piece of road, and the following day the troop carried out a shoot onto a feature called ‘Tiger’. Whilst returning from this across a chaung, a shell burst between Lts Skinner and Gwatkin, killing the former and mortally wounding the latter.

Further progress up the An road was slow, but the troop was in action again on 21st March, when a good shoot was marred by the death and injury of several members of Jemadar Chhotu Ram’s crew when their tank was hit and completely burnt out. Two days later the tanks enjoyed a monumental duel with two captured 25-pounders firing over open sights, firing a total of 460 rounds, until one of the enemy guns was damaged and the other fell silent.

For the moment, fighting on the An sector had come to a standstill, and the Lancers fought their last action of the war on the 1st April. The West Africans, who were short of artillery, asked the troop to fire a concentration onto a road junction near the pass, and in accord with the regiment’s tradition of good gunnery, they despatched 400 rounds fully indirect at extreme range, taking their corrections from an air OP. This shoot was carried out at a remarkable 15,000 yards range, with the Shermans’ guns traversed to the rear to obtain maximum elevation, and the tanks on a forward slope. The troop was withdrawn from the Arakan on 8th April.

To threaten Taungup, Christison ordered 4th Indian Infantry Brigade, comprising 2nd Green Howards, 2/7th Rajputs and 2/13th Frontier Force Rifles, supported by A Squadron 146 Regiment RAC, to effect a landing at Letpan.

There was an unreal air about the approach to Letpan, which led through numerous uncharted chaungs, and was made with the landing craft in single file. The landing itself was made with little or no trouble, apart from a visit from some American aircraft, determined to share their bomb-load with all and sundry.

The advance from Letpan was due to begin on 15th March, and during the night of the 14th a company of Frontier Force Rifles were despatched to cover an important bend in the road. They had not been in position long when, with a rumble of engines and squeal of tracks, five Japanese Type 95 Light tanks came up from the south. The Frontier Force permitted them to pass right through their position, unsuspecting and unmolested.

When the main advance began the following afternoon, with A Squadron supporting the leading infantry, the enemy tanks were soon spotted. Their commander, sighting the Lees, at once showed a clean pair of heels and headed south as fast as his tracks could carry him, only to run straight into the Frontier Force, who welcomed his tanks with a shower of Piat bombs.

Panic was now reigning supreme, and the Japanese turned north again, committing mechanical
hara-kiri
before A Squadron got them in their gun-sights. The Lees, which had been delayed by a broken bridge, found three of them in flames and the remaining two in working order; of the crews there was no sign, and it was presumed that they had taken to the jungle. The captured tanks were used as run-abouts until some RAF dive-bombers registered their objections in an explosive manner, after which they were left severely alone.

The column continued its advance towards Taungup, resistance stiffening the closer it moved to the objective. The tanks were on constant call, and were in action daily.

‘This action was the best sort of advertisement to answer the sceptics who doubted the value of the tanks in this difficult country,’ wrote Major Bucknall citing two actions in which his squadron had played a leading role.

‘The Jap 75-mm was tunnelled into the top of a feature which commanded the junction of the main road to Taungup and a track which provided an alternative approach to the Taungup
Chaung. The ground it covered was one of the few sizeable areas of paddy we had met. Initially it gained some success and when our leading troops, consisting of the Green Howards and supported by No 3 Troop, debouched, they came under severe fire. The Jats attached to the squadron also suffered heavy casualties. Eventually the gun was pinpointed and Gordon Buckley engaged it with his troop and knocked it out after a quick duel. This was real pinpoint shooting, as the high explosive shells with delayed fuses entered and burst inside the tunnel.’

The enemy position was examined by Brigadier J. F. R. For-man, the commander of 4th Indian Infantry Brigade, who was sufficiently impressed to comment that the tanks’ shooting would have formed a 2-inch group at 100 yards, which represents the highest praise a professional infantryman will allow another arm.

Some days later, Buckley’s troop was in action again.

On the night of 5th/6th April, A Company of the Frontier Force Rifles was disputing the possession of a feature, Point 370, in front of Taungup. The enemy were well dug in on the reverse slope of the feature and had counter-attacked on two occasions without much success. Thus, at dawn on 6th April, the infantry lines were very close together and the enemy’s position could be accurately pinpointed.

The troop took up an enfilade position to the south, the machine guns occupied a similar position to the north, and a mortar concentration was brought down on the line of retreat of the enemy.

Under cover of this barrage, A Company moved forward and the supporting fire was switched to the enemy lines of withdrawal; owing to the excellent co-ordination between the various arms involved, the position was taken with few casualties and the bodies of fourteen Japs, including one officer, were found.

After this action, there was little for the squadron to do. The enemy abandoned Taungup, and retired into the hills to the east withdrawing down the Prome road when the monsoon broke. It was entirely appropriate that the tanks of 146 Regiment, which had been the first into the Arakan two years earlier, should be the last to return to India, where the rest of their brigade was training hard for the invasion of Malaya.

In the final Arakan offensive, tanks had only been used in very small numbers to attain limited objectives, but their contribution should be seen in relation to their moral rather than their physical effect on the enemy. On Ramree Island, they had been used in a classic example of the Indirect Approach, and their appearance completely disrupted the garrison’s withdrawal
to its evacuation areas; on the mainland, their presence within the various beach-heads meant that the Japanese had to take these comparatively minor ventures seriously. The strategic effect of General Christison’s constant prodding at their most sensitive area meant that the enemy was forced to keep two divisions in the Arakan when they could have been of vital use elsewhere. The ultimate fate of those divisions, as we shall see, was simply a choice of deaths; by violence, by disease, or by starvation.

In the meantime, 15 Corps could see no reason why it should not go all the way to Rangoon; and that is exactly where it went.

*
Literally, ‘Here come the Gurkhas!’

*
‘The Kangaw battles were among the most desperate of the war with much hand to hand fighting. Although the Japanese dispersed and got away in the jungle they abandoned all their mechanical transport and artillery. I counted many vehicles and muzzles of guns sticking out of the water in the chaungs when flying low in a light plane.’

I feel that this batttle might well have been lost on Hill 170 had it not been for the morale raising presence of the tanks.’

*
The History of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, 1919–1952

There are two routes by which an army can approach Rangoon from Central Burma. It can move down the Irrawaddy, in which case it has the advantage of receiving at least some of its supplies by river transport, but the disadvantage of numerous chaungs which would require large quantities of bridging equipment; or it can move down the route of the principal railway into the Sittang valley by way of Toungoo which offers better going but a less satisfactory supply position.

Whichever route he chose, General Slim had the spectre of the impending monsoon, now only weeks away, to haunt him. For 14th Army to be caught
en route
and bogged down in front of collapsing communications would be a disaster of the greatest magnitude, and a major bonus for the Japanese, who could use the rainy season to rest, refit and reorganize. The advance, Slim calculated, would have to be made at an average rate of ten or twelve miles per day, even allowing for opposition and the enemy’s demolitions; there could be no time for elaborate attacks, and positions which could not be taken quickly would have to be by-passed. There would be no time for mopping up, and if necessary large bodies of the enemy would have to be left behind on the flanks and to the rear.

On the other hand, Slim was not going to permit Kimura to guess which axis he had chosen for his main thrust, and advanced on both, so that the Japanese could not concentrate to block him. 4 Corps would advance southwards from Meiktila by the railway route, this being the main striking force, whilst 33 Corps would advance down the Irrawaddy on both banks, but if the opportunity arose, get to Rangoon before 4 Corps. Meanwhile 15 Corps would put into effect a further amphibious operation to secure the port from the sea. For 14th Army it was literally Rangoon or bust, and the phrase ‘at all costs’ meant just that.

To achieve the initial deployment for the advance, Slim had to perform the difficult administrative task of moving 33 Corps right across the rear of 4 Corps. He describes this as a Union Jack movement, with divisions crossing the flag to opposite corners, and although the potential for confusion was enormous, so skilled had the various staffs become that it was completed without a hitch. The re-deployment gave 4 Corps 5th, 17th and 19th Indian Divisions, and 255 Tank Brigade, whilst 33 Corps consisted of 7th and 20th Indian Divisions, plus 254 Tank Brigade.

Being the principal contender in the race, 4 Corps’ armoured element was the heavier of the two, 116 Regiment RAC having rejoined its parent brigade, which now mustered three Sherman regiments, A and B Squadrons 7th Light Cavalry in their Stuarts, and the armoured cars of 16th Light Cavalry. 33 Corps’ armour now consisted of two Lee regiments, 3rd Carabiniers
*
and 150 Regiment RAC, C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry, and all three PAVO squadrons.

Between the two Corps lay the Mount Popa plateau, Popa itself being an extinct volcano which towered 4,000 feet above the flat plain, and a popular haunt of the deadly hamadryad, one of the only two species of snake which will actually pursue humans. Amongst these unpleasant reptiles were dug in a holding party of Japanese, who succeeded in holding the feature until 20th April, in spite of the efforts of an infantry brigade supported by C Squadron 3rd Carabiniers, whose tanks could not really get to grips because the ground was either too soft or too broken. Finally, the Japanese melted away, events elsewhere having made their stand irrelevant.

West of Mount Popa lies Kyaukpadaung which was taken by 33 Brigade and the Carabiniers’ B Squadron on 12th April. During the preceding night a Punjabi battalion had established a road block south of the town, and an artillery observation post was set up on a commanding hill. True to form, at first light, the Japanese attacked the road block, and were beaten back, losing heavily to the FOO’s guns. This clearly shocked the enemy, for when B Squadron and a Gurkha battalion went in, it was all over in less than thirty minutes, 120 bodies being counted and a 150-mm gun captured, along with a considerable quantity of stores.

13 The advance on Rangoon