Tank Tracks to Rangoon (31 page)

We tried to get an air strike, with napalm for preference, to knock off the vegetation. As the infantry advance started the tanks came out, attracting most of the hostile fire, and started a concentrated bombardment of the feature with HE. This often revealed emplacements and bunkers, and further targets were indicated by the FTO.

As the infantry advance got closer to the objective, say fifty yards, we switched to AP solid shot, knocking the bunkers about and allowing the infantry with training and practice to within five yards of the objective in perfect safety. The tanks’ fire then lifted and changed to co-ax mg to cover the ridge.

This makes the tanks sound a bit stand-offish, but the vegetation, and much more so, the very loose sandy soil, made it quite impossible to get closer.

For the FTO, the engagement looked something like this, as described by Lt-Colonel E. R. McM. Wright, who obtained a wide experience of the job with 19th Lancers.

The Sherman’s 75-mm gun, in the hands of a good gunner, was extremely accurate. For this reason, the FTO was able in the first instance to have his first round put exactly where he wanted it by giving the tank commander a straight fire order onto a conspicuous target, such as a bit of jungle scrub or shell-shot tree stump, which was easy to identify and acknowledge.

Remember, initially the FTO has no idea where the ultimate target (i.e. the bunker) is, and the tank commander has little idea where the FTO is either. Once the first directed shot is fired (as opposed to the gunfire phase for jungle clearing when the infantry are moving forward) it is possible to indicate to the tank commander from the strike the position of the forward infantry and the FTO.

The fire control and corrections were passed by conventional communications between the FTO and the tank commander, with the tank gunner probably listening in. The FTO at this stage of the attack is on his stomach with the forward infantry and no doubt the company commander is with him as they always seem to command their companies from the front end. The 38 set with a throat mike gave good voice communication, but the 4-ft aerial was sometimes a bit awkward and necessitated the FTO lying on his back while transmitting in order to get it up into the air.

Once the target had been located, and it really was difficult (and regrettably caused casualties to do so), then the fun began. It was a case of laying the gun foot by foot. Up one, down a half, left, right, and so on. If the timber splintered a good tank commander might pick it up through his binoculars, in which case he had a go on his own.

Finally, the general idea was to smash the timber with AP and pop an HE into the hole. A phosphorous smoke round was even better, as it might conceivably indicate where the other holes were, which of course was the next problem. These were the ones which invariably caused the casualties when the final assault was made. This was supported by concentrated fire from the tanks, which switched from HE to AP and elevated without interruption to enable the infantry to rush in and get on top of the bunker.

The advance of 15 Corps began on 14th December 1944, the general plan being for 81st (less one brigade) and 82nd West African Divisions to move respectively down the Kaladan and Kalapanzin valleys, whilst 25th Indian Division pushed on down the Mayu Peninsula to Foul Point. 26th Indian Division would then capture Akyab Island. B Squadron 45th Cavalry assisted the infantry in clearing some bunkers in the Goppe Bazaar area, and B and C Squadrons 19th Lancers put down concentrations in minor operations near Buthidaung and on the Mayu peninsula, but most of the birds had flown by this time.

12 Arakan—final offensive, 1944–45

By 27th December, 25th Indian Division had reached Foul Point, and plans taken from a dead Japanese officer indicated that Akyab Island was only lightly held. Accordingly, the Corps timetable was brought forward, and 74th and 3rd Commando Brigades detailed to capture the island with the support of A Squadron 19th Lancers and two troops from 45th Cavalry.

However, an artillery observation officer, flying over Akyab on 2nd January, saw absolutely no sign of the Japanese, and
landing his light aircraft in a paddy field, was told by the excited inhabitants that the enemy had fled.

The assault force, arriving offshore during the morning of the 3rd, were nonplussed by the complete absence of the naval gunfire and RAF activity which was to see them on to the beaches, and even more surprised on landing to be greeted by General Christison himself!

The offensive was going far better than anyone could have imagined at the outset. Harried by 81st Division to the east, the Japanese hastened the pace of their withdrawal. Their line of retreat ran along the coast, through Kangaw, to the An Pass and Taungup, from both of which escape roads led through the Arakan Yomas to the Irrawaddy valley. Christison now planned a series of amphibious landings along this route, designed to trap as many of the enemy as possible. The coast in this part of Burma had not been thoroughly charted, and in spite of detailed reconnaissance, contained many hazards which had not been foreseen.

First to be assaulted was the Myebon Peninsula, which would have to be neutralized before Kangaw could be attacked. The landing would be made by 3rd Commando Brigade, who would be supported by half of A Squadron 19th Lancers.

Kangaw was known to be very heavily fortified as it covered the main Japanese line of retreat at its narrowest point; however, the defences faced north.

The operation began at 0745 on 12th January. As the Commandos’ landing craft started their run in, covered by the fire of one cruiser, eight smaller warships and a number of armed launches, the RAF mounted a massive raid, mixing napalm with high explosive, and finishing off with smoke to screen the advancing assault craft.

This was just as well, as the Landing Craft Infantry touched bottom 400 yards out, and the Marines were forced to wade through heavy mud to the beach before establishing themselves in the jungle beyond. By now, the enemy was beginning to surface, and was subjecting the beaches to sporadic machine-gun shell fire.

The Landing Craft Tank arrived on a falling title and their commanders refused to ground them. The first to arrive lowered its ramp 300 yards from the shore, with the result that the leading tank, from Lt Billimoria’s troop, went straight out into four feet of water covering deep mud. After moving about five yards,
the tank heeled over and bellied hard, the water flooding in through the hull gunner’s hatch.

A more suitable landing site was found by Major Keighley, the regiment’s second-in-command, but even this required considerable improvement by sappers and infantry detachments. At length the leading LCT nosed in and the D8 recovery tractor motored off without trouble, as did Billimoria’s two remaining tanks. As the second LCT approached, the Japanese began to range on the craft obtaining a hit on the ramp just as Major Sample, A Squadron leader, was driving off.

Sample’s tank, slightly off course as a result of the explosion, bogged down, but was recovered by the D8 driven by Sergeant Haines. The LCT then withdrew, and no further tanks were landed until the following morning.

With both troops ashore, offensive operations in support of the Marines began. After crossing a difficult chaung, the tanks supported No 5 Commando in their attack on a feature named ‘Rose’. With Lt Nelson acting as FTO, the enemy’s weak defensive fire was suppressed, and the hill taken.

The tanks then moved on to the outskirts of Myebon, linked up with No 44 Commando, and moved in more or less in line, taking jungle, houses and pagodas in their stride, putting bursts of co-ax into suspicious looking trees and dug-outs. All went well until we drew up about five hundred yards short of the feature ‘Cabbage’. At least two well sited MGs inflicted casualties on the Commandos, wounding both their CO and an officer who at the time were lying on either side of Peter behind an extremely inadequate tree. A bit of fast thinking on Peter’s part enabled him to get Ben’s second tank to reverse in front of them so that they could get their casualties out, and this move probably saved a good many more as well. After blasting ‘Cabbage’ for an hour or so, the Commandos assaulted and took the position.

The next day A Squadron’s officers carried out detailed reconnaissance of the next features to be assaulted, ‘200’, ‘163’, ‘Brother’ and ‘Father’. ‘163’ was found to be unoccupied, but the remainder were attacked on the 15th, Lt Ben Pryde particularly distinguishing himself at ‘200’.

Ben took his troop straight up to his position west of ‘200’ and started shooting at the correct time, Robin meanwhile having contacted No 1 Commando south of ‘200’. The remaining tanks had by now moved into position opposite ‘163’ just in case they tried to give any trouble. Meanwhile Hank’s (Lt Lawrence) troop had arrived straight from the boat and proceeded to the north end of ‘Father’ in the hopes of catching anyone trying to run out north.

The advance on ‘200’ was slightly delayed owing to a possible air strike which didn’t materialize. Ben, unfortunately, had only one bunker visible, but fixed that up for keeps. The advance continued until they (the Commandos) had to get on top of the hill at the south end, when they were met with LMG fire and grenades and had to pull off the top. They then tried moving along the lower slopes for a short distance, but were held up again in the same way and withdrew to make a new plan. Robin Wright tried to put Ben on the target, but the reply was that he couldn’t see a damn thing. No 1 Commando, however, began to move forward again with three troops up, one on the west lower slope, one on the east lower slope, and the third up the centre.

Precisely the same thing happened again. The FTO then suggested that Ben came up through the jungle to a path on the lower slopes and tried bouncing shots through the trees. Ben replied by suggesting that he went right up on top. Looking at the gradient and the thickness of the jungle, this suggestion looked impossible; however, things were so unpleasant at that moment that any new suggestion was a good one.

Ben led the climb and managed, by knocking down enormous trees, to get to the top of the first incline. The Commandos took on a new lease of life and crept in behind the tank. Robin, Ben and the Commando troop leader decided that the best plan was to charge the positions with the Commandos behind. Calling up his other two tanks we moved forward—one Jap left it a bit late and was run down by Ben as he ran out, three were killed in their positions and the remainder fled. Ben, however, again leading owing to the thick jungle, was unable to see a sheer drop on his left and went over the side, turning about three somersaults at the bottom.

The tank came to rest on its turret, fortunately over a dip in the ground, and the crew, badly shaken, were able to scramble out. The Commandos and Bombay Grenadiers came swarming down the reverse slope to the rescue, and escorted them back to the top. Pryde had suffered a severe cut on his thigh, and had to be evacuated.

The attacks on the remaining features were less eventful, and all had been taken by 1700. The FTOs had found many excellent targets for the tanks, all of which had been hit by a concealed Japanese 75-mm without serious damage, and Lt Billimoria had disposed of a captured British 2-pounder anti-tank gun which had hit his vehicle twice.

Lt Hank Lawrence’s troop had also had a most eventful day, and had almost been overrun twice by enemy counter-attacks.

He arrived almost non-stop from the LCT and got established at about 1030. His job was to cover the Kantha Bridge and he did this from about 100 yards range. He was practically behind the Jap lines and the Bombay Grenadiers did good work, especially Brengunner
Sepoy Shera Khan. Risaldar Shangara Singh’s tank got stuck in Gaunpyu village and was successfully recovered by the troop. The Jap was fairly active—chiefly with a 75-mm gun on Pagoda Hill which was easily able to cover the area and could not be spotted—but like most Jap guns that day gave evidence of being short of ammunition, by ranging on target and doing no more.

Dfr Piara Singh then got stuck at about 1200, 100 yards west of the bridge on the bank of the chaung. He could not be recovered owing to a fallen tree immediately behind the tank, so stayed in position firing a lot at Jap infantry who twice tried to get at him from the other side, claiming twenty dead in the end. Hank and Risaldar Shangara kept their tanks just outside the village and came in every now and then to check up. Doing this Hank’s was hit by a 75-mm HE just above the track, which bulged the sponson under-plate jamming the traverse, but was able to keep the tank in action.

At about 1700 Sgt Haines brought up the D8 with Bill Merriam on board and was escorted by Jimmy’s troop up to Gaunpyu to recover Piara Singh. When we arrived most of the crew were out connecting up tow-chains and discussing the day’s operations in spite of the fact that the Jap was still dropping the odd 75-mm. On top of the turret was roosting an enormous cock, silhouetted against the setting sun and taking the air after a day in the blanket box.