Pericles of Athens (8 page)

That effacement can certainly be explained by the reformer’s premature disappearance.
Soon after carrying off this great political victory, Ephialtes was killed “by night,
in circumstances that remain obscure.”
⁵²
According to a
tradition that goes back to Idomeneus of Lampsacus, a close disciple of Epicurus,
Pericles was not uninvolved in this sordid affair. It is suggested that he “cunningly
assassinated [or arranged for the assassination of] Ephialtes, the demagogue, who
had been his friend and companion in political action, simply because he was jealous
and envied Ephialtes’ popularity [
doxa
].”
⁵³
But, as Plutarch suggests, in all probability, those were mere baseless rantings.
This serious allegation, reported one hundred and fifty years after the event, is
certainly intended to blacken the reputation of Pericles, the “demagogue.” But, quite
apart from its doubtful veracity, Idomeneus’s accusation reflects a more general tendency
of the ancient sources: they are prone to credit famous men with all important actions,
whether positive or negative, that occurred in their own lifetimes.

In effect, the Epicurean polemicist simply adopts the line of thinking used by the
ancient authors in their analyses of Ephialtes’ reforms themselves: given that some
of them ascribe to Pericles a secret influence in this episode, why not postulate
his complicity in Ephialtes’ assassination?

From this point of view, Idomeneus’s line of argument is no more well-founded—or ill-founded—than
the suggestions of the Pseudo-Aristotle or those of Plutarch. All these theories about
plots are, by their very nature, impossible to prove. In truth, this entire historiographical
construction centered on Pericles should be considered as doubtful: not only is the
implication that Pericles had a hand in murdering Ephialtes highly improbable, but
his supposed role in the reforms introduced in 462 B.C. is equally hypothetical.
⁵⁴

When they deny Ephialtes the status of a protagonist, it is in truth the Athenian
people that the ancient authors are leaving in the shadows so as to focus exclusively
on the dazzling aura surrounding the great man. It was not until the 450s—or even
the early 440s—that Pericles truly set his mark on Athenian political life. It was
only after this gradual entry into political life that he began to be elected
stratēgos
on a regular basis.

CHAPTER 2

The Bases of Periclean Power: The
Stratēgos

“P
ericles son of Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at that time, wielding
greatest influence both in speech and in action, came forward and advised them.”
¹
Those are the words with which the historian Thucydides introduces the Athenian leader
at the moment when, in 431 B.C., the city is about to engage in war against Sparta.
At this point, the historian defines the two domains that constitute the basis of
the superiority of a statesman: speech and action. And it was indeed as an orator
in the Assembly, expert in handling
logos
, and as a
stratēgos
in warfare, well accustomed to military command, that Pericles dominated Athenian
political life for twenty or so years.

Military leader and orator: those are the two indissociable aspects of Periclean power.
They rest upon a common basis, the office of a
stratēgos
. It was as a
stratēgos
, reelected time after time, that Pericles led the Athenians in warfare, showered
with all the laurels of military glory; and it was also as a
stratēgos
that he was in a position to participate in the deliberations of the Council, influence
its decisions and, in its name, propose the decrees that were then submitted to the
vote in the Athenian Assembly.

Let us begin by shedding some light upon the institutional and military mainsprings
of Pericles’ authority. After describing the function of a
stratēgos
and considering the reasons why the role played by this office was so crucial in
Athens, it will be necessary to analyze the way in which Pericles set up a veritable
policy for glory, even to the point of singing the praises of his own successes. His
valor as head of the army and navy was, however, contested by his political opponents.
It has to be said that the
stratēgos
had elaborated a new military ethos that to some extent broke away from the heroic
ideal peculiar to members of the Athenian elite. Throughout his life, Pericles refused
to engage in warfare unless it was absolutely necessary, even at the risk of being
accused of cowardice by his opponents. This rule of behavior was applied in the most
spectacular fashion at the start of the Peloponnesian
War, when Pericles persuaded the Athenians to take refuge inside the town without
doing battle with the Peloponnesian hoplites. It was certainly an effective strategy,
but it was swiftly challenged.

T
HE
R
EELECTED
S
TRATĒGOS
: A P
OPULAR
M
AGISTRATE

The Function of
Stratēgos

The office of
stratēgos
, created right at the end of the sixth century, in 501–500, rapidly became the essential
magistracy of classical Athens. The way that it operated was closely linked with the
isonomic regime set in place by the reforms of Cleisthenes. The
stratēgoi
made up a college of ten magistrates, one for each tribe, and each elected for one
year (
Constitution of the Athenians
, 22.2–3). Their number and their designation therefore depended closely upon the
new organization of the civic body into the ten tribes that had been created in 508/7.

Usually, the
stratēgoi
were recruited from among the well-to-do citizens; and the simple reason for this
was that, to have a chance of being elected, one had to be capable of winning the
confidence of the Athenians and this involved a certain degree of education, which
was, by definition, costly. All the same, nowhere does any source suggest that any
census-qualification affected the right to aim for a post as a
stratēgos
.
²
In that there was no legal barrier that limited access to such a post, this new type
of magistracy complied fully with the democratic practices that had been evolving
progressively ever since 507 B.C.

The function of
stratēgoi
was to command the Athenian army, as indeed the etymology of the word suggests (
stratos
, the army, and
agein
, to lead). Once the Persian Wars were over,
stratēgoi
definitively supplanted the post of archon that had previously served this purpose:
the polemarch was now marginalized and limited to ritual and legal functions.
³
What is the explanation for the
stratēgoi
’s rapid rise to power? The fact that they had a double advantage over the other Athenian
magistrates: not only were they elected by the Assembly (which strengthened their
popular legitimacy), but, furthermore, they could be renewed in their post. Ever since
487, archons had, on the contrary, been selected by lot, and they could not remain
in power for more than one year, after which they were admitted to the Council of
the Areopagus as figures that were, to be sure, prestigious but who, ever since Ephialtes’
reforms in 462/461, had lacked any real powers.

Over and above their military vocation, the
stratēgoi
held a measure of ex officio political power. Although they could probably not convene
the
Assembly on their own initiative,
⁴
on the other hand they did have the right to attend Council meetings, to speak in
them, and, in so doing, to propose convening the
Ekklēsia
through action on the part of the
prutaneis
(the rotating Council leaders). This gave them influence over the political life
of the city, especially given that their voices possessed particular weight in that
they stemmed from the legitimacy of election—unlike those of members of the
Boulē
, who were selected each year simply by the drawing of lots.

It was in the fifth century that the
stratēgoi
played their most notable role. Of the fourteen political leaders known in the fifth
century, as many as thirteen occupied this function, whereas in the fourth century
that tendency was to be reversed: of the twenty-six politicians identified in that
period, only six were elected as
stratēgoi
.
⁵
In the fourth century, the
stratēgos
’s function evolved into a specialized magistracy of an increasingly technical nature,
as the
Constitution of the Athenians
testifies.
⁶
From that time onward, an increasing number of politicians no longer considered it
useful to assume the function of a military leader, and this consequently lost its
aura.
⁷

In the fifth century, in contrast,
stratēgoi
were by no means mere technicians. According to the
Constitution of Athenians
, citizens had no hesitation in electing “generals with no experience of war but promoted
on account of their family reputation” (26.1). It was a development that sometimes
caused veritable military disasters. The tragic poet Sophocles, who was a
stratēgos
at the time of the expedition to Samos in 441/0 B.C.,
⁸
was the very embodiment of a
stratēgos
preoccupied with love rather than with death, with
eros
more than with
thanatos
. His contemporary, Ion of Chios, records having encountered him in Chios, on his
way to Lesbos, “in his capacity as
stratēgos
.” Having been invited to a private banquet (
sumposion
), Sophocles is said to have organized a scurrilous ruse in order to get to embrace
the handsome young lad employed to serve the wine. Having succeeded in his aim, the
poet was said to have exclaimed: “My dear hosts, I have been working on my strategic
skills ever since Pericles claimed that, even if I know all about poetry, I know nothing
of strategy. But is it not true that this stratagem of mine has been successful?”
⁹
Blinded, as he was, by the delights of the
sumposion
, the poet was clearly failing to distinguish the private sphere from the public,
and love affairs from the conduct of warfare. This was precisely something that Pericles
took care not to do, for once he had entered political life, he refused to attend
even the most modest private banquet.
¹⁰
The episode also shows to what extent the magistracy of a
stratēgos
was unspecialized, even though the people did in fact take care to elect true specialists
in military matters to the college of the ten
stratēgoi
—men such as the military experts Myronides and Phormion.

Among all the fifth-century
stratēgoi
, Pericles stands out as having had a quite exceptional career.

An Exceptional
Stratēgos

Pericles was exceptional on two counts: first, the numerous times that he was reelected
as
stratēgos
. He occupied the post at least fifteen times and consequently exerted a lasting influence
on the destiny of the city. His first attested election took place in 448/7 and then,
between 443/2 and 429/8 B.C., he was, according to Plutarch, reelected fourteen times
in succession.
¹¹
Second, Pericles may have distinguished himself from his colleagues through the manner
of his elections: according to some historians, he was sometimes elected by all the
Athenians (
ex hapantōn
), not solely by the members of his own tribe (
kata phulas
). This was a great honor for, in the early fifth century, elections in principle
took place separately within each of the tribes. In certain years, the Akamantis tribe,
to which Pericles belonged, seems to have provided the college of
stratēgoi
with two representatives. For example, in 441/440 Pericles and Glaukon both appear
in the list provided by the Atthidographer, Androtion, despite the fact that they
were both members of the same tribe.
¹²

Since the late nineteenth century, most historians have believed that
stratēgoi
were appointed according to two different methods: while the first nine were elected
by their tribes, the tenth was elected
ex hapantōn
, by the entire body of Athenians. This
stratēgos
, chosen by the entire civic community would, for that very reason, have enjoyed greater
prestige than his colleagues; and it is thought that Pericles was not alone in being
elected in this distinctive fashion. It is believed that, after the War of Samos in
440/439, the
stratēgos
Phormion was likewise elected in this fashion and that this soldier of genius was
reelected
ex hapantōn
in 430/429 at the very time when Pericles was relieved of his responsibilities and
subjected to an extremely heavy fine.
¹³

However, the hypothesis of a twofold system of election remains tenuous. It is based
on an extract from the
Constitution of the Athenians
(61.1) that attests that in Aristotle’s day the
stratēgoi
were elected no longer by their tribes but by the people as a whole. But this passage
does not record the point at which this change took place. It could very well have
happened as early as the first half of the fifth century, which would explain the
simultaneous presence of
stratēgoi
from the same tribe, without implying the coexistence of two different modes of election.
¹⁴
As early as Pericles’ time,
stratēgoi
may have been elected by the community as a whole, and this would have bestowed upon
them reinforced popular legitimacy, although it would at the same time have
deprived them of the chance to stand out individually from the rest of the other
stratēgoi
.