Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (27 page)

Not only did Dönitz aid the army with gunnery support from his warships, but he also furnished it with men. On 18 January he placed a naval infantry regiment of 3,000 men at the army’s disposal. As the situation continued to deteriorate, Dönitz realized that additional assistance was necessary. Two days later he met with Hitler and offered 20,000 naval troops to the army.
⁹⁰
On 22 January he proposed sending 1,500 men from a U-boat training division at Gdynia to protect Danzig, but Hitler refused this suggestion, claiming that these men were irreplaceable specialists. The same day Dönitz declared that as a result of Hitler’s repeated statements, even in the present situation the U-boat war must continue and even be intensified. Naval personnel involved in the submarine campaign, and those on surface ships necessary for U-boat training, must be preserved for this vital mission. All other naval troops, however, had to assist the army in any way possible. A few days later he offered another 10,000 men to OKW.
⁹¹

At the end of the month Dönitz contemplated the formation of independent divisions, perhaps even a corps, composed solely of naval troops. Himmler had created entire armies from SS personnel, and Göring had set up Air Force field divisions in 1942. Why not form his own divisions from superfluous naval personnel? Dönitz proposed this at a conference with Hitler on 30 January. Keitel and Jodl immediately voiced their approval, and Hitler agreed. Of the 20,000 men given to the army a few days earlier, they decided to hold back 8,000 to form the 1st Naval Division, the first unit of a proposed Naval Corps.
⁹²
A week later Dönitz had received permission to set up a second division of naval troops.
⁹³
On 1 April Keitel ordered the 163rd Infantry Division replenished with naval troops and transferred to the navy as the 3rd Naval Infantry Division.
⁹⁴
Now Dönitz too had begun to establish his own army, a clear indication of his prestige. There is no doubt that these men could have been put to good use in short order as replacements in army divisions.
⁹⁵
The establishment of independent formations, however, required these troops to be trained and equipped, a rather lengthy process in terms of the prevailing crisis in the East.

A final point concerns the increasingly close contact between Dönitz and Hitler in the final months of the war. In the three months from 18 January to 18 April, Dönitz attended Hitler’s situation conferences on at least fifty-six occasions. The reason for hovering at Hitler’s side was to ensure the
defense of ports in the Baltic. Once he had insisted upon Courland’s defense, he fell victim to something similar to the domino theory. First, East Prussian ports had been essential to supply Courland, and then West Prussian harbors were necessary to supply both Courland and East Prussia. Finally, Pomeranian ports had to be held to supply all isolated units east of the Oder. The defense of one later required the defense of all.

C
HAPTER
7

Bastions or Bridgeheads?

A
N ANALYSIS OF GERMAN STRATEGY
in the final months of the war poses several problems. In the first place, virtually all of Hitler’s generals, and some scholars, insist that there was no such thing. German generals (and admirals) blame Hitler for everything that went wrong and credit themselves with every success. Many former generals maintain that Hitler’s “strategy” in the final phase of the war consisted simply of attempting to avoid defeat. Hitler was merely a maniac determined to wreak the greatest possible vengeance and destruction upon his enemies, and finally on the German people themselves, before going out in a blaze of glory with Europe as his funeral pyre. A similar interpretation maintains that Hitler’s strategy depended solely on tenaciously clinging to every foot of ground held by German forces. The reason for the emergence of the Courland pocket, as well as those in East and West Prussia, and anywhere else, was simply that Hitler never permitted retreats. The following chapters consider possible alternatives, asserting that Hitler in fact had plans that he believed offered him a chance not merely to delay Germany’s defeat until June or even July 1945 but to turn the tide of the war yet again and achieve his objectives of victory, conquest, and the racial reorganization of Europe.

Courland

T
HE
“
OFFICIAL
”
REASON
for the defense of Courland and other Baltic bridgeheads was to tie down Soviet forces. According to this
“Wellenbrecher”
(or
breakwater) doctrine, Hitler believed that for every German soldier defending outposts behind the front lines, the Soviets would have to detach two to three men to contain the German garrison. By leaving behind disproportionate numbers of troops to guard Courland and other “fortresses,” the Russians would weaken themselves so seriously that Hitler would be able to defeat the Red Army before it reached Berlin, and the tide would turn in Germany’s favor.
¹
In postwar interrogations, Göring seemed to confirm that this was the reason Hitler refused to evacuate Courland:

The Führer couldn’t make up his mind to take these divisions out of there. Only six divisions were called back. All the other eighteen were lost. Nobody could understand why Hitler did not evacuate all of them. His idea was that these twenty-four divisions would tie up sixty Russian divisions. He believed that shifting these twenty-four divisions by sea would take longer than shifting the sixty Russian divisions by land.
²

Courland offers the best opportunity to analyze the
Wellenbrecher
doctrine, because it was the first major bridgehead on the Baltic, and thus was in existence the longest. In addition, more documentary evidence survives from the autumn of 1944 than for the chaotic winter and spring of 1945.

When Hitler commanded Army Group North to defend Courland, Schörner issued an order informing his troops, “The Führer has ordered that Courland be held, and to go over to the defense along the present line. Now more than ever, our task is not to yield a single foot of ground and to tie down the 150 enemy units opposite us, to smash them whenever the opportunity arises, and thereby ease the defense of our homeland.”
³

The next day Wenck confirmed that the army group’s mission consisted entirely of tying down enemy forces.
⁴
Despite the catastrophic situation on the Eastern Front in the first months of 1945, Hitler continued to insist on Courland’s defense, asserting that the army group’s evacuation would free too many Soviet divisions. He also called upon the Courland armies to conduct periodic attacks to prevent the Soviets from withdrawing forces from the area. Even as late as mid-April 1945, Hitler emphasized the importance of preventing the Soviets from transferring units to the Oder front, a point he reiterated at a meeting with Hilpert in Berlin on 18 April.
⁵
If this was the reason for Courland’s defense, was it successful?

Army Group North did initially tie down a substantial number of Soviet divisions in Courland. On 22 October, Schörner, at this time commanding approximately thirty-six divisions, briefed Guderian that the Soviets had 117 infantry and thirty-five armored units opposite the army
group, with additional enemy forces moving into Courland. By mid-November the army group reported that Soviet strength had increased by twenty to twenty-five rifle divisions and one armored corps, bringing the besieging force to sixteen armies with nearly 200 formations, consisting of 122–132 infantry and from 53 to 57 armored units.
⁶
This represented the peak of the army group’s success in tying down Soviet divisions. At the beginning of December, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, chief of army intelligence in the East, estimated that 123 Russian rifle divisions and 36 armored brigades remained in Courland. During the Third Courland Battle the army group detected the absence of four Soviet armies, including the powerful Fifth Guards Tank, Third Shock, and Second Guards armies.
⁷
Nevertheless, at the end of the year the army group reported that with about 160 formations opposite Courland, the Soviets still had not given up their intention to destroy the German bridgehead in Latvia. In fact, although the Russians had fewer divisions than in the Second Courland Battle, the actual number of enemy troops had increased, because the Soviets had replenished their units. In early January 1945 German intelligence calculated Soviet strength in Courland at approximately ninety-eight rifle divisions, eight infantry brigades, thirty-one tank brigades, and seventy-two armored regiments, facing about thirty-three German divisions.
⁸

By mid-February 1945 Gehlen estimated that only sixty-three infantry divisions, one armored corps, and thirteen independent armored units remained opposite Courland. Two weeks later, however, Vietinghoff pegged enemy strength at seventy-seven rifle divisions and forty armored formations. These numbers remained essentially unchanged until the beginning of May, when German intelligence assumed the Soviets had transferred units from Prussia to Courland, increasing Soviet forces to nine armies with over eighty-six rifle divisions and up to eighty-five independent armored units.
⁹
Since about twenty German divisions remained in Courland following the evacuations of January through March, the army group was tying down three to four times as many divisions as it possessed, even better odds than Göring claimed Hitler wanted in the first place.

Nonetheless, the Soviets withdrew a considerable number of units by the beginning of 1945. During the first two Courland Battles the Germans identified fourteen to sixteen armies opposite Courland, including three elite Guards armies, four Shock armies, one Guards tank army, and six to eight general-purpose armies. In early December intelligence indicated the withdrawal of the Fifth Guards Tank Army. Schörner acknowledged to Guderian that if the Soviets had withdrawn this army, they had removed a powerful offensive force indeed.
¹⁰
By April the Soviets withdrew at least
seven armies from Courland, including one Guards tank army, one Guards army, two Shock armies, and three to four general-purpose armies. The Russian forces remaining in Courland consisted of two Guards armies, two Shock armies, and four to five general-purpose armies.
¹¹

The Soviets also withdrew significant numbers of aircraft from Latvia. The army group reported the presence of three air armies in early November 1944, and at the end of the year it estimated the Russians had approximately 4,750 combat aircraft in the Courland area. The Germans detected the transfer of about 500 aircraft in January 1945, and by early February the Third Air Army and parts of the Fifteenth Air Army had been sent to East Prussia.
¹²

The Soviets withdrew over half their armored corps from Courland. During the first two Courland Battles Schörner’s army group faced five tank corps, one Guards tank corps, and one Guards mechanized corps. Of these units, only two tank corps and one Guards mechanized corps remained in Latvia.
¹³
In mid-April the Soviets still retained a fairly large number of independent armored units in Courland, when the Soviets disposed of an estimated sixteen tank brigades, thirty-five tank regiments, and forty-five assault gun regiments.
¹⁴

It seems less likely that Hitler ordered Memel’s defense for the purpose of tying down Soviet units. The bridgehead around the city was so small that the Russians could besiege it with relatively little force. Once the initial attacks on Memel failed, the Germans observed the withdrawal of several units. In mid-December the Germans estimated that only five Russian rifle divisions and three armored regiments stood opposite the city, albeit with plentiful reserves available from the Courland front.
¹⁵
Since the Germans had two infantry divisions and some fortress units in the city, Memel by no means tied down enough Soviet units to serve as an effective breakwater.

East Prussia

H
ITLER REPEATEDLY ORDERED
bridgeheads in eastern Germany defended to hold back enemy forces. In late February 1945 Rendulic acknowledged that his army group’s task was to tie down and inflict losses upon Soviet troops in East Prussia for the benefit of the Oder and Pomeranian fronts. Especially at the end of March and beginning of April, with the Soviet assault on Berlin imminent, on an almost daily basis Hitler instructed German troops in Prussia that their mission was to prevent the enemy from withdrawing forces to attack Berlin.
¹⁶
Like Memel, the West Prussian and Pomeranian bridgeheads tied down few Soviet divisions. Elbing and Kolberg fell too quickly to be any real hindrance to the Russians, and the
Soviets smashed German positions around Danzig and Gdynia in short order, seizing both ports and forcing their defenders back into tiny bridgeheads. It is extremely unlikely that the survivors who fled to the Hela Peninsula tied down many Soviet units, and those at the mouth of the Vistula probably did not bind many more.

East Prussia is another matter. Here, as in Courland, the Germans initially tied down quite a number of Soviet divisions. At the beginning of the January offensive Gehlen estimated that the Soviets had concentrated 145 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 77 armored units opposite Reinhardt’s army group. A few days later the Germans raised this figure to 180 rifle divisions, 5 to 7 tank or mechanized corps, and 1 cavalry corps. In mid-February, following the army group’s isolation, 95 rifle divisions and 72 armored formations faced German forces in East Prussia.
¹⁷
On 1 March Gehlen estimated the Soviets held approximately 94 rifle divisions and 75 armored units opposite Army Group North. At the same time the Soviets faced Army Group Vistula, defending the Berlin front and Pomerania, with some 123 rifle divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, and 108 armored formations.
¹⁸
As of 1 March Army Group North commanded approximately thirty divisions, and Army Group Vistula contained over forty divisions. Two weeks later, however, the Russians had cleared German forces from Pomerania east of the Oder River, and Second Army in West Prussia had been attached to Army Group North. Under these conditions the Soviets deployed nearly twice the number of units against Army Group North as they had along the Oder. Army Group North then faced 142 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 111 armored formations. Opposite Army Group Vistula were 76 rifle divisions, 7 cavalry divisions, and 57 armored units. These numbers remained essentially the same to the end of the month.
¹⁹
German estimates of Soviet strength in early April reveal a powerful concentration of troops against Fourth Army in East Prussia. Some 90 rifle divisions and 62 armored units faced Fourth Army, while 50 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and between 30 and 50 armored formations engaged Second Army. A week later Foreign Armies East, now headed by Colonel Gerhard Wessel, concluded that 129 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 92 armored units stood opposite the Army of East Prussia and that 82 rifle divisions, 7 cavalry divisions, and 78 armored units faced Army Group Vistula.
²⁰