Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (22 page)

By far the greatest actual menace to the Courland convoys came from Soviet aircraft. In Admiral Eastern Baltic’s operational area during 1944 the Germans lost eight vessels (warships and merchant vessels) sunk and eleven damaged to mines, and four ships sunk and one damaged by Soviet submarines. In contrast, enemy aircraft accounted for fifty-eight vessels sunk and 112 damaged.
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Despite all these perils, however, the percentage of German shipping lost in the Baltic was quite low.
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Air reconnaissance over the Gulf of Finland remained essential to determining the whereabouts of the Soviet fleet, but lack of fuel and Soviet air superiority impeded the fulfillment of this vital mission. The Skl requested the Luftwaffe to rectify this situation and also ordered increased patrols by naval vessels. In doing so the navy demonstrated its anxiety about the potential threat from Russia’s surface fleet. The Skl feared that by utilizing cover of darkness during long winter nights, Soviet warships could make surprise appearances in coastal areas or on convoy routes as far west as the Bay of Danzig, jeopardizing Courland’s supply.
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The navy had to continue to rely upon its own vessels for scouting, because the air force did not fly a single reconnaissance mission in the months of November 1944 and January 1945.
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Air reconnaissance or no, the Baltic Fleet never budged from Kronstadt. Soviet sources maintain that the primary reasons for its failure to sail were the presence of mine barrages and the Germans’ destruction of port installations as they retreated from the Baltic States.
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Thus only Russian submarines, torpedo boats, and fleet aircraft attempted to halt convoys to Courland. With these forces the Russians disrupted—but they, as noted, by no means prevented the delivery of supplies to Courland.

The Baltic Fleet’s inactivity came as a pleasant surprise to Kummetz, who regarded the Soviets’ caution as incomprehensible.
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He asserted that
raids against German convoy routes and submarine training areas, even if only by Russian destroyers, would have thrown his forces into disarray. German naval officers assumed that the Baltic fleet’s hesitance to leave port was due mainly to fear of mines in the Gulf of Finland and the lack of training, because Soviet warships had been bottled up near Leningrad since the autumn of 1941.

If the reason for the Soviet fleet’s inactivity remains a mystery, the Russians’ failure to conduct landings on Courland’s coast is even more perplexing. Considering the impressive Soviet success in capturing the Baltic Isles and their repeated failure to crack German defenses on the mainland, it is puzzling that the Soviets never attempted even a minor assault on Courland’s coast. If nothing else, such a feint could have drawn off German reserves during an offensive. Following the Soviet amphibious assault on Ösel on 5 October, protection of Courland’s coast became increasingly urgent. Even before the loss of Sworbe, the Germans felt that they had to guard against landing attempts in the army group’s rear. At the end of September and the beginning of October, Army Group North ordered parts of three weakened divisions and as many rear-area units as possible transferred to coastal areas to defend against possible enemy landings. Admiral Eastern Baltic reported that although swampy terrain behind Courland’s northern coast would hinder the Soviets’ ability to form deep bridgeheads, it would also impede the movement of Germans reserves to threatened sectors.
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After the loss of Sworbe the Skl recognized that the Soviets had gained an excellent springboard for operations against Courland’s northern shores, as well as valuable flank protection for landings on the eastern coast of Latvia. Schörner warned OKH that the Russians could put troops ashore at any time. German defenses were insufficient to repulse even weak landing forces, yet he could spare no additional troops from the land front.
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The army group was particularly apprehensive about an amphibious assault once weather conditions improved in the spring, especially since the navy could not lay enough mines to protect the coast. This was an excellent opportunity to break the deadlock on the land front, an opportunity that the Soviets failed to exploit.

Evacuations

A
RMY GROUP NORTH HAD OVER
five hundred thousand men when it went over to the defense in Courland, but by the beginning of April 1945 its strength had decreased by half.
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This enormous reduction in strength did not result solely from combat losses, for during its isolation the army
group gave up nearly half its divisions to other formations. Although in the beginning evacuations were somewhat limited, starting in January 1945 Hitler ordered large-scale troop withdrawals to shore up other sectors of the Eastern Front.

On 20 October, when Schörner received the command to defend Courland, Hitler ordered the army group to prepare to withdraw two infantry divisions, plus portions of several formations from Third Panzer Army that had been separated from their parent units then in Memel and East Prussia. Within a week the army group received instructions to prepare to evacuate an additional infantry division, an armored division, and the staff of Sixteenth Army. Schörner protested that he could not give up so many units and that he desperately needed Sixteenth Army’s staff, offering the staff of Army Detachment Grasser in its place. He also pointed out that the divisions OKH had requested were his strongest units. As had happened often in the past, Hitler gave in to Schörner’s arguments. The staff of Sixteenth Army remained in Courland, and the army group sent only one infantry division and the detachment staff to Army Group Center.
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The army group gave up two more infantry divisions by the end of the year, but Schörner managed to retain most of his strength. This situation changed dramatically, however, after Schörner’s departure and the Soviets launched their Vistula-Oder offensive in January 1945. The collapse of Army Groups A and Center compelled Hitler to order massive troop withdrawals. Goebbels referred to Courland as a “large reservoir” from which one division after another had been evacuated. At the beginning of February Vietinghoff protested that since early December the army group had given up, or was in the process of shipping out, nine divisions, a brigade, and numerous smaller units, which had reduced the army group’s strength by over 87,000 men. Vietinghoff did not share Schörner’s success in changing Hitler’s mind. In the following month OKH ordered the evacuation of a corps staff, an assault gun brigade, and three further infantry divisions.
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It was not an easy time for the army group to release these units, because the evacuations coincided with the Fourth and Fifth Courland battles. Vietinghoff pleaded for permission to send units already awaiting embarkation to aid in the defensive struggle, but Hitler refused.
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After the beginning of March orders to withdraw additional divisions ceased. That the army group managed to hold its front in Courland is all the more surprising in view of the evacuation of nearly half its strength. The Soviets, of course, by that time had withdrawn a large number of their units from Latvia as well.

In May 1945, after becoming Hitler’s successor, Dönitz attempted to evacuate as many troops from Courland as possible. On 7 May Hilpert
received word of Germany’s surrender, along with orders to ship out as many men as possible before the surrender took effect.
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All ships had to leave Courland’s ports by midnight on 8 May. Hilpert received instructions to evacuate all sick and wounded soldiers;
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the army group decided to send back also its reserves plus one officer and 125 men from each division. Of these troops, priority for evacuation went to soldiers with children in Germany. Thousands of men, many of whom would find no place on board, waited patiently in Courland’s ports while loading continued throughout the afternoon and evening of 8 May. A General Staff officer sent to Courland on 8 May to ensure the army group had received the capitulation order reported that not only was discipline unbroken but that the attitude of troops there was “fabulous,” “sober,” and “composed.”
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A total of four convoys left Libau with approximately 14,400 troops in sixty-five vessels. Two convoys sailed from Windau, carrying about 11,300 men in sixty-one ships. As the last convoy left Libau, advance Soviet forces arrived and fired on the ships, capturing two tugs loaded with soldiers.
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With the convoys left the last glimmer of hope. Although discipline had been maintained during the loading process, after the ships’ departure there was widespread panic. Soldiers seized practically anything that would float and attempted to escape by sea. Some reached the convoys and were taken on board, others landed in Sweden and were later turned over to the Russians, but many drowned in vessels never intended for use at sea.
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For the rest, on 8 May over 200,000 men of Army Group Courland laid down their arms and entered Soviet captivity.
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Several possible reasons for Hitler’s decision to defend Courland will be examined in the final chapters of this work. Yet the extent of Hitler’s interest in Courland deserves comment. For example, on 17 December 1944, the day after launching the Ardennes Offensive, upon Dönitz’s request Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to withdraw fighter aircraft from the Reich to protect Libau.
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At the end of February 1945 Hitler feared the Soviets might destroy Libau’s port facilities to deprive the army group of supplies; as a precautionary measure, therefore, he instructed the navy to build improvised piers at Libau and Windau. As a final example, at the end of March 1945 Hitler proposed the use of submarines to transport supplies to Courland.
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Dönitz replied that U-boats could not carry enough cargo for this to be practical, but the idea illustrates Hitler’s interest in Courland.

Hitler’s constant changing of the army group’s commanders in 1945 is another subject requiring analysis. Hitler demonstrated his desire to retain Courland by leaving Schörner, whom he considered one of his best generals—if not his very best—in command until the beginning of 1945.
Once the Soviet attack in Poland threatened Upper Silesia’s industry, Hitler called upon Schörner to reestablish Army Group A’s front. He replaced Schörner with Rendulic, another avid Nazi and a supposed defensive expert. Then the situation in East Prussia, vital for its shipyards and as an integral part of the Reich, required a firm hand and Hitler recalled Rendulic from Courland almost as soon as he had arrived. In his place came Vietinghoff, who had proven his capability in defensive battles in Italy. By the time Rendulic returned to Courland the situation in East Prussia had stabilized, although the lull proved illusory. Rendulic’s stay in Courland again was brief, but who was better suited to defend Vienna than an Austrian? Only at the beginning of April did Hitler appoint a relatively unknown general, Hilpert, to command the army group. At this time, with the Russians at the gates of so many of the Reich’s most important cities, Hitler needed the services of his top generals at home. Hitler changed commanders in other army groups on the Eastern Front in the course of 1945, but nowhere else did he do so as often as in Courland. At first glance this appears to indicate that Hitler did not quite know what to with Courland. In fact, the opposite is true. He always ensured that Courland had, in his eyes, a commander of the first rank, and he brought them from as far away as Norway and Italy for that purpose.

C
HAPTER
6

W
HILE THE SOLDIERS OF
Army Group Courland struggled to hold their positions, the Soviets did not remain idle elsewhere. Stalin launched a massive offensive in January 1945 in which the Red Army advanced from the Vistula to the Oder. In the course of this operation most of Army Group Center was forced back against the shores of the Baltic. When the Soviets severed East Prussia’s land contact with the rest of the front, Hitler refused to allow the troops there to break through to German lines. He insisted they hold their ground to defend Baltic ports. Hitler’s attempt to retain possession of the Pomeranian and West Prussian coast with the newly created Army Group Vistula also failed, and by March several of its divisions had their backs to the sea in bridgeheads around key ports. Although some of these bridgeheads, such as the ones at Elbing and Kolberg, held out for only a few days, tens of thousands of German soldiers still defended coastal sectors east of the Oder River when Germany surrendered.

Memel

T
HE SOVIET OFFENSIVE OF
5 October 1944, which isolated Army Group North in Courland, dealt a blow to German troops in Lithuania as well. As they surged toward the Baltic coast, the Russians shattered Third Panzer Army. Some German units fought their way south to East Prussia, others were pushed north into Courland, and one corps withdrew to a bridgehead around Memel, Hitler’s last peacetime territorial acquisition.

Already on 7 October the Soviet breakthrough threatened XXVIII Corps, defending the sector between Schagarren and Schaulen, with encirclement from both north and south. The corps commander, Gen. Hans Gollnick, had
to decide whether to retreat toward Libau or Memel. Gollnick regarded Memel’s defense as more important and withdrew toward that port. Gen. Erhard Raus, Third Panzer Army’s commander, appointed Gollnick commandant of Memel on the 9th and insisted the city be held to the end.
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Gollnick had the remnants of three divisions at his disposal. To augment his forces, the Germans for the first time called out their militia, the Volkssturm, to protect the Kurische Nehrung, a narrow strip of land behind the city.
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On 10 October the Soviets reached the shore of the Kurisches Haff south of Memel and the Baltic coast north of the city at Polangen, severing the corps’s contact with both Army Group Center in East Prussia and Army Group North in Courland.