Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (15 page)

C
HAPTER
4

A
S ARMY GROUP NORTH WITHDREW
to Courland, a bitter struggle ensued for possession of the Baltic Isles. This strategically located archipelago commands the entrances to the Gulf of Riga, which is accessible only through the Irben Straits or Moon Sound.
¹
The relatively unknown battle for these islands was the scene of the German Navy’s largest fleet action since the invasion of Norway four and a half years earlier, and one of Russia’s largest amphibious operations in World War II. During the fight for these islands, particularly the lengthy defense of the Sworbe Peninsula, the interests of the German Army and Navy on the northern sector clashed to a greater extent than at any other time.

The issue of protecting these islands first arose in the autumn of 1943 during discussions for Army Group North’s proposed withdrawal to the Panther Position. During the German retreat from Leningrad at the beginning of 1944, Model expressed concern about a possible Soviet coup de main against Dagö (Hiiumaa) and Ösel (Saaremaa) and strengthened the islands’ defenses.
²
Yet at the beginning of September 1944 the Baltic Isles’ garrison was still extremely weak. Upon receiving news of Finland’s surrender, Hitler ordered German troops on Ösel and Dagö reinforced, and Schörner accordingly transferred a division to the islands. Due to their proximity to the mainland, during the withdrawal from Estonia the Baltic Isles became a dumping ground for men and equipment hastily evacuated from Estonian ports. On 20 September OKH ordered the Baltic Isles to be held and instructed Schörner to prepare to reinforce the islands.
³
Schörner requested Admiral Eastern Baltic to provide naval forces and coastal batteries to defend the islands against anticipated Soviet landings. Realizing that there were not enough men to defend the entire island group, the army group decided to concentrate its forces on the larger islands of Moon (Muhu), Dagö, and Ösel. German troops evacuated Worms (Vormsi) on 26 September, and the Soviets occupied the island that night.

MAP
6.
THE BALTIC ISLES

Soviet plans to capture the Baltic Isles involved one of Russia’s largest amphibious operations of World War II.
⁴
The Soviets initially intended to land on Moon and Worms on 26 September, then to invade Dagö and Ösel the next day. This somewhat ambitious plan was delayed to allow more time to clear mines from Moon Sound and to assemble troops and landing craft. The revised plan called for the seizure of one island after another (Moon, Dagö, and finally Ösel), with the operation to be completed by 5 October at the latest. On the evening of 29 September Soviet forces
landed at several sites along Moon’s eastern coast, about three miles from the mainland. Natzmer ordered the Soviets driven from the beaches and requested support from light naval vessels. But later that night the army group instructed the Baltic Isles’ Armed Forces Commander to withdraw his troops from Moon to Ösel if necessary and to prepare for Dagö’s evacuation. The army group also intended, if Ösel’s defense was not required, to pull its forces back to the Sworbe Peninsula, at the southern end of that island, since control of the Irben Straits was vital to safeguard shipping to Riga.
⁵
The Germans withdrew from Moon to Ösel that night, and the Soviets thus gained possession of the island within a day.

OKH refused Schörner’s request to evacuate Dagö. On 30 September Hitler declared possession of Ösel and Dagö to be of decisive importance and ordered reinforcements sent to the islands immediately. Guderian reported that Dönitz had been asked to employ all available naval forces to assist in the islands’ defense and to disrupt the Soviets’ supply to their troops on Moon. Furthermore, OKH commanded Schörner to prepare an operation to recapture Moon.
⁶
It is unlikely the Germans could have regained the island, and in any case subsequent events ruled out this option. Early on the morning of 2 October the Russians landed at four sites on Dagö. The Soviets quickly broke out from their beachheads, and the Germans withdrew from the northern part of the island to form two bridgeheads in the south. By the afternoon of 3 October both bridgeheads had been evacuated, the defenders retiring to Ösel.

On the morning of 5 October the Soviets landed almost simultaneously at five locations on Ösel. The army group pointed out to OKH that in 1941 the Soviets had had seven divisions on Ösel but could not prevent German forces from taking the island. By the end of the day the Germans had written off most of Ösel and merely planned to hold bridgeheads around the port of Arensburg and on the Sworbe Peninsula. Shortly after midnight Natzmer approved a gradual withdrawal to these positions but warned that Arensburg’s defense was not to jeopardize Sworbe, which should be readied for a protracted defense. Natzmer informed OKH and Admiral Eastern Baltic, however, that German units were conducting a fighting withdrawal to a position at the center of the island.
⁷
On the afternoon of 7 October the Soviets captured Arensburg, and German troops on Ösel withdrew to positions at the head of the Sworbe Peninsula.

The next morning Natzmer notified Bonin that he feared the Soviets planned to cross from Ösel to the mainland. The Germans estimated that the Russians had six rifle divisions and two armored units on Ösel. At this time the army group’s main concern was to halt the Soviet advance on Libau and
Memel, and Natzmer complained that he could spare only one exhausted division for coastal defense in Courland. Soviet forces on Ösel pressed home their attack, pushing the Germans back to the Ariste Line, at Sworbe’s narrowest point—about three kilometers in width—on 10 October. The German commander on Sworbe pleaded for support from the navy’s Second Task Force, but Schörner refused, claiming that this would tie down all available aircraft and naval escort vessels for two days.
⁸

In an attempt to outflank German positions on Sworbe, the Soviets unsuccessfully attempted landing operations behind the front on 11 and 12 October. After a brief respite the Russians resumed the offensive from 19 to 23 October, pushing the Germans back from the Ariste Line, past a second line of defense to the Leo Line, compelling Schörner to send even more troops to Sworbe.
⁹
Hitler intervened at this point, declaring Sworbe a “fortified site,” to be held to the last man, and he called upon the navy to support the fight for the peninsula with the Second Task Force. The army group welcomed the offer of assistance but warned that it could not provide fighter protection for the warships. Nevertheless, two torpedo boats shelled Soviet positions on Sworbe on 23 October, and
Lützow
bombarded Russian forces there the following day.
¹⁰
On 28 October Hitler commanded the army group to recapture the Ariste Line and instructed the Skl to provide as much naval support as possible. When Voss pointed out that fighter protection was a prerequisite for such an operation, Hitler ordered additional fighter aircraft transferred to Army Group North. He wanted the navy to provide as many cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats as it could to support the attack.
¹¹
The next day Conrady informed the Skl that Guderian had requested support from the Second Task Force to halt the Soviet offensive. Schörner prepared to send more forces to Sworbe, but the onset of a Soviet offensive on the Courland front forced him to call off the attack to regain the Ariste Line and to return the troops assembled for the operation to their former positions on the mainland.
¹²

The front on Sworbe remained calm until 18 November, when the Soviets struck again and on the first day ejected the Germans from the entire length of their main line of defense. Schörner ordered reinforcements to the peninsula to regain the Leo Line, insisting that the Führer order to hold Sworbe must be obeyed. Sixteenth Army protested that the delivery of one or two battalions could not restore the situation and requested permission to evacuate the peninsula. Schörner clung until midday to the idea of regaining the old positions, but during the afternoon he gave up this intention as reports of the disintegration of German units there arrived. That night Schörner informed Hitler that Sworbe’s garrison had been smashed
and that he had ordered a withdrawal to bridgeheads on the peninsula’s southern tip. He concluded his message with a plea for support from the Second Task Force and for freedom of action to evacuate Sworbe.
¹³

On 21 November Natzmer confided to Gen. Carl Hilpert, Sixteenth Army’s commander, that Schörner had decided to evacuate the peninsula on his own responsibility if the situation deteriorated further. Two days later Sixteenth Army reported that the destruction of all troops on Sworbe was imminent unless they were withdrawn immediately. Disobeying Hitler’s explicit orders, Schörner commanded Sworbe’s evacuation and notified OKH of his decision. Early the next morning the last German troops had boarded ships to return to Courland. The struggle for the Baltic Isles, which had lasted nearly two months, had come to an end.
¹⁴

While Soviet and German troops had been battling for control of the islands, the German Army and Navy had clashed over the need for their defense. The army group saw no reason to hold the Baltic Isles for any length of time, especially after Riga’s evacuation. Schörner contended that once his forces had withdrawn to Courland, possession of Sworbe served no purpose. On 10 October Natzmer declared that Sworbe’s garrison could not hold out in the long run and should withdraw to the mainland after the middle of the month, once units arrived in northern Courland for coastal defense. But the next day he noted that although the reason for holding Ösel had been to guarantee the use of Riga’s port, the army group had not yet received permission to evacuate Sworbe, and it seemed likely that it would have to defend the peninsula even after abandoning Riga. Schörner stated that the “higher leadership,” presumably Hitler, wished to retain Sworbe after Riga’s evacuation but that the army group would later request to withdraw from the peninsula.
¹⁵

Schörner wrote a personal letter to Guderian on 12 October asserting that there was no convincing reason to control the Irben Straits after giving up Riga and requesting permission to evacuate Sworbe. Two days later the army group’s operations officer, Gersdorff, hand-carried Schörner’s letter to Guderian and he also proposed Sworbe’s evacuation. Conrady insisted that the peninsula must be held to prevent Soviet warships from exiting the Gulf of Riga. Gersdorff replied that holding Sworbe did not serve this purpose, because shipping lanes through the Irben Straits passed along Courland’s coast, within range of coastal batteries. Guderian declared, however, that the army group had to hold on to Sworbe in order to hinder Soviet landings on the coast of Courland. At this point Guderian, reluctant to define exactly what the army group’s future task would be, remarked that possession of northern Courland was important to the navy.
¹⁶

In fact, for some time the navy had considered retention of the Baltic Isles to be of the utmost consequence. In early August Voss had requested an assessment of the importance of the Baltic Isles. The Skl responded that these islands represented a strategic position with respect to control of the entrances to the Gulf of Finland, as well as for domination of the eastern Baltic, and pointed out that the islands were presently unfortified and weakly manned. If the Soviets captured the Baltic Isles, the Skl warned, the Russians could disrupt convoy traffic to Riga and shipping routes in the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, which would jeopardize supply for Army Group North and Twentieth Mountain Army in Finland, as well as deliveries of Swedish iron ore. Of greater importance, Soviet control of the islands would threaten the navy’s U-boat training areas. For these reasons the Skl demanded that the Baltic Isles be held as long as possible.
¹⁷

On 15 October Schörner asked Admiral Eastern Baltic for his opinion regarding Sworbe, pointing out potential supply complications due to approaching autumn storms. Mindful of his past experiences in the Crimea and Odessa, Schörner wished to protect himself from the navy’s criticism at a later date. Admiral Burchardi replied that possession of Sworbe neither excluded the possibility of Soviet landing operations on Courland’s northern coast nor guaranteed domination of the Irben Straits, explaining that the navy could not effectively mine the straits until German troops evacuated the peninsula. Burchardi complained that efforts to ensure Sworbe’s supply and defense tied up vessels urgently needed for other functions. Finally, he cautioned that the approach of bad weather could result in the isolation of Sworbe’s garrison. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of holding the peninsula, Burchardi favored giving up Sworbe. Schörner seized this unexpected opportunity and sent Burchardi’s report to OKH, along with a request to evacuate the peninsula immediately, before storms isolated the over ten thousand German troops on Sworbe.
¹⁸