Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (14 page)

One of the primary reasons for the navy’s objection to a timely retreat to the Panther Position at the end of 1943 was that giving up territory along the Gulf of Finland, primarily the Kurgolowo and Kolgampia peninsulas, would provide the Soviets an opportunity to prepare an attack against Tütters unobserved. Dönitz insisted that the island should be considered an extension of the East Wall, in order to maintain the minefields in the Gulf of Finland.
⁴²
Hitler’s interest in Tütters also is evident. During the retreat to the Panther Position at the beginning of 1944 Assmann phoned Admiral Burchardi and informed him that Hitler wanted Tütters reinforced. Dönitz, possibly fearing the army would not hold on to the Panther Position, ordered an evaluation of the garrison’s strength and supply status.
⁴³

Not until July 1944, when the army group came under pressure from Hitler to attack in order to regain contact with Army Group Center, did Hitler finally assign the island’s defense to the navy.
⁴⁴
In mid-July the Skl informed Kummetz that it intended to hold Tütters even if the army group retreated and instructed him to prepare the island for a long-term defense. A few days later the Skl noted that Tütters had been supplied for the next six to twelve months. After Schörner had ordered Aster, however, the Skl authorized Kummetz to evacuate the island. Once the attempt to seize Hogland had failed and Army Group North began its withdrawal toward Riga, even Dönitz at last realized that Tütters’s continued defense served no purpose. The island was evacuated by the morning of 19 September.
⁴⁵

By the end of October Army Group North had been isolated in the Baltic States for the second time, and despite Schörner’s hope to break through to the Reich, Hitler had decreed that Courland be held. This was certainly to the navy’s advantage, and there are several examples of Dönitz’s interest in retaining Courland. Voss reported to the Skl at the end of July that Guderian believed he could halt the Soviets before they reached the coast in East Prussia and Courland, an indication that Dönitz had been especially interested in Courland for some time.
⁴⁶
Furthermore, on 8 October Voss notified the Skl that “according to the order of the Commander-in-Chief, Navy, I have pointed out the importance of holding Courland for the conduct of the war at sea. The head of OKW [Keitel] stated that he had informed Hitler correspondingly yesterday evening.”
⁴⁷

Dönitz and Wagner left for Hitler’s headquarters on 12 October, two days after Army Group North had been cut off in Courland. Dönitz wanted to be present when Hitler reached a decision regarding the army group’s future. The next day Wagner informed the Skl that Guderian was pessimistic about Army Group North’s proposed attack to Memel, scheduled to begin on the 15th. If the attack failed, Wagner explained, Guderian intended to recommend the immediate evacuation of Army Group North’s three armored divisions and an additional two infantry divisions.
⁴⁸
On the evening of 19 October the Skl’s liaison officer to OKH reported that Army Group North’s attack had been canceled and that the navy was to prepare to evacuate several divisions from Libau. Conrady added that this information should not yet be mentioned to Army Group North, as Schörner had not yet been informed.
⁴⁹
Although the navy certainly required as much advance notice as possible to make arrangements for the troop evacuations, Conrady knew that the decision to defend Courland would be welcome news to the Skl.

In a private conversation with Hitler a few days earlier, Dönitz had emphasized the importance of the eastern Baltic as the navy’s training area and had optimistically announced that he planned to launch the submarine offensive with the long-awaited new models of U-boats in January 1945.
⁵⁰
Dönitz had successfully argued his case. The day after Hitler ordered Army Group North to go over to the defense in Courland, Voss reported that Hitler did not believe Schörner could break through to the south and that he had again pointed out the absolute necessity of holding the ports of Libau, Windau, and Memel. On 24 October, the day before Schörner proposed his second plan for an attack to Memel, Hitler instructed the navy to examine the possibility of laying an underwater cable in the Baltic to provide a communications link with Libau.
⁵¹
Hitler had already been convinced that Army Group North should remain in Courland.

Guderian’s role in the decision to defend Courland is not as clear as that of Dönitz. Originally from eastern Germany, Guderian was particularly troubled by the approach of Soviet troops to the borders of the Reich. On 8 October he evaluated the situation on the Eastern Front, and his conclusions were not reassuring. The Soviet offensive against Army Group North had achieved success, and a Russian attack in Hungary had also gained ground. Soviet troop concentrations near Warsaw indicated that an assault against Army Group Center was forthcoming; Guderian feared the Soviets also planned a thrust toward Danzig to isolate East Prussia from the Reich. Noting that Army Group North had nearly lost its land contact
with Germany again—a situation that seriously threatened Army Group Center’s northern flank—Guderian wanted to attack simultaneously from Libau to the south and from the Memel River to the north. He acknowledged, however, that the operation would succeed only if it were launched from both directions and if it took place as soon as possible. Overall, Guderian declared, the struggle against the Soviets had reached a decisive phase, due to the proximity of the front to Germany’s frontier. He concluded that to master the situation he required at least six infantry divisions, which would allow him to pull out an equal number of armored divisions currently tied down at the front so as to form an operational reserve. He closed his report with the warning that “in the coming weeks the decision of this war hinges upon holding the Eastern Front. The Soviet Union is Germany’s and Europe’s most dangerous foe. The focal point of our strategy, therefore, must clearly lie in the East!”
⁵²

By 13 October Guderian had reservations about the prospects of success for Schörner’s planned attack to break out of Courland to Memel. He hinted at this again the next day, when Army Group North’s operations officer, Colonel von Gersdorff, met with Guderian to discuss the assault. Guderian emphasized that the operation must begin as soon as possible, because the Soviets would quickly reinforce their defenses south of Libau and, he feared, Memel’s garrison could not hold out much longer. He stressed that to defend the Reich he urgently needed Army Group North’s armored divisions, as well as those in Memel. In addition, in view of the overall situation on the Eastern Front, Guderian informed Gersdorff in no uncertain terms that the army group could not expect a relief attack from East Prussia, because the Soviets had launched offensives between the Vistula and the Bug, as well as at Rozan (about fifty miles northeast of Warsaw), and he expected an attack east of Gumbinnen any day.
⁵³
The Soviet offensive into East Prussia began on 16 October, confirming Guderian’s fears. On the 20th, Army Group North was commanded to defend Courland and to prepare several divisions for evacuation.
⁵⁴

Convinced as he was that the war in the East had reached a decisive point, Guderian’s primary concern now was to prevent the isolation of East Prussia from the Reich. His comments to Gersdorff on 14 October reveal that he desperately wanted to transfer Army Group North’s armored divisions to East Prussia. Wagner’s message to the Skl the previous day divulged Guderian’s sense of urgency—if Schörner’s attack on Memel did not succeed on the first day, he would urge the evacuation of Army Group North’s armored divisions. After the Soviets attacked in Courland, causing the operation to be canceled at least temporarily, and launched the dreaded offensive into East
Prussia, Guderian acted upon his decision to evacuate forces from Army Group North. Although he was first and foremost concerned with the protection of East Prussia, it is also possible that Guderian knew he could not convince Hitler to evacuate Courland. Nonetheless, for Guderian events in East Prussia obviously had precedence over those in Latvia.

Hitler considered the army group’s position along the Gulf of Finland to be of vital importance. He had permitted the isolation of Schörner’s forces at the end of July and, once land contact had been restored, had brushed aside repeated warnings that the Soviets again would cut off its land contact unless the army group withdrew. In the first week of September Hitler insisted that despite Finland’s surrender, maintaining the army group’s position in Estonia still had political significance—to strengthen those “decent” Finns who did not want to go along with the surrender, and thereby also to influence Sweden’s attitude.
⁵⁵
Although he finally permitted Schörner to carry out Aster, Hitler did so reluctantly, because he feared the units defending the Narva front would not be able to retreat to safety, and because he regretted the threat to the navy’s only U-boat training area.
⁵⁶
Once Aster had been completed Hitler was extremely hesitant to give up Riga, convinced that the ports of Libau and Windau did not suffice to supply Schörner’s army group.
⁵⁷
Hitler also repeatedly insisted that the army group prepare an attack to eliminate Soviet forces in the Schaulen–Mitau salient. The sole strategic purpose of such an attack would have been to protect Riga and ports along the Baltic. The only other occasion when Hitler had been so insistent upon Army Group North’s launching an attack was during the summer when Army Group Center faced annihilation. Hitler’s refusal of the army group’s requests to evacuate Estonia—until the day after the attempt to seize Hogland had failed—provides another indication of his support of Dönitz’s arguments for German domination of the Baltic. As mentioned above, Dönitz intended to gain possession of Hogland and maintain it for as long as possible, but this was not the impression given to the army.
⁵⁸

The army had no interest in retaining its position in Estonia or, later, around Riga. On several occasions Schörner petitioned OKH for permission to evacuate these areas, and OKH replied that it was itself attempting to convince Hitler to do so.
⁵⁹
In all likelihood Schörner and Natzmer viewed Aster as only the first stage of a withdrawal from the Baltic States. In this connection Army Detachment Narva’s order to carry out Aster, which indicated the retreat would continue well past Riga, is noteworthy.
⁶⁰

Schörner suspected that the navy played a role counter to his aims. He met briefly with Dönitz prior to his conference with Hitler on 16 September at which he secured permission for Aster. Apparently Dönitz had expressed
interest in holding on to Reval, for the next day, when Schörner informed Guderian that the Soviet attack in the Dorpat sector had forced him to authorize an immediate retreat, he declared: “And I have an urgent request: These navy people must clearly tell the Führer that the matter at Reval in any event be scrapped. I have been all over: on the Channel coast, in Norway, the Crimea—so I know. Yesterday dangerous hints were made of Kertsch and Sevastopol. At least Sevastopol was a fortress! If we have to do that, then it can only be because the enemy forces us to do so.”
⁶¹

The Soviet autumn offensive reveals examples of both unimaginative and cunning operations by the Red Army. Although Second and Third Baltic fronts’ attacks against Riga achieved no noteworthy success, the Soviet thrust to the Baltic was well planned and skillfully executed. Bagramian shifted his armies with greater dispatch than the Germans deemed possible and caught Schörner completely unprepared for the assault. The Soviets, however, were extremely sluggish in their pursuit of retreating German forces during the withdrawal from the Segewold Position to Courland. Even an unsuccessful attack against the narrow Tuckum–Schlock corridor probably would have thrown the retreat into disarray.

For the first time in the period under consideration, Hitler did not change the army group’s commander in a time of crisis. Schörner deserves high marks for his performance during the retreat to Courland. Although Bagramian caught him unawares in the offensive of 5 October, Schörner saved Army Group North from almost certain annihilation east of Riga. If he had not, contrary to Hitler’s instructions, made extensive preparations for Aster and later ordered the retreat without waiting for approval, Army Detachment Narva, and perhaps the entire army group, might not have reached relative safety in Courland.

It is unlikely that another commander, except perhaps Model, could have convinced Hitler to retreat as frequently as Schörner was able to—Guderian and Wenck certainly had less success—or that any other general would have risked, and survived, Hitler’s wrath by ordering retreats before obtaining permission. The most likely reason for this is that Hitler did not question Schörner’s personal loyalty to him and thus accepted Schörner’s actions.
⁶²
Schörner also displayed considerable talent for improvisation. The retreat to Courland in general, and Aster in particular, was a major withdrawal, involving over half a million men and distances measured in hundreds of kilometers. His reputation as a martinet and his mania for traffic control are well attested, but in this instance these qualities contributed to the army group’s survival.

Notwithstanding Dönitz’s vehement postwar protests that he never intervened in questions regarding the war on land, particularly in the case of Courland,
⁶³
he in fact frequently urged Hitler to defend coastal sectors long after these areas no longer held any value for the army. He had prevailed upon Hitler to cling to the Narva sector ever since Army Group North began its withdrawal from Leningrad in January. He had gone to Hitler’s headquarters in mid-September for the sole purpose of preventing the army group’s evacuation of Estonia. This was of decisive importance to Dönitz at the time, since the operation to seize Hogland was under way. Even when Tanne East had failed and Hitler granted conditional approval for Aster, Dönitz still believed that the decision to abandon the Estonian coast was not irrevocable. Schörner had no choice but to accept Hitler’s option to cancel the retreat within the allotted two days, but he accelerated preparations to such an extent that the order would have been difficult to rescind. Nonetheless, even after 16 September Dönitz believed that he still had time to influence Hitler before the retreat would actually take place. When Schörner authorized the retreat to begin immediately on 17 September, Dönitz had no alternative other than to abandon his plans to mount another operation to capture Hogland as well as his intention to hold Tütters. Following Army Group North’s retreat to Courland, Dönitz remained determined to prevent the Soviet fleet from gaining access to the Baltic, either by maintaining the mine barrages in the Gulf of Finland or combatting Soviet warships that attempted to overcome the German blockade. The Skl considered Germany’s possession of the Baltic Isles vital for this task.