Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (56 page)

Phaedr. How ridiculous! 

Soc. Ridiculous! Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy? 

Phaedr. Certainly. 

Soc. And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse puts good for evil being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, falsely persuades them not about "the shadow of an ass," which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evily-what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed? 

Phaedr. The reverse of good. 

Soc. But perhaps rhetoric has been getting too roughly handled by us, and she might answer: What amazing nonsense you are talking! As if I forced any man to learn to speak in ignorance of the truth! Whatever my advice may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at the truth first, and then come to me. At the same time I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth will not give you the art of persuasion. 

Phaedr. There is reason in the lady's defence of herself. 

Soc. Quite true; if only the other arguments which remain to be brought up bear her witness that she is an art at all. But I seem to hear them arraying themselves on the opposite side, declaring that she speaks falsely, and that rhetoric is a mere routine and trick, not an art. Lo! a Spartan appears, and says that there never is nor ever will be a real art of speaking which is divorced from the truth. 

Phaedr. And what are these arguments, Socrates? Bring them out that we may examine them. 

Soc. Come out, fair children, and convince Phaedrus, who is the father of similar beauties, that he will never be able to speak about anything as he ought to speak unless he have a knowledge of philosophy. And let Phaedrus answer you. 

Phaedr. Put the question. 

Soc. Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed-that is what you have heard? 

Phaedr. Nay, not exactly that; I should say rather that I have heard the art confined to speaking and writing in lawsuits, and to speaking in public assemblies-not extended farther. 

Soc. Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours when at Troy, and never of the rhetoric of Palamedes? 

Phaedr. No more than of Nestor and Odysseus, unless Gorgias is your Nestor, and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus. 

Soc. Perhaps that is my meaning. But let us leave them. And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law court-are they not contending?

Phaedr. Exactly so. 

Soc. About the just and unjust-that is the matter in dispute? 

Phaedr. Yes. 

Soc. And a professor of the art will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time, if he is so inclined, to be unjust? 

Phaedr. Exactly. 

Soc. And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good? 

Phaedr. That is true. 

Soc. Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art of speaking by which he makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion? 

Phaedr. Very true. 

Soc. The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is the art, if there be such an art, which is able to find a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others? 

Phaedr. How do you mean? 

Soc. Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception-when the difference is large or small? 

Phaedr. When the difference is small. 

Soc. And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once? 

Phaedr. Of course. 

Soc. He, then, who would. deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things? 

Phaedr. He must. 

Soc. And if he is ignorant of the true nature of any subject, how can he detect the greater or less degree of likeness in other things to that of which by the hypothesis he is ignorant? 

Phaedr. He cannot. 

Soc. And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances? 

Phaedr. Yes, that is the way. 

Soc. Then he who would be a master of the art must understand the real nature of everything; or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or how to avoid it? 

Phaedr. He will not. 

Soc. He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all? 

Phaedr. That may be expected. 

Soc. Shall I propose that we look for examples of art and want of art, according to our notion of them, in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand, and in my own speech? 

Phaedr. Nothing could be better; and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract and-wanting in illustrations. 

Soc. Yes; and the two speeches happen to afford a very good example of the way in which the speaker who knows the truth may, without any serious purpose, steal away the hearts of his hearers. This piece of good-fortune I attribute to the local deities; and perhaps, the prophets of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration to me. For I do not imagine that I have any rhetorical art of my own. 

Phaedr. Granted; if you will only please to get on. 

Soc. Suppose that you read me the first words of Lysias' speech. 

Phaedr. "You know how matters stand with me, and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain that I ought not to fail in my suit, because I am not your lover. For lovers repent-" 

Soc. Enough:-Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of those words? 

Phaedr. Yes. 

Soc. Every one is aware that about some things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ. 

Phaedr. I think that I understand you; but will you explain yourself? 

Soc. When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all? 

Phaedr. Certainly. 

Soc. But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves? 

Phaedr. Precisely. 

Soc. Then in some things we agree, but not in others? 

Phaedr. That is true. 

Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power? 

Phaedr. Clearly, in the uncertain class. 

Soc. Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err? 

Phaedr. He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle. 

Soc. Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred. 

Phaedr. Certainly. 

Soc. Now to which class does love belong-to the debatable or to the undisputed class? 

Phaedr. To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good? 

Soc. Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech? for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot well remember. 

Phaedr. Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake. 

Soc. Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. Alas! how inferior to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement of his lover's speech did insist on our supposing love to be something or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again: 

Phaedr. If you please; but you will not find what you want. 

Soc, Read, that I may have his exact words. 

Phaedr. "You know how matters stand with and how, as I conceive, they might be arranged for our common interest; and I maintain I ought not to fail in my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over." 

Soc. Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus? 

Phaedr. Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end. 

Soc. Then as to the other topics-are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow next in order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote off boldly just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition? 

Phaedr. You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition. 

Soc. At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning, and end, adapted to one another and to the whole? 

Phaedr. Certainly. 

Soc. Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian. 

Phaedr. What is there remarkable in the epitaph? 

Soc. It is as follows:- 

I am a maiden of bronze and lie on the tomb of Midas; 

So long as water flows and tall trees grow, 

So long here on this spot by his sad tomb abiding, 

I shall declare to passers-by that Midas sleeps below. Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference. 

Phaedr. You are making fun of that oration of ours. 

Soc. Well, I will say no more about your friend's speech lest I should give offence to you; although I think that it might furnish many other examples of what a man ought rather to avoid. But I will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric. 

Phaedr. In what way? 

Soc. The two speeches, as you may remember, were unlike-I the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted. 

Phaedr. And right manfully. 

Soc. You should rather say "madly"; and madness was the argument of them, for, as I said, "love is a madness." 

Phaedr. Yes. 

Soc. And of madness there were two kinds; one produced by human infirmity, the other was a divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention. 

Phaedr. True. 

Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also said to be the best, we spoke of the affection of love in a figure, into which we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Love, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain. 

Phaedr. I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you. 

Soc. Let us take this instance and note how the transition was made from blame to praise. 

Phaedr. What do you mean? 

Soc. I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles of which we should be too glad to have a clearer description if art could give us one. 

Phaedr. What are they? 

Soc. First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear. 

Phaedr. What is the other principle, Socrates? 

Soc. The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name-after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.