Years of Victory 1802 - 1812 (85 page)

¹
To Sir W. C. Beresford,
30th
March,
1811.
Gurwood.

on the way and losing two dragoons of his escort in a swollen stream. On the 22nd, while reconnoitring Badajoz, he was all but captured himself by a sudden sortie. During the next two days he drew up detailed instructions for the siege, and arranged for the support of 15,000 Spanish troops in the neighbourhood. Then, on April 25th, after giving Bercsford discretion to fight or retire should Soult—as he expected—advance from Seville to relieve the fortress, he set off again for the north on receipt of disquieting news from Spencer.

For Wellington had underestimated both the obstinacy of Massena's injured pride and his army's capacity for recovery. Re-equipped from bases in Leon and reinforced by drafts from Bessieres's Army of the North, the French were ready to take the field again within three weeks of their arrival at Salamanca. It-was an achievement which could have been accomplished by no other. Behind it was the certain knowledge of the grim old Marshal—born of twenty years of revolutionary politics—that, unless he redeemed his misfortunes quickly, it would be too late. His only chance of deflecting Napoleon's wrath was to take the offensive at once.

His capacity to do so turned chiefly on the retention of Almeida, If the 1300 troops left there under General Brennier could be re-provisioned, the northern door into Portugal would remain open, and, with Badajoz also in French hands, Wellington would be in a cleft stick. To guard both entrances into Portugal he would then be forced to divide his inadequate forces permanently. Massena's problem was to relieve Almeida in time. Lacking the means fo breach its walls, the British could not storm it. But in the chaos of the French retreat little provision had been made for victualling the place, and it could only hold out for a few weeks. Already the British sharpshooters had driven its few cattle from their only pasture on the glacis,
¹
and the garrison had been reduced to half rations. Every effort
, therefore, was made at Massen
a's headquarters to prepare a convoy for its relief at the earliest possible moment.

It was this which brought Wellington hurrying back from the south. Knowing Spencer's limitations, he had given him orders not to contest the passage of the river but to retire, if pressed, westwards. Yet, with Badajoz still to be regained, Wellington now knew that the early reduction of Almeida was vital. If Massena moved to its relief, he would be compelled, at whatever risk, to fight. For unless he could cover it until famine had done the work of his missing

¹
Kincaid,
72-3.
423

siege-train, Napoleon would still be free to renew the invasion of Portugal.

«..

By an immense exertion Massena had assembled 42,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry beyond the Agueda to escort the convoy. Wellington, with two of his eight divisions absent in Estremadura, had only 34,000 foot and 1800 horse. Of these not more than 26,000 wer
e British. His troops, cantoned
over an area of twenty square miles, hailed his return on April 29th with considerable relief. It was not that they feared the odds, but, having tasted victory, they had little wish to revert to the dreary, familiar tale of blunders, retreats and evacuations. With "Old Douro," as they called him, they felt safe. The sight of his long nose in a fight, Johnny Kincaid said, was worth a reinforcement of ten thousand men any day.
¹

His first act on rejoining was to order an immediate concentration. It increased the difficulties of feeding his troops, but there was no alternative. Had Almeida been covered by a dominating hill position like Bussaco, his numerical inferiority would have given him little anxiety, especially as he had forty-eight guns to the thirty-eight which was all his adversary had been able to horse. But the beleaguered fortress stood just outside the mountains, on the high rolling plateau to the east of the Coa where Massena's cavalry—borrowed mostly from Bessieres's Army of the North— were bound to prove dangerous. Having to fight in the open, Wellington chose the best position he could find. He withdrew his troops from the more exposed Agueda to within five or six miles of Almeida. Here, with his left, entrenched among the woods and rocks in front of the town, he disposed the army along a line of low hills behind the narrow gorge-of the Dos Casas. With a clear field of fire before them he felt complete confidence in the ability of his well-trained infantry and artillery to hold up any frontal attack.

The weak -point was on the right, five miles to the south, where the main road from Ciuadad Rodrigo into the Portuguese hinterland crossed the Dos Casas at the village of Fuentes de Onoro—the Fountain of Honour. Behind it on rising ground Wellington posted the best pa
rt of four divisions—Spencer's 1
st, Picton's 3rd and the newly-formed 7th, and, when it came in after covering the withdrawal, the Light Division as a reserve. The village itself he picketed with 28 companies of light troops—British, Portuguese and German. The stronger ground on the left was held by the 5th and 6th Divisions alone. With his usual skill Wellington concealed his men in such a

¹
Kincaid,
73-4.
See also
Random Shots,
168;
Gomm,
215.

way that it was difficult for Massena before attacking to discover their stations or strength.

The French crossed the Agueda on May 2nd, 1811, by the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, the British rearguard retiring before them all day in skirmishing order across the Espeja plain. Early on the 3rd they came up against Wellington's position. After examining it Massena decided to throw his whole weight against Fuentes de Onoro in the hope of breaking his adversary's line and driving him into the Coa. To this end he concentrated five of his eight infantry divisions opposite the British right, and at one o'clock in the afternoon launched them against the village—that is, at the precise point where Wellington was expecting them. They came forward in the usual way, in three dense columns, and, after a hard fight in which they lost heavily, gradually forced the allied sharpshooters back through the narrow streets. Then, before they could recover breath, Wellington launched his counter-at
tack. Two battalions of the 1
st Division —the 71st or Glasgow and the 79th or Cameron Highlanders—with the 2nd battalion of the 24th in support were ordered to advance in line and clear the village. The m
en were hungry, having received
no bread ration for two days. But Colonel Cadogan of the
71st
addressed them with a cheerful, " My lads, you have no provision; there is plenty in the hollow in front, let us down and divide it!" They went forward at the double, with their firelocks trailed and their bonnets in their hands; when they came into view of the enemy, their Colonel cried again, " Here is food, my lads, cut away! Let's show them how we clear the Gallowgate!" At which the Highlanders waved their bonnets, gave three cheers and, bringing their firelocks to the charge, went about the business without another word. While the French officers broke into a frenzy of exhortation, the only order heard in the Scottish ranks was an occasional, "Steady, lads, steady!"
¹

Though the Highland charge was finally held on the west of the village by a French counter-attack,, and firing continued among the tumbled houses and gardens till after midnight, Fuentes remained in British hands. By the end of the day Massena had lost
652
men, including
160
prisoners, to Wellington's
259
casualties without having achieved anything. Next morning in beautiful weather, the two armies faced one another across the river, but the attack was not resumed. After a little mild cannonading, both sides occupied themselves in collecting their wounded, with the usual spontaneous outbreak of fraternising. The French then fell to parading, marching and band-playing in order to impress the British, and the British, characteristically, to playing football.

Meanwhile both Generals were engaged in more serious business. Massena, as after Bussaco, was probing to the left with his cavalry to discover whether there was a way round the British flank. Wellington, knowing that there was and anticipating the move, was extending his right to meet it. The newly-arrived
7th
Division, consisting of
900
untried British infantry,
2200
Portuguese and
1500
foreign auxiliaries,
²
was moved towards Pozo Bello, a village in the plain two miles beyond Fuentes. There was danger in tin's, for it offered scope to the French cavalry, but there was no other way in which Wellington could both cover Almeida and prevent Massena from cutting his communications across the Coa. The troops who in happier circumstances would have extended his right beyond his adversary reach—as at Bussaco—were far away in the Guadiana valley, trying to recover Badajoz.

As soon as darkness fell Massena began to move his men southwards towards Pozo Bello and the woods beyond. His plan was to turn the right of the allied line with three infantry divisions and

¹
Journal
of
a Sold
ier,
107.
2
Oman, IV,
620.

four brigades of cavalry—some 17,000 bayonets and 4000 sabres in all. Then, at the critical moment, when the British were rushing reserves to their threatened flank, three more divisions under General Drouet of the 9th Corps were to renew the frontal attack on Fuentes, and, in conjunction with the sweep from the south, break the back of Wellington's line. Meanwhile Reynier's 2nd Corps, by a demonstration across the Dos Casas, was to prevent the British 5th and 6th Divisions from moving to the aid of their engulfed right and centre.

The test began at dawn when the French cavalry emerged from the woods beyond Pozo Bello and fell on the small force of British and Hanoverian horse guarding the extreme right of the army. The latter, displaying great coolness and gallantry, fell slowly back on the village, where the French infantry joined in the attack about an hour after daylight. Here two isolated battalions of Major-General Houston's 7th Division were severely mauled and forced to retreat on their main body to the north-west. They were only saved by the self-sacrifice of a regiment of German Hussars which repeatedly showed front and charged. By this time Massena's intention was clear. His horsemen were ranging over the. open plain south of Fuentes with the obvious intention of cutting off the 7th Division, while dense columns of infantry were emerging from the woods beyond the captured village of Pozo Bello.

Wellington, who always seemed to see clearest in a crisis, at once altered his dispositions. Realising from the numbers deploying against his right that nothing very formidable was to be feared on his original front, he moved the 3rd and ist Divisions southwards to form a new line at right angles' to the old, pivoting it on the roc
ky hillside about Fuentes de On
oro. By doing so he temporarily sacrificed his communications with Portugal, but their retention was no longer compatible with the blockade of Almeida. Seeing war as an option of difficulties, he yielded the lesser object for the greater. For so long as he held the heights between Fuentes and the Coa, the French would still be unable to relieve Almeida without storming his lines. Nor could they remain astride his communications for long without exposing their own to his counter-attack. And not even a French army could exist in those wasted mountains without supplies.

At the same time Wellington ordered the 7th Division to fall back to the right of his new position. To prevent the French from cutting it off he moved the Light Division down on to the plain. By a happy chance Craufurd had arrived from England on the previous evening, and the light i
nfantry, delighted to be rid of
Erskine's galling rule, were in the highest spirits.
¹
They set out on their mission with complete confidence in their ability to cope with Montbrun's cavalry. By brilliant mancevring and steady, deadly fire, they closed the gap between the army and their imperilled comrades, enabling the latter to continue their withdrawal without molestation. They then started, with the help of Cotton's cavalry, to fall back to the British lines.