Why Leaders Lie (16 page)

28
. Quoted in Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999
(New York: Knopf, 1999), 281–82. See also Joel Beinin,
The Dispersion Of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, And The Formation Of A Modern Diaspora
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 19–20, 31–32, 90–117; Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman,
Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 54–61; Livia Rokach,
Israel’s Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett’s Personal Diary and Other Documents
, 2
^nd
ed. (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982), 38–42; Shabtai Teveth,
Ben-Gurion’s Spy: The Story of the Political Scandal That Shaped Modern Israel
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

29
. Quoted in Anthony Cave Brown,
Bodyguard of Lies
(New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 10. See also Thaddeus Holt,
The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War
(New York: Skyhorse, 2007); Phillip Knightley,
The First Casualty: From the Crimea to Vietnam; The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and
Myth Maker
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Michael Howard,
Strategic Deception in the Second World War
(New York: Norton, 1995); Harold D. Lasswell,
Propaganda Technique in the World War
(New York: Knopf, 1927); J. C. Masterman,
The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972); Arthur Ponsonby,
Falsehood in War-Time, Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated throughout the Nations during the Great War
(New York: Dutton, 1928); Evelin Sullivan,
The Concise Book of Lying
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 229–53.

30
. Quoted in Warren F. Kimball,
The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 7.

31
. It is important to note that militaries place a high premium on truth telling within the organization, because it is an essential ingredient of success in combat. Everyone in the chain of command needs to be confident that they are receiving truthful information from their superiors and subordinates. Otherwise, commanders and their staffs would make plans and wage war on the basis of faulty information, which would markedly increase the likelihood of failure as well as unnecessary casualties. This is why institutions like West Point place great emphasis on their honor code. While deception has no place inside a military organization, it is expected that rival militaries will try to deceive each other, especially in wartime.

32
. Thomas C. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 23, 33. See also Thomas C. Schelling, “Game Theory and the Study of Ethical Systems,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution
12, no. 1 (March 1968): 34–44.

33
. Although the conventional wisdom is that bluffing is commonplace in labor negotiations, at least one scholar argues that it happens “less often than many writers suggest.” Chris Provis, “Ethics, Deception and Labor Negotiation,”
Journal of Business Ethics
28, no. 2 (November 2000):145–58.

34
. The same logic explains why poker players do not show their hole cards following a successful bluff; if they did, the tactic might not work again.

35
. There is hardly any evidence of lying in Andrew Moravcsik’s detailed analysis of the various bargains among the European countries that created the European Union,
The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). Although Moravcsik does not directly say why lying is absent from the history he examined, it seems clear that it is because he believes that the relevant European states only came to the bargaining table when: (1) there was substantial overlap among their preferences; (2) they all knew a great about “the range of potential agreements, national preferences, and institutional options”; and (3) they all thought that an agreement would lead to “joint gains.” Not only would it have been hard to lie in such an information-rich environment, but it also would have made no sense, because such deceitful behavior probably would have scuttled the deal, “a result that would leave all worse off” (ibid., 61, 481–85).

36
. Anthee Carassava, “Greece Admits Faking Data to Join Europe,”
New York Times
, September 23, 2004; Daniel Howden and Stephen Castle, “Greece Admits Deficit Figures Were Fudged to Secure Euro Entry,”
Independent
, November 16, 2004; Helena Smith and Larry Elliot, “EU Raps Greece over Deficit,”
Guardian
, December 2, 2004.

37
. Trachtenberg,
Constructed Peace
, 121–22. See also James McAllister,
No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 225.

38
. McCallister,
No Exit
, 234. See also minutes of National Security Council Meeting, December 10, 1953, in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 2:450–51.

39
. Ponsonby,
Falsehood in War-Time
, 19.

40
. Charles Horton Cooley,
Human Nature and the Social Order
, rev. ed. (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1922), 388.

1
. James Chace,
Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), chap. 16.

2
. Quoted in Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis Revisited,”
Washington Monthly
, November 2004.

3
. Among the best sources on the
Greer
incident are Robert Dallek,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 285–88; Waldo Heinrichs,
Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 166–68;
David M. Kennedy,
Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 497–99; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason,
The Undeclared War: 1940–1941
(Gloucester, MA: Smith, 1968), 742–50; David Reynolds,
The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), chap. 8; John M. Schuessler, “The Deception Dividend: FDR’s Undeclared War,”
International Security
34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 133–65

4
. As Robert Divine notes, “The submarine commander, far from being guilty of an unprovoked assault, had turned in desperation on his pursuer in an effort to escape destruction.”
The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II
(New York: Wiley, 1967), 143.

5
. All the quotations in this paragraph and the next are from Dallek,
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy
, 285–88; see also Langer and Gleason,
Undeclared War
, 744–46.

6
. Among the best sources on the Gulf of Tonkin incident are: Eric Alterman,
When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences
(New York: Viking, 2004), chap. 4; Joseph C. Goulden,
Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair; Illusion and Reality
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); Robert J. Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964,”
Cryptologic Quarterly
19 and 20, nos. 4 and 1 (Winter 2000 and Spring 2001), 1–55; David Kaiser,
American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), chap. 11; Fredrik Logevall,
Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), chap. 7; H. R. McMaster,
Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam
(New York: HarperCollins, 1997), chap. 6; Edwin E. Moïse,
Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Gareth Porter,
Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), chap. 6.

7
. Alterman,
When Presidents Lie
, 204–5.

8
. Alterman,
When Presidents Lie
, 193. These are Alterman’s words.

9
. Goulden,
First Casualty
, 50.

10
. Hanyok, “Skunks,” 21–49; Moïse,
Tonkin Gulf
, 206–10, 241–43. See also Alterman,
When Presidents Lie
, 186–90.

11
. Logevall,
Choosing War
, 198. These are Logevall’s words. See also Porter,
Perils of Dominance
, 196–98.

12
. Kaiser,
American Tragedy
, 335–36.

13
. Moïse,
Tonkin Gulf
, 243. These are Moïse’s words. It is now clear that there was no attack on the
Maddox
on August 4, 1964. Hanyok, “Skunks,” 3.

14
. Moïse,
Tonkin Gulf
, 243.

15
. These were the words used by McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk when testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 6. Logevall,
Choosing War
, 203. See also ibid., 198–99; and McMaster,
Dereliction of Duty
, 133–35, for similar comments by President Johnson and other senior administration officials.

16
. Michael R. Beschloss,
Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–1964
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 494–95; Hanyok, “Skunks,” 5–12; Logevall,
Choosing War
, 201; McMaster,
Dereliction of Duty
, 121–30; Moïse,
Tonkin Gulf
, 99–105, 228–29, 239–41.

17
. See Logevall,
Choosing War
, 199–203; Moïse,
Tonkin Gulf
, 99–105.

18
. Alterman,
When Presidents Lie
, 205; Logevall,
Choosing War
, 203. One might argue that the Johnson administration told a third lie related to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The president and his chief advisors claimed throughout 1964 and into early 1965 that they had no intention, much less plans, for escalating the war in Vietnam. In fact, Johnson portrayed himself as the peace candidate in his 1964 campaign for the presidency against Barry Goldwater. However, throughout that period, Johnson was actually laying the plans for expanding the war, as is evidenced by his behavior in the Gulf of Tonkin incident. For further elaboration on this matter, see Alterman,
When Presidents Lie
, chap. 4; Kaiser,
American Tragedy
, chap. 11; Logevall,
Choosing War
, 193–221, 242, 253, 314–15; Deborah Shapley,
Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 304–5.

19
. Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Says U.S. Has ‘Bulletproof’ Evidence of Iraq’s Links to Al Qaeda,”
New York Times
, September 28, 2002.

20
. Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Sees Lack of Proof for Qaeda-Hussein Link,”
New York Times
, October 5, 2004.

21
. The Powell quotes are from Richard Cohen, “Powellian Propaganda?”
Washington Post
, February 13, 2003;
Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration’s Public Statements on Iraq
, Report prepared for Congressman Henry A. Waxman by the Minority
Staff, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, March 16, 2004, 23; Transcript of Secretary Powell’s Press Conference, January 8, 2004. See also Derrick Z. Jackson, “Powell’s Shrinking Credibility on Iraq,”
Boston Globe
, January 14, 2004; Christopher Marquis, “Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking Iraq to Al Qaeda,”
New York Times
, January 9, 2004.

22
. Spencer Ackerman and John Judis, “Deception and Democracy: The Selling of the Iraq War,”
New Republic
, June 30, 2003, 18; Douglas Jehl, “Report Warned Bush Team about Intelligence Doubts,”
New York Times
, November 6, 2005; Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Said to Find No Hussein Link to Terror Chief,”
New York Times
, September 9, 2006; John Prados, “Phase II: Loaded for Bear,”
TomPaine.com
, November 10, 2005; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments
, 109th Cong., 2d sess., September 8, 2006, 60–112; Jonathan Weisman, “Iraq’s Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties Were Disputed Before War,”
Washington Post
, September 9, 2006.

23
. Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, “Al Qaeda–Hussein Link Is Dismissed,”
Washington Post
, June 17, 2004.