Authors: David E. Murphy

What Stalin Knew (26 page)

BOOK: What Stalin Knew

5.96Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub

Read Book Download Book

ads

On June 20, a Friday, the American embassy wives and employees

were busy packing. Mrs. Steinhardt took Karmen with her on a last round

of shopping in the commission stores. She told Karmen that all the women

would be flying out of Moscow the next day, she to Stockholm, the others to

Teheran. The men of the embassy would go to the new dacha at Tarasovka

while journalists would move from hotels in town to places on the city’s

outskirts. All the foreigners with whom Karmen came in contact predicted

that Germany would defeat the USSR in from six weeks to three months.

Karmen asked why earlier reports had produced no response and de-

manded that they be sent to a higher level.19

Among the other agents reporting on the American embassy were

Verny, a chauffeur with a good command of English who also reported on

the plans to lease a new dacha. On June 20 Verny took the ambassador

around the outskirts of Moscow to reconnoiter roads that could be used if

the city was evacuated. Jack, the ambassador’s valet, reported that on

June 1 he had helped the ambassador pack three valises. Necessary items

were put in the first valise, next to the door; the second accommodated

items of lesser importance. The first would be taken if there were only

fifteen minutes to leave, the second if they had half an hour, and so forth.20

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY

115

Such minutia was probably typical of the reports Second Directorate

agents working in various diplomatic installations in Moscow sent to their

case officers, but taken together the details represent the thoughts and

actions of foreigners who appear to have been convinced that war with Ger-

many was at hand. Combined with the transcripts from listening devices

and telephone taps, the information should have persuaded the recipients—

Stalin, Molotov, and Beria—that something vitally threatening was afoot.

There were other indicators as well. On June 14 German authorities

issued an order to all German merchant ships not to enter Soviet ports.

Those already in Soviet ports were to leave immediately. On June 20 the

Leningrad Directorate of the Soviet Baltic Commercial Fleet reported a

radiogram, sent in the clear, uncoded, from the freighter
Magnitogorsk
that

it was being held in the German port of Danzig for unknown reasons. The

Baltic Commercial Fleet message noted that ‘‘the
Magnitogorsk
is not re-

sponding to our queries. Although we have had no instructions from Mos-

cow, tomorrow, June 22, we will order the
Lunacharsky
to return to Lenin-

grad and the
Vtoraia Piatiletka
to go to Riga.’’ The last German ship to leave

Leningrad on June 15 carried the German specialists helping to complete

the German cruiser
Luetzow,
purchased earlier by the Soviets. It seems

incredible that no one in the Soviet navy’s Baltic Fleet became aware of

these messages, historically a prime indicator of approaching hostilities.21

In addition to controlling the activities of the Moscow operational

departments, the Second Directorate oversaw and in some cases directed

counterespionage operations in the union republics. For this reason it was

kept informed of operations by German military intelligence (Abwehr) in

key border areas. One wonders how Merkulov’s men interpreted the fol-

lowing report and what they did with it. Coming at the end of a description

of German military activities along the frontier were these ominous sen-

tences: ‘‘German intelligence is sending its agents into the USSR for short

periods—three to four days. Agents being dispatched for longer periods,

ten to fifteen days, are instructed that in the event German troops cross

the frontier before they are scheduled to return to Germany, they must

report to any German troop unit located on Soviet territory.’’22 Such re-

porting shows the need to draw strategic conclusions from simple coun-

terintelligence reports. If the interrogation of captured Abwehr agents re-

flected briefing along these lines by their handlers, it should have been

evident that the Wehrmacht was on the point of invading the Soviet Union.

Taken as a whole, the information obtained from NKGB counterin-

telligence confirmed that provided by foreign intelligence sources, yet

116

LISTENING TO THE ENEMY

there is no suggestion that it influenced in any way Stalin’s conviction

that Hitler would not attack the USSR because he was still preparing the

invasion of Great Britain. But what of the impact of this reporting on

the professional officers who obtained it and comprehended its meaning?

Their silence was the result of living and functioning in a world of fear

where one dared not confide in one’s colleagues. As the material obtained

from their operations grew more threatening, some of them—those very

close to the center—began to express their concerns openly but never, of

course, to the Great Leader himself.

[To view this image, refer to