CHAPTER 26
Gail Van Winkle glanced at her notes, then looked straight into Thomas’s eyes. “Know anybody named Rochon in Moreno Valley?”
“Two or three,” said Thomas.
“Named Rochon?”
“Yes, ma’am.”
“In fact, you, I believe, have denied that you dealt drugs with Regina. Is that right?”
“Yes, ma’am.”
“Did you get a shipment from Rochon out of California?”
“No, ma’am.”
“You never did?”
“No, ma’am.”
“Never got crystal meth from him?”
“Not shipments.”
“Well, how would you get them from him from California?”
“When I had made a trip previously, I had brought a little back with me.”
“He never sent you any by UPS.”
“No, ma’am.”
“You made a lot of phone calls back and forth to him in California.”
“Yes, ma’am.”
“And after this murder, [you] still did, right?”
“I can’t say how many. I don’t recall. I talked to a lot of people on the phone.”
“Well, I believe you just testified that you did do a small amount of dealing of drugs.”
“No,” said Thomas. “I obtained small amounts. I never sold small amounts or large amounts.”
“When you got drugs, when you came over, did you not supply Regina and Kim with drugs?”
“Once or twice.”
“So is it your testimony you’re not a drug dealer because you didn’t sell it to them, you just gave it to them?”
“Well, as much as, they got it more than I got it. I was just able to get it when they weren’t able to get it. The drug game isn’t necessarily one hundred percent all the time. Sometimes you call people and they have it, sometimes you don’t. When they didn’t have it, I called friends and they would have it.”
“You had connections.”
“Yeah,” answered Thomas, “I guess.”
“Basically,” said Van Winkle, “what you could get was crystal meth. Is that right?”
“Cocaine, marijuana.”
“And crystal meth.”
“Yes, ma’am.”
“In fact, didn’t you get Kim started on crystal meth?”
“I wouldn’t say I got her started. I didn’t forcibly do it.”
“You made it available,” said Van Winkle.
“Yes, ma’am.”
“And you continued to give her drugs even though, as you described her, she was clearly addicted.”
“After it was apparent that she was, I didn’t. I quit giving [it to] her.”
“You’re saying you quit?”
“Giving her.”
“So when was it apparent that she was an addict?”
“Pretty much right away. I mean, . . .” His voice trailed off.
Van Winkle’s adrenaline pumped, the way it always did during a trial, the way Thomas had told Kim his had when he had carried Regina’s body to the tub.
“Right away she was an addict and then you quit having anything to do with getting her drugs. Is that what you’re testifying to?”
“I guess, right before, right before Regina’s death, murder, death.”
“Now you’re saying it was right before Regina’s death that you quit giving her drugs.”
“Well,” stuttered Thomas, “I mean, she was using up until the time, but she really didn’t. It really wasn’t. I guess her demeanor, having to have the drugs, weren’t as bad as before.”
“Until right before Regina’s death,” quizzed Van Winkle. “Is that your testimony now?”
“Yes, ma’am.”
Thomas admitted to going to Builders Square and buying cement, a trash can, a chain, and a padlock. Van Winkle asked him why he bought cement. “I don’t know,” he responded at first. Then he added, “You can see on the picture [of my father’s house], there’s a stairwell on the outside of the house. It’s a three-level house. It’s on stilts. The outside stairway is wood and it’s separated from the house because the foundation at the bottom is sinking because the ground stays wet pretty much all the time.”
“So where was the cement when the police came out to your house?”
“In one of the trailers,” he said.
“So it wasn’t where all the other items were . . .”
She didn’t ask him why he was thinking about running around buying concrete and trash cans for his dad when he had a dead body sitting back home underneath a tin shed in the hot, summer sun of Texas.
“Didn’t offend you to burn her body up,” said Van Winkle.
“Yeah, it offended me to do what I was doing,” said Thomas. “I cared a lot for Kim.”
“Cared a lot for Kim. And you want this jury to believe, when she came in and told you about Regina, that you told her to call the police, turn herself in?”
“Now, how did your blood get in Kim’s bathroom trash?”
“I don’t know,” said Thomas. “Maybe when I shaved. I don’t know. From the scooter accident. I don’t know.”
“Scooter accident. Kim’s apartment.”
“Like I said,” he responded, “I went back and forth.”
“You went back and forth after the scooter accident.”
“The whole time.”
“So the scooter accident that happened in May, the tissue with your blood on it would still be in the trash can?”
“I’m saying I don’t know, ma’am.”
“And you would agree that you had a better motive to kill Regina than Kim [did].”
“No, ma’am, I don’t agree.”
“You didn’t think Regina was going to turn you into the police?”
“I wasn’t worried about that because I wasn’t doing anything to be worried for that reason.”
“You were a drug connection, weren’t you?”
“Both of us were.”
“Well, didn’t she have information that she could tell the police that would get you in trouble?”
“I don’t believe so.”
“And didn’t you tell Kim, just hours before you killed her, you weren’t going to let anybody send you to prison?”
“No, ma’am, I did not.”
“And you weren’t thinking about that; you weren’t scared about that.”
“No, ma’am, I was not.”
“Pass the witness,” said Van Winkle.
“Nothing further. Thank you, Your Honor,” said Sawyer. The defense rested.
The state briefly recalled Maximina Bautista, out of the presence of the jury, and again tried to enter her testimony. She was asked if she recognized in the courtroom the man she had seen with the very, very short hair at the Heritage Inn. No, she said, she didn’t.
Gail Van Winkle stated that, outside the courtroom, Bautista had told her that she had recognized Justin Thomas. Van Winkle’s plea was to no avail.
Anita Morales returned to the stand to rebut a question regarding whether she’d entered the courtroom and heard any testimony. She said she hadn’t.
The jury was dismissed until the following morning.
On Wednesday, August 21, 1996, at 9:05 a.m. the charge against Justin Heith Thomas was read.
“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,” said Judge Fuller. “The defendant, Justin Thomas, stands charged by indictment with the offense of Murder alleged to have been committed in Travis County, Texas, on or about the 29th day of June, 1995. To this offense the defendant has entered a plea of ‘Not Guilty.’
“You are instructed that the law applicable to this case is as follows:
I.
“A person commits the offense of murder if he:
“(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; or
“(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
II.
“‘Individual’ means a human being who has been born and is alive.
“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
“‘Deadly weapon’ means anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
III.
“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.
“A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
IV.
“You are further instructed that you may consider all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, if any, of Regina Hartwell, and the previous relationship existing between the accused and Regina Hartwell, together with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense alleged in the indictment.
V.
“Now bearing in mind the foregoing definitions and instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 29th day of June, 1995, in the County of Travis, and State of Texas, as alleged in the indictment, the defendant, Justin Thomas, did then and there, intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, Regina Hartwell, by stabbing Regina Hartwell with a knife, a deadly weapon; or
“if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 29th day of June, 1995, in the County of Travis, and State of Texas, as alleged in the indictment, the defendant, Justin Thomas, did then and there, with intent to cause serious bodily injury to Regina Hartwell commit an act clearly dangerous to human life thereby causing the death of an individual, Regina Hartwell, by stabbing Regina Hartwell with a knife, a deadly weapon;
“then you will find the defendant guilty of Murder, and so say by your verdict; but if you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict ‘Not Guilty.’
VI.
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the jury first believe that the accomplice’s evidence is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him, and even then you cannot convict unless the accomplice’s testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission.
“You are further instructed that mere presence of the accused in the company of an accomplice witness shortly before or after the time of the offense, if any, is not, in itself, sufficient corroboration of the accomplice witness’s testimony.
“You are charged that Kim LeBlanc was an accomplice if any offense was committed, and you are instructed that you cannot find the defendant guilty upon the testimony of Kim LeBlanc unless you first believe that the testimony of the said Kim LeBlanc is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment; and even then you cannot convict the defendant, Justin Thomas, unless you further believe that there is other evidence in this case, outside the evidence of said Kim LeBlanc, tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged in the indictment and then from all the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
VII.
“In all criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the State. All persons are presumed innocent and no person may be convicted unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the defendant has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with an offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require the defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.
“The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.
“It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecutor’s proof excludes all ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning the defendant’s guilt.
“A ‘reasonable doubt’ is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs.
“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.
“In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict ‘Not Guilty.’
“‘Element of offense’ means (a) the forbidden conduct; (b) the required culpability, and (c) the required result (if any). ‘Conduct’ means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state. ‘Required culpability’ means the mental state required by law such as intent, knowledge, recklessness or criminal negligence.
“You are further instructed as a part of the law in this case that the indictment against the defendant is not evidence in the case, and that the true and sole use of the indictment is to charge the offense, and to inform the defendant of the offense alleged against him.