Washington's Revolution: The Making of America's First Leader (43 page)

The French had to be dealt with carefully, because of tension between its two naval commanders in America. Barras was senior to de Grasse in service, but de Grasse had recently received promotion, making him higher in rank. As one who had not served as long as Barras, he hesitated to order him to bring his Rhode Island fleet southward. Barras, in any case, did not want to serve under his former junior colleague and made his distaste for such a position clear by declaring that he was considering sailing not to New York or the Chesapeake or the West Indies, but in an opposite direction—to Newfoundland.

Watching conditions that threatened turmoil, Washington attempted to calm them and to keep his strategy responsive to changing circumstances. In mid-August he suggested to Barras that he add his ships to de Grasse’s. The British seemed to have sent Admiral Robert Digby and a squadron of ships to reinforce commanders—he mentioned Graves and Rodney—in America. At the time he wrote Barras, he expected that Henry Clinton would be reinforced by troops sent up the coast from Virginia, and he had learned that transports had just arrived in New York from Europe with several thousand Hessian soldiers.
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Lafayette at this time led a small American army in Virginia. Washington had attempted to advise him during the year on how to defend the state against the British army there, led by Major General William Phillips until his death, in May 1781. In the months since Benedict Arnold’s arrival at the beginning of the year with around two thousand troops, Virginia had seen much campaigning, with the Americans on the run and seeking a way to stop a British rampage. Lafayette, aided by Baron Steuben, who was sent by Washington to infuse the Virginia militia with discipline, had held Arnold’s force off in places, but most of the time he had to yield ground in the face of superior numbers. Those numbers grew in May when Cornwallis arrived. In mid-August, Washington wrote Lafayette with instructions to “prevent” the British from retreating into North Carolina, and to concert measures with de Grasse, who was on his way. By this time, though Washington did not say so to Lafayette, the American effort against New York had been abandoned. The Chesapeake would provide the ground for the combined Franco-American operation he had so badly wanted. New York would have to wait.

On August 17, Washington wrote Admiral de Grasse about the change in strategy, a change, he explained, that owed much to his reading of the balance of forces north and south. The arrival of three thousand Hessian troops gave the enemy an impressive force in New York, and he feared that British troops in the southern states might be on their way to New York. Without a doubt, the French refusal to attempt to take ships across the bar in New York Harbor also played a part in the decision.
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Washington was known for his measured judgment, and he rarely if ever acted impulsively. But he could move quickly, and he now demonstrated a capacity for rapid judgment. He wanted to anticipate British strategy as quickly as possible in order to bring French naval power to bear. He might have thought, given his earlier experience with the Comte d’Estaing, that he should get the French into action before they disappeared. Whatever his feelings, he asked de Grasse to think about what the allies should do if they found that the British had the greater part of their army in the Chesapeake, or only a detachment of troops there, or if the British had totally withdrawn
their troops. Washington made his own preferences clear: The allies should lose no time in attacking with their “United Force” if the British were there in full strength; and if the British had withdrawn to New York or strengthened Charleston, the allies should send a sizable force southward to confine them to Charleston and prevent them from expanding their ground in South Carolina and Georgia. Whatever the British did, Washington recommended that the allies establish a base for the French fleet at Portsmouth, Virginia. He wanted a permanent station in the Chesapeake.
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This last recommendation of a permanent station was made before Washington met de Grasse. He had not yet fully realized that de Grasse intended to remain in the Chesapeake for the shortest possible time. A few weeks later, when Washington met him, his hopes for combined operations were quickly dashed, though de Grasse promised to stay until the end of October.

While wishing for more, Washington settled for less, but he had to make use of his ally almost immediately. The first task was to get the French and his own troops on the road to Virginia. How to do so without revealing to Henry Clinton what they were doing was a question of importance. The march of the two armies from the Hudson could not fail to be observed, but their destination could be concealed for a time. Washington thought that Clinton would suspect that his force on Staten Island might soon be under attack; a few months earlier Washington had planned such an attack, issuing orders to a large number of his commanders to prepare for such a venture.

Clinton’s agents had learned of what was planned at that earlier date, and he expected that something similar was afoot now that his enemies had brought their armies together along the Hudson. Another possibility forecast the Americans setting up in New Jersey, close enough to Virginia to give Lafayette support, but Clinton discounted the likelihood that Washington and Rochambeau would continue on to Virginia, where food supplies were low. Besides, if the British controlled Chesapeake Bay, as Clinton thought they would, the Americans and the French could not depend upon supply from the sea. Thus, during these late-summer months, Clinton seemed without fear that his enemy might move to attack Cornwallis. For a few days at least, he may have been fooled by the sight of thirty boats mounted on carriages pulled along by American troops. The natural inference was
that no army would encumber itself in this fashion unless it intended to sail them. And where would they sail? A likely answer was from the New Jersey shore across the water to Staten Island. The French added their own note of deception by building large ovens at Chatham, New Jersey, an indication that they were preparing for a long stay there.
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Clinton’s own state of mind did not permit him to linger long over the question of what Washington and his French allies were up to. He had been convinced for months that his army in New York was in danger, and throughout much of the summer he fretted over how much the navy could do to protect him against attack from the sea. Arbuthnot gave up his command in early July, and though Clinton was happy to see him go, he was no clearer than before about how much naval support he would have.
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The march to the Chesapeake began on August 19. Washington wrote de Grasse asking him to send ships up the bay to Head of Elk to meet a portion of the army there for transport to Virginia. He did not expect all to be accommodated, but having several thousand exempted from a march sure to be fatiguing would protect his force. De Grasse obligingly provided ships, as did a number of American ship owners; those soldiers who could not be fitted in simply marched, an action American troops were accustomed to.

Marching troops to the South remained on Washington’s mind even as he worried over the seagoing voyages of both de Grasse and the British enemy. Rochambeau literally did not know the way from New York to Virginia, and it was up to Washington to give him information about the best of the roads. This he did, just as earlier he had laid out the easiest routes from Rhode Island to New York.
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Logistics, as always, also demanded attention. Feeding troops on the move was more difficult than when they were in garrison—and finding means of carrying supplies was hard wherever the soldiers happened to be. This was no time for constitutional scruples, and Washington, feeling urgency, now authorized the quartermaster general to use force in impressing horses and oxen needed to pull wagons filled with supplies essential to the move. As for the provisions themselves, he depended, with doubts, on Barras to carry at least fifteen hundred barrels of salted meat when he came to the Chesapeake. He had not met Barras and was beginning to wonder if he ever would, a feeling that might have turned to anger had he known that Barras was
at this time considering sailing to Halifax, apparently with the idea of an attack all his own. This was a passing fancy and never had a chance of becoming an embarrassing reality.
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Rochambeau, always a solid and reliable commander, at last felt he could act under his orders and put his troops in motion on schedule. On September 8, they began to march into Head of Elk. Washington, who had been there for two days, was delighted and greeted his colleague with a warmth and enthusiasm that surprised a French staff officer who was present. Rochambeau soon gave him additional reasons for delight. Washington expected that the American troops, all from northern or eastern states, might bring little spirit to the enterprise in the South, given how they had suffered in the service of their country. To soften their anger at their treatment, he asked Robert Morris, who, as the financial official for Congress, was responsible for providing money, to find specie to give a month’s pay to each soldier. Morris tried but failed to come up with the full amount. Rochambeau then came to the rescue again and made up the difference from money he had with him. There is no way to measure the importance of this generosity, but it is clear that the French action contributed strongly to American morale.
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For a few days in early September, Washington felt unshackled from the bonds of command. Ships had appeared from the Chesapeake to ferry troops down the bay; other soldiers were well on the march; the French had committed themselves to the operation; de Grasse had arrived; and Cornwallis, who he had feared might turn his army around to attack the Carolinas, once more seemed to be isolating himself—this time on the York River.

Washington’s account of these days in his diary does not express either optimism or pessimism; rather, it is, as he almost always was, measured and matter-of-fact. There was an exemption to his usual behavior, however. De Grasse’s appearance in the bay on September 5 gave him such delight that he waved his hat and white handkerchief to Rochambeau, who was on board a ship approaching Chester, where Washington had received the news of the French arrival. He did not tell others of this incident, nor did he write of it; but others did, and it explains why he felt it safe now to go home to Mount Vernon for a short visit. He set out on horseback and reached Baltimore on September 8; most of a day was spent there, and then he was soon on horseback
again, riding with only a couple of aides to Mount Vernon. This was his first visit since he had ridden to Boston in May 1775 to assume command of what became the Continental Army. Martha Washington had gone to his camp several times in the intervening years, but these few days at home were different, and though Washington said little of them, they strengthened his spirit.
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His stay was a short three days, and on September 14 he rode to Williamsburg to supervise the preparation of the combined army. The next day he wrote de Grasse “to block up Lord Cornwallis in York River,” a wish—certainly not an order—given his uncertainty about where the French fleet was. While wondering about de Grasse’s position, he found Lafayette in Williamsburg; the two men met as a father and son might greet each other after a long separation. Lafayette’s arms embraced Washington as his affection flooded out, and Washington, we may be certain, took more than ordinary comfort in the gesture. That evening, another French aristocrat, the Marquis de Saint-Simon, the commander of the French soldiers carried by de Grasse, gave a “rich supper” for Washington. The company included several of the important leaders of both armies, and Washington received the plaudits of all.
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De Grasse had vanished for a good reason: to fight the British for control of the waters of the bay. The results of the shooting were affected by bad weather—a minor storm, in fact—and neither the British, led by Admiral Thomas Graves, who had come down from New York, nor the French enjoyed a triumph in their brief clash in open waters. But the French retained control of the bay, a point driven home when Admiral Barras, untouched by the battle between de Grasse and Graves, slipped into the Chesapeake after the naval battle had ended with a cargo of heavy artillery and provisions. His arrival also added eight ships of the line to the twenty-eight under de Grasse.

On returning to the bay, de Grasse wrote Washington that he wanted a meeting with his American and French colleagues. Washington did not resist this request—he himself had requested it earlier—and on September 17, he, Rochambeau, Henry Knox, and Louis Duportail, plus many staff officers, set sail from Williamsburg for Lynnhaven Bay, sixty miles away, where de Grasse awaited them on the
Ville de Paris
, his flagship, which was at anchor along with thirty-one ships of the line. De Grasse provided their transportation, a handsome launch
that had been captured from the British. The voyage took them down the James River and across the bay: They did not arrive in quiet, as de Grasse put on a great ceremony and naval parade in their honor.
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The conference itself did not last long: De Grasse seemed most concerned that the Americans understood that he could not loiter in the Chesapeake, though when pressed by Washington to remain until the British surrendered, he reported that his orders were to leave no later than mid-October. Washington’s concern was that the French keep their naval power and army contingent at Yorktown long enough for a conventional siege to be mounted. A siege was preferable to an all-out assault, because it would be less costly in bloodshed. The deadline before November for de Grasse’s departure seemed to promise time for such siege operations. Reassured on this score, Washington asked that French frigates sail up the York to cut off British escape and to deny them access to foodstuffs if they stayed put. De Grasse refused, saying that his ships would be in great danger from British guns along the river. He also would not make his ships available for operation against the British in the Carolinas if the siege was of short duration. Washington also pushed for help in taking back Charleston. De Grasse’s refusal proved easier to accept when he offered the use of two thousand seamen and a supply of powder should the Virginia siege fail and a major assault prove necessary.