Voices of Islam (40 page)

POLITICAL STRUGGLES THAT SHAPED THE CONCEPT OF AHL AL-SUNNA WA’L-JAMA‘A

The primary factor that shaped the development of the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l- Jama‘a was politics, as the nascent and growing Muslim community sought to defend its unity and internal peace and support the existing leaders against threats posed by the claims of opposition political movements. Struggles over who the leader should be led to major and bloody schisms between various factions, out of which first evolved the Khariji, Shi‘a, and Sunni political par- ties and then the lesser political divisions within the community.

In the fi years after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, the community asked: Should the leader be from among the Emigrants (
Muhajirun
), those who emigrated with the Prophet from Mecca, or from the Supporters of the Prophet from Medina (
Ansar
)? While this question became irrelevant within one generation, others persisted: Should the leader be from the Prophet’s Arab tribe of Quraysh, and if so, should he be from the clan of Banu Hashim or Banu Umayya? Should the leader be from the Prophet’s family or, even more specifically, from the line of his cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali? The Shi‘a took the latter position. Should the leader be any person

What Is Sunni Islam?
189

who ruled according to the principles of justice and who abided by the teach- ings of the Qur’an and its Law? This was the adamant position of the Khari- jites. Was the personal morality of the ruler relevant if his rule was competent and just? Were errors of judgment a sin, and if so—whether the sin was a moral one or a political error of judgment—can the leader continue to rule? What is the role of the community in such a case? Did the Prophet himself give any guidance on this? Does the Qur’an give any guidance on this?

These issues deeply split the community. Paradoxically, while the Sunni– Shi‘a divide continues today, most of the original issues that created this divi- sion neither define nor fuel the contemporary debate.
3
Passionate differences of opinion on these questions led to political divisions, which in turn influ- enced the rise and crystallization of different schools of theology and law.

By the second half of the reign of the third Caliph, ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan (r. 644–656
CE
), the seeds of political confl began to sprout. The chal- lenges of administering a growing empire that included Egypt, Syria, Basra, and Kufa (in modern Iraq) compounded ‘Uthman’s diffi His ten- dency to appoint governors from among his clan opened him to the charge of nepotism, and his inability to rein in some of their excesses bred growing restlessness, especially in the provinces of Egypt and Iraq.

The Official Recension of the Qur’an

Another factor that played a larger political role than is now recognized was a by-product of what was perhaps ‘Uthman’s most valuable accomplish- ment: establishing the official recension of the Qur’an. This was prompted by a crisis caused by various factions in different regions that disputed the method of reciting various Qur’anic passages.
4
The governor of Mada’in (near modern Baghdad), Hudhayfa ibn al-Yaman, complained to ‘Uthman, urging him to take steps to end the disagreement: ‘‘O Commander of the Faithful,’’ he said. ‘‘Save this community (
Umma
) before they differ about the Book as [happened with their predecessors] the Jews and the Christi- ans.’’
5
The Syrians contended with the Iraqis, the former following the reci- tation style of Ubayy ibn Ka‘b and the latter that of ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas‘ud, with each party accusing the other of infidelity (
kufr
).
6
Frequently, the recita- tion of the Holy Book was made the subject of boasting. The people of Hims, for example, boasted that their way of reciting the Qur’an was superior to that of the people of Basra, whose compilation of the Qur’an they acclaimed as the ‘‘Heart of Hearts.’’
7

Realizing that the unity of the Muslim
Umma
was at stake, ‘Uthman decided to unify the community behind a single authorized text of the Qur’an. He asked the Prophet Muhammad’s wife Hafsa to send him the manuscript she had in her possession, and he ordered Zayd ibn Thabit,

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‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr, Sa‘id ibn al-‘As, and ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Harith b. Hisham to make exact copies of the available manuscripts. ‘Uthman then sent to every Islamic province one copy of the Qur’an accompanied by a reciter (
qari’,
pl.
qurra’
), ordering that all other Qur’anic materials, whether written

in fragmentary manuscripts or whole copies, be burned.
8
With reference to

the language of the text, he gave preference to the dialect of the Quraysh, the Prophet’s tribe, over the other dialects whose use the Prophet had sanc- tioned. The reciters were unhappy with this, for they thought of themselves not as mere reciters of the Qur’an but as keepers of the Holy Word. By spe- cializing in the different dialects of Arabic and forms of Qur’anic recitation, they served as key resources in the understanding and interpretation of the Qur’an. ‘Uthman’s decision reduced their power and influence. Their dissat- isfaction was to play a critical and defining role in the subsequent conflict.

‘Ali’s Confrontations: ‘‘Let the Qur’an Decide between Us’’

After ‘Uthman’s assassination in 656
CE
by rebels dissatisfied with their governors in Iraq and Egypt, the fourth Caliph, ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, faced a turbulent
Umma.
A series of confrontations developed that resulted in ‘Ali having to wage two internal battles. The first was against a group led by the Prophet’s wife ‘A’isha and two Companions of the Prophet, Talha and Zubayr, in the Battle of the Camel near Basra in 656
CE
.
9
The second battle was against ‘Uthman’s relative Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Syria, at the Battle of Siffin in 657. These conflicts deeply and permanently divided the community along essentially political lines.

During the confrontation between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya at Siffin, Mu‘awiya’s side was losing when Mu‘awiya’s colleague ‘Amr b. al-‘As shrewdly advised him to have his soldiers hoist copies of the Qur’an on their lances, sug- gesting, ‘‘Let the Qur’an decide between us.’’ Weary of fighting, and seeing that a cease-fire afforded them the opportunity to reestablish their influence, ‘Ali’s partisans, which included a number of Qur’an reciters, urged ‘Ali to submit to arbitration. They agreed to abide by the Book of God (that is, the Qur’an) and ‘‘the just
Sunna
(precedent) that unites, not disperses,’’ as the means of resolving the dispute. While
Sunna
here referred to the approved practice of Muslim leaders in political and administrative matters, we can clearly see in this expression the seeds of the future expression,
Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama‘a
.

While awaiting the verdict of the arbitration, certain individuals among ‘Ali’s supporters protested against recourse to arbitration with the cry,
la hukma illa li-llah,
literally, ‘‘No decision but God’s.’’ This phrase implied that it was improper to apply to humans for a decision about the leadership of the Muslims. This view was based on a divine ordinance in the Qur’an: ‘‘If two parties of the Believers fight with one another, make peace between

What Is Sunni Islam?
191

them; but if one rebels against the other, then fight against the one that reb- els, until they return to obedience to God’’ (Qur’an 49:9). In his battle against ‘A’isha and her supporters, ‘Ali had appealed to this verse, and now the dissidents logically maintained that it was his duty to continue to fi against Mu‘awiya, as a similar situation prevailed.

Those who raised the cry of ‘‘No decision but God’s’’ persuaded other partisans of ‘Ali that arbitration was a sin against God, for it substituted a human decision for the divine command—especially the decision of people who were not known for having exemplary spiritual or religious status. In their eyes, it was unthinkable for ‘Ali to submit to arbitration. ‘Ali was a man of deep piety, renowned for his knowledge of the Qur’an from his lifetime asso- ciation with the Prophet. To stoop to Mu‘awiya’s level was simply wrong.

A large group of ‘Ali’s followers that believed in this position stopped near Kufa and proclaimed their secession from ‘Ali. ‘Ali visited their camp and rec- onciled himself to their position. After his return to Kufa, however, he asserted his intention of not infringing the Siffin agreement to arbitrate. This angered the group outside of Kufa. When they learned that ‘Ali had sent Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari as his negotiator to the arbitration meeting, a group of 3,000 to 4,000 dissidents secretly left Kufa and hundreds more left Basra.
10
The ral- lying place chosen by these dissidents was Nahrawan, on a canal channeled from the Tigris River.

The result of the arbitration was inconclusive, and ‘Ali decided to engage Mu‘awiya in battle again. First, however, he felt it was necessary to deal with the insurgency of his former partisans, the Kharijites, so he went to them in Nahrawan. They demanded that he confess himself guilty of an act of impiety (
kufr
). This ‘Ali could not possibly do, and he angrily refused. After promis- ing safety to those who changed their minds and supported him—and there were a few who did—he attacked the Kharijites and killed most of them. This eroded ‘Ali’s base of support, forcing him to return to Kufa and to give up the campaign against Mu‘awiya.

The struggle between Mu‘awiya’s partisans (
shi‘at Mu‘awiya
) and ‘Ali’s partisans (
shi‘at ‘Ali
) continued. In 658
CE
Mu‘awiya persuaded the Syrians to acknowledge him as Caliph. Three months later, he took Egypt and awarded its governorship to his friend ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, which eroded ‘Ali’s control over the territories of Islam. Before ‘Ali could move again against Mu‘awiya, he was killed in 660
CE
by the Kharijite Ibn Muljam in revenge for members of his wife’s family who had lost their lives at Nahrawan. ‘Ali’s son Hasan succeeded him for a short time but then agreed to abdicate for the sake of the community’s unity. Mu‘awiya entered Iraq in 661
CE
. With Egypt and Iraq under his control, the power of Medina as the capital of the Islamic state was effectively broken, and Mu‘awiya celebrated the year 661
CE
as
sanat al-jama‘a,
the ‘‘year of the (unifi of the) community.’’
11
The elements of the concept of the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama‘a were now in place, although not yet commonly in use.

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The Kharijites versus the Murji’a: Using Theology to Support Political Power

While ‘Ali’s battle with Mu‘awiya was purely a matter of political and mili- tary strategy, the Kharijites became the first Muslim sect to base their move- ment on uncompromising moral principles. ‘Ali’s attack upon them led to their reactionary insistence that the community of believers was obliged to depose the Imam who ‘‘went off the right path’’—their justification for aban- doning ‘Ali after he accepted arbitration. They declared every believer who was morally and religiously irreproachable to be capable of being raised by the vote of the community to the supreme dignity of the Imamate, ‘‘even if he were an Ethiopian slave.’’
12
The result was that each of the leaders of the Kharijites was recognized by them as
Amir al-Mu’minin
(Commander of the Faithful). Consequently, the only other leaders besides their own that they recognized as legitimate were Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, whom they particu- larly venerated. As for ‘Uthman, he was recognized as legitimate only during the first six years of his reign, and ‘Ali was regarded as legitimate only until the Battle of Siffin. Legitimacy to them was therefore not a permanent fea- ture inherent in the leader but rather subject to that leader’s correct deci- sions, a principle that many Sunnis and Shi‘as today would find acceptable. The Kharijites therefore staked out a principled position in opposition to both the Shi‘at ‘Ali and the Shi‘at Mu‘awiya.

Mu‘awiya had been governor of Damascus since the time of ‘Umar and shrewdly leveraged his political power in Damascus, expanding it over the entire territory ruled by Islam. By appointing his son Yazid as his successor, he founded the Umayyad dynasty based in Damascus (661–750
CE
). In doing so, he revolutionized the concept of the Caliphate, transforming it into a hereditary monarchy instead of its being based on a formula that sought the most qualified person for the task, which was how the majority of the Muslim population thought the Caliph should be nominated. This was also the basis on which the first four Caliphs had been chosen.

Reactions against Mu‘awiya’s appointment of Yazid were strong. The Shi‘a advocated the notion of the
person
who should rule: namely, the Prophet’s family, and in particular the family of ‘Ali and his descendants. They therefore developed a political theory that rejected the fi three Caliphs as having usurped ‘Ali’s rightful claim to the Caliphate.

Arguments soon swirled around the question of what should be done with a leader deemed to have done wrong, and rating the former Caliphs became a nasty and contentious political debate. The
Murji’a
(literally, ‘‘deferrers’’) wanted to eliminate discord in the Muslim community and thus proposed deferring judgment on this matter to God. They recommended that Muslims abstain from declaring either support for or opposition to the earlier Caliphs. They held that Muslims do not lose the status of believers by committing a single incorrect action; wrongdoers, including Caliphs, instead become

What Is Sunni Islam?
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‘‘aberrant believers’’ and are to be punished or forgiven by God. This doc- trine of deferring judgment to God was a stepping-stone toward the later thinking of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama‘a. Abu Hanifa (d. 767
CE
), the founder of one of the four major legal schools of Sunni Islam, stressed the idea of the community (
jama‘a
) of Muslims and of the Sunna as its unifying princi- ple. For him, following the Sunna meant following the middle road, avoiding extremes, and basing decisions on scriptural proofs.