Voices of Islam (251 page)

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speak of
hijab
(covering) as a religious duty that mandates a woman to cover her hair and body (with the exception of face and hands) when in the pres- ence of unrelated men and in public. A good example is Jamal Badawi’s booklet,
Gender Equity in Islam: Basic Principles.
Marriage, Badawi states, ‘‘is about peace, love and compassion, not just the satisfaction of men’s needs,’’ but then he goes on to reproduce all the
fi h
rulings on marriage and divorce almost verbatim.
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In line with other texts in this genre, Badawi is content with simply outlining what he calls ‘‘normative teachings of Islam,’’ glosses over male dominance, and imputes the injustices that women suffer in marriage and society to what he calls ‘‘diverse cultural practices among Muslims.’’ He seems to be unaware that many of the
fiqh
rulings that he reproduces negate the ‘‘basic principles’’ of ‘‘gender equity’’ that he claims as Islamic in his booklet.

Two texts of this genre that offer a new rationalization and defense of the classical
fiqh
rulings on marriage and covering and contain a theory of gender rights, are Murteza Mutahhari’s
System of Women’s Rights in Islam
and Maulana Abul A‘la Maududi’s
Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam.
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Both authors were Islamic ideologues, and their writings, rooted in anticolonial and anti-Western discourses, have become seminal texts for Islamist groups and movements. Writing in Urdu in the 1930s, in the context of pre-partition India, Maududi’s adamant rejection and condem- nation of modernity and liberal values have made him more appealing to radical Islamists. For him, the problem with Muslims is that they have abandoned their own way of life and adopted secular (that is, Western and to some extent Hindu) values that have corrupted them and are destroying their civilization. The solution he offers is an ‘‘Islamic state’’ with the power and inclination to enforce the Islamic way of life, where women’s seclusion and control by men are foundational. Mutahhari, writing in Persian in 1960s Iran as part of the religious opposition to the Shah’s secularizing policies, is less adamant in his opposition to modernity and less overtly patriarchal: he is more popular with moderate Islamist groups.

These two texts differ in style, language, and sophistication, but they follow the same line of argument, based on the same premises of the ‘‘naturalness’’ of laws in Islam and the ‘‘innate difference’’ between men and women. These two premises become the pillars of a new defense of gender inequality, which goes as follows: though men and women are created equal and are equal in the eyes of God, the roles assigned to them in creation are different, and
fiqh
rules reflect this difference. Differences in rights and duties do not mean inequality or injustice; if correctly understood, they are the very essence of justice. This is so, they argue, because these rulings not only reflect the Shari‘a, the divine blueprint for society, but they are also in line with ‘‘human nature’’ (
fitra
) and take into consideration the biological and psychological differences between the sexes.

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This new defense has, ironically, further accentuated the internal contra- dictions and anachronisms in classical
fi
rulings. For example, if, as the classical theory of sexuality holds, women’s sexual desire is greater than men’s, and if laws in Islam work with, not against, the grain of nature, then how can they allow men but not women to contract more than one marriage at a time? Surely God would not give women greater sexual desire, and then allow men to be the polygamists and make covering obligatory for women? The Neo-Traditionalists resolve such contradictions by modifying the classical theory of sexuality, to eliminate its conflict with the newly advocated theory of the naturalness of
fiqh
-based law. Women’s sexuality, thus, is now explained as passive and responsive, and men’s as active and aggressive—a theory that has indeed little precedent in classical texts.
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It is important to note here that, in arguing for such a theory of sexuality, both Maududi and Mutahhari do not quote Islamic texts but Western psychological and sociological studies. Their readings of these—now long outdated—sources are quite selective, and they cite as ‘‘scientific evidence’’ only those that are in line with
fi
defi tions of marriage. They are also selective in their readings of the sacred texts and in their usage of classical
fiqh
concepts and definitions.

To give a flavor of these arguments, let me quote from Mutahhari’s defense of men’s unilateral right to terminate the marriage contract. His arguments, in my view, are the most refi among those that give the concept of gender equality no place in Islam. As already mentioned, he argues that ‘‘human nature’’ (
fi
) is reflected in the naturalness of Shari‘a laws. Though his language and his theory of sexuality differ from those of the classical
fi
texts, the male-centred view of creation and the notion of marriage as dominance remain the same.

Nature has devised the ties of husband and wife in such a form that the part of woman is to respond to the love of man. The affection and love of a woman that is genuine and stable can only be that love which is born as a reaction to the affection and admiration of man toward her. So the attachment of the woman to the man is the result of the attachment of the man to the woman and depends upon it. Nature has given the key of love of both sides to the man, the husband. If he loves his wife and is faithful to her, the wife also loves him and remains faith- ful to him. It is admitted that woman is naturally more faithful than man, and that a woman’s unfaithfulness is a reaction to the unfaithfulness of the man.
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Having defined women’s sexuality as passive and subordinated to that of men, Mutahhari now gives a new rationalization for why
fiqh
gives men the right of divorce.

Nature has deposited the key of the natural dissolution of marriage in the cus- tody of man. In other words, it is man who by his own apathy and unfaithfulness

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toward his wife makes her cold and unfaithful. Conversely, if the indifference begins on the side of the wife, it does not affect the affection of the man, rather, incidentally, it makes the affection more acute.
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The logical conclusion to be drawn is that there is no need for any change or reform in the laws of marriage and divorce.

Sometimes these people ask: ‘‘Why does divorce take the form of a release, an emancipation? Surely it should have a judicial form.’’ To answer these people it should be said: ‘‘Divorce is a release in the same way that marriage is a state of dominance. If you can possibly do so, change the natural law of seeking a mate in its absoluteness with regard to the male and the female, remove the natural state of marriage from the condition of dominance; if you can, make the role of the male and female sexes in all human beings and animals identical in their relations, and change the law of nature. Then you will be able to rid divorce of its aspect of release and emancipation.’’
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Gender Equality: Questioning the Premises of Inequality

With the rise of political Islam in the second part of the twentieth century, and the rallying cry of ‘‘Return to the Shari‘a’’ as embodied in
fi h
rulings, Islamist political movements appropriated these Neo-Traditionalist texts and their gender discourse. Family law reforms introduced earlier in the cen- tury by modernist governments in some Muslim countries were dismantled, for instance in Iran, Algeria, and Egypt. In Iran, after the establishment in 1979 of an Islamic state ruled by clerics, women’s covering and gender segre- gation in public space became mandatory. Women from all walks of life came to experience the harsh reality of subjugation to a religious patriarchy fused with the machinery of a modern state.

Paradoxically, the Islamists’ slogan of ‘‘Return to Shari‘a’’ and their attempt to translate
fi
notions of gender into policy became the catalyst for a critique of these notions and a spur to women’s increased activism. In Iran and elsewhere, a new phase began in the politics of gender in Islam as growing numbers of women came to question whether there was an inher- ent or logical link between Islamic ideals and patriarchy. One crucial element of this new phase has been that it places women themselves—rather than the abstract notion of ‘‘the status of woman in Islam’’—at the heart of the battle between forces of traditionalism and modernism. Using the language of political Islam and advocating a brand of feminism that takes Islam as the source of its legitimacy, women started to challenge the hegemony of patri- archal interpretations of the Shari‘a and to question the validity of the views of those who until now have spoken in the name of Islam. Such a challenge was made possible, even inevitable, by the Islamists’ ideological construction of Islam, and the very methods and sources that the Neo-Traditionalists used

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in their defense and rationalization of
fi h
constructions of gender rights. By relying on arguments and sources outside religion and by imposing their patriarchal vision of the Shari‘a through the machinery of a modern state, the Islamists inadvertently opened the door to a sustained critique of religious patriarchy in ways that were not previously possible.
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By the late 1980s, a new way of thinking about gender emerged, a dis- course that is ‘‘feminist’’ in its aspiration and demands, yet ‘‘Islamic’’ in its language and sources of legitimacy. Some versions of this new discourse came to be labelled ‘‘Islamic Feminism’’—a notion that remains contested by both the majority of Islamists and some secular feminists, who see it as antithetical to their respective positions and ideologies, and as a contradiction in terms.
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‘‘Islamic Feminism’’ is part of a new ‘‘Reformist’’ (as I call it) religious thinking that is consolidating a conception of Islam and modernity as com- patible, not opposed. Reformist thinkers do not reject an idea simply because it is Western, nor do they see Islam as providing a blueprint, as having an inbuilt program of action for the social, economic, and political problems of the Muslim world. Following and building on the work of earlier reformers such as Mohammad Abduh, Muhammad Iqbal, and Fazlur Rahman, they contend that the human understanding of Islam is flexible, that Islam’s tenets can be interpreted to encourage both pluralism and democracy, and that Islam allows change in the face of time, space, and experience.
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Not only do they pose a serious challenge to legalistic and absolutist conceptions of Islam, but they are also carving a space within which Muslim women can

achieve gender equality in law.

Instead of searching for an Islamic genealogy for modern concepts like gender equality, human rights, and democracy (the concern of earlier reformers) the new thinkers place the emphasis on how religion is under- stood and how religious knowledge is produced. In this respect, the works of the new wave of Muslim thinkers—such as Mohammad Arkoun, Nasr Abu Zayd, and Abdolkarim Soroush—are of immense importance and rel- evance. In particular, Soroush’s interpretative-epistemological theory of the evolution of religious knowledge—known as ‘‘The Contraction and Expan- sion of Shari‘a’’—makes possible a reconciliation of faith with rationality and with contemporary notions of justice and women’s rights.
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In Soroush’s words:

Our understanding of revealed texts is contingent upon the knowledge already set around us; that is to say that forces external to Revelation drag our interpre- tation and understanding of it in various directions
...
. Believers generally con- ceive of religion as something holy or sacred, something constant. You cannot talk about change or evolution of religious knowledge. They stick to the idea of fixity. But as I have demonstrated in my work, we have to make a distinction between religion on the one side and religious interpretation on the other. By religion here I mean not faith which is the subjective part of religion but the

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objective side which is the revealed text. This is constant, whereas our interpreta- tions of that text are subject to evolution. The idea is not that religious texts can be changed but rather over time interpretations will change. We are always immersed in an ocean of interpretations. The text does not speak to you. You have to make it speak by asking questions of it.
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Such an approach to religious texts is opening the way for the radical rethinking of some
fi h
rulings to accommodate concepts such as gender equality and human rights. Though in Iran their views have not yet been adequately refl in legislation, reformist clerics have been challenging old
fi
wisdoms and trying to promote gender equality within an Islamic framework. For instance, since the early 1990s, Mohsen Sa‘idzadeh has been trying to formulate and defend the ‘‘gender equality’’ perspective in
fi ,
which he claims to have been supported by a number of eminent jurists in the past.
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In 2003, another reformist cleric, Mohsen Kadivar, argued that over 90 percent of what were considered to be Islamic laws relating to women needed to be revised and rethought in line with contemporary notions of justice and gender, as they no longer qualifi for the epithets ‘‘Islamic’’ or ‘‘
shar‘i
.’’ According to him, for a ruling or a law to be consid- ered part of the Shari‘a it must meet three criteria. The first is the soundness of its rational basis: it must satisfy the rational demands of the time. Second, it must be in line with justice of its time. Third, it must be more advanced and progressive than existing laws in other societies. The laws introduced by the Prophet met all of these criteria. People accepted them, not because the Prophet had introduced them, but because they corresponded with their sense of justice and ideas of rationality as well as being more advanced and progressive than existing laws.
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