Read Urban Injustice: How Ghettos Happen Online
Authors: David Hilfiker,Marian Wright Edelman
Urban Injustice: How Ghettos Happen (12 page)
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It is no coincidence that social insurance programs are administered by the federal government using nationally uniform standards and benefits pegged to inflation. Public assistance programs, on the other hand, tend to be administered by state or local governments, with standards that vary from place to place, while cost-of-living raises for public assistance programs generally depend upon the uncertainties of local legislative whims and processes. Since few state or local governments permit “deficit spending,” in times of recession, when the need for public assistance is highest, local and state tax coffers dwindle. As a consequence, federally administered “social insurance” programs have substantially better benefits than “public assistance.” Compare the average $394 TANF payment for a family of three to the usual $515 payment for a
single
disabled person covered by the federal SSI program. As another example, in the twenty years
before
the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, AFDC benefits (adjusted for inflation) declined by 40 percent, while Social Security benefits remained stable.
single
disabled person covered by the federal SSI program. As another example, in the twenty years
before
the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, AFDC benefits (adjusted for inflation) declined by 40 percent, while Social Security benefits remained stable.
The administrations of Lyndon Johnson and—contrary to popular perception—Richard Nixon saw the next major expansion of federal social insurance. The War on Poverty, as Johnson called it, aimed to eradicate poverty in the United States. It was a time of national self-confidence: if we could put a man on the moon, surely we could end poverty. The Johnson administration, however, was unwilling to challenge the essential societal structures responsible for such extreme inequality. Instead, its programs stayed within the conceptual separation of social insurance and public assistance codified in the 1930s.
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Johnson’s programs were grandly conceived; they led to a significant increase in spending for social welfare. Unfortunately, the war in Vietnam intervened, and funding for almost every program was severely curtailed. According to Michael Harrington, the “war at home” never cost even one percent of the federal budget, making it more a skirmish with, rather than a war on, poverty. Despite their limited funding, however, many war on poverty programs were successful by almost any measure. The Headstart program, which provided preschool childcare and instruction; Legal Aid, which offered legal services to those who would otherwise be unable to afford one; the Job Corps, which provided jobs and training for young people; and Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), which recruited volunteers for service in poor areas, offered services that demonstrably improved the lives of many. Food stamps—begun as a small program during the New Deal to supplement farm income, revived in 1961 by John F. Kennedy, and vastly expanded by Nixon to make stamps available without cost to the poor—successfully protected people from hunger. Increases in disability payments prevented destitution, Medicaid quite successfully brought medical care to those below the official poverty level, and Medicare provided for the elderly and permanently disabled. Social Security benefits were raised and, in 1972, indexed to inflation, ultimately cutting the poverty rate of the elderly by two-thirds and making the elderly the least poor American age group.
A common perception is that the Great Society programs failed, a conclusion that ignores the evidence of their successes. Part of this misperception arose because many of the programs were evaluated as failures using goals that were either never intended or never even barely reachable based on the limited funding available. For example, the intent of AFDC payments was to provide some financial relief to struggling families. Even at their height during the 1960s, the levels of AFDC payments were never high enough to bring people out of poverty. In fact, given the policy of subtracting private sources of income (such as gifts or part-time jobs) from AFDC benefits, and given that official poverty rates are calculated before taxes and do not count in-kind income (such as food stamps), it’s not even
theoretically
possible for AFDC benefits to raise a family above the poverty level. To judge AFDC a failure because it did not lower poverty rates, then, is to misunderstand the purposes of the program. To take another example, evaluating Medicaid by its goal—to make health care accessible to the needy who are eligible for it—reveals a highly successful program. Headstart and the Job Corps were, judged by their own goals, also very successful. Although it is difficult to separate out the effects of the War on Poverty from those of the economic expansion that took place at the same time, poverty did decline sharply throughout the 1960s. Twenty-two percent of the population fell below the official poverty line in 1960, only 11 percent in 1973.
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theoretically
possible for AFDC benefits to raise a family above the poverty level. To judge AFDC a failure because it did not lower poverty rates, then, is to misunderstand the purposes of the program. To take another example, evaluating Medicaid by its goal—to make health care accessible to the needy who are eligible for it—reveals a highly successful program. Headstart and the Job Corps were, judged by their own goals, also very successful. Although it is difficult to separate out the effects of the War on Poverty from those of the economic expansion that took place at the same time, poverty did decline sharply throughout the 1960s. Twenty-two percent of the population fell below the official poverty line in 1960, only 11 percent in 1973.
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“Community action programs” were controversial from their inception in 1964 and were responsible for much of the backlash against the War on Poverty. The programs implicitly defined powerlessness as an important source of poverty. To empower poor people, the federal government funded community activists directly, thus deliberately bypassing local politics and politicians, whom federal antipoverty officials often saw as part of the problem. Local community action agencies deliberately recruited members of target communities as leaders and employees, often alienating local officials even as they empowered neighborhood groups. A few highly publicized examples of local African-American recipients who used funds to support militant tactics, however, created a backlash against not only the programs themselves but also the War on Poverty in general. Although community action agencies changed local politics in often-positive directions, they created too many enemies, and in 1967 Congress amended the law to require local government approval of the agencies. In 1974, funding was completely withdrawn.
The expansion of the AFDC program in the Great Society era represented a major change in social welfare policy. From its beginnings during the New Deal, AFDC had, in practice, been confined mostly to widows with dependent children. In the 1960s, however, a combination of factors—the growing feminization of poverty, a more militant welfare rights movement, the soaring promises of the War on Poverty, and a sense after the first of the urban riots that something had to be done—resulted in drastically increased applications for assistance, mostly from women who were divorced, separated, or never-married, rather than widowed. This change was due neither to an increase in the number of the poor nor to changes in the law that made more people eligible, but rather to the fact that more eligible people applied and more applicants were accepted. At the beginning of Johnson’s presidency, only one out of three eligible families received AFDC. By 1971, more than nine out of ten eligible families were receiving benefits. Although AFDC has always supported more white than black families, a popular perception grew that this program—what most people think of as “welfare”—primarily supported inner-city black families
In recent years, those arguing for “welfare reform” have claimed that the costs of “welfare” had spun out of control, blaming AFDC by implication. In fact, however, AFDC costs had declined since the 1960s. It was the Medicaid program, which provides matching grants to states to encourage medical assistance to the poor, whose costs had soared. Before AFDC was dismantled in 1996, Medicaid expenditures had become almost five times as expensive as AFDC.
Medicaid costs ballooned over the past several decades primarily for three reasons. First, the cost of medical care has risen precipitously and across the board. Second, though Medi
care
(publicly run health insurance for people over sixty-five and most permanently disabled people) covers most kinds of medical costs for the elderly, it only covers 80 percent of those expenses and does not cover nursing home care at all. As a result, Medic
aid
must take on medical care not only for poor mothers and their children, but also for the disabled and the elderly poor. Medicaid has certainly stepped into this breach, but the cost of nursing home care has risen even more rapidly than other medical expenses. (The majority of those who receive Medicaid’s nursing home benefit are formerly middle-class elderly who have run through their savings paying for the costs of their care.) Although two-thirds of Medicaid recipients are young women and their children, they account for less than one-third of its payments; the remainder goes to the disabled and elderly. Finally, costs have risen because the program has been an “entitlement,” meaning that the government has legally committed itself to provide whatever funds are necessary to cover anyone who fits the guidelines. Even so, nationally only about a third of those living below the official poverty line have been eligible for its benefits.
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care
(publicly run health insurance for people over sixty-five and most permanently disabled people) covers most kinds of medical costs for the elderly, it only covers 80 percent of those expenses and does not cover nursing home care at all. As a result, Medic
aid
must take on medical care not only for poor mothers and their children, but also for the disabled and the elderly poor. Medicaid has certainly stepped into this breach, but the cost of nursing home care has risen even more rapidly than other medical expenses. (The majority of those who receive Medicaid’s nursing home benefit are formerly middle-class elderly who have run through their savings paying for the costs of their care.) Although two-thirds of Medicaid recipients are young women and their children, they account for less than one-third of its payments; the remainder goes to the disabled and elderly. Finally, costs have risen because the program has been an “entitlement,” meaning that the government has legally committed itself to provide whatever funds are necessary to cover anyone who fits the guidelines. Even so, nationally only about a third of those living below the official poverty line have been eligible for its benefits.
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The ballooning costs of Medicaid account for almost all the increased federal expenditures on social programs for the poor over the last twenty years. Almost every other program has actually contracted, while—for reasons that its recipients have no control over at all—Medicaid has grown enormously.
By far the most massive of the social welfare programs during the Johnson and Nixon administrations were Social Security and Medicare. While these programs were not directed specifically toward the poor, they were and remain the most effective federal antipoverty programs. The Great Society expansion of Social Security and creation of Medicare—from which
everyone
benefited—dwarfed funding for all other social welfare programs combined. It is not coincidental that these two programs were so important in alleviating poverty. Because they targeted everyone of a certain age, they enjoyed broad political support. Not only were they adequately funded, but (unlike AFDC, for example) their benefits also increased
automatically
with inflation. As a result, however, the federal government spent about 75 percent of its social welfare budget during the Johnson and Nixon years on the non-poor!
everyone
benefited—dwarfed funding for all other social welfare programs combined. It is not coincidental that these two programs were so important in alleviating poverty. Because they targeted everyone of a certain age, they enjoyed broad political support. Not only were they adequately funded, but (unlike AFDC, for example) their benefits also increased
automatically
with inflation. As a result, however, the federal government spent about 75 percent of its social welfare budget during the Johnson and Nixon years on the non-poor!
Although it is not well known, social welfare programs expanded greatly under Richard Nixon, the Republican president who followed Lyndon Johnson. Despite Nixon’s anti-welfare rhetoric, government spending on welfare and public housing actually increased more during his administration than in Johnson’s.
Although the Great Society programs were moderately successful, given their funding levels, the seeds of a powerful backlash had been sown. The war in Vietnam not only drained billions of dollars from the federal budget that might otherwise have gone into public assistance programs, but “Johnson’s war” also claimed much of the president’s energy and undermined his authority in other areas. The debate over the war divided the Democrats into feuding camps and emboldened conservative opponents.
In addition, the soaring rhetoric that went with the largely underfunded Great Society programs raised unreasonable expectations. Americans had not grasped the depths of poverty in the country and believed the promises to end it. Although Johnson’s programs were not, in fact, specifically targeted at black, inner-city communities, media coverage certainly helped shape a general perception that the intended beneficiaries were African Americans. When the northern ghettos erupted in the second half of the decade, support for the Civil Rights movement—and along with it the War on Poverty—declined precipitously. In addition, rates of crime rose sharply during the second half of the 1960s, probably more because the Baby Boomer generation was coming into its adolescence,
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than due to the expanding ghettos. Whatever the explanation, the national mood changed from one of sympathetic concern to fear and mistrust. “Law and order” became a driving concern for many in the middle class. Increasingly, the public came to feel that the disadvantaged needed to be controlled rather than “coddled.”
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than due to the expanding ghettos. Whatever the explanation, the national mood changed from one of sympathetic concern to fear and mistrust. “Law and order” became a driving concern for many in the middle class. Increasingly, the public came to feel that the disadvantaged needed to be controlled rather than “coddled.”
The Great Society programs had been passed during an era of economic expansion and prosperity that looked as if it might continue forever. The popular sense had grown that the country could both fight poverty and, at the same time, increase individual workers’ living standards. In 1973, however, the oil embargo burst that fantasy, creating apprehension and economic uncertainty. Unemployment and skyrocketing inflation stoked fears of scarcity. African-American despair in the inner city was highly visible (on television, if nowhere else), and growing rapidly. White voters, even those many who had no contact whatsoever with black communities, found this threatening. Welfare and its urban clients became excellent scapegoats for the increasing decline in American productivity.
By the mid-1970s, the perception had grown that, to borrow Ronald Reagan’s later phrasing, “we had declared war on poverty and poverty won.” Conservative critics blamed the poor for their poverty, blamed welfare for exacerbating it, offered volunteerism as a better response than “government handouts,” and pushed government at all levels to reduce benefits. In part due to the fiasco of the Moynihan Report and in part due to fear of the black, inner city itself, liberal voices had withdrawn from the debate over black urban realities, so the conservative argument went unopposed. The political mood shifted dramatically. Government—from local to federal—has waged war on welfare ever since.
As economic realities in the large cities of the North and Midwest worsened in the mid-1970s, their tax bases declined—this at the very moment that the need for services was increasing. As cities’ infrastructures began to collapse, their credit ratings slipped. Rural and suburban voters drew back even further from urban problems, and felt even less responsibility for spending state money on urban problems, less willing to “subsidize” urban deficits. Voters in most states, for instance, rescinded their support for general relief to the destitute, which disproportionately affected those large cities. Aside from food stamps, such general assistance programs, which gave low levels of direct cash aid, had been the sole source of government assistance to most financially needy adults who were neither parents of small children nor disabled. (By 1998, only four states remained that gave direct cash assistance to able-bodied adults without dependent children.)
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