Unsinkable: The Full Story of the RMS Titanic (55 page)

32
Gracie, 8-9; Marcus, 150; Triumph and Tragedy, 114.

33
Marcus, 106; Triumph and Tragedy, 114.

34
A legend that has persisted for decades about the
Titanic’s
maiden voyage is that Ismay was pressuring Captain Smith to make a record-breaking crossing. This is not true. However high-handed and arrogant his behavior might be, Ismay could not alter the laws of physics. The Olympic-class ships, which displaced over 46,000 tons, had engines generating some 55,000 shaft horsepower (shp), which were capable of driving the Olympic and Titanic at a maximum of 24 ½ knots. In contrast, the
Lusitania
and
Mauretania,
which at the time were routinely trading speed records, displaced only 33,000 tons, but were driven by turbines which generated 68,000 shp. This gave the two ships a top speed of 26½ to 27 knots, clearly speeds the Olympic or Titanic could never attain. Additionally, the
Lusitania
and
Mauretania,
besides being lighter and having more powerful engines, had much superior hull forms, thanks to Admiralty assistance with their designs, a feature which may have added as much as a knot to their top speed.

35
Am. Inq., 963-64; Br. Inq., No. 18828-18840; A Night to Remember, 82; Marcus, 116; The Night Lives On, 60.

36
Transcribed from the original in the possession of the Southhampton City Museums.

37
Marconigraph,
June 1911; Karl Baarslag,
SOS,
20 and 30.

38
A Night to Remember, 37; Lynch, 71-72; Baarslag, 24-46.

39
Amer. Inq., 393, 825, 963-64; Br. Inq., No. 8943, 15689, 16099, 16122, 16176, 18828-18840.

40
Br. Inq., No. 16791.

1
Br. Inq., No. 17704-17709.

2
Amer. Inq., 963-64.

3
Br. Inq., No. 13611-13635; Lynch, 79-80; Triumph and Tragedy, 115.

4
Marcus, 109.

5
A Night to Remember, 178.

6
Beesley, 46-48; Lynch, 77-79; Marcus, 108; Triumph and Tragedy, 115.

7
Amer. Inq., 937; Br. Inq., No. 13707-13724, 16918-16922; Lightoller, 222-23; Triumph and Tragedy, 115.

8
Amer. Inq., 902; Br. Inq., No. 2401-2408, 13656-13671, 17250-17280.

9
Br. Inq., No. 8988-9020; Marcus, 120-21; A Night to Remember, 37-38; Wade, 352.

10
Am. Inq., 357-63; Br. Inq., No. 1027, 13734, 15353, 15355, 17275-17280, 17299-17326; A Night to Remember, 14; Lynch, 84-85; Marcus, 128.

11
In 1912, helm orders were still given according to the tradition of the earliest days of sail; that is, by the direction the tiller bar was pushed in order to turn the ship, not the direction the rudder was turned. Murdoch’s order of “Hard a starboard
^!
” meant that Hitchens turned the wheel to the right, which caused the big steam-powered rudder motor in the stern to turn to the right, making the rudder pivot left. Helm orders on British merchant ships weren’t rationalized until the mid- 1930s when it was finally decided to set the helm controls up so that the wheel and the rudder moved the same direction.

12
Amer. Inq., 359-61; Br. Inq., No. 17299-17326; A Night to Remember, 14-15; Marcus, 128-29; The Night Lives On, 77-79.

13
Amer. Inq., 533-34, 600-602, 671; A Night to Remember, 15-16.

14
Amer. Inq., 512-15; A Night to Remember, 14-15; Lynch, 91; Wade, 241 42.

15
Amer. Inq., 111, 332-33, 986-99; A Night to Remember, 16, 26; Wade, 241.

16
Amer. Inq., 884; A Night to Remember, 18-19.

17
Amer. Inq., 966, 1002, 10096; Wade, 242-43.

18
Amer. Inq., 42, 1142; A Night to Remember, 16; Pellegrino, 21-22.

19
Amer. Inq., 235-36; Br. Inq., No. 15358-15385; A Night to Remember, 19 and 32.

20
A Night to Remember, 33.

21
Report to the Mersey Commission (Br. Rpt.), 32-34; Marine Review, May 1912, 154-60; A Night to Remember, 35-36; Marcus, 132; The Night Lives On, 74. For many years it was believed that the iceberg had torn a 300-foot-long continuous gash in the
Titanic’s
side, apparently a belief formed by a spate of speculative illustrations in the popular press, which showed the liner being sliced open like a giant tin can. It was with some shock, then, that Dr. Robert Ballard reported in 1986, when he was able to closely examine the wreck, that there was no evidence of such a gash. Yet, that such a gash was highly unlikely had been established as far back as May 1912. Edward Wilding, a marine architect for Harland and Wolff, in a brilliant piece of theoretical engineering, concluded from the reports of the rate at which the breached compartments flooded that the total area in those compartments open to the sea was approximately 12 square feet. This would have meant that a continuous cut in the
Titanic’s
hull 300 feet long would have been only a half inch wide for it’s entire length—a difficult feat for a cutting torch, let alone an iceberg. It wasn’t until 1996 that ultrasonic probes conducted by Paul Mathias were able to conclusively establish that there was no gash: the damage done was indeed a seires of bent plates, split seams, and small holes—the total area open to the sea being just a little over 12 square feet.

22
Br. Inq., No. 664-668, 1860-1867, 3997-4002, 3715-3729, 3736;
Engineering,
14 June 1912, 847-50; Marine Review, May 1912, 154-60.

23
Amer. Inq., 27-41; Br. Rpt. 32-34; Marine Review, May 1912, 154-160;
Syren
and Shipping, 24 April 1912; Marcus, 295; The Night Lives On, 85.

24
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 15 April-25 October 1912; Engineering, 14 June 1912, 847-50; Marine Review, May 1912, 154-60; Brinnin, 250-51, 267-69, 347-51; Marcus, 37; Wade, 75.

1
Amer. Inq., 69; Br. Inq., No. 13734; Lightoller, 227.

2
Amer. Inq., 260.

3
Ibid., 436.

4
Ibid., 1103; New York Times, 19 April 1912; Beesley, 80-82; Gracie, 14-16.

5
Amer. Inq., 1024; Colliers, 4 May 1912, 10-14; Beesley, 50-53.

6
Amer. Inq., 1147; Semi-Monthly Magazine (Washington Post), 26 May 1912, 3-4; A Night to Remember, 25.

7
Marcus, 137.

8
A Night to Remember, 25.

9
Amer. Inq. 995-96.

10
Ibid., 332.

11
Ibid., 794 and 808; Beesley, 52; Gracie, 17.

12
A Night to Remember, 25; Wade, 248.

13
Lynch, 73; Wade, 247.

14
Amer. Inq., 228-29, 1032-36.

15
Br. Inq., No. 1917-1932.

16
Ibid., No. 708-827, 1940-1957.

17
Harper’s
Weekly, 29 April 1912; Elizabeth Shutes quoted in Gracie, 251-52; Marshall, 67.

18
Amer. Inq., 333; Beesley, 78; Lynch, 96.

19
The bulk of the recounting of what transpired in the wireless shack comes from Bride’s interview in the New York Times, April 20, 1912; additional information comes from his testimony before the Senate Committee, 103-61, 1045-55, as well as from the author’s conversations with private investigator David Norris in April 1992.

20
A Night to Remember, 40-41; Wade, 244-45.

21
Amer. Inq., 1114; Br. Inq., No. 933-936.

22
Amer. Inq., 885.

23
Amer. Inq., 1105; Dr. Dodge quoted in Gracie, 292; A Night to Remember, 42.

24
A Night to Remember, 45.

25
Amer. Inq., 109 and 808.

26
Amer. Inq., 1148-49.

27
This incident would provide generations of gossip mongers with a source of endless speculation. It is usually maintained, and under the circumstances reasonably so, that an illicit liaison was taking place in C-78. Given the social and moral tone of the period, public revelation of the affair would have been disastrous for all involved, hence the reluctance of the couple inside to open the door. If such was the case, their secret stayed safe with them that night, most likely all the way to the bottom of the Atlantic.

28
Amer. Inq., 807-8; A Night to Remember, 43; Lynch, 98.

29
A Night to Remember, 44 and 45.

30
Br. Inq., No. 9963-9997.

31
The
Shipbuilder,
125-26; Lynch, 101.

32
Amer. Inq., 331; Molly Brown quoted in Gracie, 127-28.

33
Amer. Inq., 1040-41; Semi-Monthly Magazine (Washington Post), 26 May 1912, 3-4; A Night to Remember, 44; Edith Russell quoted in Pellegrino, 211-212.

34
Colliers, 4 May 1912, 10-14.

35
Lynch, 94-95.

36
Amer. Inq., 1121.

37
Gracie, 7; A Night to Remember, 47-48.

38
Amer. Inq., 72-73.

39
Ibid., 72-88; Lightoller, 229-31.

40
Beesley, 83-84.

41
Amer. Inq., 227.

42
Ibid., 988-1000; Gracie, 228-33.

43
Amer. Inq., 577, 810, 988-1000; Gracie, 228-35.

44
Amer. Inq., 105-10.

45
Ibid., 235-37.

46
Wade, 280.

47
Amer. Inq., 111-12.

48
Br. Inq., No. 11337-11409; The Night Lives On, 90.

49
Amer. Inq., 332;
Harper’s
Weekly, April 29, 1912;
A
Night to Remember, 54.

50
Amer. Inq., 519.

1
Bullock, 69-72; Marcus, 139-40.

2
Amer. Inq., 796; Br. Inq., No. 2792-2801.

3
Br. Inq., No. 2008-2096; A Night to Remember, 57-58; Triumph and Tragedy, 149.

4
It’s worth keeping in mind that a red sidelight or running light is always shown from the port (left) side of a ship’s bridge and a green sidelight is shown from the starboard (right) side, then taking the time to compare the movements of the unknown ship seen from the Titanic with those of the drifting
Californian
relative to the unknown ship she spotted, as described in Chapter 10.

5
Bride’s Interview, New York Times, 20 April 1912.

6
Amer. Inq., 1100, 1109, 1149-50, 1162; A Night to Remember, 62 and 63; Semi-Monthly Magazine (Washington Post), 26 May 1912, 3-4; Lightoller, 238; Marcus, 149-50.

7
Lynch, 112.

8
New York Times, 19 April 1912; Marshall, 61.

9
Lynch, 112 and 117.

10
Gracie, 19, 32, 124; A Night to Remember, 74.

11
Lightoller, 233-34.

12
Amer. Inq., 595, 602, 755; Bullock, 71; A Night to Remember, 67; Wade, 291 and 293.

13
Amer. Inq., 79, 334-35; Colliers, 4 May 1912, 10-14; Molly Brown quoted by Gracie, 128.

14
Lightoller, 233-34; A Night to Remember, 66.

15
Harper’s
Weekly, 20 April 1912; Elizabeth Shutes quoted by Gracie, 254.

16
Amer. Inq., 1166; Lynch 94 and 115.

17
Br. Inq., No. 9885-9907, 11289-11322; New York Sun, 22 April 1912.

18
Amer. Inq., 1210-45; New York Sun, 22 April 1912; A Night to Remember 112-14; Marcus, 160-61; The Night Lives On, 113-25; Wade, 380-83.

19
Richard Harding Davis, Our English Cousins, 149-50.

20
Journal
of Cammerce:
Report of the Titanic Inquiry (1912), 267; Lightoller, 243; A
Night to
Remember, 75; Marcus, 161.

21
Gracie, 25.

22
Lightoller, 240.

23
Amer. Inq., 240.

24
Ibid., 273-75, 526, 798, 810-12, 971-72, 1041; Br. Inq., No. 5141-5153, 11501-11730, 12647-12668.

1
In years to come armchair navigators would frequently suggest that Captain Smith should have had the Titanic steam over to this other ship. While certainly a plausible idea, given the benefit of hindsight, it had certain drawbacks at the time that certainly would have caused the captain to reject the idea even if it had been brought up. Most significantly, Captain Smith knew his ship had been badly damaged, but just how extensively was uncertain—at one point Andrews had used the phrase “torn to bits below.” There was the distinct possibility that if the ship’s structure was affected, trying to make headway in a sinking condition might actually make the damage worse and drive the bow right under, sinking the ship in a matter of minutes. Three years later, the
Lusitania
would sink less than twenty minutes after she was struck by a German torpedo, and her speed of eighteen knots contributed heavily to the rapidity of her sinking: her forward momentum literally drove her bow down under the water.