Unholy Fury (44 page)

It was, however, Whitlam's unpredictability that disturbed policy makers in Washington the most.Verbal sallies and rhetorical onslaughts were one thing, but the Americans were struggling to discern the ‘precise direction' of Australian foreign policy in the early days of the second Whitlam government. Because they saw no ‘systematic strategy' governing his foreign policy, they wondered what course the ‘new nationalism' might take—in Asia, at home, and elsewhere. In keeping with this theme of uncertainty, a ‘touch of schizophrenia' was identified in many Australians' views on relations with the United States. While the vast majority of the Australian people wanted more ‘independence of action' within the alliance, the study also noted that equally they did not want ‘any significant breakdown' in the political, economic or security fields of the relationship. In summary, ANZUS was struggling to maintain the purchase it once had on the Australian strategic imagination:

 

For many Australians … the ANZUS alliance has faded in relevance with the receding of concern over Japanese military ambitions and, more recently, with a lessening of Cold War tensions and the welcomed advent of détente. Australians now believe that only very unlikely events could raise any significant threat to their security in the decade or so ahead, such as a breakdown of the world trend towards détente or a radical change in Jakarta that would leave Indonesia rather unstable or antagonistic towards Australia. The relative isolation of Australia has probably helped push potential threats from the Soviet Union or China much more to the background than has been the case with our West European or Japanese allies. This sense of security
gives the Government of Australia the feeling that it can safely follow policies more independent of the US.

 

It was not all Australia's fault: the memorandum clearly acknowledged that the United States had played a part in pushing its junior ally to this point. The failure to consult on matters such as the Middle East alert had ‘grated on Australian sensitivities' and exacerbated ‘the long-standing charge that “we take Australia for granted”'. Only now, it seemed, were the warnings from the US embassy in Canberra in the 1960s finally being heeded.

The study generated considerable debate among the various agencies in Washington, and not a little bureaucratic infighting. The hardest line was being taken by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who, even before the study was completed, authorised his department to begin looking at where and when it might relocate US intelligence installations. The State Department thought such a move would only increase frictions with Canberra; the CIA wanted to leave the intelligence relationship unchanged and pushed to postpone any decision on removing Pine Gap, ‘hoping [that] there might be a chance of leaving it in Australia until the 1980s'. Australian officials—at least according to this document—began to plead that the Americans not overreact. Nevertheless the harder Defense line did make it into the final version of the memorandum, and formed ‘Option 1', which advised the White House to:

 

Begin immediately to attenuate certain ties in the US-Australian alliance relationship, on the assumption that this will induce the Whitlam government to reverse those major elements of its foreign policy which are inimical to US interests.

 

That option included a reduction in both the flow of the most sensitive intelligence and joint military exercises, ‘vigorous' reaction to Australian foreign policy initiatives that ‘undercut our own' and ‘increased restrictions on US-Australian trade and capital flows'. The pros and cons of such an approach were clearly set out: in this case the most glaring pro being that if Option 1 was ‘unsuccessful in influencing the current Labor government, [it] could undermine it
with the Australian people, setting the stage for an Opposition victory'. It was a remarkable comment: the administration contemplating what course of action would have the most devastating domestic political effect. In the end, Option 1 was deemed far too high a risk, potentially producing a ‘downward spiral' in the relationship and possibly resulting in the ‘early loss' of the Pine Gap facility, which had been in operation for only four years at this time. The memorandum also noted, however, that ‘it is less than certain that the Government of Australia will continue to provide this installation a favourable, protected environment, or that it will not exercise its option to terminate the existing agreement upon one year's notice anytime after December 1975'. Legally, Whitlam could also give one year's notice to the Americans to leave Woomera in 1978 and North West Cape in 1988. However, the memorandum noted that Whitlam understood the importance of the installations and that they should remain ‘for the time being'. Seeing him now as a strong proponent of détente policy, the analysts judged that he would ‘want to avoid any action that he recognises would make progress in that field more difficult for the United States'.

By the time the report was due to be handed to the White House, the mood in Washington had settled somewhat. That was explained partly by the fact that, as one briefing note highlighted, ‘the Australians have been trying to show that they do not want to get too far away from us', a clear reference to the diplomatic offensive emanating from the Australian embassy in Washington. And the background documents to the memorandum observed that ‘although Australians are increasingly sensitive to implications of US domination, they are not anti-American'. In addition, Jim Cairns had said publicly that he would neither press for the early removal of the installations nor seek a security clearance to know more about their functions. Whitlam, too, had told Marshall Green that he would assume full responsibility for Cairns to preserve secrecy should he be given access to any US intelligence material. These developments tended to calm rattled nerves. The Defense Department was less concerned than before and the State Department was still of the view that it was better ‘not to rock the boat in these tricky waters'. Thus when the National
Security Council prepared Kissinger to handle the discussion at the crucial meeting to determine the memorandum's recommendations, he was advised that:

 

Essentially, we need to decide whether we stay on course with our policy and count on the Australian Government not to depart too much from our common relationship, whether to begin to back away, or whether to try to deepen the relationship so as to give Australia a deeper stake in it.

 

Marshall Green, for one, believed that the best option was for the United States to expand defence cooperation with Australia in order to accommodate new needs, such as nuclear-powered warship visits, the home-porting of a US destroyer escort and the establishment of the Omega global navigational system—all of which he felt were achievable if the US agreed to remove Pine Gap in 1978. The White House agreed, choosing to ‘test and clarify Whitlam's intentions' over the remainder of 1974, and ‘making selective use of pressure on Whitlam if necessary'. At the same time, it was agreed to provide inducements to give Australians a greater stake in the relationship—including the carrot of a vice presidential visit to Australia the following year and the promise of a regional economic group that would include, in addition to Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and possibly Indonesia and the Philippines. But these gifts were to be doled out only if ‘some recent signs of Whitlam's inclination towards a more cooperative relationship with us test out over the rest of the year'. The White House was taking out insurance: it wanted to maintain access to Australian sites for its defence and intelligence installations for as long as required, but it also wanted to accelerate the development of alternatives.

In short, the study recommended preservation of the ANZUS alliance, support for Australia's stabilising role as a regional power, and encouragement of ‘Australian foreign policies that harmonize with, rather than undercut, those of the US.'
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It showed that the United States still expected to be able to haul their junior ally back into line. The study also advocated maintenance of US access to defence installations in Australia and careful regard for political
pressure that may require their eventual relocation. In the end, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller did visit Australia in early 1976, but there was no substantive move towards a Pacific Basin economic consultative group.

The report never made it to Nixon. By the time it was scheduled for discussion, the president had fallen victim, finally, to the Watergate scandal and resigned from office. He retreated to La Casa Pacifica, his private home at San Clemente on the Pacific coast, to lick his wounds and begin the long process of rehabilitation.

On the day Nixon resigned, 9 August 1974, Whitlam offered no public comment on the president's demise. But he did write immediately to the new occupant of the Oval Office, Gerald Ford, extending the good wishes of his government and the Australian people.
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Whitlam's true feelings about the downfall of Nixon were probably only publicly revealed in November 1976 when, as Opposition leader, he released a statement welcoming the election of Jimmy Carter to the presidency. Despite his respect for Ford, Whitlam was sure that ‘most Australians are impressed that the American people have changed their political leaders'. He could barely contain his joy that a Democrat was back in the White House. The statement read:

 

Mr Carter will follow the policy of Democratic administrations in the past. They are more outgoing; they are more internationalist … Americans once again have an administration which embodies the aspirations of the peoples of the world—like the Roosevelt administration, the Truman administration and the Kennedy administration.
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For Gough Whitlam, 1976 revived the real United States: the United States he had looked to in the previous decade as the ‘most generous, idealistic nation' on earth. This, for him, was the true American vision.

THE ‘MELLOWING' OF GOUGH WHITLAM

Nixon's departure almost immediately changed the tone and temper of American–Australian relations. Although Kissinger was staying on as secretary of state, diplomats on both sides let out a sigh of relief.
According to Australia's ambassador in Washington, Patrick Shaw, the president's resignation had removed ‘a great impediment' to the alliance and the government could expect a ‘happier period' ahead. Marshall Green believed too that Nixon's fall and his replacement by Gerald Ford had ‘transformed the atmosphere', and he was even telling contacts in Canberra that during much of his time in the post he had found it ‘exceedingly hard to react to the various Australian pinpricks with enough vigour to satisfy the White House, without being judged [in Australia] to have over-reacted'. At last, the American envoy could step off the diplomatic tightrope. Green was not overly optimistic, however, at the prospects for Whitlam's own political resilience. With ‘no policy to combat inflation' he predicted that Labor had, at best, only six to twelve months life left before its replacement by the Liberal–Country Party coalition.
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But coming to the end of 1974, Green could even count five straight months clear of any ‘gratuitous remarks' from the prime minister.
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And Henry Kissinger, preparing Ford for his first meeting with the Australian leader in October that year, could now get past Whitlam's ‘personal penchant for grandstanding' and welcome a ‘mellowing in his foreign policy approach'. Here was an ally seemingly back in line—acknowledging the importance of the defence installations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and global deterrence, and showing a greater attentiveness to the views of Asian leaders. This was a different Australian political beast being presented here: weakened on the domestic front and hence more conciliatory abroad. The United States could even turn a blind eye to Whitlam's off-the cuff-remarks in New York in September 1974—where he had addressed the UN General Assembly—in which he suggested that the Americans and the Soviets had interfered in the domestic affairs of other countries.
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Marshall Green seemed intent on giving the new relationship an even more dramatic, final flourish. Towards the end of his posting, the American ambassador was saying in public what he had confided quietly to Australian diplomats in private. Speaking publicly in New York in March 1975 he declared an emphatic end to the era of sycophancy. Although the US relationship with the Whitlam team
might not be as close as with previous governments, ‘in many ways it's healthier than before'. Both sides had to accept the blame for the recent strains, and he reiterated that there had ‘been problems of failure to consult, the fault being mostly on Washington's side in that regard'. Green even excoriated the obsequious attitude of previous Australian governments, describing the Holt policy of ‘All the Way with LBJ' as a ‘downright embarrassment' to Australia and its subsequent leaders. He concluded that all political parties in Australia were in favour of ‘a nationalistic policy for Australia … We understand that and agree with it'.
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Now Green, like Whitlam, was burying the slogans of the Cold War alliance. The speech generated considerable press coverage in Australia, one newspaper leading with ‘“Do it Your way” says the US', an editorial noting that Green had effectively spiked the guns of both the Labor left and Liberal right, in so doing giving the Whitlam government the greatest foreign policy fillip of its career.
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There was speculation, too, that Green might have been using the speech to take implied credit for overcoming the deliberate nastiness with which Nixon and Kissinger had treated Australia over the previous two years.

The euphoria in Labor's ranks at the speech aside, the remarks were certainly enough to provoke widespread gloom and doom amongst Australian conservatives, some pouring out their ‘chagrin' and ‘surprise' in private meetings with US diplomats. One, the federal member for Bradfield David Connolly, could even agree that it was time to ‘shake up the old sycophantic relations', but particularly disliked ‘hearing the Labor Party being given credit by the American ambassador for the shake-up'.
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So used to corralling the symbols and sentiments of the alliance for their own side of politics, some conservatives were clearly traumatised by the overturning of the established order.