Under the Bloody Flag (45 page)

Even so, reprisal ships operating within the confines of the regulations returned with varied and sometimes rich returns. There were wide fluctuations in the seizure of enemy prizes, ranging in annual value from £100,000 to £200,000. The most common type of prize, accounting for about one-half of the total number of captured cargoes, was made up of European commodities, particularly wine, timber, corn and fish. The more valuable prizes were of American goods, including sugar, hides, logwood, ginger, gold, silver and pearls, though ships laden with treasure were rarely taken. In total they accounted for more than three-quarters of the total value of prize cargoes. Because of their size and armament, few vessels returning from the East Indies were captured. However, one of the richest prizes taken during the war was a Portuguese carrack, the
Madre de Dios
. This huge prize was captured in 1592 off the Azores, on the return voyage from the east, but only after a prolonged conflict involving five of Cumberland’s ships acting in consortship with a fleet of men-of-war, in which the Queen had an interest, and other reprisal ships. The value of the cargo, of spices, jewels, perfumes and gold, was close to £500,000, but the prize was so extensively pillaged that Cumberland and the other promoters were left to share out £140,000. For the principal adventurers, this may have barely covered the cost of the venture.
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Characteristically the war of reprisals served competing and complementary interests. By promoting the sea war, the regime created an outlet for the employment of private resources and investment, as well as for the expression of anti-Spanish hostility. While the nature of the conflict reduced the Crown’s control over strategy, weakening its ability to direct operations at sea, it may have been well suited to the maintenance of a defensive war against one of the greatest powers in western Europe. At a time when the Queen was forced into an increasingly burdensome commitment in the Netherlands and northern France, the maritime conflict provided her with the opportunity to harass and weaken the enemy in a potentially profitable way, while limiting the dangers of employing the navy in risky and costly offensive actions. But the length of the war, which was still in progress at the time of the Queen’s death, had unforeseen and contradictory consequences. On the one hand it encouraged the development of better organized, business-like enterprises, as the more amateurish and unsuccessful adventurers were forced out of business; on the other hand it led to growing disorder at sea, within a context of mounting international competition involving English, Dutch, French and Flemish men-of-war. There was an inherent danger that the so-called ‘wild men’ of the war of reprisals would subvert public and private ambitions, while weakening the coalition of interests which sustained the conflict at sea, by their disorderly behaviour.
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The scale and length of the war thus had unexpected consequences for maritime depredation. The later 1580s and early 1590s were marked by overseas complaints against English pirates, which became more widespread and intense as the war progressed. In some parts of Europe it appeared that the English were engaged in an unprecedented attack on neutral trade and shipping as well as on Iberian commerce. Much of this overseas complaint was about the seizure of contraband, or the capture of neutral vessels carrying enemy cargoes, rather than piracy as such. But the disorderly activities of reprisal ships undermined the ability of the regime to maintain the distinction between legitimate privateering and piracy. As a result the sea war provoked a cycle of irregular spoil, piracy and violence at sea, encouraging overseas reprisals and retaliation.

Maritime depredation confused profound issues of strategy, property rights and international law. Although the regime justified the seizure of munitions and provisions aboard neutral ships as a lawful means of weakening the enemy, in practice there was no widely accepted definition of contraband of war. In June 1586, for example, the French insisted on their right to trade freely with Spain, England or the Low Countries, citing in their defence English practice during the last Franco-Spanish war, when English merchants traded with both countries. To some extent the difficulty was an unavoidable consequence of the limited development of international law, especially as it applied to neutral rights and practices. But it was also the result of self-interested political and economic considerations. In the Netherlands the issue was a source of discord among the rebels against Philip II, with the merchants of Amsterdam and other ports in Holland insisting on the right to trade with Spain, against the demands of those who tried to restrict or halt it. At a time when the regime in England was seeking to promote the ‘common cause’ of international Protestantism, while preventing the spread of hostilities in France, the seizure of neutral shipping was an acutely sensitive issue, which threatened to embroil it in protracted and damaging disputes with friends and allies.
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Against this background the opening years of the war witnessed an onslaught on shipping in the Channel which endangered the distinction between lawful reprisals and piracy. Vulnerable French trading and fishing vessels were especially exposed to disorderly spoil by the English. In May 1586 the
Jonas
of Rouen, laden with a cargo of sugar from the Canary Islands, was taken by two English men-of-war off Cape Finisterre and brought into Bridgewater. It was followed by the seizure of five or six ships, laden with corn, during June and July, several of which were carried off to Flushing, then in the hands of an English governor and garrison, where they were adjudged as lawful prize. The spoil of French shipping aroused widespread anger and resentment. In July Burghley was informed that the recent plunder of sixteen vessels provoked such hostility towards the English in St Malo that they were afraid to be seen in public. It also led to concern among merchants in the West Country that they would be debarred from trading across the Channel. During September, complaints of the seizure of ten or twelve French vessels were accompanied by reports that their companies had been cast overboard and drowned. Shortly after, it was reported that ten headless corpses, bound together, were washed ashore along the coast of Treguyer. The following month Henry III complained to the Queen about the seizure of wheat and rye laden aboard two English ships at Hamburg for the governor of Calais. The grain was taken into Zeeland by Captain Henry Griffin and declared to be legal prize, in spite of objections from the English Lord Admiral.
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The regime appeared to be powerless to prevent this determined assault on French shipping. In January 1587 William Waad, visiting Paris on other diplomatic business, was informed that 150 traders or shippers had been spoiled by English men-of-war. These complaints were aggravated by allegations concerning the difficulty and delay in securing justice in England, which led to a suspension of Anglo-French trade in January. Although it was lifted in May, by then the issue of disorderly depredation was complicated by the plunder of naturalized Spaniards resident in France.
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The seizure or spoil of at least sixteen French vessels during the period from March to June 1587 led to violent retaliation. In June two English ships bound for La Rochelle were plundered by men-of-war from Dieppe. The French reportedly ‘used great cruelty towards the men, slaying divers of them a sang froid, and leaving some of them most barbarously upon certain rocks, to the end they might perish … for want of succour’.
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Despite intervention from Sir Edward Stafford, the English ambassador in Paris, in support of French complaints, by November 1587 commissioners acting for Henry III were considering the issue of letters of reprisal against England. Early in 1588 Stafford warned Burghley of the diplomatic damage from the unruly spoil of French ships: ‘these continued sores upon sores will mar all in the end’, he cautioned, compelling the French into ‘thinking that we desire to have quarrels with them’. As England prepared to meet the threat of the Spanish Armada, its relations with France seemed to be endangered by the corrosive issue of maritime depredation. French representatives continued to complain of piracy and illegal spoil by adventurers such as Captain Leye, ‘who makes war without any warrant’, as well as by disorderly captains in the Queen’s service. In addition the plunder of vessels from the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle threatened to damage relations with Henry, King of Navarre, the leader of the Protestant interest in France and heir to the throne.

Although French shipping bore the brunt of English disorderly depredation during the early years of the war, the assault on neutral trade provoked wider overseas complaint. The concern of the regime to prevent the traffic in war material and provisions to Spain from northern Europe turned the Channel into a battleground for contraband trade and neutral rights. While ships from Norway arrived in Spain during August 1586 having ‘met no man of war all the way’, the regime saw the supply of the enemy with certain commodities, especially ordnance, as a ‘very bad and unconscionable trade’.
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Even among friendly states, however, there was disagreement over the extent of the English definition of contraband. While the King of Denmark agreed to accept gunpowder, ordnance, saltpetre, pitch, tar and other naval supplies in a list of such prohibited goods, he objected to the inclusion of wheat and rye. Under these conditions neutral traders either sought guarantees from the Queen that their ships would not be attacked, or they diverted their vessels around Scotland to avoid the dangers of the Channel.

But the issue of contraband was soon clouded by disorderly and indiscriminate attacks on trading vessels, regardless of their intended destinations. During 1586 Dutch merchants complained of rovers and freebooters, with or without commissions, who disposed of plundered goods in London, Dover and the Isle of Wight, the proceeds of which were used to wage war against Spain. The captures included the
Hope
of Flushing, which was taken under colour of reprisals by a vessel sent out by Watts and his London partners. The following year the King of Denmark threatened to arrest English shipping if his subjects were unable to obtain redress for such spoil. The Queen apologized for the unruly activities of English reprisal ships, providing compensation for their victims. But she also urged the Danish monarch ‘to consider how hard it is to restrain men-of-war from outrages by sea and land, in times of hostility between princes’.
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As a result, Danish complaints continued. In January 1588 the King angrily complained to Elizabeth of the damage to his honour and reputation, following the seizure of a fishing vessel returning from Iceland by two English captains, Wickes and Wood, who evidently tore up a royal passport and letter of safe conduct. The company of the vessel were spoiled of their victuals and clothing and set ashore in Ireland, while the cargo was sold at Chester. Faced with daily complaints against the activities of English pirates, the King threatened to ‘use his own means for revenge of these outrages’.
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The early years of the war at sea thus witnessed the establishment of a pattern of maritime enterprise which dangerously confused the distinction between lawful depredation and piracy. Despite the regime’s prohibition of reprisals against targets other than Spain and Portugal, English adventurers launched an indiscriminate campaign of plunder against neutral trade and shipping. Although it defended such attacks as a legitimate means of denying Spain supplies of contraband of war, its position was undermined by the activities of captains such as Diggory Piper. During 1585 and 1586 Piper was one of several captains who deliberately targeted French and Danish shipping. His seizure of a Danish vessel under colour of reprisals was described by the civilian lawyer, Dr Hammond, as ‘plain piracy’.
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In order to reduce the level of piratical activity, the author of an undated paper, of
c
.1587, called for rapid legal action against pirates, including summary executions without any prospect of pardon, as well as more effective regulation of the sea war by Admiralty officials. But the suggestion that the plunder of neutral vessels should be regarded as piracy, which would have overwhelmed the High Court of Admiralty with offenders, underlined the difficulty in trying to maintain a clear distinction between illegal and legal enterprise.
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The response to English depredation was overseas complaint and condemnation, accompanied by retaliation which generated a violent cycle of reprisals and piracy. Thus the raids of Dutch and Flemish men-of-war aroused anger among the south-east ports, while the French response provoked widespread concern in the south-west. The disruption and damage to peaceful trade, particularly in provincial ports, swelled the ranks of unemployed mariners, increasing the pool of potential recruits for irregular maritime venturing, including localized piracy. Under such conditions the violence and disorder at sea were sustained, and justified, by mutual grievances and hostility. In August 1588 the Lord Admiral warned that the ill-treatment of English subjects by the French forced men into piracy.
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If the sea war bred disorderly reprisals, it also served as a cover for the persistence of small-scale piracy. The legal distinction between both forms of activity was deeply compromised by the actions of captains like Piper. As during the 1540s, however, there was a tendency for the former to concentrate on overseas targets, while pirates spoiled domestic as much as foreign shipping. Localized piracy was heavily overshadowed by the scale and vigour of the reprisal war; nevertheless, it remained a problem in the coastal waters of the British Isles, reinforcing and occasionally merging with more ambitious forms of depredation.

During the years preceding the Armada campaign, much of this activity was an attenuated survival of the organized piracy which had flourished so widely during the 1570s. With local support, it persisted particularly within the Irish Sea and along the coast of East Anglia. In June 1586 the council complained to magistrates and the commissioners for piracy in Wales about the presence of pirates in Cardiff and the neighbouring region; local constables who had allowed them to escape were to face exemplary punishment. The pirates included several groups who operated off the coast of north Wales, spoiling ships sailing to and from Ireland. Later in the year the council was informed that pirates openly resorted to Gorleston, where ‘disordered persons keep the town in awe’.
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Various reports of 1586 and 1587 identified the leading offenders as Captains Wise, Beare, Cooke, Smith, Kanter, Cole and Strangewich, but there were undoubtedly others who were engaged in the business. Cooke seems to have been engaged in the spoil of local shipping within the Irish Sea, disposing of plunder in Milford Haven and Carmarthen, possibly with the continued connivance of local officials. The apprehension and punishment of such rovers remained dependent on the cooperation of local officers, with varying results. In August 1587 a servant of the Lord Admiral, who was sent to Margate to apprehend certain pirates, encountered the master of ‘their fellowship and confederacie’, but he escaped when an official in the town refused to assist in his arrest.
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