To Lose a Battle (45 page)

The Luftwaffe Attacks

For the massive air support promised that day, the Luftwaffe
had allocated the whole of Lieutenant-General Bruno Loerzer’s
Fliegerkorps
II, one of the principal components of the Third Air Fleet, commanded by General Hugo Sperrle, plus Major-General Wolfram von Richthofen’s
Fliegerkorps
VIII, borrowed from Kesselring’s Second Air Fleet operating in the north. Kesselring and Sperrle (later promoted Field-Marshals for their work during the French campaign) were both regular, Army officers who had transferred to the Luftwaffe in the 1930s, while Kesselring, an artillery man, had only learned to fly when he was forty-eight. Sperrle, a vast brooding figure, had, however, gained invaluable experience as first commander of the Condor Legion in Spain. Loerzer was what was known as ‘an old eagle’, who, claiming forty-four victories, had tied for seventh place in the German list of First War aces. Freiherr von Richthofen, cousin of the famous ‘Red Knight’ and who had also been a junior member of his ‘Flying Circus’ in the First War, had succeeded Sperrle in the Condor Legion, establishing a reputation as the Luftwaffe’s outstanding expert on ‘close support’ tactics. It was his Stukas particularly that were to make their mark at Sedan. Between them, Loerzer and Richthofen disposed of nearly 1,500 aircraft,
¹⁵
roughly equivalent to the combined British and French total available air strengths in France. Certainly by 1940 standards, it was a staggering concentration of air power to be brought to bear on just a few miles of front.
¹⁶

At 0700 hours, Loerzer’s level bombers, mostly Dornier 17 ‘Flying Pencils’, started bombing the French positions. But these were ‘harassing attacks’, hardly heavier than the raids of the previous days. The bombing continued for four hours, gradually mounting in intensity. It was particularly the communication
links of the defenders that were hit by this preliminary ‘softening-up’. Grandsard stated that his artillery fire plan was greatly hindered by repeated breaks in telephone lines, and as the morning progressed, its fire began to slacken. Visiting the H.Q. of General Baudet’s newly arrived 71st Division, Grandsard found that the makeshift divisional telephone exchange had been destroyed, and that Baudet, still disgruntled at the accelerated movement into line of his division, had already ‘been affected by this bombardment’. Grandsard says he tried to ‘comfort’ Baudet, telling him too that ‘it did not seem the enemy would be able to attack on the 13th with important forces’. Meanwhile, General Lafontaine of the 55th Division was complaining to Grandsard that he was being bombed without any intervention from Allied aircraft, and this was of course shaking the morale of his soldiers. Grandsard promptly passed on these views to Huntziger, coupled with a plea for immediate air cover; but according to Grandsard, Huntziger gave a most ‘unsatisfactory’ response: ‘They must receive a baptism of fire.’

The total failure of both Allied air forces at Sedan on 13 May is one of the more extraordinary, in some ways inexplicable, features of the whole battle. If any simple, general explanation is to be found, it must lie in the dreadful quagmire of liason links between the various French ground armies and combat units of the Air Force. As far as bombing missions to break up the German concentrations east of the Meuse were concerned, General d’Astier tells us that at 0940 hours on the 13th, he was at last asked by Billotte to allot priority to air support for the Second Army. But he claims that he was given no inkling of the imminence of a German river-crossing attempt, Billotte speaking only in vague terms of ‘the next two or three days’. It was not until midday that the Second Army reported tank concentrations near Givonne, and it added that for the moment it did not require intervention by bombers as its artillery ‘was engaging these targets’. Thus, in the stereotyped mind of the French artilleryman, simultaneous aerial bombing could only upset his observation. (Meanwhile Billotte, reporting Rommel’s crossing at Houx, also refused air support
on the grounds that armour had already been sent for – the sequel to which has been recounted.)

What about the British? In the absence of any desperate plea for assistance from General Georges, Barratt’s Advanced Air Striking Force (A.A.S.F.) spent the 13th licking its wounds. They were painful. For the previous three days, the rate of loss had amounted to 40 per cent of all sorties on the 10th, 100 per cent on the 11th, and 62 per cent on the 12th. By the evening of 12 May, the A.A.S.F.’s total of 135 serviceable bombers had dwindled to 72, and perhaps not surprisingly Barratt had received a signal from the Chief of the Air Staff in London expressing concern at his heavy losses, and warning ‘we cannot continue indefinitely at this rate of intensity… If we expend all our efforts in the early stages of the battle we shall not be able to operate effectively when the really critical phase comes.’ It would be hard to conceive of a more ‘critical’ day than 13 May; nevertheless, with this
caveat
of the previous night, Barratt made no call on his Blenheims, and the Battles restricted themselves to blocking a crossroads near Breda, in Holland.

As for Allied fighter cover over Sedan, General Ruby, who was then at Huntziger’s H.Q., claims that all Grandsard’s requests were immediately passed on to the air command, but the latter’s ‘appalling organization’ somehow swallowed them up. General d’Astier states that his fighters in fact made 250 sorties that day between the Ninth and Second Army fronts, shooting down twenty-one enemy planes for the loss of twelve; but this was a mere drop in the bucket compared with the turn-out of the Luftwaffe. Typical of what the French fighters were up against was this entry in a squadron diary: ‘Between 10 and 11 o’clock, a three-plane patrol flying over the area Carignan–Sedan runs into 50 enemy bombers protected by 80 Messerschmitts. Free-for-all in which Lieutenant Wrana is shot down…’ Against this kind of competition, the French Curtisses – 60 m.p.h. slower than the Me-109s – were at a grave if not hopeless disadvantage. Nevertheless, considering the seriousness of the threat on the 13th, one does get the impression that the French fighter squadrons, whose pilots were
already short on sleep, did not press home their attacks with every ounce of vigour.

At midday the intensity of the bombing rose sharply, with the Luftwaffe sending over hundreds of planes in dense formations. Sergeant Prümers of the 1st Panzer, still being heavily shelled by the enemy artillery, was among those to watch with awful fascination the first appearance of Richthofen’s Stukas:

Three, six, nine, oh, behind them still more, and further to right aircraft, and still more aircraft, a quick look in the binoculars – Stukas! And what we are about to see during the next twenty minutes is one of the most powerful impressions of this war. Squadron upon squadron rise to a great height, break into line ahead (
Reihenformation
) and there, there the first machines hurtle perpendicularly down, followed by the second, third – ten, twelve aeroplanes are there. Simultaneously, like some bird of prey, they fall upon their victim and then release their load of bombs on the target. We can see the bombs very clearly. It becomes a regular rain of bombs that whistle down on Sedan and the bunker positions. Each time the explosion is overwhelming, the noise deafening. Everything becomes blended together; along with the howling sirens of the Stukas in their dives, the bombs whistle and crack and burst. A huge blow of annihilation strikes the enemy, and still more squadrons arrive, rise to a great height, and then come down on the same target. We stand and watch what is happening as if hypnotized; down below all hell is let loose! At the same time we are full of confidence… and suddenly we notice that the enemy artillery no longer shoots… while the last squadron of Stukas is still attacking, we receive our marching orders…

The Stukas operated in three groups, each of about forty planes; the first coming in at about 5,000 feet, would attack with two or three planes at a time while the second group hovered watchfully at 12,000 feet, looking for the targets missed by the first group and then – after that had expended its bombs – moving in in turn; the third group operated in isolation, picking out single or moving targets. After the Stuka waves, the Dorniers would resume their work; then more Stukas. Around them buzzed the Me-109s and the heavier
Me-110 ‘destroyers’, pouncing on any slower French fighter that attempted to get at the vulnerable Stukas.

Watching the steady procession of the bomber formations, Guderian suddenly realized that the Luftwaffe was carrying out the tactics he and Loerzer had agreed upon, not the massive, once-for-all bombardment dictated by Kleist. Though puzzled, Guderian ‘sighed with relief’. When the day was over he questioned Loerzer; shrugging his shoulders, the First War ace explained that Kleist’s change of orders had arrived ‘well, let’s say, too late. They would have muddled the
Geschwader.
So I didn’t pass them on!’

The Stukas kept on coming in. Down they screamed, sirens howling, loosing their solitary 550-lb bomb upon the thinskinned French pill-boxes, on the infantry crouching exposed in their trenches, and on the gun crews. It was against the French artillery positions in their poorly concealed and shallow gunpits that the rage of the Stukas was particularly concentrated, and among these it was the new reinforcements arrived the previous night, with insufficient time to dig themselves in, who suffered most. The explosive force of the heavy bombs literally turned batteries upside down, wrecked guns and filled the working parts of anti-aircraft machine-guns with earth and grit. Observers in concrete bunkers were blinded by dust and smoke, and everywhere telephone lines were ruptured. The noise was terrifying.
¹⁷
Grandsard’s reservists had the impression that each plane was about ‘to land right on top of him’, that it simply could not miss. In some uncanny way, the German pilots seemed to know exactly where every gun and bunker lay. Nowhere was one out of sight, nowhere out of range of this dreadful weapon.

Yet owing to the inaccuracy of the Stukas, casualties were in fact not great. But as an instrument of terror it was far more effective than the Kaiser’s ‘secret weapon’ of 1914, the
‘Big Bertha’ shells that had plunged down on the Belgian forts; more effective than the gas attack at Ypres; more than the first appearance of flame-throwers, or even the tank. This was a new dimension of war for which not even tough regulars had been prepared, and Grandsard’s men were flabby civilians whose morale was not conspicuously high, and who had received absolutely no training in how to cope with dive-bombing. For what ensued they could not entirely be blamed. Says General Ruby:

The gunners stopped firing and went to ground, the infantry cowered in their trenches, dazed by the crash of bombs and the shriek of the dive-bombers; they had not developed the instinctive reaction of running to their anti-aircraft guns and firing back. Their only concern was to keep their heads well down. Five hours of this nightmare was enough to shatter their nerves, and they became incapable of reacting against the enemy infantry…

To add to their demoralization, over their heads they could see no sign of any Allied planes coming to their assistance. Plea after plea from the 55th Division went apparently unanswered.

Seen from the German side of the river, the whole of the west bank had disappeared in a blanket of smoke. Even at a distance the waiting Germans suffered disagreeably from the tremendously high pressure caused by the bomb blasts. In awe, they wondered how anything could possibly survive such an inferno. Then, half an hour before H-Hour, Guderian’s artillery joined in the hideous fugue with a short but ferocious barrage. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the stunning effect of the Stukas, the flak gunners moved their weapons out of cover, manhandling them right down almost to the very river’s edge to engage with flat trajectory fire the French bunkers just across the river. At this close range, the twin-barrelled 20-mm. and 37-mm. automatic cannon swiftly sought out the bunker slits and gun embrasures. Against those bunkers where the protective armour had not arrived, the consequences were deadly, though much less so with those that were properly equipped. But the most lethal work was affected by a piece that was later to achieve renown as the most feared anti-tank gun
on any side – possibly, with the Russian T.34 tank, as the most successful single weapon of the whole war. This was the German ‘88’. Designed by Krupp as the Wehrmacht’s standard heavy anti-aircraft gun, it was a direct descendant
¹⁸
of the weapon hastily produced (also by Krupp) in 1870 to shoot down the French balloons escaping from besieged Paris. The 88-mm. imparted a very high muzzle velocity, and therefore, at close ranges, tremendous hitting and penetrating power. The ‘88’ had been tried out experimentally in the early part of 1939, firing at close range into the embrasures of the French-designed bunkers among the Czechs’ ‘Little Maginot Line’, supposedly at Hitler’s own instance. The results were devastating, and it is worth noting that (according to General Menu) they were reported upon in detail by the then French Military Attaché in Prague. The first combat employment of the ‘88’ in a horizontal role, however, occurred purely by accident; during the Polish campaign, an isolated flak unit had been attacked by surprise by Polish cavalry and, in the emergency, brought their ‘88s’ to bear, firing them over open sights. The success achieved surprised even the Germans. Suddenly new possibilities presented themselves. Now at Sedan, the French bunkers designed to stand up to the oblique fire of guns of all calibres up to 210 mm. proved desperately vulnerable to the direct fire of the ‘88s’, limited in number as they were. One by one the guns in the bunkers were smashed, their crews blinded by splinters, or horribly mutilated by shells exploding within the confined space of the bunkers; or else simply forced by the torrent of light flak fire to abandon guard at the embrasures.