Their Finest Hour (49 page)

Former Naval Person to President .

27.VIII.40.

Lord Lothian has cabled me the outline of the facilities you have in mind. Our naval and air experts, studying the question from your point of view, had reached practically the same conclusions, except that in addition they thought Antigua might be useful as a base for flying-boats. To this also you would be very welcome. Our settled policy is to make the United States safe on their Atlantic seaboard “beyond a peradventure,” to quote a phrase you may remember.
¹

2. We are quite ready to make you a positive offer on these lines forthwith. There would, of course, have to be an immediate conference on details, but, for the reasons which I set out in my last telegram, we do not like the idea of an arbiter should any difference arise, because we feel that as donors we must remain the final judges of what the gift is to consist of within the general framework of the facilities which will have been promised, and always on the understanding that we shall do our best to meet United States wishes.

3. The two letters dratted by Lord Lothian to the Secretary of State are quite agreeable to us. The only reason why I do not wish the second letter to be published is that I think it is much more likely that the German Government will be the one to surrender or scuttle its fleet or what is left of it. In this, as you are aware, they have already had some practice. You will remember that I said some months ago in one of my private cables to you that any such action on our part would be a dastard act, and that is the opinion of every one of us.

4. If you felt able after our offer had been made to let us have the “instrumentalities”
²
which have been mentioned or anything else you think proper, this could be expressed as an act not in payment or consideration for, but in recognition of, what we had done for the security of the United States.

5. Mr. President, this business has become especially urgent in view of the recent menace which Mussolini is showing to Greece. If our business is put through on big lines and in the highest spirit of good will, it might even now save that small historic country from invasion and conquest. Even the next forty-eight hours are important.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

27.VIII.40.

Lord Lothian’s account of President Roosevelt’s request should now be put into the first person in case a public declaration is required in our name. For instance, “His Majesty’s Government make the following offer to the President of the United States: ‘We are prepared in friendship and good will to meet your representatives immediately in order to consider the provision of effective naval and air bases in the following islands,’ ” etc.

Let me have a draft on these lines, so that I can dictate a cable. The draft should be in my hands this morning.

Accordingly:

27.VIII.40.

His Majesty’s Government make the following offer to the President of the United States:

We are prepared in friendship and good will to meet your representatives forthwith, in order to consider the lease for ninety-nine years of areas for the establishment of naval and air bases in the following places:

 

N EWFOUNDLAND	A NTIGUA
B ERMUDA	S T. L UCIA
B AHAMAS	T RINIDAD
J AMAICA	B RITISH G UIANA

Subject to later settlements on points of detail….

At the same time I suggested the following text of the telegram for publication which the President might send me to elicit the assurance he desired.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain is reported to have stated on June 4, 1940, to Parliament, in effect, that if during the course of the present war in which Great Britain and British Colonies are engaged, the waters surrounding the British Isles should become untenable for British ships-of-war, a British Fleet would in no event be surrendered or sunk, but would be sent overseas for the defence of other parts of the Empire.

The Government of the United States would respectfully inquire whether the foregoing statement represents the settled policy of the British Government.

The President adopted this version, and I sent him the following agreed reply:

You ask, Mr. President, whether my statement in Parliament on June 4, 1940, about Great Britain never surrendering or scuttling her Fleet “represents the settled policy of His Majesty’s Government.” It certainly does. I must, however, observe that these hypothetical contingencies seem more likely to concern the German Fleet or what is left of it than our own.

Thus all was happily settled, and on September 5, using the language of understatement, I duly informed the House of Commons and obtained their acquiescence and indeed general consent:

The memorable transactions between Great Britain and the United States, which were foreshadowed when I last addressed the House, have now been completed. As far as I can make out, they have been completed to the general satisfaction of the British and American peoples and to the encouragement of our friends all over the world. It would be a mistake to try to read into the official notes which have passed more than the documents bear on their face. The exchanges which have taken place are simply measures of mutual assistance rendered to one another by two friendly nations, in a spirit of confidence, sympathy, and good will. These measures are linked together in a formal agreement. They must be accepted exactly as they stand. Only very ignorant persons would suggest that the transfer of American destroyers to the British flag constitutes the slightest violation of international law, or affects in the smallest degree the non-belligerency of the United States.

I have no doubt that Herr Hitler will not like this transference of destroyers, and I have no doubt that he will pay the United States out, if he ever gets the chance. That is why I am very glad that the army, air, and naval frontiers of the United States have been advanced along a wide arc into the Atlantic Ocean, and that this will enable them to take danger by the throat while it is still hundreds of miles away from their homeland. The Admiralty tell us also that they are very glad to have these fifty destroyers, and that they will come in most conveniently to bridge the gap which, as I have previously explained to the House, inevitably intervenes before our considerable wartime programme of new construction comes into service.

I suppose the House realises that we shall be a good deal stronger next year on the sea than we are now, although that is quite strong enough for the immediate work in hand. There will be no delay in bringing the American destroyers into active service; in fact, British crews are already meeting them at the various ports where they are being delivered. You might call it the long arm of coincidence. I really do not think that there is any more to be said about the whole business at the present time. This is not the appropriate occasion for rhetoric. Perhaps I may, however, very respectfully, offer this counsel to the House: When you have got a thing where you want it, it is a good thing to leave it where it is.

Thus we obtained the fifty American destroyers. We granted ninety-nine-year leases of the air and naval bases specified in the West Indies and Newfoundland to the United States. And thirdly, I repeated my declaration about not scuttling or surrendering the British Fleet, in the form of an assurance to the President. I regarded all these as parallel transactions, and as acts of good will performed on their merits and not as bargains. The President found, it more acceptable to present them to Congress as a connected whole. We neither of us contradicted each other, and both countries were satisfied. The effects in Europe were profound.

Mussolini Prepares to Invade Egypt
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Our Competing Anxieties — The Italian Strength in North Africa — Concentration Towards the Egyptian Frontier
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Beads on the String
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Initiative of Our Covering Troops
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Amphibious Possibilities
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Need to Reinforce with Tanks and Other Weapons
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My Complaints of Dispersion
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The Kenya Front
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Palestine
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Need to Send Forth an Armoured Brigade and Later the Second Armoured Division
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The Mediterranean Short Cut — The Tanks Have to Go Round the Cape
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Plans for Cutting the Italian Coastal Road from the Sea
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Ministerial Committee on the Middle East — General Wavell Comes Home for Conference
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Hard and Tense Discussions with Him
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Directive of August
16
— Assembly of the Army of the Nile
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Its Tactical Employment
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The Somaliland Episode
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A Vexatious Rebuff —
My Minutes Thereupon
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Increase in Italian Forces in Albania
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My Report on the General Situation to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

W
ITH THE DISAPPEARANCE
of France as a combatant and with Britain set on her struggle for life at home, Mussolini might well feel that his dream of dominating the Mediterranean and rebuilding the former Roman Empire would come true. Relieved from any need to guard against the French in Tunis, he could still further reinforce the numerous army he had gathered for the invasion of Egypt. The eyes of the world were fixed upon the fate of the British Island, upon the gathering of the invading German armies, and upon the drama of the struggle for air mastery. These were, of course, our main preoccupations. In many countries we were presumed to be at the last gasp. Our confident and resolute bearing was admired by our friends, but its foundations were deemed unsure. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet were determined to defend Egypt against all comers with whatever resources could be spared from the decisive struggle at home. All the more was this difficult when the Admiralty declared themselves unable to pass even military convoys through the Mediterranean on account of the air dangers. All must go round the Cape. Thus we might easily rob the Battle of Britain without helping the Battle of Egypt. It is odd that, while at the time everyone concerned was quite calm and cheerful, writing about it afterwards makes one shiver.

* * * * *

When Italy declared war on June 10, 1940, the British Intelligence estimated – we now know correctly – that, apart from her garrisons in Abyssinia, Eritrea, and Somaliland, there were about 215,000 Italian troops in the North African coastal provinces. These were disposed as follows: in Tripolitania, six metropolitan and two militia divisions; in Cyrenaica, two metropolitan and two militia divisions, besides frontier forces equal to three divisions; a total of fifteen divisions. The British forces in Egypt consisted of the 7th Armoured Division, two-thirds of the 4th Indian Division, one-third of the New Zealand Division, and fourteen British battalions and two regiments of the Royal Artillery, ungrouped in higher formations; the whole amounting to perhaps fifty thousand men. From these both the defence of the western frontier and the internal security of Egypt had to be provided. We, therefore, had heavy odds against us in the field, and the Italians had also many more aircraft.

During July and August the Italians became active at many points. There was a threat from Kassala, on the White Nile, westward towards Khartoum. Alarm was spread in Kenya by the fear of an Italian expedition marching four hundred miles south from Abyssinia towards the Tana River and Nairobi. Considerable Italian forces advanced into British Somaliland. But all these anxieties were petty compared with the Italian invasion of Egypt, which was obviously being prepared on the greatest scale. For some time past Mussolini had been steadily moving his forces eastward towards Egypt. Even before the war a magnificent road had been made along the coast from the main base at Tripoli, through Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Libya, to the Egyptian frontier. Along this road there had been for many months a swelling stream of military traffic. Large magazines were slowly established and filled at Benghazi. Derna, Tobruk, Bardia, and Sollum. The length of this road was over a thousand miles, and all these swarming Italian garrisons and supply depots were strung along it like beads on a string.

At the head of the road and near the Egyptian frontier an Italian army of seventy or eighty thousand men, with a good deal of modern equipment, had been patiently gathered and organised. Before this army glittered the prize of Egypt. Behind it stretched the long road back to Tripoli; and after that the sea! If this force, built up in driblets week by week for years, could advance continually eastward, conquering all who sought to bar the path, its fortunes would be bright. If it could gain the fertile regions of the Delta, all worry about the long road back would vanish. On the other hand, if ill-fortune befell it only a few would ever get home. In the field army and in the series of great supply depots all along the coast there were by the autumn at least three hundred thousand Italians, who could, even if unmolested, retreat westward along the road only gradually or piecemeal. For this they required many months. And if the battle were lost on the Egyptian border, if the army’s front were broken, and if time were not given to them, all were doomed to capture or death. However, in July, 1940, it was not known who was going to win the battle.

Our foremost defended position at that time was the railhead at Mersa Matruh. There was a good road westward to Sidi Barani, but thence to the frontier at Sollum there was no road capable of maintaining any considerable strength for long near the frontier. A small covering mechanised force had been formed of some of our finest Regular troops, consisting of the 7th Hussars (light tanks), the 11th Hussars (armoured cars), and two motor battalions of the 60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade, with two regiments of motorised Royal Horse Artillery. Orders had been given to attack the Italian frontier posts immediately on the outbreak of war. Accordingly, within twenty-four hours, the 11th Hussars crossed the frontier, took the Italians, who had not heard that war had been declared, by surprise, and captured prisoners. The next night, June 12, they had a similar success, and on June 14, with the 7th Hussars and one company of the 60th Rifles, captured the frontier forts at Capuzzo and Maddalena, taking two hundred and twenty prisoners. On the 16th they raided deeper, destroyed twelve tanks, intercepted a convoy on the Tobruk-Bardia road, and captured a general.

In this small but lively warfare our troops felt they had the advantage, and soon conceived themselves to be masters of the desert. Until they came up against large formed bodies or fortified posts, they could go where they liked, collecting trophies from sharp encounters. When armies approach each other, it makes all the difference which owns only the ground on which it stands or sleeps and which one owns all the rest. I saw this in the Boer War, where we owned nothing beyond the fires of our camps and bivouacs, whereas the Boers rode where they pleased all over the country.

Ever-growing enemy forces were now arriving from the west, and by the middle of July the enemy had re-established his frontier line with two divisions and elements of two more. Early in August our covering force was relieved by the support group of the 7th Armoured Division, comprising the 3d Cold-stream Guards, the first 60th Rifles, the 2d Rifle Brigade, the 11th Hussars, one squadron of the 6th Royal Tank Battalion, and two mechanised batteries, R.H.A., one of which was antitank. This small force, distributed over a front of sixty miles, continued to harass the enemy with increasing effect. The published Italian casualties for the first three months of war were nearly thirty-five hundred men, of whom seven hundred were prisoners. Our own losses barely exceeded a hundred and fifty. Thus the first phase in the war which Italy had declared upon the British Empire opened favourably for us.

* * * * *

It was proposed by the Middle East Command, under General Wavell, to await the shock of the Italian onslaught near the fortified position of Mersa Matruh. Until we could gather an army, this seemed the only course open. I therefore proposed the following tasks: First, to assemble the largest fighting force possible to face the Italian invaders. For this it was necessary to run risks in many other quarters. I was pained to see the dispersions which were tolerated by the military authorities. Khartoum and the Blue Nile certainly required strengthening against the Italian-Abyssinian border, but what was the sense of keeping twenty-five thousand men, including the Union Brigade of South Africa and two brigades of excellent West African troops, idle in Kenya? I had ridden over some of this country, north of the Tana River, in 1906. It is a very fine-looking country, but without much to eat. The idea of an Italian expedition of fifteen or twenty thousand men, with artillery and modern gear, traversing the four or five hundred miles before they could reach Nairobi seemed ridiculous. Behind the Kenya front would lie the broad-gauge Uganda Railway. We had the command of the sea, and could move troops to and fro by sea and rail with a facility incomparable to anything that could be achieved by enemy land movements. On account of our superior communications, it was our interest to fight an Italian expedition as near to Nairobi and the broad-gauge railway as possible. For this large numbers of troops were not required. They were more needed in the Egyptian Delta. I got something, but only after a prolonged hard fight against the woolly theme of being safe everywhere.

I did my utmost to draw upon Singapore and bring the Australian division which had arrived there, first to India for training and thence to the Western Desert. Palestine presented a different aspect. We had a mass of fine troops sprawled over Palestine: an Australian division, a New Zealand brigade, our own choice Yeomanry division, all in armoured cars or about to be; the Household Cavalry, still with horses, but longing for modern weapons; with lavish administrative services. I wished to arm the Jews at Tel-Aviv, who with proper weapons would have made a good fight against all comers. Here I encountered every kind of resistance. My second preoccupation was to ensure that freedom of movement through the Mediterranean was fought for against the weak Italians and the grave air danger, in order that Malta might be made impregnable. It seemed to me most important to pass military convoys, especially of tanks and guns, through the Mediterranean instead of all round the Cape. This seemed a prize worth many hazards. To send a division from Britain round the Cape to Egypt was to make sure it could not fight anywhere for three months; but these were precious months, and we had very few divisions. Finally, there was our island, now under pretty direct menace of invasion. How far could we denude our home and citadel for the sake of the Middle East?

* * * * *

In July, 1940, I began, as the telegrams and Minutes show, to concern myself increasingly about the Middle East. Always this long coastal road bulked in my mind. Again and again I recurred to the idea of cutting it by the landing of strong but light forces from the sea. We had not, of course, at that time proper tank-landing craft. Yet it should have been possible to improvise the necessary tackle for such an operation. If used in conjunction with a heavy battle it might have effected a valuable diversion of enemy troops from the front.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

10.VII.40.

Bring the following before the C.O.S. Committee:

Have any plans been made in the event of large forces approaching the Egyptian border from Libya to cut the coastal motor road upon which they would be largely dependent for supplies of all kinds? It is not sufficient merely to bombard by air or from the sea. But if a couple of brigades of good troops could take some town or other suitable point on the communications, they might, with sea-power behind them, cause a prolonged interruption, require heavy forces to be moved against them, and then withdraw to strike again at some other point. Of course, such an operation would not be effective until considerable forces of the enemy had already passed the point of interception. It may be, however, that the desert itself affords free movement to the enemy’s supplies. I wonder whether this is so, and if so why the Italians were at pains to construct this lengthy road.

I still do not see why it should not have been possible to make a good plan. It is, however, a fact that none of our commanders, either in the Middle East or in Tunis, were ever persuaded to make the attempt. But General Patton in 1943 made several most successful turning movements of this character during the conquest of Sicily, and gained definite advantages thereby. It was not until Anzio in 1944 that I succeeded in having this experiment tried. This, of course, was on a far larger scale, nor did it, in spite of the success of the landing, achieve the decisive results for which we all hoped. But that is another story.