The Worst Journey in the World (67 page)

The expedition was originally formed for two years from the date of
leaving England. But before the ship left after landing us at Cape Evans
in January 1911 the possibility of a third year was considered, and
certain requests for additional transport and orders for stores were sent
home. Thus it came about that the ship now landed not only new sledges
and sledging stores but also fourteen dogs from Kamchatka and seven
mules, with their food and equipment. The dogs were big and fat, but the
only ones which proved of much service for sledging were Snowy, a nice
white dog, and Bullett. It was Oates' idea that mules might prove a
better form of transport on the Barrier than ponies. Scott therefore
wrote to Sir Douglas Haig, then C.-in-C. in India, that if he failed to
reach the Pole in the summer of 1911-12, "it is my intention to make a
second attempt in the following season provided fresh transport can be
brought down: the circumstances making it necessary to plan to sacrifice
the transport animals used in any attempt.

"Before directing more ponies to be sent down I have thoroughly discussed
the situation with Captain Oates, and he has suggested that mules would
be better than ponies for our work and that trained Indian Transport
Mules would be ideal. It is evident already that our ponies have not a
uniform walking pace and that in other small ways they will be
troublesome to us although they are handy little beasts."

The Indian Government not only sent seven mules but when they arrived we
found that they had been most carefully trained and equipped. In India
they were in the charge of Lieutenant George Pulleyn, and the care and
thought which had been spent upon them could not have been exceeded: the
equipment was also extremely good and well adapted to the conditions,
while most of the improvements made by us as the result of a year's
experience were already foreseen and provided. The mules themselves, by
name Lal Khan, Gulab, Begum, Ranee, Abdullah, Pyaree and Khan Sahib, were
beautiful animals.

Atkinson would soon have to start on his travels again. Before we left
Scott at the top of the Beardmore he gave him orders to take the two
dog-teams South in the event of Meares having to return home, as seemed
likely. This was not meant in any way to be a relief journey. Scott said
that he was not relying upon the dogs; and that in view of the sledging
in the following year, the dogs were not to be risked. Although it was
settled that some members of the expedition would stay, while others
returned to New Zealand, Scott and several of his companions had left
undecided until the last moment the question of whether they would
themselves remain in the South for another year. In the event of Scott
deciding to return home the dog-teams might make the difference between
catching or missing the ship. I had discussed this question with Wilson
more than once, and he was of opinion that the business affairs of the
expedition demanded Scott's return if possible: Wilson himself inclined
to the view that he himself would stay if Scott stayed, and return if
Scott returned. I think that Oates meant to return, and am sure that
Bowers meant to stay: indeed he welcomed the idea of one more year in a
way which I do not think was equalled by any other member of the
expedition. For the most part we felt that we had joined up for two
years, but that if there was to be a third year we would rather see the
thing through than return home.

I hope I have made clear that the primary object of this journey with the
dog-teams was to hurry Scott and his companions home so that they might
be in time to catch the ship if possible, before she was compelled by the
close of the season to leave McMurdo Sound. Another thing which made
Scott anxious to communicate with the ship if possible before the season
forced her to leave the Sound was his desire to send back news. From many
remarks which he made, and also from the discussions in the hut during
the winter, it was obvious that he considered it was of the first
importance that the news of reaching the Pole, if it should be reached,
be communicated to the world without the delay of another year. Of course
he would also wish to send news of the safe return of his party to wives
and relations as soon as possible. It is necessary to emphasize the fact
that the dog-teams were intended to hasten the return of the Polar Party,
but that they were never meant to form a relief journey.

But now Atkinson was left in a rather difficult position. I note in my
diary, after we had reached the hut, that "Scott was to have sent back
instructions for the dog party with us, but these have, it would seem,
been forgotten"; but it may be that Scott considered that he had given
these instructions in a conversation he had with Atkinson at the top of
the Beardmore Glacier, when Scott said, "with the depôt
(of dog-food)
which has been laid come as far as you can."

According to the plans for the Polar Journey the food necessary to bring
the three advance parties of man-haulers back from One Ton Depôt to Hut
Point was to be taken out to One Ton during the absence of these parties.
This food consisted of five weekly units of what were known as XS
rations. It was also arranged that if possible a depôt of dog-biscuit
should be taken out at the same time: this was the depôt referred to
above by Scott. In the event of the return of the dog-teams in the first
half of December, which was the original plan, the five units of food and
the dog-biscuit would have been run out by them to One Ton. If the
dog-teams did not return in time to do this a man-hauling party from Cape
Evans was to take out three of the five units of food.

It has been shown that the dog-teams were taken farther on the Polar
Journey than was originally intended, indeed they were taken from
81° 15', where they were to have turned back, as far as 83° 35'. Nor were
they able to make the return journey in the fast time which had been
expected of them, and the dog-drivers were running very short of food and
were compelled to encroach to some extent upon the supplies left to
provide for the wants of those who were following in their tracks.
The dog-teams did not arrive back at Cape Evans until January 4.

Meanwhile a man-hauling party from Cape Evans, consisting of Day, Nelson,
Clissold and Hooper, had already, according to plan, taken out three of
the five XS rations for the returning parties. The weights of the
man-hauling party did not allow for the transport of the remaining two XS
rations, nor for any of the dog-food. Thus it was that when Atkinson came
to make his plans to go South with the dogs he found that there was no
dog-food south of Corner Camp, and that the rations for the return of the
Polar Party from One Ton Depôt had still to be taken out. That is to say,
the depôt of dog-food spoken of by Scott did not exist. There was,
however, enough food already at One Ton to allow the Polar Party to come
in on reduced rations. This meant that what the dog-teams could do was
limited, and was much less than it might have been had it been possible
to take out the depôt of dog-food to One Ton. Also the man-food for the
Polar Party had to be added to the weights taken by the dogs.

To estimate even approximately at what date a party will reach a given
point after a journey of this length when the weather conditions are
always uncertain and the number of travelling days unknown, was a most
difficult task. The only guide was the average marches per diem made by
our own return party, and the average of the second return party if it
should return before the dog party set out. A week one way or the other
was certainly not a large margin. A couple of blizzards might make this
much difference.

In the plan of the Southern Journey Scott, working on Shackleton's
averages, mentions March 27 as a possible date of return to Hut Point,
allowing seven days in from One Ton. Whilst on the outward journey I
heard Scott discuss the possibility of returning in April; and the Polar
Party had enough food to allow them to do this on full rations.

Atkinson and Dimitri with the two dog-teams left Cape Evans for Hut Point
on February 13 because the sea-ice, which was our only means of
communication between these places, and so to the Barrier, was beginning
to break up. Atkinson intended to leave Hut Point for the Barrier in
about a week's time. At 3.30 A.M. on February 19 Crean arrived with the
astounding news that Lieutenant Evans, still alive but at his last gasp,
was lying out near Corner Camp, and that Lashly was nursing him; that the
Last Supporting Party had consisted of three men only, a possibility
which had never been considered; and that they had left Scott,
travelling rapidly and making good averages, only 148 geographical miles
from the Pole. Scott was so well advanced that it seemed that he would be
home much earlier than had been anticipated.

A blizzard which had been threatening on the Barrier, and actually
blowing at Hut Point, during Crean's solitary journey, but which had
lulled as he arrived, now broke with full force, and nothing could be
done for Evans until it took off sufficiently for the dog-teams to
travel. But in the meantime Crean urgently wanted food and rest and
warmth. As these were supplied to him Atkinson learned bit by bit the
story of the saving of Evans' life, told so graphically in Lashly's diary
which is given in the preceding chapter, and pieced together the details
of Crean's solitary walk of thirty-five statute miles. This effort was
made, it should be remembered, at the end of a journey of three and a
half months, and over ground rendered especially perilous by crevasses,
from which a man travelling alone had no chance of rescue in case of
accident. Crean was walking for eighteen hours, and it was lucky for him,
as also for his companions, that the blizzard which broke half an hour
after his arrival did not come a little sooner, for no power on earth
could have saved him then, and the news of Evans' plight would not have
been brought.

The blizzard raged all that day, and the next night and morning, and
nothing could be done. But during the afternoon of the 20th the
conditions improved, and at 4.30 P.M. Atkinson and Dimitri started with
the two dog-teams, though it was still blowing hard and very thick. They
travelled, with one rest for the dogs, until 4.30 P.M. the next day, but
had a very hazy idea where they were most of the time, owing to the vile
weather: once at any rate they seem to have got right in under White
Island. When they camped the second time they thought they were in the
neighbourhood of Lashly's tent, and in a temporary clearance they saw the
flag which Lashly had put up on the sledge. Evans was still alive, and
Atkinson was able to give him immediately the fresh vegetables, fruit,
and seal meat which his body wanted. Atkinson has never been able to
express adequately the admiration he feels for Lashly's care and
nursing.

All that night and the next day the blizzard continued and made a start
impossible, and it was not until 3 A.M. on the morning of the 22nd that
they could start for Hut Point, Evans being carried in his sleeping-bag
on the sledge. Lashly has told how they got home.

At Cape Evans we knew nothing of these events, which had made
reorganization inevitable. It was clear that Atkinson, being the only
doctor available, would have to stay with Evans, who was very seriously
ill: indeed Atkinson told me that another day, or at the most two, would
have finished him. In fact he says that when he first saw him he thought
he must die. It was a considerable surprise then when Dimitri with Crean
and one dog-team reached Cape Evans about mid-day on February 23 with a
note from Atkinson, who said that he thought he had better stay with
Lieutenant Evans and that some one else should take out the dogs. He
suggested that Wright or myself should take them. This was our first
intimation that the dogs had not already gone South.

Wright and I started for Hut Point by 2 P.M. the same day and on our
arrival it was decided by Atkinson that I was to take out the dogs. Owing
to the early departure of our meteorologist, Simpson, Wright, who had
special qualifications for this important work, was to remain at Cape
Evans. Dimitri having rested his dog-team overnight at Cape Evans arrived
at Hut Point on the morning of the 24th.

Now the daily distance which every 4-man party had to average from Hut
Point to its turning-point and back to Hut Point, so as to be on full
rations all the way, was only 8.4 geographical miles. From Hut Point to
the latitude in which he was last seen, 87° 32' S., Scott had averaged
more than ten geographical miles a day.

Taking into consideration the advanced latitude, 87° 32' S., at which the
Second Return Party had left Scott, and the extremely good daily averages
these two parties had marched on the plateau up to this point, namely
12.3 geographical miles a day; seeing also that the First Return Party
had averaged 14.2 geographical miles on their return from 85° 3' S. to
One Ton Depôt; and the Second Return Party had averaged 11.2 geographical
miles on their return from 87° 32' S. to the same place, although one of
the three men was seriously ill; it was supposed that all the previous
estimates made for the return of the Polar Party were too late, and that
the opportunity to reach One Ton Camp before them had been lost.
Meanwhile the full rations for their return over the 140 miles (statute)
from One Ton to Hut Point were still at Hut Point.

My orders were given me by Atkinson, and were verbal, as follows:

1. To take 24 days' food for the two men, and 21
days' food for the two dog-teams, together with the food
for the Polar Party.

2. To travel to One Ton Depôt as fast as possible and
leave the food there.

3. If Scott had not arrived at One Ton Depôt before
me I was to judge what to do.

4. That Scott was not in any way dependent on the
dogs for his return.