The World at War (49 page)

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN

Well, it took quite a while to persuade them to come round. Alanbrooke was a brilliant, decisive man who spoke rather too quickly for the Americans to follow always. Didn't always win his arguments by his manners. I think what really happened was that their great man Marshall was brought around by Sir John Dill, who had been sent over to represent us with the Americans.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WEDERMEYER

Sir Alan Brooke was sometimes a little curt in his reactions to General Marshall's suggestions and it was perfectly apparent to those who attended. Fortunately Sir John Dill, noting that the situation was becoming tense and that nothing constructive could be accomplished, suggested that we all break up and have a cup of tea, and everyone enthusiastically agreed. Sir John Dill enjoyed great esteem and confidence among Americans. His pleasing personality and tact as well as his penchant for low-key diplomacy gained many friends during the war among American political and military leaders. Perhaps as a result of this Casablanca incident an unusual comradeship and personal friendship quickly developed and maintained throughout the war between Sir John and General Marshall. The affection and respect in which Sir John was held in this country is recognised by the fact that he is the only foreigner buried in our Arlington National Cemetery, where an impressive equestrian statue marks his final resting place.

BRIGADIER GENERAL IRA C EAKER

Commander Eighth Air Force, USAAF

I had a message one day from Commanding General Arnold to meet him in Casablanca the following day. I did not even know there was a Casablanca conference in the works but I took a B-17 and flew down and General Arnold told me that the Prime Minister had secured an agreement from our President Roosevelt that the Eighth Air Force would discontinue
daylight bombing and join the RAF in night bombing. I said to General Arnold, 'This is a tragic error. Our crews are not trained for night bombing; we'll lose more people coming into this misty island at four in the morning than we will over German targets; our planes are not properly equipped for night bombing and besides we'll permit the Germans to go into the factories in the morning. If we continue this compound effort day and night we'll keep them from working around the clock, and with our small bomber force we'll keep a million men standing on the West Wall. Think how many divisions that will deny the Eastern Front and to our own forces when we cross the Channel.' Well, General Arnold said he'd been hopeful that I would feel strongly about it. He said, 'I think you have a better chance than any of the rest of us to convince Prime Minister Churchill.' The next morning at ten o'clock when I went to the Prime Minister's villa he said, 'I'm not sure you're aware of it but I'm half American.' And he said, 'The tragic losses your gallant crews are sustaining has led me to suggest you join Air Marshal Harris with the night effort, because his losses are considerably lower than yours.' Well, I said, 'In my year's service in Britain, Mr Prime Minister, I have learned that you always listen to both sides of the case before you make a decision. I've set down here in a memorandum one page in length the reasons why I think we should continue.'
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He said he would read it and sat down on a couch and invited me to join him and read it very carefully and very deliberately. When he had finished he said, 'Young man, you've not convinced me you're right but you have convinced me that you should have a further opportunity to prove your case. When I see your President at lunch today I will tell him that I withdraw my request that you join the RAF at night bombing and continue to give time to your present effort.'

ANTHONY EDEN

We had our difficulties of course – one, the American instinct I suppose, in view of their constitutional position, was not to get involved in any commitments too early. The Russians' instinct was to try and get everything done or anyhow their claim set down very clearly at the earliest possible moment. Probably we were somewhere between the two but over the
French business, our difficulties particularly with the Americans were considerable and that led the Russians to make difficulties about the French too. I still think the French should have been there, and our arguments with the Americans about de Gaulle were endless and I think the Americans were quite wrong about it. My view simply was that de Gaulle was there and he was the symbol of French resistance, even though we might not like some of the things he did or wanted to do.

DREW MIDDLETON

American journalist

Most of us had been brought to Casablanca from Tunisia and Algeria. We spent two days in a rather comfortable hotel and then on the afternoon of the third day we were taken out to the garden of the building in which the main conference had been held. Mr Churchill was there, the President was carried in and they sat down together side by side and began to talk. Mr Roosevelt began by saying that when he was a young man the great reputation in the American military was General Grant, who had once sent an order saying he would accept no
terms but unconditional surrender, and that these in fact were the terms the Allies or the United Nations wanted to present to their enemies. He then went on as though he did not understand how important a statement he had made. Mr Churchill looked considerably surprised at this and in later years he told me that he had been surprised, that there had been no discussion between them beforehand and I think to the end of his life – I know to the end of his life – Mr Churchill felt that it was not the best way to present the Allied position to the enemy. However, as he said then and later, he was Mr Roosevelt's ardent lieutenant and he would go along with it.

AMBASSADOR W AVERELL HARRIMAN

President Roosevelt's Special Envoy to Europe

I don't know how Roosevelt decided on that question of unconditional surrender. I know that he sprang it on Churchill at this press conference but I don't know whether he did that intentionally or by accident. He brought it out in a way that wasn't fully understood, that there couldn't be any terms of surrender, there had to be unconditional surrender, but he spoke about peace and the Federal General Grant who said [at the Confederate surrender], 'Your officers can take your side arms and you may need your horses for ploughing.' In other words, he showed a certain generosity about what he intended it to be, but that never came through. I had dinner with Churchill that night in Casablanca and he was very much upset that this had been sprung on him without consideration. On Roosevelt's side it was perfectly true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had discussed it from the military standpoint and had agreed that it was a good thing to do, but Churchill thought there should be political consideration given. Now whether Churchill wasn't consulted because Roosevelt was afraid that Churchill wouldn't agree I don't know. Roosevelt had a habit of doing things like that, he didn't like unpleasant arguments and sometimes did things without consultation, which occasionally made Churchill quite angry. That's when [Roosevelt's Chief Presidential Adviser] Harry Hopkins came in to smooth things out. I was opposed to it, I felt that it would lead to the Germans holding out longer. Stalin at first was opposed but later on very much in favour of it – I think it became clearer that he was afraid that the Germans would surrender to our side on the terms which would be far more favourable to us than to him. Our Chiefs of Staff were always afraid Stalin would make a deal again with Hitler. I knew that was utterly impossible, the breach had been so great.

ANTHONY EDEN

It was originally Roosevelt's idea and, as you know, originates from the American Civil War, but we were told about it in advance actually, though I think Winston was taken aback by the actual moment of the announcement. I'm sceptical whether it had much effect either on Germany or Japan, but we were troubled in the Foreign Office about its possible effect on the satellites and we did raise, quite soon after Casablanca with the Americans and the Russians, the question of whether we couldn't deliberately cut the satellites out of the unconditional surrender treatment altogether. The Russians soon agreed about that; interestingly enough the Americans were more difficult because they didn't want to put any conditions on what their President said, but eventually they agreed too that in any propaganda to the satellite countries there'd be no mention of unconditional surrender.

CHARLES BOHLEN

US diplomat

My personal objection to the doctrine of unconditional surrender which was produced by President Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference in 1943 was that it seemed to almost ensure that the war would go on to the very bitter end, that there was no opportunity left for any possibility of revolt against Hitler inside the Third Reich. And it would seem to prolong war unnecessarily. The Soviets sent us a note in which they voiced some objection, for the same reasons I'd indicated, to the doctrine of unconditional surrender and the State Department supported it and sent it over to the White House. But it came back rejected by Roosevelt who had fixed in his mind that the surrender of General Lee to General Grant at Appomattox Court House was unconditional, which I don't think historically it really was. I don't know why he advanced it. I imagine one reason was to do with fighting a coalition war: one of the ways of keeping anybody in the coalition from making any moves or tentative proposals to the enemy was to commit themselves to war to the bitter end.

DREW MIDDLETON

I think that there was a legitimate argument that this would make the Germans fight harder, that it would be used by Dr Goebbels and others to inspire greater resistance once we got into Germany. It was also said that because of this there would be very little chance of an opposition movement developing to Hitler. That, I think, was proven by history to be untrue – there was an opposition movement, even then. I think first Roosevelt wanted to reassure the Soviet Union, secondly he wanted to reassure people in Europe who might at that time be having second thoughts about who was going to win – and I include in that Vichy France – and thirdly, I think he meant it as an inspirational message to our own people. We were not going to – that there were not going to be further compromises, that the West meant to fight the thing to the end and win it completely.

GRAND ADMIRAL KARL DÖNITZ

Commander-in-Chief, German Navy

In consequence of the defeat of the submarine, the Anglo-American invasion of Normandy in July 1944 was now a success and now we knew clearly that we had no more chance to win the war, but what could we do? At the conference of Casablanca when the Allies fixed that Germany would get a peace only by unconditional surrender, by this decision it was clear that there could no longer be an independent German government. Germany would be ruled in the coming years of peace by the victorious Allies and for this purpose Germany should be divided into four pieces. And of course our military fronts had, by a capitulation, to stop where they were standing. The soldier had to stay, they had to give their armament, their weapons and had to go as prisoners into the hands of their enemies. For instance three and half million German soldiers on our Eastern Front who in this time were still standing far inside the Russian frontier had to become Russian prisoners. After all, we believed that the war would be lost in the summer of 1944; we could not give the advice to end the war by unconditional surrender. This demand of the Allies that Germany had to surrender unconditionally was a political mistake.

DREW MIDDLETON

I think the [American] defeat at the Kasserine Pass in February 1943 had a very good effect. One thing, of course, it got rid off a lot of second-rate officers, secondly it brought the troops face to face with the fact that this was going to be a long war and a tough one, and that the Germans were very good. Armies never learn from other armies; they have to learn by themselves and a lot of the tactics we used disastrously at Kasserine were those the British Army had used equally disastrously two years before in the Western Desert, and then discarded. I think it helped our Army, and it also made them realise – because the British came down from the north and did help – that this was going to be a cooperative effort and that we couldn't win it alone. Also it got the average GI accustomed to the fact that there was going to be one battle after another and that they weren't going home every time a city like Algiers fell.

LIEUTENANT GEORGE GREENFIELD

British Army officer

The first knowledge we had of the Tehran conference resulted in an absolute fiasco because a cable had arrived at the GHQ in Baghdad and it was marked Top Secret and Confidential and signed by some former naval person [Churchill's wartime code name]. The Orderly Officer who was on duty that night and who had a camp bed in the main operational office was a regular soldier – a very stuffy man who was always telling the temporary officers and gentlemen just how they ought to behave and how regulars behaved. The dispatch rider arrived in the middle of the night and produced this fantastic, very secret hush-hush cable, which of course was in an envelope. Half awake and half asleep he put it on the desk but unfortunately he pushed it under a blotting pad. The result being that thirty-six hours later the secret cable that was supposed to go to the Commanding Officer was still lying under a blotting pad on somebody's desk. I think some office cleaner eventually discovered it.

CHARLES BOHLEN

Churchill and Roosevelt had made a number of attempts to get together with
Stalin and it only came to fruition at the time to decide military matters. The real purpose of the conference was to agree on a date for the cross-Channel jump for the Allied armies and to coordinate with the Soviet offensive from the East. Each of these three men were as different as could be. Churchill was an extremely attractive individual with a great zest for living, which was very pleasant to watch. Roosevelt was an exuberant man – in foreign affairs, where precision is so important, he was inclined to deal in improvisations and would try to make decisions based upon the circumstances as they developed at the conference. Stalin was always very reserved, very quiet and behaved very well with the foreigners. He seemed to know his dossier very well and be in complete command of any situation. I know nothing about what the Soviet method of work was, how the delegation operated when they were in private.
Tehran was a very small conference and Roosevelt insisted on it being kept informal. Rather than set the agenda, any
discussions revolved around the question of setting a date for the Second Front. Mr Churchill was never against the idea of a cross-Channel jump but he had grave apprehensions of fixing a date. The date was fixed within one week at
Tehran without regard to the state of the Nazi defences. He had in mind the difficulties of amphibious operations, also I think he was very conscious that the British had really one great asset left and that was the Home Army, and he was very much afraid that if the Nazi defence was sufficiently developed you'd have a great bloodbath. The Channel would swim red with blood: he kept talking like that all the time. But the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had always held the view that the way you were going to end the war was to go right for the throat of Germany across the Channel. And the Russians were very anxious to have our armies come to grips with the Germans to relieve the pressure on them in the Eastern Front. Once Churchill came around, as he always did, he came around wholeheartedly, I don't think with any afterthoughts. The main accomplishment of Tehran was military and in that sense it was the most successful conference that we ever had with the Russians. There were some political discussions after dinner and at luncheon but no decisions actually were made.