The World at War (38 page)

MAJOR-GENERAL WALTHER WARLIMONT

Deputy Chief of Wehrmacht Operations

I would not say the campaign in North Africa was considered a sideshow by Hitler or anyone else. Hitler had consented to this expedition of German troops only after, and on account of, the Italian collapse in December 1940, In the Western Desert, based on Rommel's unexpected successes and in connection also with the German campaign in Russia, far-reaching plans came aiming at such high goals as cutting off the British lifeline with the Empire and their oil supplies too. An opportunity of this kind always remained far from being realised since Rommel's troops were much too scarce in number and we were not able to reinforce them because of the steadily growing requirements, particularly on the Eastern Front, because of the predominance of the British fleet in the Mediterranean and because of our eventual failure in the east.

MAJOR-GENERAL FRANCIS DE GUINGAND

Chief of Staff to generals Auchinleck and Montgomery

Churchill was in some political difficulties at the time, things were going against Britain and naturally the morale of the British people wasn't all that good. Everyone was wanting some victory or some stimulus and some help, therefore it was essential that on the one front where we were fighting, the desert front, we should produce some concrete results. And he was determined that we should have that and he was going to give us all the resources he had available in human reinforcements and also material. And so we did feel the Prime Minister was a hundred per cent behind us, which he was, and he did the most amazing things, forcing through convoys with tremendous loss to get equipment to us.

GENERAL WALTER NEHRING

Commander Afrika Korps in 1942

I was never convinced that to reach a major success in the Western Desert might have altered the outcome of the war. Our forces were too weak, our supply in the Mediterranean was too dangerous and plentiful in losses and therefore never sufficient for victory. Our military operations in North Africa were only of
secondary interest to Hitler, who was concerned mainly with the hard war against Russia. Finally the German forces in North Africa were only a lost lot sacrificed by Hitler.

COLONEL SIEGFRIED WESTPHAL

Operations Officer to Field Marshal Rommel

I think that Hitler had no interest for the situation of the German soldiers in the front line. But the situation of the German soldiers in the Eastern Front was incomparably more bad than the German soldiers in the North Africa desert. We were not a main thing; the eyes of Hitler were directed every day to the Russian Front, the deciding front, and our role was not so important. He was content if we had no difficulties and he couldn't help us if we were in very bad situations. Yet he did send us what we needed in supply, but he was not able to guarantee that this supply came from the continent. He was helpless in this situation like we too.

LAWRENCE DURRELL

British author and wartime press officer in Cairo

Auchinleck was absolutely charming but an extremely sedentary man. He had no real personality, he was handsome and personable and quiet in a Scots way but he hadn't any, you know, for a critical moment you need a bit of rhetoric, a bit of panache and a sort of 'Charge, boys, charge' thing – and he hadn't got that precisely.
^*34
The people who had it, like General Harding, were not in evidence and were commanding detachments in the desert and being shot up. It's sad about Wavell because he had that. His orders for the day were inspiring and you needed that inspiration.

MAJOR GENERAL DE GUINGAND

I was Director of Military Intelligence at the time but the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East used to always take me up to the desert with him when he went, and I was there during the tremendous panic that took place when we had to retreat from the Gazala line and to hold Tobruk, which we failed to do. I had never seen such chaos; it looked like you'd never be able to save the situation. I've never seen the desert road crammed with every sort of vehicle, every unit muddled up higgledy-piggledy, no one knew what was going on. Lucidly our Air Force was stronger than the enemy's, otherwise I think we would have been routed. We got back to El Alamein hoping that they had taken precautions beforehand to prepare defensive positions, that there was somewhere for us to go to, but it was touch and go for several days. One wondered whether we'd ever be able to hold the front and prevent Rommel from getting into Egypt and Cairo itself. He was running into supply problems but he found a tremendous lot of supplies like petrol and transport in Tobruk and during that time Auchinleck relieved Ritchie of his command and took over personal command of the Army himself. I saw that take place, and I thought he pulled things together magnificently and eventually the front settled down. We made one or two half-hearted attempts to try counter strokes but there wasn't enough force behind it and Rommel began to run out of supplies. Men were tired and the thing stabilised and then we had to begin to plan for eventual battle in El Alamein.
^*35

NORMAN CORWIN

American 'Poet Laureate of the radio'

The early grumbles were against involvement in somebody else's war. We felt that this was a war made in Europe for Europeans and that it was none of our business and we had better stay out of it. There was even a sentiment – I remember this being expressed – to the effect that England would
fight to the last American. I was actually involved in an effort by radio to countervail, to counteract that sentiment. Much of it was inspired by . . . I do believe there was a fifth column at work, but there has always been blatant anti-British sentiment in certain sectors of the population. It had a chance to flourish and to be developed when Britain met reverses not only in Europe but in Africa. When they lost Tobruk and suffered reverses in the desert, the sentiment was whipped up more than it had been before.

REAR ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN

Chief of Combined Operations

I remember Roosevelt said, 'It seems to be an awful waste of time that we should be pouring divisions into England and you take out the same number of divisions, say six divisions, to fight in Africa. Would it make more sense if we sent out divisions to fight in Africa?' I said, 'Of course it would. How do you propose to send them?' He said, 'Round the Cape, join up with the Army of the Nile and fight our way back west.' I said, 'Why don't you send them straight there, right from the Atlantic ports and into the western Mediterranean ports?' 'Yes', said Roosevelt, 'I remember Winston reminding me about
Operation Gymnast, which is your plan, isn't it, for that operation?' I said, 'May I tell my Prime Minster this? Because you see the important thing from your point of view is that you've got a lot of brave but entirely unblooded, inexperienced soldiers. But having got ashore, in which you're bound to succeed, they won't then try and push you back. This gives you a chance to consolidate and from there you have many options open to you.' He liked that very much and said I could tell the US Chiefs of Staff when I saw them.

COLONEL WESTPHAL

You succeeded in summer 1942 finally to stop the exhausted rest of the German Army that reached Alamein, and that was absolutely the deciding point. I think the German Army in the desert has never fully recovered from this exhausting campaign, which did begin on 26th May and ended in El Alamein. Besides, it was absolutely unknown to us that you had built up a strong position at Alamein.

PRIVATE ROBERT REED

2nd New Zealand Division, Eighth Army

We had been through Greece and Crete, we had been chased out of the desert on several occasions, we'd had several terrific reverses where we'd lost everything, lost many men. But never at any occasion did I realise, or thought, we were going to lose the war. I can't give you any reason why I didn't realise we could have lost the war, but I knew we were going to win.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN HARDING

Commanding 7th Armoured Division

Rommel was a brilliant tactician, a great opportunist and a very fine leader on the battlefield. He was very quick to see an opportunity and seize it and his forces responded. He had his army trained and poised in such a way that he could almost immediately take advantage of any opportunity that he saw, exploiting a limited success.

GENERAL NEHRING

The biggest advantage of the German forces in the Western Desert prior to Montgomery's arrival in August 1942 was that they had a skilled commander. Rommel and his troops were both tested in war, 1939 to 1940 in Poland and France. On the British side, experience in war was at the time missing, but the British generals and their troops were learning it well and quickly.

PRIVATE RUHI PENE

Maori member of the 2nd New Zealand Division, Eighth Army

All Field Marshal Rommel's men were good, they were real fighters, we admired them just like I think they admired us – why else invite us here today?
^*36
As a matter of fact at one stage of the fighting Field Marshal Rommel was admired that much and idolised by our troops that they had photos up in their tents. Then word came down from our general to the officers to pass on to all the men to cut this business out of idolising the man.

LIEUTENANT PAOLO COLACICCHI

Italian Tenth Army

Rommel himself became a sort of myth to the Italian soldiers just as much as to the German soldiers. In fact one regiment, the Bersaglieri – they are the ones with a lot of feathers in their hats – fighting out of Tobruk baptised Rommel 'Romolito', which in Italian means little Rommel and also refers to Romulus. This was a Roman regiment and they liked him, and on one occasion he even put some of their feathers in his own colonial helmet and wore it because he was pleased with them.

MAJOR GENERAL HARDING

Rommel became a bit of a hoodoo yes, but personally I don't think I ever felt it. I remember taking special measures to try and destroy this image of infallibility and invulnerability, that in some people's minds sprung up as a result of Rommel's success. What I call psychological and propaganda ones, instructions to commanders, papers issued on the subject, but mainly by word of mouth and by examples from commander to commander, and so down to the troops.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RONALD BELCHEM

7th Armoured Division

Obviously the Rommel
legend had an adverse effect on morale because General Auchinleck issued a most extraordinary directive to his generals saying that by all means possible they had to repress the idea that Rommel was a magician or a bogeyman. I don't think one should overemphasise this – Rommel's name, and it was a good name – was built up by the fact of his own personal mobility on the battlefield. He had a flair for being at the crucial point at the right moment, to give orders on the spot and so forth, and incidentally be got a great write-up from our own press correspondents. But if there was a danger of Rommel's legend causing inferiority complexes among our own people, this was really a reflection on our own leaders. It implied lack of confidence in our own tactical commanders and lack of confidence perhaps in our own equipment. But I don't think one should over-emphasise this because even after the [May–June 1942] defeat at Gazala and the retreat right back to Alamein the fighting formations were not licked – they were bewildered.

MAJOR GENERAL HARDING

I can remember being told by representatives from London that the two-pounder anti-tank gun mounted in the Crusader tank was about the best weapon there was. It wasn't, because it couldn't really destroy a German tank at all. On the other hand, it did take us a long time, longer than perhaps it should have done, to appreciate the fact that in modern war with armour and air power it is a combination of armour, infantry, artillery and engineers, the whole thing supported by air power, and this took us a long time to learn.

COLONEL WESTPHAL

In the first time of the African campaign we had the advantage to have better tanks, but then from month to month the British on the other side became stronger and stronger, and the equipment and ammunition became better. So the only advantage we had at last was perhaps sometimes a tactic more mobile than the other side. The task of the German Africa Army was only to bind a lot of troops of the other side so long as possible and in this manner help the Eastern Front and to cover Italy from a landing operation. I have never the meaning that we would have the possibility to occupy Egypt or to reach or cross the Suez Canal. Younger people than I were quite more optimistic and were influenced by some great success we had in these two years – I was always not pessimistic but of a critical nature, and I think it was quite good.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BELCHEM

I think the main problem was disparity of
tactics. We had been trained to fire on the move, to execute a sort of cavalry charge on tracks, and to handle our men that way. The Germans had studied this problem much more than we between the wars – and also, of course, Rommel had experience from northern France and so had many of his tank crews – and they appreciated that the tank's best action against his enemy is to wait for him to come on, sitting in a hull-down position, and that if they're caught in the open to decoy the enemy on to their anti-tank guns and not to hurl themselves at a brick wall, and that their real objective is to find a weak spot and to pull themselves through it. But above all armoured forces must be ready to concentrate quickly in overwhelming force at the right point. I think in this context one must think of radio – I don't think that the higher commanders in the early part of this campaign really understood that mobile ops cannot function efficiently without first-class radio communications – and over and over again you'll find instances where the command man was not on the air at the crucial moment. As a German report said, 'At no time and at no place did the British High Command feed in concentrations of their available resources at the critical point.'