The Will Of The People (Conspiracy Trilogy Book 1) (16 page)

Even the extraction of the
spetsnaz
– including the dead – had
been beset with problems, coming close to disaster. NATO forces in
northern Lithuania had already been on standby, air and ground
units consequently reacting far more quickly than had been
anticipated. It was only because the two helicopter pilots had
wilfully disobeyed orders, extricating the
spetsnaz
earlier than planned, that
they had managed to cross into Belarus just minutes before being
intercepted.

To complete the
debacle, the intelligence gathered from the dacha complex was
apparently negligible, the only significant success the capture of
a lone terrorist. At least seven others had been killed, but
altogether it was a poor reward for the loss of four good men, and
the repercussions were only just beginning.

Despite such setbacks, Grebeshkov truly believed Moscow’s war
against
August 14
was being won, albeit slowly. Of the original thirteen
terrorists, just six were left, including of course, the FSB’s
prime target of Eglitis. With Nazarenko’s help, they now had names
and faces for all six, their age profile a curious split of young
and old: nine were under twenty-five, the remaining four all over
fifty.

Not that
August 14
was Moscow’s only problem. While Markova’s fears
that Golubeva could be part of a coup were probably an
exaggeration, there was enough evidence to sow the seeds of doubt,
especially in the present atmosphere of mistrust. Grebeshkov had
considered denouncing Golubeva in the vain hope of saving himself
before immediately rejecting the idea. She could simply be acting
on the President’s behalf, garnering support for difficult times
ahead. Even if guilty, would ruining Golubeva really help
Grebeshkov’s cause? Whatever her motives, for the moment at least,
the wisest course seemed simply to say nothing.

Forty minutes
he had been alone with his thoughts when the conference door was
thrust open and the President strode into the room, the door pulled
closed behind him. Grebeshkov stood respectfully, the President
immediately waving him to sit back down.

“I’ll be
brief, General,” the President said brusquely, seating himself
directly opposite Grebeshkov. “Your record as an investigator in
the FSB is impressive. Success which, according to Irina Golubeva,
is based on old-fashioned thoroughness combined with the confidence
to act as much on instinct as reason. Is that a fair assessment,
General?”

“I would like
to think so, Sir.” Golubeva was rapidly going up in Grebeshkov’s
estimation, her unexpected praise an immediate reward for his
decision not to expose her.

The President continued, “Recent events have precipitated a
change in policy, General Grebeshkov; as of now, you will take
total charge of the FSB counter-terrorist operation, with direct
control over the Police and National Guard. All other of your
responsibilities will be delegated elsewhere. I expect the
remaining six members of
August 14
to be caught or killed by the end of the month.
Is that clear, General?”

“Perfectly
clear, Sir.” What else could he say?

“The National
Advisory Committee meets tomorrow at ten to discuss Lithuania. The
mess there needs to be cleared up or preferably turned to our
advantage. I expect you to attend.”

Grebeshkov
stood as the President left, a mixture of emotions churning inside
of him. It wasn’t a court-martial but it might well soon be; there
were just over two weeks until the end of May – two weeks to
perform a miracle.

On the market
for some eight months but left furnished so it could continue as a
holiday let, a short gravelled drive led up to the cottage’s front
door. Detached, cottage-style bungalow, two bedrooms, recently
modernised, large plot to include small arable field, no onward
chain – the agency brochure had done its best but interest had been
minimal. Another of the cottage’s key features was its isolation,
with the nearest neighbour being some two hundred yards back along
the country road towards Marshwick.

The move from the
Farriers
definitely offered Anderson far more space, and
it would have been foolish to spurn the convenience of a washing
machine and kitchen. Both were becoming essential as he was fast
running out of clean clothes and thanks to the
Farriers
also eating far too much.
Now it would be back to a less-fattening and rather more basic
menu, more down to laziness than lack of culinary skill.

It had been after six by the time Charlotte had arrived at
the
Farriers
with
the house keys. A hurried meal, then with each taking their own car
to the cottage, there had been limited opportunity to chat and
compare notes. Anderson thus took his time about settling himself
in to his new surroundings, working hard to encourage the
semi-serious banter with Charlotte which seemed to have become part
of their normal routine. But there was also something else, a
mutual attraction which neither now tried to disguise.

Anderson’s
offering of red wine might have been rejected but their parting
kiss was as tender and affectionate as Anderson could have hoped
for. And with Charlotte’s work rota giving her a free Saturday, the
promise of a mystery tour around Lincolnshire was something
different to look forward to, a free day away from the self-imposed
stress of Pat McDowell and Erdenheim.

Including
Grebeshkov there were now seven members of the President’s inner
circle, going by such titles as First Deputy Prime Minister and
Presidential Assistant, the National Advisory Committee merely a
convenient name for the group of non-elected officials who really
held the power in today’s Russia. In truth, Grebeshkov doubted
whether any Russian over the age of sixteen actually believed they
were ruled by a democratically elected parliament sworn to follow a
set of honourable ideals. Democracy might work for the West –
although that was debatable – but for Russia a subtle form of
autocracy served the needs of the Federation far better. It was a
strange and somewhat unsettling experience for Grebeshkov, and he
was still coming to terms with being moved from a committee which
had no power to one that doubtless had too much.

Grebeshkov had been the first to arrive by some ten minutes,
and a casual nod had been the only sign of greeting as the other
members of the Committee had taken their places around the long
table. The single woman and only non-
silovik
was Irina Golubeva:
Silovik
, a person of
force, it meaning a politician whose origins were based in the FSB
or some other military-type service. Golubeva’s support had kept
Grebeshkov from following the Prime Minister into obscurity and he
had felt obliged to bury all records relating to her various
liaisons, Grebeshkov’s continuing frustration with his political
masters testing even his loyalty.

As the
President brought the meeting to order, a simplified map of the
Baltic replaced the Presidential Standard on the various digital
displays, Kaliningrad outlined in red. Grebeshkov was impatient to
begin, frustrated with every minute wasted. A terrorist every two
days – that had become his new, if unlikely, target.

“The repercussions from Lithuania have been significant,” the
President said gruffly, “with protests turning violent in several
European capitals, our embassy in Warsaw attacked. We have a moral
right to protect our nation from the threat of terrorism and I’m
not prepared to offer anything approaching an apology; fortunately,
NATO seems keen to downplay the incident and Russia is not alone in
demanding answers from Lithuania. Their government denies any
complicity with
August 14
– apparently the dacha settlement had more to do
with drug traffickers than terrorists. Sanctions may persuade
Vilnius to be more receptive but it will take time; similarly, it
would be foolish to expect the U.N. to offer anything
constructive.”

The President
spoke quietly to the aide seated beside him, before tapping a
command onto the small table-top console to his right; immediately
a red icon flashed on the map display close to Poland’s northern
coastline.

“Lithuania may well prove to be the least of our problems,”
said the President with a sigh of frustration. “The terrorist
captured there is a Marek Tamm, Estonian, age twenty-three; the
dacha complex had apparently been shut down over the winter and we
are fortunate that Tamm’s group of twelve was the first to arrive
once Nazarenko’s group had left. However, the SVR have now
identified a second t
errorist
base, west of Gdansk, which has possibly been
active since at least October; there is also circumstantial
evidence to link it with figures within the Warsaw Establishment.
An incursion on Polish soil, even a drone strike, would doubtless
be worse than Lithuania and we are consequently facing the prospect
of a terrorist war for months to come.”

Grebeshkov
well understood the President’s dilemma, it the same as that faced
by the Prime Minister just two days earlier. Russia’s allies in
Eastern Europe were few and far between, many countries unable or
unwilling to forget past Soviet atrocities, Belarus the only one to
maintain strong ties with Moscow. Ethnic Russians made up a quarter
of Estonia and Latvia’s population, and – together with Poland –
the three Baltic States were clearly determined to ensure they
would not be the next Ukraine, their own private war leaving Russia
with various unpalatable options.

The President
took their continued silence as his cue to resume his analysis,
“The number of cyber-attacks on soft targets has continued to grow,
with much of Moscow’s transport and energy infrastructure
particularly susceptible. Tracing their precise origin has proved
difficult with the attacks being redirected via multiple proxy
connections; however, I’m told the prime source is again likely to
be Eastern Europe, with both Poland and Estonia apparently being
centres of suitable expertise.

“Intelligence indicates the facility in Poland has some
twenty residents. In a week, they could be in Russia. In a
month,
August 14
could have a new base in the Ukraine or Georgia. Time is most
certainly not on our side. Our soldiers’ sacrifice might have given
us a few days grace, or it could have accelerated
August 14’s
plans. The
FSB has focused much of its efforts on these Lithuanian cells; now
there is also the unwelcome likelihood that one or more groups
arrived from Poland, perhaps as early as January. Unless the Polish
Government generously decides to be more helpful, we presently have
no clue as to the number or identity of
August 14’
s agents already resident
here.”

The President
paused briefly, looking across the table at Grebeshkov. “For the
moment, we can only focus on the dangers as we know them. In terms
of the terrorists trained in Lithuania and presently still at
large, General Grebeshkov has assured me that we will have Eglitis
and his five remaining associates in custody before the end of the
month.”

And so the pressure mounts
.
Grebeshkov acknowledged the President’s words with a nod, sensing
that it wouldn’t matter anyway. The President seemed to be working
his way towards an alternative that would either solve the problem
of
August 14
for
good, or risk driving the President from power.

“It’s imperative,” continued the President forcefully, “to
show the world our determination to rid Russia of these terrorists.
To do that we must dramatically increase the pressure on Poland,
and so ensure they in turn react quickly and effectively
against
August 14
; it cannot be allowed to reorganise and so threaten us in
the future.” The President’s tone hardened, “Only if we make an
example of Poland will the rest of Eastern Europe finally realise
the stupidity of allying themselves with those wanting to bully and
intimidate Russia.”

He paused a
moment as though for emphasis, “I propose that this can be achieved
through the following: firstly, the immediate suspension of certain
strategic exports to Poland, including oil supplies via the Druzhba
pipeline; secondly, the closing of the Strait of Baltiysk, thus
shutting the port of Elblag.” The President tapped the console
beside him, and the map of the Baltic zoomed in to show Gdansk Bay,
Poland to the west, the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad a hundred
and thirty kilometres to the east. “Thirdly, a naval blockade of
Poland’s two major ports of Gdansk and Gdynia.”

The uproar
which greeted his words was less than the President had expected
but more than he had hoped for. With a resigned shake of his head,
he leant back in his chair and waited patiently for the hubbub to
cease. Eventually there was silence.

“Gdansk and Gdynia,” the President explained, “are some
twenty kilometres apart, and I’m advised that such a blockade
should be relatively easy to implement. Unlike sanctions, a naval
blockade would be a visible and dramatic signal as to our intent,
sending a message to any other country thinking of harbouring
terrorists. Taken together, these three actions would have a
significant and immediate effect on Poland’s economy. Russia could,
of course, give Poland an ultimatum, a final opportunity to act
against
August 14
– however, such gestures are pointless unless we could
absolutely guarantee that all terrorists would immediately be
arrested, and then deported to Russia. In the present climate,
whilst Russia threatens but does not act, I do not believe Poland
would ever fully comply with such demands. Consequently, these
three measures would need to be implemented without prior
warning.