The War Within (59 page)

Republicans often voiced as much suspicion and distrust as Democrats.

The president rarely was the voice of realism on the Iraq War.

* * *

There is an encyclopedia of lessons for the next president to learn from Bush's management of the war. The first might be to trust the public with the truth, in all its pain and uncertainty. In the summer and early fall of 2006, when it was obvious the United States was failing in Iraq, the American people most likely would have rejoiced if the president had leveled with them, said he knew the strategy was not working and that he had begun an intensive review.

The president is correct when he says he should not make decisions based on polls or focus groups. But in a democracy, the public is not something just to "game" or "spin." The administration worried too much about a

"hothouse" election year story of internal debate and strife and not enough about the war itself. In the decision not to level, the president gave up what could have been his greatest assetópublic support.

"When did he decide to become commander in chief?" one of the people involved for years in Iraq War decision making asked me recently. "That is the question."

The answer is that there were moments, but far too few. After ordering the invasion, the president spent three years in denial and then delegated a strategy review to his national security adviser. Bush was intolerant of confrontations and in-depth debate. There was no deadline, no hurry. The president was engaged in the war rhetorically but maintained an odd detachment from its management. He never got a full handle on it, and over these years of war, too often he failed to lead.

* * *

As the Bush presidency becomes history, the wars he began will become part of another president's story.

"Most important question, really. There's going to be a new president-elect who will come in here," I asked during our last interview on May 21, 2008. "Not as a Democrat or a Republican, but as the president, what are you going to say to the new leader about what you are handing off in Iraq?"

He thought about it for a moment. "What I'll say is, 'Don't let it fail.'"

Every person has shortcomings. But a president's shortcomings are visited upon an entire nation and, in a major war, they are visited upon the world.

The next president will face a complex set of organizational, military, political and leadership challenges because of the Iraq War. It won't be solved with slogans or party doctrine, or through wishful thinking. When the next president steps into the Oval Office on January 20, 2009, and surveys what he has inherited, I suspect he will be sobered by all that has been left behind.

GLOSSARY

AIF:
Anti-Iraqi forces.

Al Qaeda:
International terrorist organization headed by Osama bin Laden.

AQI or AQIZ:
Al Qaeda in Iraq. Homegrown terrorist organization affiliated with al Qaeda that sprang up after the U.S. invasion in March 2003.

Baath Party:
Saddam Hussein's ruling political party in Iraq from 1968 to 2003.

Battalion:
U.S. Army or Marine unit normally made up of about 600 to 800 personnel.

Brigade:
U.S. Army or Marine unit normally made up of 3,000 or more personnel.

CentCom:
Central Command. U.S. military command responsible for the Middle East and South Asia; headquartered in Tampa, Florida.

CPA:
Coalition Provisional Authority. Agency responsible for Iraqi occupation from May 2003 to June 2004; led by L. Paul Bremer.

Dawa Party:
"The Call"; small Shia party in Iraq that includes Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

DDR:
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias.

DIA:
Defense Intelligence Agency. Coordinating intelligence agency in the Defense Department that reports to the secretary of defense but is subject to the coordinating authority of the director of national intelligence.

de-Baathification:
Policy of removing Baath Party members from positions of responsibility in government, military and schools.

Defense Policy Board:
Group of former officials, retired military officers and other experts who advise the secretary of defense on policy.

DNI:
Director of national intelligence. Office established in 2005 that oversees and directs the activities of the various intelligence agencies.

DOD:
Department of Defense.

EFP:
Explosively formed projectile. A shaped charge capable of penetrating armor that is substantially more lethal than conventional IEDs.

GCC:
Gulf Cooperation Council. Regional group made up of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.

Green Zone:
Also known as the International Zone. Heavily fortified area of central Baghdad where the Iraqi government and U.S. diplomatic presence are headquartered.

HUMINT:
Human intelligence.

IED:
Improvised explosive device. A makeshift bomb made of old munitions and other explosives, used by various al Qaeda and insurgent groups on or alongside roads.

ISF:
Iraqi security forces.

Iraq Study Group:
Bipartisan group formed March 2006, charged with conducting an independent assessment of the situation in Iraq.

J2:
Intelligence directorate of the Joint Staff.

J3:
Operations directorate of the Joint Staff.

J5:
Strategic plans and policy directorate of the Joint Staff.

JAM or Mahdi Army:
The Jaish al Mahdi. Militia headed by radical anti-American Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

JCS:
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JSAT:
Joint Strategic Assessment Team. Group that advised General Petraeus in Iraq in early 2007.

JSOC:
Joint Special Operations Command.

MCNS:
Ministerial Committee on National Security. The high-level Iraqi policy council.

MNSTC-I and/or Minsticky:
Multi-National Security Transition CommandóIraq. Training arm of the U.S. Army responsible for forming the new Iraqi army and police force.

NIE:
National Intelligence Estimate.

NSA:
National Security Agency. Responsible for intercepting foreign communications and protecting the communication and cryptographic systems and codes of the United States.

NSC:
National Security Council. The president and his senior foreign policy makers, including the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of national intelligence.

The NSC staff is headed by the national security adviser.

OIF:
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Name of the 2003 invasion and ongoing U.S. military operations in Iraq.

Operation Together Forward:
Unsuccessful two-phase security plan to reduce violence in Baghdad that ran from June 2006 to October 2006.

PRT:
Provincial Reconstruction Team. State Department civilian teams that coordinate rebuilding and government issues at the provincial level in Iraq.

RFF:
Request for Forces. Official request by a battlefield commander for additional troops.

SCIRI or SIIC:
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The leading Shia party in Iraq, it was renamed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council on May 12, 2007.

SecDef:
Secretary of Defense.

SVTS or VTC:
Secure video teleconference. Video and audio hook-up used between Washington and Baghdad.

Tank:
Pentagon conference room designated for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NOTES

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Almost all of the Bush administration's internal deliberations on the Iraq War have been classified. Early in my reporting, I was able to obtain documents that provided glimpses of how the decision making evolved in 2006 and 2007. The White House agreed to declassify a dozen documents after my initial inquiries, and I was able to independently acquire dozens more.

Most of the information in this book was obtained from interviews with more than 150 people, including the president's national security team, senior deputies and other key players responsible for the intelligence, diplomacy and military operations in the Iraq War. Officials with firsthand knowledge of meetings, documents and events, employed at various levels of the White House staff, the departments of Defense and State, and the intelligence community also served as primary sources.

Most interviews were conducted on "background," meaning that the information provided could be used but the sources would not be identified by name in the book. Many sources were interviewed multiple times by me or my research assistant, Brady Dennis. We interviewed some sources a half-dozen times or more. Nearly everyone allowed us to record the interviews so the story could be told more fully and accurately, with the exact language they used.

I interviewed President Bush on the record in the Oval Office for nearly three hours on May 20ñ21, 2008. In all, I have interviewed him six times about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for a total of nearly 11 hours. Past interviews from which I drew material for this book are noted.

In addition, critical information came from an array of documentsómemos, letters, official notes, personal notes, briefing summaries, PowerPoint slides, e-mails, journals, calendars, agendas and chronologies. Where documents are quoted, we have had access to the originals or to copies.

The use of dialogue in meetings or conversations comes from at least one participant, usually more, as well as from written memos or contemporaneous notes. When thoughts, conclusions or feelings are attributed to a participant, that point of view has been obtained from that person directly, from the written record, or from a colleague whom the person told. Quotation marks are used when I judged the written record or firsthand recollections precise enough to justify their use. Quotation marks were not used when the sources were unsure about the exact wording, or when the documentation was unclear.

I have attempted to preserve the language of the main characters and sources as much as possible, using their words even when they are not directly quoted, reflecting the flavor of their speech and attitudes as best I could.

No reporter can with 100 percent accuracy re-create events that occurred months or even years earlier. The human memory is fallible, and the past often looks different in retrospect. By checking with numerous sources and comparing their accounts to the written record, I have tried to provide as accurate an account as possible.

I realize that because this book provides the first in-depth examination of the deliberations that led to the troop surge in Iraq, it is much closer to the first draft of history than the last. I have tried, as always, to find the best obtainable version of the truth.

PROLOGUE

The information in this chapter comes primarily from background interviews with seven firsthand sources.

* * *

In 2005, after Hurricane Katrina:
Spencer S. Hsu and Susan B. Glasser, "FEMA Director Singled Out by Response Critics,"
The Washington Post,
September 6, 2005, p. A1.

The day before Bush's conversation:
SECRET Camp David agenda summary dated June 12, 2006, and declassified by the White House in 2008 in response to specific questions asked by the author. Casey's presentation was from 9:30 A.M. to 10:15 A.M.

The plan, classified SECRET:
Author's review and dictated notes of a SECRET document dated June 12, 2006, consisting of a one-page security assessment, a counterinsurgency strategy and a joint campaign plan.

I later read Hadley's statement:
Author interview with President George W. Bush, May 20, 2008.

In his special file:
SECRET statistical review described to the author by a knowledgeable source.

The president himself:
Interview with President George W. Bush, May 20, 2008, and several knowledgeable sources.

As a first step:
SECRET Camp David agenda summary dated June 12, 2006, and declassified by the White House in 2008 in response to specific questions asked by the author.

The morning had begun:
Author's review and dictated notes of a SECRET document dated June 12, 2006, consisting of a one-page security assessment, a counterinsurgency strategy and a joint campaign plan.

Rice's State Department briefing:
SECRET Camp David agenda summary dated June 12, 2006, and declassified by the White House in 2008 in response to specific questions asked by the author. The State Department briefing was from 3:15 P.M. to 3:45 P.M.

And yet, "I sense something":
Presidential Documents, June 14, 2006, p. 1133 (Vol. 42, No. 24), www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v42no24.html.

In an interview two years later:
Interview with President George W. Bush, May 20, 2008.

Bush insisted he understood:
Interview with President George W. Bush, May 21, 2008.

"What frustrated me is that":
Interview with President George W. Bush, May 20, 2008.

"That's one of many questions":
Interview with President George W. Bush, May 21, 2008.

CHAPTER 1

The information in this chapter comes primarily from background interviews with five firsthand sources.

* * *

The snowflake sent on October 28, 2003:
Author's review and dictated notes of a SECRET snowflake dated October 28, 2003.
CHAPTER 2

The information in this chapter comes primarily from background interviews with five firsthand sources.

* * *

A SECRET analysis showed:
Author's review and dictated notes of a document dated January 8, 2005.

Daily attacks doubled:
Chart of weekly security incidents in Iraq between January 2004 and May 2008.

"With a month to go before elections":
A knowledgeable source's account of the December 2004 document.

When I interviewed the president:
Interview with President George W. Bush, August 20, 2002. See Bob Woodward,
Bush at War,
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, p. 342.