The War Within (49 page)

* * *

Petraeus's forces were beginning to flip tribes in Anbar regularly, signing up leaders who had grown frustrated with al Qaeda violence and intrusions. It was an effort that had started in late 2005 with Marines in the al-Qaim area in the farthest reaches of Anbar, near the Syrian border. Slowly and steadily, the movement had spread along the Euphrates River valley to Ramadi, where tribal sheiks were now sending hundreds of local young men to join the Iraqi police force.

But what about Baghdad? Petraeus had heard that a former Iraqi Special Operations Forces captain and leader of a Sunni insurgent group called the Baghdad Patriots wanted to sign with the United States against al Qaeda. Abu Abed, also known as Saif, brought with him a force of somewhere between 40 and 100 experienced fighters.

Abed's sudden unemployment when the Iraqi army was abolished in 2003, like so many others, left him feeling disrespected and disdainful of the Americans. Since then, however, al Qaeda had taken over the Amiriya neighborhood, a Sunni enclave. They had blown up Abed's house and killed his brothers, and now they were coming after him. Amiriya was so violent that U.S. and coalition forces couldn't enter the area in Humvees. An M1 tank and a Bradley armored personnel carrier had been blown up in the neighborhood.

The first notice American forces had of Abed's change of heart was a cell phone call on May 29 from a local imam, who informed the U.S. battalion commander in the area that the militia intended to take its neighborhood back from al Qaeda. News of the Baghdad Patriots' requestóthey wanted the Americans to provide weapons and stay out of the wayórocketed up the chain of command.

Petraeus, out jogging with some young officers, was joined by a U.S. Army major who worked in Amiriya. A dozen soldiers from his battalion had already been killed that month. The major told Petraeus that the overture from Abed was significant, though there were considerable risks to helping him and his men. Prime Minister Maliki wouldn't be happy to see the Americans stand up a Sunni militia. And several officers wondered if the Americans were making a deal with the devil. After all, Abed was a former insurgent who undoubtedly had killed U.S. soldiers.

"We've got to support him," Petraeus ordered after the run. "Drive him on our Bradleys. Get ammunition from the Iraqi army and give it to him."

Within 24 hours, the neighborhood began to quiet. The Iraqi fighters knew the area, and they began leading the Americans to arms caches, al Qaeda hideouts and IEDs. While some in the battalion held on to their deep reservations, most saw the arrangement and the subsequent reduction in violence as a sign of progress.

Privately, Petraeus saw it as a potential turning point in the capital. The key to drawing down U.S. forces was to get the Iraqis to protect their own population so Petraeus's troops wouldn't have the job.

* * *

Gates approached a handful of senators, including the new chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, to inquire about the prospects of getting Pace confirmed for another two-year term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

"What do you think?" Gates asked.

"It's going to be a battle royal up here on Iraq," Levin replied.

Gates asked Levin to "sound out" colleagues.

Levin felt it mostly boiled down to accountability. Congress had held no one at the highest levels accountable for failed policies. He knew there was no way Pace could get through a confirmation hearing without it becoming a venting session.

"Well, can you see whether or not others feel that way?" Gates asked.

Levin, who had served in the Senate since 1979 and had voted against the war in 2002, approached half a dozen of his Democratic colleagues and some Republicans. They all told him it would involve a real fight to get Pace confirmed. A few said, "Hell, no."

For starters, Pace had played a role in shaping a strategy that had not worked. But worse, there was a feeling among the senatorsóreinforced by various military officersóthat Pace had not been outspoken, that he wasn't the kind of guy who would stand up to the administration and say things were on the wrong track. Retired General James Jones, for example, the Marine commandant from 1999 to 2003, had said Pace was too docile in dealing with Rumsfeld and had likened him to "the parrot on the secretary's shoulder."

It'll be a bloody battle, Levin warned Gates. A confirmation hearing would focus on all the failures in Iraq and Pace's role in them. He didn't see how Pace could get confirmed. Gates decided not to take the chance.

On Friday, June 8, Gates announced that General Pace would step down as chairman of the Joint Chiefs in September. He said he wanted to spare Pace the rancorous congressional hearings. "I think that the events of the last several months have simply created an environment in which I think there would be a confirmation process that would not be in the best interests of the country," Gates told reporters at the Pentagon. "I am disappointed that circumstances make this kind of a decision necessary."

Despite Gates's effort to sugarcoat his decision, Pace was being fired. He would retire after just two years in the post, the shortest tenure of any chairman in more than four decades. Along with the simultaneous retirement of Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, the JCS vice chairman, it meant that the top Washington generals linked to Rumsfeld's tenure were all but gone.

* * *

In June, Hadley sent O'Sullivan to Iraq. She saw panic everywhere. The additional brigades and the new strategy were in place, and yet violence was skyrocketing, with attacks reaching more than 1,550 a week, about 220 a dayóa new record. And on top of that, the politics remained stagnant. Reconciliation was nowhere in sight. But as unbelievable as it might seem, she found Baghdad preferable to Washington.
Chapter 36

O
n June 13, about 9 A.M., insurgents launched a second attack on the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam. The bombing destroyed the mosque's two ten-story minarets. The first attack, 16 months earlier, had been the trigger that set off massive sectarian violence. In Baghdad, Petraeus and the American military intelligence officials held their breath.

Prime Minister Maliki was furious.

"How could this happen?" he asked Petraeus in an accusatory tone. "With all the coalition forces there, with all the Iraqi forces there, you and the coalition must have let this happen. How can these people get in?"

"There were plenty of forces present," Petraeus answered. "Something else is involved. What I suggest, Mr. Prime Minister, is I will give you a helicopter and my personal assistant. Go there. Go yourself. Have a look. Go talk to the commanders and see what happened."

Petraeus's assistant was a skillful translator and civilian contractor named Sadi Othman, who had attended a Mennonite college in Kansas and once worked as a driver in New York City. Known to everyone simply as Sadi, he was a towering man and former basketball player whom Petraeus referred to as "the Michael Jordan of Jordan," his native country. Sadi had begun working for Petraeus as a translator in Mosul after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. When Petraeus returned as the commanding general, he made Sadi one of his senior advisers. He answered Petraeus's cell phone in Iraq, and as far as most Iraqis were concerned, Sadi was Petraeus.

Maliki and Sadi flew to Samarra and were received by the local Iraqi commanders.

"Every time I ask you about Samarra," Maliki began yelling at the national police commander on the scene, "you say it's perfectly okay, there's nothing to worry about. How can this happen? You're an idiot! You're incompetent! You have all these protective guards" around the mosque.

Maliki then ordered a curfew shutting everything downóno walking, no driving. Later, it became clear that the bombing had been an inside job by members of the Iraqi police.

The next day, June 14, Maliki, Petraeus and Crocker met at about 12:45 P.M.

"We really understand two things about the terrorists now," Maliki said. "The first is that they target essential services because these have a direct impact on the people, and the people then have a direct impact on the government. It shows the government to be ineffective in stopping the attacks and restoring essential services." He specifically mentioned interruptions of oil and electricity. "The second thing we know is they'll target holy sites in order to generate sectarian violence between the groups."

Ignoring this recital of the obvious, Ambassador Crocker told him, "I applaud the orders you've given as a consequence of yesterday's events. I think you did exactly the right thing. The importance of these statements in your orders is that you're placing the blame squarely on al Qaeda and are demonstrating that this is an attack against all elements of Iraqóthe Sunnis, the Shia and the Kurds, as well. This is very important that it is seen as an al Qaeda attack on Iraq, not on any particular sect."

"Yes," Petraeus said, "I strongly agree. You did all the right things. And things are calm now, but we can't count on this calm."

"That's why we have this extended curfew," Maliki said. "And we also postponed the exams," referring to secondary school exams.

"Your trip yesterday was very important," Petraeus said. "You demonstrated leadership."

"We have closed off the entire scene."

"How quickly can this be rebuilt?" Petraeus asked. "Can construction start right away, with or without the U.N.?" He was referring to the plan to rebuild the mosque from the bombing 16 months earlier.

"Yes," the prime minister replied, "in fact yesterday we were about to sign the papers, UNESCO and the Turkish company that won the award, to begin the reconstruction." UNESCO was the branch of the United Nations collaborating on Iraq reconstruction projects. Maliki said President Bush had called him the previous day "to say that the U.S. would provide any support necessary for the reconstruction."

"It would be a powerful signal to the public," Crocker said, "to sign the contract in the next couple of days, with lots of media. The world would be pleased."

"Well," Maliki answered, "it's up to UNESCO."

Petraeus and Crocker recognized the typical Iraqi political response. Instead of reaching over and strangling Maliki as they seemed to want to do, Petraeus said, "There's a saying that you're really good if you can turn adversity into opportunity, and you can in this case."

"Right now the people of Samarra are intimidated," Maliki said, adding confidently, "But when they see the Iraqi security forces there, I am sure they'll openly support them."

U.S. intelligence showed, however, that the Iraqi police forces were highly sectarian, and some still carried pictures of Saddam. But neither challenged Maliki's assertion.

"Keep this quiet for two days," Petraeus said, "but we're about to start a major national, nationwide attack against al Qaeda sanctuaries." He promised that if the U.S. had any intelligence from the operations, he would share it with the prime minister. Crocker said that Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani had agreed to compromise on the Iraqi law to share oil revenues with the provinces, an important piece of legislation. "And the next step is to introduce it to the parliament," Crocker said.

Maliki was nodding yes. "Not only do we have this agreement," he said, "but we also have the framework agreement on the de-Baathification law."

Petraeus pounced on the public relations opportunity. He knew that Hadley and others in the administration were searching for a dramatic event. He suggested that Maliki capitalize on the agreement to rebuild the Samarra mosque and the news of a compromise on the oil law. "In another day," he said, "you have all the Sunday talk shows. So why don't you orchestrate a media campaign on these favorable events to show you in a good light?" He added, "Let me help generate the talk shows."

"There's another bit of good news," Maliki said. "Sadr has suspended his members' participation in the council, and the parliament can then expedite all of this activity." Recently, six government ministers loyal to Sadr had quit in protest at Maliki's refusal to set a timetable for a U.S. troop withdrawal. It had left Maliki free to choose their replacements.

"I'll be on Fox Sunday," Petraeus said, "and I'll emphasize all these points, so that you get from me support on the talk shows. Or at least on Fox."

"Yes," said Ali al-Dabbagh, Maliki's spokesman. "We should participate in the shows."

"We'll line it up," Petraeus said. He pointed to Dabbagh. "You do Al Jazeera."

"And we have more good news," Petraeus said. He made a point of ending meetings with Maliki on a positive note.

The repairs on the oil platforms in the Gulf that allow the loading of tankers had just been completed. "We should highlight this too," he said, "the completion of the repairs on the Basra oil terminals." He also had photographs of southwestern Baghdad, an area of focused redevelopment.

The Petraeus philosophy on media coverage was that the reporters would unearth the bad news on their own. If he and Maliki didn't serve up good news, however large or small, it most likely would go unreported.

On
Fox News Sunday
with Chris Wallace on June 17, General Petraeus said, "Yesterday, there was an agreement with UNESCO and the government of Iraq to rebuild that Samarra mosque." Wallace showed little interest, asking instead about the levels of violence and the absence of an oil law. Petraeus said all the problems in Iraq were not

"going to be resolved in a year or even two yearsÖ. Historically, counterinsurgency operations have gone at least nine or 10 years." But, he insisted, "there is good prospect for progress in the months ahead."

Ultimately, the contract to rebuild the Samarra mosque was signed, but agreements on de-Baathification reform and an oil law stalled.

* * *

On June 28, Rice gathered 20 senior State Department officials, the most senior undersecretaries and her closest seventh-floor aides for a two-day private retreat at Airlie Center, a conference facility in the Virginia countryside.

After they had discussed various programs to transform diplomacy and foreign assistance, she raised the real question.