The Underground Girls of Kabul (36 page)

If Shukria’s husband eventually comes to collect the children there is little she will be able to do. When they are taken away from her, she is reduced to a figure she does not yet know how to name or to describe.

“That will be my fourth destiny. A divorced woman without her children.”

She thinks out loud: Perhaps this happened because their marriage was never proper to begin with? She was never a real bride, anyway. She was just Shukur; miserable, in that stupid wedding dress. The marriage probably failed because she could never quite force that man out from inside of her. As her body was put into a dress, she tried to make her mind follow. Nor did she ever get a
mahr
—that sum that should but rarely is paid to the bride to secure her.

“Right now I am nothing. I was nothing and I am nothing. I was never a man and never a woman. I was a wife and now I will not be a wife anymore. When he takes my children away from me, I will not be a mother. To whom do I have value? Can you tell me—to whom?”

She wags her head from side to side, her voice bristling.

“To your children, your parents, and to your patients,” I say. “To us. You have value to us.”

But Shukria still shakes her head.

“How many lives should I have? How many people must I be?”

Azita

T
HE PRODUCER ASKED
for color, so she added the turquoise scarf to break up her all-black. He is happy with the small concession, nodding in approval as Azita walks back onto the television set. Then he turns to the production assistant right behind him. Something is still not quite right: Azita needs more
eyes
. The assistant springs into action, and Azita patiently allows her eyes to be lined with even thicker strokes of black kohl while the female sound operator attaches a small microphone at the neckline of her black coat. Azita remains still. She knows it will be faster if a professional does it. They are all waiting for her now.

“Ready?”

Azita nods to the producer. Ready. And the tape rolls again.

Heat is rising quickly on the hillside terrace, but little can dampen her energy today, where she is placed on a small stage in front of three cameras and a local production crew. Her delivery is flawless and moving; she tells the story of how she came from a dirt-floor house in the provinces and took the seat for Badghis in parliament. It’s her success narrative and she doesn’t miss a beat when she ties it to the future of Afghanistan: “Our nation is in trouble, but it will never go anywhere by itself,” she exclaims to the future viewers. “The responsibility
for your future lies with you. No one will take care of it for you.”

Azita is still waiting, hoping to be reinstated in parliament. But this is a good diversion, allowing her to play the role of a politician again for few hours.

She is one of three judges on a television program meant to get young Afghans—a majority of the population is under 25—interested in politics. In this
American Idol
–format, each young contestant will make a speech in front of the panel of experienced politicians, who will offer on-air coaching and finally cast votes on his performance. No young women have signed up, but dozens of young men have gathered for this production funded by one of the American nonprofits aimed at “democracy promotion” abroad. Each participant wears his Friday best, ranging from a traditional
shalwar
to a camouflage jacket and cowboy boots.

The strong lighting on the set makes Azita’s eyes glimmer and gives her the familiar rush. She has a momentary flashback to the introduction she used to read to her sisters back in Badghis when they played television:
“Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. This is the news hour.”
Today, being a female television anchor would be a far from respectable job. For a woman to expose herself on television is to be seen by many men at once. Azita could not work in television; it would kill her political aspirations for good. Even appearing on this show could seem a little low-class for a woman. She knows it. But it offers her a chance to get out of the house. And for as long as the camera is on, she is on. To her delight, the production crew had even sent a car and a driver to pick her up that morning, as though she was someone important.

The past few weeks have not offered much reprieve from her confinement in Golden City. Her husband is the only one who can drive her now, and he will do so only when he is willing and in a good mood. He no longer allows her to take taxis, and every meeting outside the house needs to be negotiated with him in advance. With Kabul deteriorating, it is for her own safety, he has stated. Because
he cares about her. On some days, he decides they will not leave the house at all.

One at a time, the show’s contestants walk out before the judges. Each participant will touch his chest with the right hand and exclaim a respectful
“Salam aleikum”
greeting before making his political speech about Afghanistan’s future. Most presentations are far from Azita’s upbeat tone: A dominant theme is that foreign troops should leave sooner rather than later. Such statements are usually met with cheering approval by other contestants awaiting their turns, even though they have been asked to be silent.

Azita takes the role of a coach, altering between gentle criticism—“I don’t understand if you even have a political idea”—to praise, suddenly exclaiming
“afaim”
or
“bravo”
when she hears something good. When one young man is struck dumb as he faces the judges, Azita slowly talks him out of paralysis: “Breathe. Feel yourself. We are your friends.”

He delivers his three allotted minutes in a rambling stream of words. If he were in power, his first and most urgent priority would be to put an end to the stealing of aid money by officials and make sure it was used better. He gets the highest score from the judges. He has hit on a topic that enrages many Afghans, and he is still in the running to become Afghanistan’s “Hope for the Future.”

F
OREIGN AID WORKERS
, who can be the most cynical of all about their own difficult field, will sometimes mutter a one-sentence response to why, after a decade of aid to Afghanistan, it still ranks
close to the bottom of the Human Development Index: “Too much money.” And too many cooks.

Afghanistan has historically been called “the Graveyard of Empires” in war memoirs. In our time, it may also be called “the Playground of Foreign Aid Experimentation.”

The ambitious project, much like what the Russians set out to do, of turning around a country where many still perform daily tasks according to hundred-year-old traditions and where infrastructure is
virtually nonexistent has prompted disillusioned aid workers to routinely trade stories of engendering epic chaos: when dozens of “projects” and millions of dollars converge on a single province, as each nationality and each organization attempts to execute its own version of democracy and development—usually without ever speaking to one another. Add to that confused and increasingly frustrated Afghans caught in the middle.

Countries wanting to remain in good diplomatic standing with Washington, D.C., after 2001 contributed not only troops but also generous offerings of foreign aid. Between 2006 and 2011, a total of
more than $30 billion was spent on development aid to Afghanistan by about thirty countries and a few large multilateral organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank. The single biggest contribution came from the United States, which also had the biggest staff and the most fanciful projects. Plus the more than one thousand nongovernmental organizations registered to operate in Afghanistan—all with different agendas and ideas of what works best.

A fundamental quandary for all those entities is that they need to demonstrate some progress for the money to keep flowing from donors. Just not too much, as abundant optimism could risk that same flow of money. Delivering foreign aid to a weak, war-torn country with few functioning institutions, where war still rages in many places, raises the bar even higher. In that state, Afghanistan was simply unable to absorb much of the money that was pushed into the country. Instead, the massive, well-meaning funds fueled mismanagement and corruption.

Norwegian political scientist Astri Suhrke offers
a scathing review in her 2011 book
When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan
. With twenty-five years of experience in Afghanistan, she describes the “very modest results” of foreign aid there as a direct consequence of overly confident organizations setting out to entirely rebuild Afghanistan, aided by a very powerful foreign aid lobby that reacts to every visible failure by appealing for more funds to rectify them. Together, these entities have not only largely failed to help
Afghanistan, but also caused irrevocable harm by creating “a rentier state unparalleled in Afghan history and nearly unique in the world of international assistance,” she writes, with a complete dependency on foreign aid and little accountability toward its own citizens.

Afghanistan holds a spot at the very bottom of Transparency International’s corruption index, and as the war is drawing to a close, Afghan officials are openly trying to cash in as much as possible before most troops—and money—leave for good. Of the aid contributed by U.S. taxpayers, for instance, as little as ten cents on the dollar may at times have reached its intended recipients, according to
an auditor at the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Much of the rest has fueled a fragile and corrupt economy where a select few—both Afghans and foreigners—have been made extraordinarily wealthy.

The strong urge by Western donors to help, in particular, Afghan women has also proved fraught with failures and strange priorities.

One of the most heralded achievements—education, and especially of girls—touts impressive official numbers:
close to ten million students registered, compared with around fifty thousand under the Taliban. But half of Afghanistan’s newly created schools have no actual buildings, many lack teachers, most students never graduate, and one-fifth of the registered students are permanently absent.

Many students also find that the foreigners’ interest in schooling does not extend to higher studies. Mostly located in urban areas, universities have limited slots available and charge fees too high for most. As 40 percent of Afghan girls will marry before the age of eighteen, when childbearing and managing a household will take precedence over education, it is hard to understand why more slots and scholarships have not been offered to those young women who have the ability and permission to get higher educations.

In a single year,
more than seven hundred “projects” related to gender and improving the lives of women and girls in Afghanistan were also sponsored by foreign donors. A report by Norwegian political scientist Torunn Wimpelmann explains that despite some progress, especially in the urban centers, “
gains are on the whole modest
and reversible.” But more notably, “the emergence of a jet-setting strata of English-speaking women activists” in Kabul, focusing mainly on an international audience, has managed to create an even larger gap between urban and rural women and those separated by class, wealth, and education. One consequence of this, Wimpelmann writes, is that women’s rights have increasingly become viewed as an elite and Western-backed issue by many in Afghanistan. Now, taking a conservative stand on women’s rights has therefore become the necessary norm for many politicians or influential power brokers who want to demonstrate their nationalist and Islamic credentials. That will be the unfortunate legacy of “women’s issues” in Afghanistan for some time to come, similar to the Russian experience. A long-term investment in a strengthened justice system and a functioning parliament would have benefited women and girls more, Wimpelmann contends, echoing the words of Azita.

N
OT UNTIL ELECTRICITY
on the television set goes out for the third time does Azita relinquish her chair on the set and walk back to the shade inside, as taping for the show breaks by midday. The producer has arranged for a lunch of meat stew and Mountain Dew. Azita declines the bread. She explains to the two fellow male judges that she is trying to lose weight.

They are also politicians, about twice her age. She wants to use the opportunity to secure their support for her reinstatement in parliament, and the men politely ask after the health of her father, who they know from his “political days.” How is he?

Azita is equally polite in her response: He is doing well. Not so political these days. His old age and all.

But they persist. He must have inspired her to take up a career in politics?

Azita smiles. It was all so long ago. She really doesn’t want to talk about her father. He is retired now.

A better topic, she suggests, is how they can support her in the struggle to claim her rightful seat. “Being at home is not restful. It’s
depressing. It’s not who I am. I feel useless there. It’s when I am outside the house that I feel valuable,” she tells them.

They seem to understand. They know she is more than a housewife—that she is her father’s daughter. She beams at their affirmation.

But when Azita returns home this afternoon, she will find Mehran in tears again, refusing to speak or eat. Her stepmother has invented her most efficient line so far, and she has been hammering it all day, while Azita has been out of the house: “You are not Mehran. You are Mahnoush. You are
Mahnoush-Mahnoush-Mahnoush
.”

I
N THE HOUR
after dinner, Azita will pay even more dearly for her outing, when her husband prompts her on when his regular monthly allowance will be reinstated. It is a conversation they have had several times now, and at first, Azita just listens to him.

In his opinion, the fact that Azita no longer receives a salary from parliament is no excuse. Their agreement from years ago stills stands: He allows her to work on the condition of a marital kickback. She cannot change those terms now, just because she is temporarily unemployed. Her husband makes his case again: He agreed to move to Kabul and live there once she got into parliament. He agreed to stay for these additional months as she continues to try to get her seat back—and he should be compensated accordingly. He has stood by her side and acted as her “house husband,” as his only job. And it has not been without effort. So she cannot just stop paying him. Their deal was always the same—part of what she brings in is handed over to him, in cash. What she keeps is for food, school fees, and rent.