The Two Admirals

Come, all ye kindred chieftains of the deep,
In mighty phalanx round your brother bend;
Hush every murmur that invades his sleep,
And guard the laurel that o'ershades your friend.

Lines on Trippe.

It is a strong proof of the diffusive tendency of every thing in this
country, that America never yet collected a fleet. Nothing is wanting to
this display of power but the will. But a fleet requires only one
commander, and a feeling is fast spreading in the country that we ought
to be all commanders; unless the spirit of unconstitutional innovation,
and usurpation, that is now so prevalent, at Washington, be controlled,
we may expect to hear of proposals to send a committee of Congress to
sea, in command of a squadron. We sincerely hope that their first
experiment may be made on the coast of Africa.

It has been said of Napoleon that he never could be made to understand
why his fleets did not obey his orders with the same accuracy, as to
time and place, as his
corps d'armée
. He made no allowances for the
winds and currents, and least of all, did he comprehend that all
important circumstance, that the efficiency of a fleet is necessarily
confined to the rate of sailing of the dullest of its ships. More may be
expected from a squadron of ten sail, all of which shall be average
vessels, in this respect, than from the same number of vessels, of which
one half are fast and the remainder dull. One brigade can march as fast
as another, but it is not so with vessels. The efficiency of a marine,
therefore, depends rather on its working qualities, than on its number
of ships.

Perhaps the best fleet that ever sailed under the English flag, was that
with which Nelson fought the battle of the Nile. It consisted of twelve
or thirteen small seventy-fours, each of approved qualities, and
commanded by an officer of known merit. In all respects it was efficient
and reliable. With such men as Hallowell, Hood, Trowbridge, Foley, Ball,
and others, and with such ships, the great spirit of Nelson was
satisfied. He knew that whatever seamen could do, his comparatively
little force could achieve. When his enemy was discovered at anchor,
though night was approaching and his vessels were a good deal scattered,
he at once determined to put the qualities we have mentioned to the
highest proof, and to attack. This was done without any other order of
battle than that which directed each commander to get as close alongside
of an enemy as possible, the best proof of the high confidence he had in
his ships and in their commanders.

It is now known that all the early accounts of the manoeuvring at the
Nile, and of Nelson's reasoning on the subject of anchoring inside and
of doubling on his enemies, is pure fiction. The "Life" by Southey, in
all that relates to this feature of the day, is pure fiction, as,
indeed, are other portions of the work of scarcely less importance. This
fact came to the writer, through the late Commodore (Charles Valentine)
Morris, from Sir Alexander Ball, in the early part of the century. In
that day it would not have done to proclaim it, so tenacious is public
opinion of its errors; but since that time, naval officers of rank have
written on the subject, and stripped the Nile, Trafalgar, &c, of their
poetry, to give the world plain, nautical, and probable accounts of both
those great achievements. The truth, as relates to both battles, was
just as little like the previously published accounts, as well could be.

Nelson knew the great superiority of the English seamen, their facility
in repairing damages, and most of all the high advantage possessed by
the fleets of his country, in the exercise of the assumed right to
impress, a practice that put not only the best seamen of his own
country, but those of the whole world, more or less, at his mercy. His
great merit, at the Nile, was in the just appreciation of these
advantages, and in the extraordinary decision which led him to go into
action just at nightfall, rather than give his enemy time to prepare to
meet the shock.

It is now known that the French were taken, in a great measure, by
surprise. A large portion of their crews were on shore, and did not get
off to their ships at all, and there was scarce a vessel that did not
clear the decks, by tumbling the mess-chests, bags, &c, into the inside
batteries, rendering them, in a measure, useless, when the English
doubled on their line.

It was this doubling on the French line, by anchoring inside, and
putting two ships upon one, that gave Nelson so high a reputation as a
tactician. The merit of this manoeuvre belongs exclusively to one of
his captains. As the fleet went in, without any order, keeping as much
to windward as the shoals would permit, Nelson ordered the Vanguard
hove-to, to take a pilot out of a fisherman. This enabled Foley, Hood,
and one or two more to pass that fast ship. It was at this critical
moment that the thought occurred to Foley (we think this was the
officer) to pass the head of the French line, keep dead away, and anchor
inside. Others followed, completely placing their enemies between two
fires. Sir Samuel Hood anchored his ship (the Zealous) on the inner bow
of the most weatherly French ship, where he poured his fire into,
virtually; an unresisting enemy. Notwithstanding the great skill
manifested by the English in their mode of attack, this was the only
two-decked ship in the English fleet that was able to make sail on the
following morning.

Had Nelson led in upon an American fleet, as he did upon the French at
the Nile, he would have seen reason to repent the boldness of the
experiment. Something like it
was
attempted on Lake Champlain, though
on a greatly diminished scale, and the English were virtually defeated
before they anchored.

The reader who feels an interest in such subjects, will probably detect
the secret process of the mind, by which some of the foregoing facts
have insinuated themselves into this fiction.

"Then, if he were my brother's.
My brother might not claim him; nor your father,
Being none of his, refuse him: This concludes—
My mother's son did get your father's heir;
Your father's heir must have your father's land."

KING JOHN.

The events we are about to relate, occurred near the middle of the last
century, previously even to that struggle, which it is the fashion of
America to call "the old French War." The opening scene of our tale,
however, must be sought in the other hemisphere, and on the coast of the
mother country. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the American
colonies were models of loyalty; the very war, to which there has just
been allusion, causing the great expenditure that induced the ministry
to have recourse to the system of taxation, which terminated in the
revolution. The family quarrel had not yet commenced. Intensely occupied
with the conflict, which terminated not more gloriously for the British
arms, than advantageously for the British American possessions, the
inhabitants of the provinces were perhaps never better disposed to the
metropolitan state, than at the very period of which we are about to
write. All their early predilections seemed to be gaining strength,
instead of becoming weaker; and, as in nature, the calm is known to
succeed the tempest, the blind attachment of the colony to the parent
country, was but a precursor of the alienation and violent disunion that
were so soon to follow.

Although the superiority of the English seamen was well established, in
the conflicts that took place between the years 1740, and that of 1763,
the naval warfare of the period by no means possessed the very decided
character with which it became stamped, a quarter of a century later. In
our own times, the British marine appears to have improved in quality,
as its enemies, deteriorated. In the year 1812, however, "Greek met
Greek," when, of a verity, came "the tug of war." The great change that
came over the other navies of Europe, was merely a consequence of the
revolutions, which drove experienced men into exile, and which, by
rendering armies all-important even to the existence of the different
states, threw nautical enterprises into the shade, and gave an
engrossing direction to courage and talent, in another quarter. While
France was struggling, first for independence, and next for the mastery
of the continent, a marine was a secondary object; for Vienna, Berlin,
and Moscow, were as easily entered without, as with its aid. To these,
and other similar causes, must be referred the explanation of the
seeming invincibility of the English arms at sea, during the late great
conflicts of Europe; an invincibility that was more apparent than real,
however, as many well-established defeats were, even then, intermingled
with her thousand victories.

From the time when her numbers could furnish succour of this nature,
down to the day of separation, America had her full share in the
exploits of the English marine. The gentry of the colonies willingly
placed their sons in the royal navy, and many a bit of square bunting
has been flying at the royal mast-heads of King's ships, in the
nineteenth century, as the distinguishing symbols of flag-officers, who
had to look for their birth-places among ourselves. In the course of a
chequered life, in which we have been brought in collision with as great
a diversity of rank, professions, and characters, as often falls to the
lot of any one individual, we have been thrown into contact with no less
than eight English admirals, of American birth; while, it has never yet
been our good fortune to meet with a countryman, who has had this rank
bestowed on him by his own government. On one occasion, an Englishman,
who had filled the highest civil office connected with the marine of his
nation, observed to us, that the only man he then knew, in the British
navy, in whom he should feel an entire confidence in entrusting an
important command, was one of these translated admirals; and the thought
unavoidably passed through our mind, that this favourite commander had
done well in adhering to the conventional, instead of clinging to his
natural allegiance, inasmuch as he might have toiled for half a century,
in the service of his native land, and been rewarded with a rank that
would merely put him on a level with a colonel in the army! How much
longer this short-sighted policy, and grievous injustice, are to
continue, no man can say; but it is safe to believe, that it is to last
until some legislator of influence learns the simple truth, that the
fancied reluctance of popular constituencies to do right, oftener exists
in the apprehensions of their representatives, than in reality.—But to
our tale.