The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (100 page)

The Iran problem is an enduring constant in American foreign policy. Over the decades, every administration has had its moments with Iran. The country has been too strategically important to ignore. Various administrations have tried to woo it back into the Western fold, or talk of replacing the Islamic Republic with one more to Washington’s liking, but the results have been uniformly miserable. In the final analysis, Iran simply rejects any vision of
the Middle East as imposed by the will of the United States. A famous quote by Ayatollah Khomeini puts it succinctly: “We will resist America until our last breath.” Unfortunately, Washington has helped perpetuate the animosity. The United States has displayed a callous disregard for Iranian grievances and security concerns. Giving a medal to a ship’s captain who just inadvertently killed 290 civilians and then wondering why Iran might harbor resentment is just the most obvious example of American obtuseness. An ill-conceived intervention in the Lebanese Civil War against the Shia, while at the same time backing Iraq, threatened the new Iranian government. Tehran’s response, to level a building full of marines and to take American hostages, still colors American thinking, equally understandably. Washington invariably took the wrong course with Iran. When diplomatic openings appeared, hardliners refused to talk and advocated overthrowing the Islamic Republic. When Iran killed U.S. soldiers and marines in Lebanon and Iraq, successive administrations showed timidity when hard-liners called for retribution.

Glimmers of optimism invariably give way to the smell of cordite and talk of war. In 2012, the prospects for conflict peaked again. Seasoned, pragmatic Iran watchers called for tougher sanctions to punish Iranian intransigence regarding its nuclear program. But punishing Iran for its intransigence also hardens Iranian leaders and justifies in their minds the need for a nuclear program, both for increased self-sufficiency and as a deterrent against Western aggression. Within the U.S. administration, discussions in the White House Situation Room turned to the possibility of pressing for sanctions against Iran’s central bank. As this is the means by which Iran receives payment for its oil exports, this would be a radical act, tantamount to an embargo of Iranian oil. “Iran could see it as a de facto act of war,” said one senior Obama administration representative.

Unfortunately, now neither side has much desire to work to bridge their differences. Distrust permeates the relationship. Three decades of twilight war have hardened both sides. When someone within the fractured governing class in Tehran reached out to the American president, the United States was unwilling to accept anything but capitulation. When President Obama made a heartfelt opening, a smug Iranian leadership viewed it as a ruse or the gesture of a weak leader. Iran spurned him. Obama fell back on sanctions and CENTCOM; Iran fell back into its comfortable bed of terrorism and warmongering. Soon it may no longer be twilight; the light is dimming, and night may well be approaching at long last.

The burden of writing a book frequently falls on the writer’s family. My wife, Heys, and my young son, Matthew, patiently endured the many days I spent ensconced in my study or away conducting research. My parents provided both their personal insights as well as continuous encouragement as this book morphed with each seemingly never-ending rewrite.

At last count, I interviewed well over four hundred individuals in the United States and overseas. They invited me into their homes and made room in busy schedules to share with me their recollections. Many sat for hours answering my questions and tolerated numerous follow-up questions and interviews. My chief regret is that so many of their fascinating stories could not be included in the final text. Several individuals deserve particular notice. The late Caspar Weinberger and William Odom offered their unique insights, and the former defense secretary’s family graciously approved my request to review his papers. Richard Armitage always found time to answer my questions. Admiral James Lyons’s memory and personal papers started me along many new and important paths to unraveling this history. Retired admirals Tony Less, Harold Bernsen, and John Poindexter kindly tolerated my frequent requests for interviews. Peter Wikul’s and Marc Thomas’s interviews filled in the details of some of the key military engagements against Iran during the late 1980s. My father, George Crist, offered up his papers and notebooks. The Islamic Republicc facilitated interviews with officials. Others who helped fill in key holes: James Parran, Anthony Zinni, John Abizaid, Hooshang Amirahmadi, Nazhatoon Riahi, George Cave, Jack Devine, Joseph Strasser, Richard Williams, Tim Weiner, Mark Perry, P. X. Kelley, Robert Harward, and Kevin Cosgriff. There were a number of others
who provided invaluable assistance but need to remain anonymous. I am deeply grateful for their time and information.

The American public is fortunate to have the most accessible military archives in the world. The staffs at the Naval Historical Center, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Army Heritage and Education Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command were extremely helpful in obtaining and, in the case of the navy’s operational archives, declassifying many records. They allowed me to listen to hundreds of oral histories that provided recollections immediately after the events described. The staff at the old Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard opened their extensive collections and declassified many documents and interviews too. The staffs at both the National Archives and Library of Congress were ever gracious and helpful. I am also indebted to the scholars at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Cold War Studies and the National Security Archive for breaking loose so many documents from the U.S. government.

I am also grateful to The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, especially Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Patrick Clawson. They allowed me to use their facilities and opened their Rolodexes for six months while I wrote the Clinton and Bush chapters. Their collegiality and insights helped immeasurably in an accurate telling of this story.

I am indebted to several people who aided me in this book. Michael Gordon, a great reporter, encouraged the book and helped open doors. My agent, Andrew Wylie, saw the importance of the subject and applied his considerable talents to the project from the outset. Dr. John Shortal graciously allowed an extended absence from a demanding job to complete the book. My dissertation adviser, Peter Garretson, helped in the early stages of what would become this tome. Susan Carroll helped with copyediting. John Partin, the recently retired historian at Special Operations Command, aided this project immensely at various stages. His wealth of knowledge about the history of special operations forces is unsurpassed.

I could not have had a better team supporting me than the professionals at Penguin. My editor, Scott Moyers, offered sage advice that sharpens the manuscript and broadens its scope to encompass the birth of conflict between the United States and Iran. Emily Graff worked tirelessly to get maps and photos, all the while cheerfully incorporating many last-minute changes to the text. I am also indebted to production editor Noirin Lucas and copy editor
Nicholas LoVecchio, as well as my publicist, Liz Calamari, who developed a great strategy to market the book.

This book required several years to write. With each iteration and new lead the story and accuracy improved. The murky world of writing contemporary history is not always straightforward. I have tried to be as thorough and evenhanded as possible, putting aside my own biases in telling this important story. Any errors are mine alone and the conclusions in no way represent the views of the U.S. government.

Research for this book began nearly twenty years ago as part of a dissertation on the Reagan administration. As time passed, I continued my research, interviewing more current participants and reading more material as it became available and declassified. Anyone who has written contemporary history understands the challenges of finding primary source documents. Before 1989, paper records were catalogued and frequently preserved at various archives; since the U.S. government started producing memos and messages in electronic format, preservation has been haphazard at best. Many still reside on computers with the originating agency and have never made it into any organized archives. Many more have been deleted. I have a stack of CENTCOM documents declassified in 1993 that simply don’t exist anymore except in my files.

Many of the documents referenced were obtained through Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Review Requests. I submitted some of these requests and benefited from other researchers’ efforts. Both Donald Rumsfeld and Doug Feith declassified many documents related to the George W. Bush administration. Select documents and some oral histories held at the Naval Historical Center and the now defunct Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington Naval Yard were reviewed and declassified at my request.

Fortunately, many people still keep notebooks and their own personal collection of key records. In researching the book, I interviewed hundreds of participants, many of whom served at the most senior levels of the U.S. government. This included off-the-record conversations with government officials, intelligence officers, and special forces operatives. I met with Iranian exiles and Revolutionary Guard defectors, and even family members of one
Iranian executed for spying. A number made their papers and diaries available for me to examine. Unfortunately, constraints on the length of the manuscript prohibited many of their often fascinating stories from being included in the final manuscript. They, however, provided the author with a far greater depth of understanding of thirty years of history of the U.S. and Iranian conflict.

Others provided unhindered access to their personal papers. This included: Lieutenant General William Odom, Admiral James Lyons, General George Crist, the family of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Captain Peter Wikul. The senior aide to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, made available his own private diaries, in which he recorded daily meetings and significant conversations at the highest level of the U.S. government.

Iranian sources proved the most problematic, but I was able to interview a number of former and current Iranian diplomats and military officers, as well as read declassified intelligence documents. A number of former military and civilian intelligence officers shared their insight into Iranian actions. Iranian news media provided a wealth of information on both political and military issues. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service was invaluable in finding older Iranian new a sources.

There are several important archives that contain many linear feets’ worth of records related to the U.S.-Iranian conflict. The Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton presidential libraries contain many of the most important records, although many of the documents still remain classified. Several service archives hold records of the military activities against Iran. These include: The Air Force History Office in Washington, D.C.; the archives and oral histories collection at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama; the U.S. Marine Corps archives, personal papers, and oral histories at Quantico, Virginia; the vast collection of documents and oral histories at the Operational Archives, Ship’s Histories, and Aviation History Branches at the Naval History and Heritage Command Center, Washington, D.C.; and the oral histories and personal papers held at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The latter holds the collections of two CENTCOM commanders, generals Binford Peay and Robert Kingston. Both the U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command historians provided access to some of their records. Several historians in the Joint History Office, Joint Staff shared their
insights into U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The Library of Congress holds several important collections including those of Alexander Haig, Caspar Weinberger, and William Odom.

C
HAPTER 1
“A L
ITTLE
K
ING IN
Y
OUR
H
EART
”

1.
Department of State memorandum, “The Huyser Mission in Iran: January 4 to February 4, 1979,” February 1979.

2.
Robert Huyser,
Mission to Tehran
(New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 1.

3.
Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation, “The Energy Problem,” April 18, 1977,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: President Jimmy Carter, 1977
, volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 656–62.

4.
Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States
,
1946
, volume 8, pp. 359–65.

5.
There is considerable truth to the often cited quotation by American vice consul in Iran Robert Rossow, Jr.: “One may fairly say that the Cold War began on March 4, 1946.” The agreement signed in 1942 following the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran stipulated that all foreign troops would leave Iran within six months after the end of hostilities. By late 1945, the Soviets had made no effort to withdraw their troops, and they were backing two communist independence movements: in Iranian-controlled Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish areas of western Iran. This stance coincided with intimidating forward posturing of Soviet forces against Turkey, both along their common border and on the border to the north with Bulgaria.