The Super Summary of World History (71 page)

Figure 58 Japanese conquest of the Philippines 1942

MacArthur rejected this “defeatist” attitude and decided to defend the Philippines at the landing beaches and expel the invader. This was an unwise decision. The war planners in Washington knew the striking power Japan could bring against the isolated and distant islands and they knew the Japanese would have the initiative.
[263]
MacArthur decided on a defense requiring the American and Philippine forces to attack and repel the invader upon his landing. If the enemy took the beaches he would fight them all the way to Manila. Unfortunately, the Philippine forces were far from first line troops, and the American forces were few and without adequate equipment for such an adventure. In addition, MacArthur had no idea where the Japanese would land.

It gets worse. MacArthur
utterly
failed
to
prepare
a
defense
on
Bataan
.
Moreover,
no
food
or
medical
supplies
were
stored
on
the
peninsula
. MacArthur failed to follow orders, and he failed to develop a backup plan in case his new plan collapsed. American troops would pay the price in blood for MacArthur’s incompetence in this critical matter.

Figure 59 Japanese assaults on Bataan 1942

The Japanese landings took place in the northern areas of Luzon on December 10, 1942, and then quickly moved south toward Manila. Regretfully, for the Americans, the critical battle had already taken place. After warnings that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and pleas from his air commanders to allow them to strike Formosa where the Japanese air forces were concentrated, MacArthur did nothing
.
Soon thereafter,
MacArthur’s
entire
air
force
was
destroyed
on
the
ground
by Japanese air raids. Without air cover the navy was forced to leave stripping the islands of everything except infantry forces. Japan moved forward with complete air and naval superiority. There was no hope now.

Figure 60 Japanese Conquest 1942

In spite of the loss of his air force and his naval support, MacArthur insanely went forward with his plan to meet the invader north of Manila. Japan’s excellent veteran troops with air and sea support routed the combined Filipino and American forces. The Japanese then began maneuvering to surround Manila where the Japanese assumed the Americans would make their last stand. This assumption helped with the withdrawal to Bataan. As a complete military disaster stalked the defenders,
General
Wainwright
(MacArthur’s second in command) managed to reposition key units allowing the army to reach Bataan. However, MacArthur failed to prepare Bataan for a siege and the hastily retreating army took little food or medical supplies with them. Wounds, disease, and hunger proved to be an enemy every bit as strong and effective as the Japanese at eliminating the defenders.

Bataan’s American and Filipino troops threw back Japanese attacks, including amphibious assaults on the western beaches; however, they continued falling back. Starving and ragged men fought while suffering from malaria and constant gnawing hunger. Food rations diminished to one thousand calories per day. Japanese artillery pounded the men, enemy aircraft bombed and strafed their positions, and to all this Allied soldiers possessed no effective answer. MacArthur kept demanding help from Washington, but after the defeat at Pearl Harbor no help was possible. The US Navy was just holding on around Australia, and the destruction of MacArthur’s air force doomed ships trying to gain access to Bataan, except occasional submarines and PT boats. The defenders fought on until May 8, 1942 when Wainwright surrendered the last of his emaciated command on Corregidor. The Philippines had fallen.

MacArthur missed the surrender because he was in Australia demanding that Wainwright fight on. Escaping by PT boat on February 22, 1942, along with the president of the Philippines, he then went by aircraft to the comforts of Australia. After Wainwright surrendered MacArthur demanded he be court-martialed. President Franklin Roosevelt had appointed MacArthur as the US Army’s commander for the Pacific Theater of War. The starving dying men he left behind would never understand Roosevelt’s decision.
[264]

After the surrender of the Filipino and American forces the Japanese subjected the men to the vilest murder and torture. Japanese soldiers thought surrender was dishonorable, and quitting proved you were not a soldier. Few of the more than eighty thousand American and Filipino prisoners of war would return. Over
twelve
thousand
died
in
the
Bataan
Death
March
alone. Meanwhile, from Australia, MacArthur avowed to the press corps, “I shall return . . .”
[265]

While the conquest of Bataan and Singapore continued, Japan also pushed a rapid advance through the South Pacific. Sea control was critical, thus, a combined Allied force of American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) ships under Admiral Doorman (Dutch navy) attacked the Japanese at the
Battle
of
the
Java
Sea
on February 27, 1942. The small fleet was making a last gasp attempt to slow the Japanese juggernaut. Due to poor coordination among the Allied ships, and excellent tactical control by the Japanese commanders, a smaller Japanese force annihilated the ABDA force.
[266]
ABDA lost
5
cruisers,
5
destroyers,
and
2,300
sailors.
The disaster is right up there with Pearl Harbor. Japan lost four loaded transports. By May 1942, the Japanese fleet of eleven battleships, ten aircraft carriers, eighteen heavy cruisers, and twenty-eight light cruisers plus numerous destroyers had campaigned from Pearl Harbor to the Indian Ocean without the loss of a single major ship. Along the way they destroyed or damaged every battleship in the US Pacific fleet, damaged the US Far East squadron at the Philippians, annihilated the ABDA naval force, chased the Royal Navy from the southern seas, and forced the Australian navy back to its home waters. Total victory sailed with Japan. The only forces left in the Pacific that threatened them were the three US aircraft carriers that Japan missed at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Yamamoto, Japan’s chief of naval operations, was lobbying for an effort in the Central Pacific to lure the US carrier fleet out to its destruction in a decisive action. He knew the United States would out produce Japan in a long war so he thought it a necessity to destroy the US aircraft carriers now, before the US Fleet recovered from its defeats. The Japanese high command wanted to continue the push to the south and draw the US Fleet into an action there. Yamamoto argued the US Navy must believe a vital asset was in jeopardy before they would choose to do battle with the more powerful Japanese Combined Fleet. He believed actions in the south would not draw the US Navy into battle. By attacking and seizing Midway Island he threatened Pearl Harbor by putting it in bomber range. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo (April 18, 1942) decided the matter.
[267]
If a US carrier task force could threaten the emperor
[268]
that threat must be eliminated; thus, the high command agreed to Yamamoto’s plan but with substantial changes.

Admiral Yamamoto’s plan was overly complex. It divided his forces in the face of the enemy, and it assumed the Americans would not fight unless forced to by dire circumstances.
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Most military types will tell anyone who will listen that if you have the larger force use it all at one point of assault and gain absolute superiority over the foe. The Japanese plan put four carriers away from the main action at Midway. Two large carriers sailing with an invasion fleet to Port Moresby planned to return in time for the Midway action, but why take them so far away, and put them at risk, so near the date of the big show? These carriers failed to join the action at Midway, and this reduction of striking power haunted the Japanese fleet at the battle.

Yamamoto’s plans began to go wrong quickly. At the
Battle
of
the
Coral
Sea
on May 4 through 8, 1942
,
only pilots from the aircraft carriers saw the other fleet
.
For the first time in history two fleets fought it out never coming in sight of one another. When it was over, the US Navy lost the heavy fleet carrier
Lexington
and the Japanese lost a light carrier (
Soho
). In addition, the US Fleet carrier
Yorktown
suffered extensive damage. The loss of the Lexington was a hefty blow to the US Navy. On the surface, it seemed the Japanese won another victory; however, two Japanese fleet carriers
Shôkaku
and
Zuikaku
lost a large number of aircraft and pilots, plus they suffered battle damage and returned to Japan for repair and replenishment of pilots and aircraft. Thus, two fleet carriers were lost to the Midway operation and the Japanese invasion fleet turned back, thereby failing to invade Port Moresby. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first strategic defeat for the Japanese navy.

The Japanese may have wondered why two US aircraft carriers happened to be hanging around the Coral Sea at that particular moment in time. It was not bad luck. The code breakers at Pearl Harbor’s station Hypo deciphered parts of a key Japanese code and through brilliant analysis unscrambled Yamamoto’s plan. Admiral Nimitz, now in charge of the US Pacific Fleet, had trusted his code breaking genius,
Commander
Rochqfort
, and sent his carriers to intercept the Port Moresby invasion fleet. He would trust this same man and his team’s analysis again when they declared that Japan’s next objective was the tiny island of Midway. Nimitz sent ALL three of his available carriers to fight the Japanese fleet at Midway. By holding zero back Nimitz took a huge risk with his last and best naval units. Literally everything would ride on their performance and luck.

The Battle of Midway

June
4
to
June
6,
1942