The Strong Man: John Mitchell and the Secrets of Watergate (85 page)

9. Grover, “Cabinet Enigma” memo on Meeting with Attorney General John N. Mitchell, February 18, 1969, Box D61, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Papers, Library of Congress; reprinted in Dean J. Kotlowski,
Nixon’s Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy
(Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 28.

10. Graham,
The Civil Rights Era
, pp. 302–3; Jack Bass and Walter DeVries,
The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945
(Meridian, 1977), p. 29 (fool’s gold); THD, 53 (emphasis in original); HN, April 15, 1969; Safire,
Before the Fall
, p. 237 (hundred years, intermarriage); Daniel P. Moynihan,
The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan
(Vintage, 1973), p. 156; WH memo for [the] Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from Alexander P. Butterfield, Subject: Note from the President, March 26, 1969; WHSF—SMOF, JDE Subject File, Desegregation, Box 30, NARA (forthright; emphasis in original); Ehrlichman interview (embarrassed); Leonard interview, October 14, 1999. In undermining Finch’s standing with Nixon, the attorney general had inside help: At his suggestion, Robert Mardian, a Goldwater campaign veteran who worked the South and West for Nixon in ’68 and owed his allegiances to Mitchell and Kleindienst, was named HEW’s general counsel. “I didn’t have a very comfortable time at HEW,” Mardian later recalled, “because [Finch’s aides] all referred to me, almost to my face, as Mitchell’s spy” see Robert Mardian, interview with author, August 2, 1993; Evans and Novak,
Nixon in the White House
, pp. 144; and Ehrlichman,
Witness to Power
, pp. 199–200.

11. Viorst “‘The Justice Department’” (hard-pressed); HN, February 17, 1969 (hit, too); Panetta and Gall,
Bring Us Together.

12. Kotlowski,
Nixon’s Civil Rights
, pp. 29–30.

13. HN, June 30, 1969 (emphasis in original); Kotlowski,
Nixon’s Civil Rights
, p. 30 (record number).
Time
praised Mitchell for bringing “several important court suits that could hasten integration” see “Nixon’s Heavyweight,”
Time
, July 25, 1969.

14.
Oregon v. Mitchell
, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Michael Barone, “Nixon’s America,”
U.S. News & World Report
, September 20, 1999; Warren Weaver Jr., “Mitchell Urges a Wide Revision on Voting Rights,”
New York Times
, June 27, 1969; Warren Weaver Jr., “Nixon Rights Bill Appears Doomed by a G.O.P. Attack,”
New York Times
, July 2, 1969; “Excerpts From Statements by Mitchell and McCullough on the Voting Rights Bill,”
New York Times
, July 2, 1969;
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXV, 1969
(Congressional Quarterly, 1970), pp. 411, 421–27;
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXVI, 1970
(Congressional Quarterly, 1971), pp. 192–93; Graham,
The Civil Rights Era
, pp. 346–65; Kotlowski,
Nixon’s Civil Rights
, pp. 76–93.

15. “Sit-In at Mitchell’s Office,”
Washington Evening Star
, July 1, 1969; Associated Press, “Mitchell’s Office Site of Sit-In,”
New York Post
, July 1, 1969; “Nixon’s Heavyweight,”
Time
; Harris,
Justice
, pp. 193–94.

16. Reichley, “Elm Street’s New White House Power” Harris,
Justice
, p. 194.

17. “The President’s Men,” PBS; CI, August 13, 1986.

18. WH memo from Daniel P. Moynihan for John D. Ehrlichman, [no subject], November 25, 1969, WHSF—SMOF, JDE Subject file, Box 21, NARA (lawyer-like); Moynihan,
The Politics of a Guaranteed Income
, pp. 157–58.

19. Evans and Novak,
Nixon in the White House
, pp. 152–55 (public unrest); Panetta and Gall,
Bring Us Together
, pp. 253–62; Bass and DeVries,
The Transformation of Southern Politics
, pp. 29–30 (opposite); Warren Weaver Jr., “Nixon Missile Plan Wins in Senate By a 51–50 Vote,”
New York Times
, August 7, 1969.

20. The President’s News Conference of September 26, 1969.

21. Osborne,
The Second Year
, p. 22 (respect); Panetta and Gall,
Bring Us Together
, p. 302.

22. EN, February 7, 1970; HN, February 19, 20, and 27, 1970.

23. HN, February 27, 1970 (bullet, so be it); WH memo for the president from Bryce Harlow, Subject: Charlotte School Situation, February 11, 1970; POF, HW File, Box 5, NARA.

24. Evans and Novak,
Nixon in the White House
, p. 173; Statement About Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools, March 24, 1970.

25. Robert Mardian, interview with author, September 14, 1993.

26. George Shultz, interview with author, April 29, 1996. In an uncharacteristic fit of peevishness, Shultz threatened to follow Agnew. “Shultz says if Mardian stays, he’ll resign,” Haldeman recorded; see HN, March 31, 1970. Both men stayed on.

27. George P. Shultz,
Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State
(Scribner’s, 1993), p. 1046; and George P. Shultz, “How a Republican Desegregated the South’s Schools,”
New York Times
, January 8, 2003. As President Reagan’s secretary of state, Shultz related the Mitchell story to Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, to illustrate how the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue could shift from “whether” to “how.”

28. Leonard interview, March 17, 1992; Kotlowski,
Nixon’s Civil Rights
, p. 37. Even George McGovern acknowledged in 1994: “Nixon was actually pretty good on civil rights questions” see Strober and Strober,
Nixon
, p. 114.

29. Robert R. Detlefsen,
Civil Rights Under Reagan
(ICS Press, 1991), p. 26.

30.
CBS Morning News
, July 23, 1973 (Vernon Jordan); Graham,
The Civil Right Era
, p. 320.

31. Kotlowski,
Nixon’s Civil Rights
, p. 64.

32. Kleindienst interview. Nixon was also instrumental in the South’s economic development. President Clinton’s secretary of labor acknowledged that thanks to Nixon’s revenue-sharing programs, the South’s “population and share of the gross national product exploded” see Robert B. Reich, “Without a Cause,”
New York Times Book Review
, March 7, 1999.

ROBBING THE PRESIDENT’S DESK

1. SSCEX, W. Donald Stewart, February 19, 1974.

2. Landau interview, December 16, 1993 (emphasis in original).

3. Author’s transcript, NT, Nixon-Kissinger, Conversation No. 17–132, White House Telephone, January 1, 1972, 2:43 p.m.–3:56 p.m., NARA (press conferences); Thompson,
The Nixon Presidency
, pp. 142, 204–5 (entirely trust, there goes Henry); Kissinger interview.

4. THD, 335–36 (gold standard); TPOP, 165 (MIRV). To author Len Colodny, Mitchell boasted of how Nixon persuaded the Soviets, in exchange for a corresponding American pledge, to abandon construction of a weapon system that Nixon, blocked by Congress, “couldn’t have built anyway” see CI, December 5, 1987. Mitchell also discussed with Colodny the attorney general’s role in the Four Power Talks on Berlin, including the use of his own Watergate apartment, in February 1971, for secret strategy sessions. “I think that there was a ‘two-track’ [back-channel policy] going on over in Germany, too,” said Mitchell. He described Egon Bahr, an aide to West German chancellor Willy Brandt and a key interlocutor in the negotiations, as “a slippery character” who forced Nixon and Mitchell to “devise the program of getting Willy Brandt to act without Bahr closing it off” see CI, July 10, 1986. Ken Rush, the U.S. ambassador to West Germany, also remembered the strategy sessions at the Watergate; see Thompson,
The Nixon Presidency
, pp. 338–39.

5. TPOP, 209–10. Richard Ober, the CIA official in charge of Project Chaos, rebutted internal complaints about its legality by noting that “members of the administration, including Dr. Kissinger and Attorney General Mitchell, have been briefed on this program.”

6. Notes of interview with John Mitchell (May 8, 1985), 2:00 to 4:00 p.m. [by Robert Gettlin]. Mitchell told Gettlin the files showed President Kennedy had “smoked pot in the White House.”

7. CI, August 17, 1986.

8. DOJ memorandum of meeting [by]J. N. Mitchell, Subject: Cambodia/ South Vietnam, April 28, 1970, reprinted in its entirety in Henry Kissinger,
White House Years
(Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 1484–85. In his memorandum, Mitchell noted Kissinger “was leaning against…the use of U.S. forces in Cambodia.”

9. Richard Helms handwritten notes, “Meeting with the President on Chile at 1525,” September 15, 1970; reprinted in Peter Kornbluh,
The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability
(New Press, 2003), p. 35.

10. Gettlin interview (devious); CI, March 8, 1985 (didn’t like), April 19, 1988 (knock off).

11. Walter Isaacson,
Kissinger: A Biography
(Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 209–10.

12. Haldeman interview.

13. Alexander Haig, interview with author, July 27, 2000 (Harvard faculty); CI, January 24, 1986 (Machia-fucking-vellian, psychopath).

14. Isaacson,
Kissinger
, pp. 212–13, 789n2.

15. FBI memo for Mr. Tolson, Mr. DeLoach, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Bishop from John Edgar Hoover, [no subject], May 9, 1969, 5:05 PM, reprinted at HJC, VII: 143–45; TPOP, 91.

16. FBI Summary of Interview of John G. [
sic
] Mitchell [conducted May 11, 1973], [filed] May 12, 1973, reprinted at HJC, VII: 163–65.

17. Assistant FBI director William Sullivan told the
Los Angeles Times
he sent the wiretap records to the White House because he suspected the aging Hoover would use them to coerce Nixon and Mitchell into retaining him as FBI director. Sullivan called Hoover “a master blackmailer” who aimed “to keep Mitchell and others in line” see Edward W. Knappman, ed.,
Watergate and the White House
, Volume 1:
June 1972–July 1973
(Facts on File, 1973), p. 50. Robert Mardian, to whom Sullivan transferred the files, said Sullivan warned him the Kissinger taps “would destroy the presidency” Mardian interview. Mitchell thought Sullivan “a little nuts” and accused him of “name dropping and wheeling and dealing” in a bid to replace Hoover; see FBI Summary of Interview with John G. [
sic
] Mitchell. At the same time, Mitchell shared Sullivan’s concerns about Hoover’s custodianship of the records: “Hoover is tearing the [FBI] apart trying to get at them,” he told Nixon in October 1971. “Hoover won’t come and talk to me about it. He’s just got his Gestapo all over the place.” Nixon agreed the records belonged “in a special safe” see Anthony Summers,
Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover
(G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1993), pp. 400–401. Later, Nixon disingenuously told Hoover’s successor, Clarence M. Kelley, in June 1973: “That an officer of the Bureau would suggest that Edgar Hoover would blackmail the attorney general or the president of the United States—I just couldn’t believe it. And I don’t believe it today” see author’s transcript, NT, Nixon-Kelley, Conversation no. 933-5, Oval Office, 10:05 a.m. to 10:35 a.m.

18. Ruckelshaus’s announcement is reprinted at HJC, VII: 285–86.

19. Letter to William D. Ruckelshaus from John N. Mitchell, May 17, 1973, reprinted at HJC, VII: 166–67.

20. FBI memo for the attorney general from John Edgar Hoover, Re: Colonel Alexander M. Haig/Technical Surveillance Request, May 20, 1969, reprinted at HJC, VII: 194–95 (installed); FBI memo for the attorney general from John Edgar Hoover, Re: Mr. [redacted]/Technical Surveillance Request, July 23, 1969, reprinted at HJC, VII: 273 (higher authority).

21. FBI memo to Mr. Tolson from C. D. DeLoach, Subject: [redacted]/Request for Electronic Surveillance/By Attorney General and President, September 10, 1969, reprinted at HJC, VII: 243; FBI memo for the attorney general from John Edgar Hoover, Re: [redacted], September 10, 1969, reprinted at HJC, VII: 244.

22. FBI Letter from William D. Ruckelshaus to John N. Mitchell, May 24, 1973, reprinted at HJC, VII: 169–70. Ruckelshaus asked FBI handwriting analysts to authenticate Mitchell’s signatures, and they did; see FBI memo to Mr. Conrad from C. F. Downing, Subject: Sensitive Coverage Placed At/The Request of the White House, May 18, 1973, reprinted at HJC, VII: 168.

23. SSC, IV: 1626–27.

24. WSPF memo from Frank Martin to the file, Re: Interview of John Mitchell [conducted December 14, 1973], [filed] January 4, 1974; RG 460 WSPF
U.S. v. Mitchell
(Jencks)—Mitchell. Asked during his testimony before the House impeachment committee why “regular order” was not followed in the re-authorization of the wiretaps, Mitchell could only demur: “I can’t answer that question after this period of time. I have no recollection as to the discussions involved other than the basic authorization with respect to the concern that [Nixon] had over national security. I was not privy or knowledgeable of all of the discussions that the people in the White House may have had with the director of the FBI” see HJCW, II: 199. Mitchell found it hardest to explain the tap that most reflected his involvement: the physical surveillance placed on his youthful nemesis, John Sears.

25. “Questions About Gray,”
Time
, March 5, 1973.

26. HJC summary of John Mitchell interview [conducted] July 7, 1974, [drafted] July 8, 1974; RG 460 WSPF
U.S. v. Mitchell
(Jencks)—Mitchell, NARA.

27. Ovid Demaris,
The Director: An Oral Biography of J. Edgar Hoover
(Harper’s, 1975), p. 277. Kleindienst later expressed bitterness that Mitchell had misled him about the wiretaps. “This was the only aspect of my relationship with John Mitchell that I found [him] less than forthright, candid, and direct,” Kleindienst said. “He always maintained to me that…he had nothing to do with it; and it turned out, in later years, that he did” see Strober and Strober, p. 96.

28. CI, April 13, 1987 (emphasis added).

29. Letter to Ruckelshaus from Mitchell; DOJ letter to Hon. J. W. Fulbright from Elliot L. Richardson, September 12, 1973, reprinted at HJV, IV [
White House Surveillance Activities
], 200–201;
CBS Evening News
, May 16, 1973 (massive leaks); Isaacson,
Kissinger
, p. 223; Frank Jackman, “Nixon’s Liability in Tapping Upheld by the Top Court,”
New York Daily News
, June 23, 1981; Morton Halperin, interview with author, March 24, 1994. Halperin and Hedrick Smith, one of the wiretapped newsmen, filed civil suits against Mitchell and Kissinger—and in Halperin’s case, ex-President Nixon—charging invasion of privacy.
Halperin v. Kissinger
, for which both Mitchell and Nixon gave depositions, dragged on for almost a decade. In 1981, the Supreme Court deadlocked over whether to uphold a lower court’s assessment of damages against Mitchell and Nixon; Chief Justice Rehnquist recused himself from the case. Ultimately Mitchell was dropped as a defendant and the case settled—with no damages paid—when Kissinger sent Halperin a public apology. Anthony Lake, another wiretapped aide, asked Kissinger for a written statement affirming that Lake never violated any security clearances and acknowledging that the wiretapping program was wrong. When Kissinger refused, Lake sued his former boss; the case ended in January 1989, when Kissinger sent Lake a “Dear Tony” letter. Characteristically, Kissinger laid blame elsewhere—specifically on Mitchell, who had died two months earlier. “It was Attorney General Mitchell’s view that such techniques were within the president’s powers,” Kissinger wrote.