The Spanish Civil War (94 page)

Negrín’s policy in February 1939 has been the subject of controversy. He wished to fight on. But in private, he made sure that he and his friends had safe routes for escape. Did he, while presenting a front
of resistance to the end, secretly welcome Casado’s conspiracies? Was he outmanoeuvred, or did he allow himself to be outmanoeuvred? Did he know of Casado’s (and Matallana’s) secret dealings with Franco, and if he did, why did he not arrest them? In retrospect, the communists, on whom he relied more and more, considered his conduct a ‘contradiction and incomprehensible’; while he reaffirmed his decision to resist, he did nothing to organize resistance.
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Negrín seems in truth to have been undecided. He desired peace but knew, better than Casado, that Franco’s terms would be harsh. Until the collapse in Catalonia, he had had an army behind him. Now, in the centre of Spain, he found himself with an untried army, headed by officers whose loyalty was questionable. Yet he knew too that the communist commanders, even if effective, had their first loyalty to the party. Negrín’s only strategy was to await the holocaust of a world war. His tactics could only be (and there he did see eye-to-eye with the communists) to be the last to abandon the fight.

On 16 February, Negrín held a meeting of republican military leaders in a hanger at Los Llanos aerodrome, just south of Albacete.
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There were present several veteran commanders of the republican army—men who, as captains or majors, had rallied to the republic in July 1936 and who now held, some of them, if precariously, the
bâtons
of general officers. To them Negrín spoke for two hours. He described the failure of his peace negotiations of the last month. He also described how, since May of the previous year, he had been seeking peace on honourable terms, through intermediaries. He said that now there was no other course but resistance. Next to speak was General Matallana, who argued that it was madness to continue to fight. He appealed to the humanity of the Prime Minister to bring an end to the war. Generals Menéndez, Escobar and Moriones, commanders of the Armies of the Levante, Estremadura and Andalusia respectively, agreed with Matallana. All of them regular officers before 1936, they represented in their own lives, in an acute form, the tragedy of the war: they were loyal to the government, hostile to revolution. Admiral Buiza, commander of the navy (he had been reappointed to that post to succeed González Ubieta), reported that a commission representing the crews of the re
publican fleet had decided that the war was lost, and that the nationalist air attacks would soon force the fleet to leave Spanish waters, unless peace negotiations were begun. Negrín told Buiza that the leaders of that commission should have been shot for mutiny. Buiza said that, while, in principle, he agreed with Negrín, he had not so acted, because he personally agreed with the commission’s views. Next, Colonel Camacho spoke on behalf of the air force. He said that he had left only three squadrons of Natasha bombers, two of Katiuskas and twenty-five Chatos or Moscas. He also proposed peace. But he did say that the air force had enough petrol for a year’s more war. General Bernal, military governor of the naval base at Cartagena, spoke likewise. Miaja, the ‘hero of Madrid’, complained that he had not been permitted to speak. Negrín now gave him the floor, saying that he had wanted him, as commander-in-chief, to speak last. Surprisingly, Miaja demanded resistance at all costs. Thereupon, Negrín summed up, without making firm suggestions as to the action to be followed; but he let it be understood that, since negotiations had failed, the war would have to continue.
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There were some who afterwards wondered whether Negrín’s action in summoning officers known to be pessimistic did not indicate that the Prime Minister was already himself pessimistic. Why too did he fix the government at the small undistinguished manufacturing town of Elda, twenty miles inland from Alicante, so far from Madrid, if he wanted to go on fighting? It was suspiciously near to the coast in case escape should be necessary. The communist high command, now almost openly under the chairmanship of Togliatti, had, on the other hand, set up their headquarters nearby, in the beautiful palm forest at Elche, and the same question might have been asked of them too.
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It seems likely that, while Casado, Matallana and the other officers in Madrid were conspiring with anarchists and the politicians in Madrid, Negrín had reached the conclusion that a temporary dictatorship under himself with communist support was necessary to ensure the continuance of the war. Casado, Matallana, Escobar and other officers who were not in agreement with the prime minister would be promoted to positions of no importance.

The situation in Madrid was indeed now bleak, as Casado had said. Negrín perhaps did not quite realize how bad it was. The Quaker Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees reported that the food supply was such that even if the existing level were maintained, it could not support life for more than two or three months more. There was no heating, hot water, medicine nor surgical dressings. These conditions defeated such international help as was being mobilized. ‘Food for Spain’ funds were being gathered in England. Gifts were made by several governments. The governments of Canada, Norway and Denmark bought surplus food and gave it to Spain. Belgium gave about £10,000 worth of food, Sweden £75,000 (in addition to an earlier £50,000). The French government agreed to send 45,000 tons of flour to the republic, though not as a gift. The United States sent 600,000 barrels of flour through the Red Cross. But this cargo was shunted about the Mediterranean from one port to another before being finally delivered. The shipowners also attempted to make the bill for transport of the flour as large as possible, justifying themselves by saying that, each time a port was named for delivery, it fell to the nationalists. Thus the hungry children of the republic waited three months after the arrival of the US flour at Le Havre. The Quaker commission, meantime, continued to give aid to territory conquered by the nationalists, though they insisted on strict conditions for it.
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The nearer the republic drew to its end, however, the greater international interest there was in its fate—especially in the United States. Madrid was a strange, silent city whose inhabitants knew that, if the war were to continue, their hour of trial had come round again. Newspapers continued a bland optimism which no one felt, as did the radio services, which continued under Negrín’s direction.

Under cover of secrecy, Casado was continuing his negotiations with Burgos. His plan was to arrest and hand over to Franco many communist and other leaders, and he even apologized that he would not be able to prevent the flight of some.
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Colonel Ungría at Burgos received a full description of Negrín’s meeting at Los Llanos. Two colonels on Casado’s staff, Garijo and Muedra, the first a Fifth Columnist, also contemplated handing over the army in the central zone, without more ado.

On 13 February Franco, meantime, concentrated the mind of those inclined to work for surrender by promulgating a decree applying to all guilty of ‘subversive activities’ from October 1934 until July 1936, as well as to those who since had ‘opposed the nationalist government in fact or by vexatious passivity’. This gave a broad licence for vengeance. The issue of reprisals was the most important one for the republic. If guarantees against them had been given, the republic would have made peace a year before. Azcárate was still pressing the British government to put Negrín’s last three points as an armistice to Franco. Otherwise, the republicans were saying, Franco would be responsible for a continuation of the bloodbath. On 17 February, Azcárate and Álvarez del Vayo, still in Paris, telegraphed to Negrín to suggest that freedom from reprisals should be made the only condition of peace, and to allow them to put this to Lord Halifax for transmission to Franco. Halifax had proposed this simple condition to Azcárate. Due to telegraphic delays (attributed subsequently by Azcárate and Álvarez del Vayo to the wilful interference of Casado), Negrín’s affirmative reply did not reach Paris until 25 February. Halifax, meantime, on 22 February, had given up waiting for the agreement to his proposal. He set in motion an unconditional recognition of the nationalist government.
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Chamberlain had three days earlier confided to his diary: ‘I think we ought to be able to establish excellent relations with Franco, who seems “well disposed to us”’.
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Long before that, on 18 February, Franco had ended all ideas of a conditional peace, whether put by Britain, or France or by any republican. ‘The nationalists have won,’ he declared, ‘the republicans must, therefore, surrender without conditions.’ Franco had stated in November 1938 that there could be no question of an amnesty: ‘Those who are amnestied are demoralized’. He believed in ‘redemption through the penalty of labour’. Those who were not executed would have to ‘re-educate’ themselves by work in labour camps.

On 20 February, Casado was visited at the Alameda de Osuna by an agent of Franco’s intelligence, Colonel José Centaño de la Paz, who
had been, throughout the war, chief of a precision instrument factory belonging to the republican army at Aranjuez, but also, since 1938, head of a spy ring, known as ‘Lucero Verde’. He and Manuel Guitián, also an agent of Burgos, called on Casado and were received with enthusiasm; Casado made exaggerated promises as to what he could do, saying he could hand over the Army of the Centre by 25 February. He promised to go to Negrín and demand his resignation. Centaño then produced a written guarantee for the lives of career officers in the republican army who had committed no crime and who laid down their arms. ‘Magnificent, magnificent!’ said Casado. Centaño had reported to Burgos favourably of Casado before and had spoken of him as an anti-communist second to none.
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During another discussion, on 22 February, Casado left Centaño the impression that he could realize his plan of surrender ‘with complete success and with all security’: these words being written in capitals in the report. Casado, meantime, begged the nationalist high command to delay any offensive.
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Franco dispatched on the 22nd a telegram to Neville Chamberlain assuring him that his own patriotism, his honour as a gentleman, and his known generosity were the finest guarantees for a just peace. He later announced that the tribunals to be set up after the republican surrender would deal only with criminals—‘reprisals being alien to the nationalist movement’.
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This bland remark, along with the telegram to Chamberlain, was considered by Britain to be the only condition obtainable for her recognition of the nationalist government.

In the meantime, Casado banned the publication of the communist paper
Mundo Obrero
on 23 February, because of a manifesto due to appear in it which attacked Largo Caballero for leaving Spain, and which urged continued resistance. Uribe, the communist minister of agriculture, in Madrid, protested. Casado still refused to permit publication. The following day, the manifesto was circulated by hand. Casado recalled it so far as was possible. Negrín returned to Madrid on 24 February, and Casado tried to persuade him that the right course was capitulation. He was unsuccessful, as he must surely have realized
would be the case. He had clearly promised to Franco more than he could give. Franco himself disliked the idea of ‘treating’ with any new council of defence which might include a politician such as Besteiro. He was anyway receiving reports from such officers as General Jurado, now in France, and even General Matallana, still in overall command of the Armies of the Centre, as to where the resistance would be least if an attack were to be launched.
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On 26 February, Senator Bérard completed his diplomatic mission in Burgos. All the nationalist demands were accepted. France and nationalist Spain would live together as good neighbours, cooperate in Morocco, and prevent all activities directed against the security of each other. The French government undertook to return all Spanish property taken to France against the wishes of its true owners. This would include £8 million in gold kept in Mont de Marsan as security for a loan made in 1931. The Bank of France had refused to return this gold, although the loan had been repaid. All other republican possessions in France, all battle, merchant and fishing vessels, works of art, vehicles and documents, were also to be sent to Spain. In return, the nationalists agreed to receive a French ambassador at Burgos.

Thus the official recognition by France and Britain could occur on 27 February. Chamberlain read out Franco’s telegram on 22 February to the House of Commons. Both the Liberal and Labour parties opposed recognition and forced a debate. Attlee condemned Chamberlain’s devious way of agreeing the act of recognition with Daladier before telling the House of Commons.

We see in this action [he concluded] a gross betrayal of democracy, the consummation of two and a half years of the hypocritical pretence of non-intervention and a connivance all the time at aggression. And this is only one step further in the downward march of His Majesty’s government in which at every stage they do not sell, but give away, the permanent interest of this country. They do not do anything to build up peace or stop war, but merely announce to the whole world that anyone who is out to use force can always be sure that he will have a friend in the British Prime Minister.

Chamberlain answered this by saying that General Franco had given pledges of mercy and that, short of war, Britain could never enforce any conditions on him. There followed, as often in the course of the Spanish war, a heated exchange between Sir Henry Page Croft, a conservative supporter of General Franco (it was he who, a year before, had described Franco publicly as ‘a gallant christian gentleman’),
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and Ellen Wilkinson, a fervent friend of the republic. Eden supported the government from the back benches, saying that to delay recognition might prolong the war. Yet other conservative back-benchers, such as Vyvyan Adams, deplored unconditional recognition. The communist Gallacher suggested that the Prime Minister should be impeached.
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