The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (89 page)

There was no reply from Razak. Many years later I read in the Tunku’s official biography by Mubin Sheppard that Razak had reported to him in London that he could not get through to me and persuade me to stop politicking. That, the Tunku said, had confirmed him in his determination to get Singapore out of Malaysia.

42. The Tunku Wants Us Out

The Tunku was struck by an attack of shingles while he was in London in mid-June 1965. Lim Kim San, whom he had taken along as a member of his delegation to the Prime Ministers’ Conference, visited him in hospital and wrote to me on 23 June:

“The old boy is confined in bed with shingles and is in low spirits. He is surrounded with people all the time but I managed to have a word with him. He still thinks of having a rearrangement but does not know what form it should take but at the same time he thinks there is no urgency at all and it could be undertaken after Confrontation.

“He has not discussed this with anybody here and I quite believe him, for when I met Arthur Bottomley (secretary of state, Commonwealth Relations) at the Commonwealth Conference, he told me that his report from Malaya indicated that things are OK and that the Malays, with exception of a few of the Ultras whom he considered to be well under control by Tunku and/or Razak, are now less sensitive and that the situation is less explosive. He was told that even the extremists are holding their horses and that with Tunku away none of them will start anything for fear of being accused of taking advantage of Tunku’s absence and illness. I told him (Bottomley) that trouble started every time he was away. But he said not to worry … He was friendly and pleased to see me and we broke off the discussion just before the meeting was called to order. …”

After he returned from London in early July, Kim San met me to describe the Tunku’s condition and mood. The Tunku had said, “You can tell your prime minister he can attend the next Prime Ministers’
Conference on his own.” I asked him what the Tunku meant by that. Would there be a rearrangement? Would Singapore become a special state in a confederation? Kim San could not quite fathom what the Tunku had in mind. Years later, recording my oral history in 1981, I sent him a copy of his 23 June 1965 letter. He commented, “On reflection, as I have told you several times, Tunku indicated indirectly that he would give Singapore independence. I was too obtuse then to catch the significance of some of his remarks.” Kim San had concentrated on the possibility of a rearrangement and missed the bigger implications of the Tunku’s cryptic statements. In London he had met the Tunku only once, which meant that as early as 23 June 1965 the Tunku was thinking in terms of a total separation.

In the meantime, Keng Swee had been away in Germany for more than a month for medical treatment. In mid-July he saw me to say he had just met Razak at his residence and unexpectedly found Ismail and Ja’afar Albar there as well. He said Razak wanted to discuss a rearrangement that would allow both sides to disengage from what would be a disastrous collision.

I discussed with Keng Swee all the possible alternatives and decided that anything was worth trying if we could avoid a racial collision. Keng Swee saw Razak and Ismail again in Kuala Lumpur on 20 July. He told them that only I, Lim Kim San and Eddie Barker knew of his discussions with Razak. Chin Chye and Raja were too deeply involved in the Malaysian Solidarity Convention to consider any rearrangement. He assured Razak that I should be able to carry the PAP if the business was properly handled, but that any premature leak would jeopardise it.

Keng Swee then asked me for a written authorisation to continue the discussions and conclude the rearrangements that he could reach, including, he said, a “hiving-off” from the federation. I feared trouble if the talks leaked prematurely, first, with the British, who had opposed any rearrangement, and next, with Raja, Chin Chye and Pang Boon, who
would be against any disengagement from the political contest in peninsular Malaysia where they came from and their families were. But the stakes were high and a collision would be bloody. I wrote a note authorising Keng Swee to discuss with Razak, Ismail and such other federal ministers of comparable authority concerned in these matters in the central government any proposal for any constitutional rearrangements of Malaysia.

Keng Swee came back to report that Razak wanted a total hiving-off. Razak had made two points: first, he wanted Keng Swee to confirm I was in favour. Keng Swee said, “Yes, provided it is done quickly before Lee’s commitment and involvement in the Solidarity Convention makes it impossible for him to get out.” Ismail accepted this point. Razak appeared both relieved and incredulous because, according to Keng Swee, he half-expected me to reject the idea. Keng Swee said I was realistic enough to see that a collision was imminent and that the consequences were incalculable.

The second point Razak made was that the hiving-off must be a concerted move. In other words, the PAP must support it. He proposed that the Federation and Singapore jointly tell the British of their intentions. He felt they would agree if we stood firm together. Keng Swee pointed out that this course of action must fail. The British would adamantly oppose a separation. He reminded them of how thoroughly Antony Head and his team had thwarted the less radical rearrangement we had agreed with the Tunku in February. Keng Swee urged that the separation be presented to the British as a
fait accompli
when parliament reassembled on 9 August. The necessary constitutional amendments must first be made granting Singapore independence, with all three readings taking place on that day. Ismail readily agreed to this. Razak was greatly amused and said that perhaps PAP tactics were the best. Keng Swee added that he saw no objection if, as an act of courtesy, Lord Head, as British high commissioner to Malaysia, was informed of our intentions at 9:30 am
on the day, just half an hour before the independence bill was introduced. This was received with great merriment.

Ismail said two documents needed to be drawn up: an amendment to the constitution making the secession of Singapore possible, and an act giving Singapore independence under that amendment. In the interests of security, civil servants should not be brought in to prepare these, and he asked if we could do the work. Ismail and Razak must have thought through the necessary constitutional procedures. Keng Swee said Eddie (Singapore’s minister for law) would try to produce a draft for them in a week to ten days, and that was agreed. Keng Swee impressed upon both of them the imperative need for secrecy and added pointedly to Ismail that his expatriate civil servants, in particular, should not be told anything about the matter either.

Keng Swee sensed that Razak felt greatly relieved and grateful to him for his part in promoting this solution. He really believed it would not only avert the calamity that was now dangerously impending, but also put an end to the tension and misery he had had to endure in recent months. It had all taken just half an hour but they spent another 20 minutes exchanging pleasantries, as Razak insisted that Keng Swee should not leave too early. He also arranged for a police car to take him to the airport transit lounge so as to avoid any journalists.

Immediately after Keng Swee reported to me on that meeting, I saw Eddie in my office. The work was so sensitive that I was not certain our state advocate-general was the best person to undertake it. He might not be able to keep it secret. Eddie himself went to the law library of the University of Singapore to look for precedents, and found one in the break-up of the Federation of the West Indies. To limit the number of persons who needed to know, he dictated his drafts not to his own personal assistant but to Wong Chooi Sen, the cabinet secretary, an officer whose loyalty and discretion were beyond doubt. The only others involved were Stanley Stewart, as head of the civil service, and George
Bogaars, as head of Special Branch. I had called in Bogaars to be quite certain he was confident we could contain any threat from the communists in an independent Singapore as long as we did not allow them to rebuild their organisation. He assured me that we could.

Eddie drafted the two documents, but I asked him to draw up a third, a proclamation of independence. I showed his drafts to Choo. I was still not satisfied with them. I wanted our agreement with the state of Johor, upon which we depended heavily for our water supply, to be included in them and endorsed by the two governments as a formal treaty to be honoured as such. I was too hard-pressed, and told Choo, who was a good conveyancing lawyer, to find a neat way to achieve this. Once she had done so, I approved the drafts for Eddie to submit to Razak. Despite all the uncertainty, I decided to stick to my planned holiday and wait to see whether the Tunku wanted to go on with hiving-off or would change his mind.

There were reasons for doubt. Just the week before, Tan Siew Sin had visited Singapore for a meeting of the University Students’ Union to say that the central government would go ahead with their decision to close the Bank of China in Singapore the following month. Despite unofficial protests broadcast over Radio Peking, he denied that the closure would affect trade between Malaysia and China. This indicated no inclination to disengage, let alone have Singapore leave Malaysia altogether. Next, Razak, while touring the southern islands on 25 July, made tendentious statements calculated to stir up Malay sentiment against the PAP, saying that the uncooperative spirit of our government made it difficult for Kuala Lumpur to extend its rural development programme to the local Malays. This unnecessarily mischievous move also made me wonder whether Keng Swee had correctly read and reported Razak, that he really wanted Singapore to hive off. Something was up. Could they, in fact, be testing the ground with a view to suspending the constitution and appointing a governor? Or planning something else unpleasant?

Keng Swee was also worried. He was uneasy about the burden and the blame he would have to bear if the scheme leaked or was aborted. When I was preparing this book in 1994, he gave me permission to read his oral history recorded in 1980–81, and I learnt that he never pressed Razak for a looser rearrangement as I had asked him to. He knew they wanted Singapore out of their parliament and went along with their desire to have us hive off. Keng Swee also said that he wanted that written undertaking from me because he feared I would balk at separation.

Keng Swee called on Razak at Federation House in Singapore on 27 July, to discover that he indeed had second thoughts about the hiving-off. Keng Swee again found him hesitating and constantly reversing his position. He complained of insomnia and appeared morose and despondent. In a rambling 90-minute conversation, he said he had written to the Tunku about their discussions three days after their last meeting, and it was now up to the Tunku to decide, but he would return from London only on 4 August. Razak did not expect him to rush matters, and it was doubtful if the independence bill could then be arranged for the 9th – for one thing, there were various interests to consult, like the sultans.

He then expressed misgivings about the consequences of independence for Singapore – supposing the government entered into a deal with Peking? Razak also put up totally unacceptable ideas about defence, saying Malaysia would have to run the Singapore army. Keng Swee told him that could not be. We would raise and maintain our own army, but for operational purposes it would be put under whoever commanded all Malaysian forces opposing Indonesia. Razak said, “Oh. So the present system will be retained, that is, we command your army?” In order not to deepen further his doubts on the subject, Keng Swee did not point out that this arrangement would hold true only during Confrontation.

Razak next said independence for Singapore meant a resounding victory for Sukarno. Did we want to give Sukarno a boost? Why not have
a partial disengagement? Keng Swee told him we were willing to have it any way he liked, even going on as at present. Keng Swee said Singapore’s position was strengthening by the day with support from Commonwealth countries. This depressed Razak further, and he reverted to saying that there was no solution other than complete separation – but then backed off again and talked about some kind of confederation whereby Kuala Lumpur controlled defence and foreign affairs.

Keng Swee stressed the need for an early decision before our commitment to the Malaysian Solidarity Convention became irreversible, but while he readily agreed to this, Razak continued to harp on various objections to the whole scheme: Tan Siew Sin was against separation, and UMNO’s general support for it could not be taken for granted. He feared opposition. But, on the other hand, the available police and military forces would not be enough to bottle up widespread disorders if Singapore remained in Malaysia, so, after all, perhaps hiving-off was the only solution. He asked Keng Swee if he could suggest another way out. Keng Swee said he could not.

Yet through the press, Razak called upon the Singapore government to work hard hand-in-hand with Kuala Lumpur to carry out development schemes for the Malays. I began to fear that we were again on a collision course.