The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (124 page)

^*
Hitler’s proclamation to the Army announcing the opening of hostilities was broadcast over me German radio at 5:40
A.M
., and the newspaper extras were on the street shortly after. See below, p. 599.

^*
The German operation to seize the Dirschau bridge over the Vistula before the Poles could blow it up had been planned early in the summer and appears constantly in the papers for “Case White.” It was specifically ordered in Hitler’s Directive No. 1 on August 31. Actually the operation failed, partly because early-morning fog hampered the dropping of paratroopers who were to seize the bridge. The Poles succeeded in blowing it up just in time.

^*
See above, pp. 566–67.

^†
See above, p. 588.

^‡
Actually Mussolini’s decision was conveyed to Britain the night before. At 11:15
P.M
. on August 31 the Foreign Office received a message from Sir Percy Loraine in Rome: “Decision of the Italian Government is taken. Italy will not fight against either England or France … This communication made to me by Ciano at 21:15 [9:15
P.M
.] under seal of secrecy.”
¹⁰

That evening the Italians had been given a scare by the British cutting off all telephone communication with Rome after 8
P.M
. Ciano feared it might be the prelude to an Anglo–French attack.

^*
At 4:30
P.M.
, following a meeting of the Council of Ministers in Rome, the Italian radio broadcast the Council’s announcement “to the Italian people that Italy will take no initiative in the way of military operations.” Immediately afterward Hitler’s message to Mussolini releasing Italy from its obligations was broadcast.

^*
Twice during the afternoon of September 1, Bonnet instructed Noël, the French ambassador in Warsaw, to ask Beck if Poland would accept the Italian proposal for a conference. Later that evening he received his reply: “We are in the midst of war as the result of unprovoked aggression. It is no longer a question of a conference but of common action which the Allies should take to resist.” Bonnet’s messages and Beck’s reply are in the
French Yellow Book
.

The British government did not associate itself with Bonnet’s efforts. A Foreign Office memorandum signed by R. M. Makins notes that the British government “was neither consulted nor informed of this
démarche.”
¹⁵

^†
The previous afternoon, on instructions from Halifax, Henderson had burned his ciphers and confidential documents and officially requested the United States chargé d’affaires “to be good enough to take charge of British interests in the event of war.” (
British Blue Book
, p. 21.)

^*
Ciano claims that the note was sent as the result of “French pressure.” (
Ciano Diaries
, p. 136.) But this is surely misleading. Though Bonnet was doing all he could to get a conference, Mussolini was pushing the proposal even more desperately.

^*
The minutes of the meeting, drawn up by General Decamp, chief of Premier Daladier’s military cabinet, came to light at the Riom trial. The paper was never submitted to other members of the meeting for correction, and General Gamelin in his book,
Servir
, claims it was so abbreviated as to be misleading. Still, even the timid generalissimo confirms its main outlines.

^*
In his book,
Servir
, Gamelin admits that he hesitated to call attention to some of France’s military weaknesses because he did not trust Bonnet. He quotes Daladier as later telling him, “You did right. If you had exposed them, the Germans would have known about them the next day.”

Gamelin also claimed (in his book) that he did point out at this conference the weakness of France’s military position. He says he explained that if Germany “annihilated Poland” and then threw her whole weight against the French, France would be in a “difficult” situation. “In this case,” he said, “it would no longer be possible for France to enter upon the struggle … By spring, with the help of British troops and American equipment I hoped we should be in a position to fight a defensive battle (of course if necessary). I added that we could not hope for victory except in a long war. It had
always
been my opinion that we should not be able to assume the offensive in less than about two years … that is, in 1941–2.”

The French generalissimo’s timid views explain a good deal of subsequent history.

^*
The Foreign Secretary had sent Henderson two warning telegrams during the night. The first, dispatched at 11:50
P.M
., read:

I may have to send you instructions tonight to make an immediate communication to the German Government. Please be ready to act. You had better warn the Minister for Foreign Affairs that you may have to ask to see him at any moment.

It would seem from this telegram that the British government had not quite made up its mind to go it alone despite the French. But thirty-five minutes later, at 12:25
A.M
. on September 3, Halifax wired Henderson:

You should ask for an appointment with M.F.A. [Minister for Foreign Affairs] at 9
A.M
. Sunday morning. Instructions will follow.
²⁵

The decisive telegram from Halifax is dated 5
A.M
., London time. Henderson, in his
Final Report
, says he received it 4
A.M.

^*
Halifax sent an additional wire, also dated 5
A.M
., informing the ambassador that Coulondre “will not make a similar communication to the German Government until midday today (Sunday).” He did not know what the French time limit would be but thought it “likely” to be anything between six and nine hours.
²⁷

^*
He reappeared for a moment on September 24 when he met with Forbes at Oslo “to ascertain,” as he told the Nuremberg tribunal before he was shut off, “if there was still a possibility of averting a world war.”
³³

^*
So shoddy was this hastily prepared note that it ended with this sentence: “The intention, communicated to us by order of the British Government by Mr. King-Hall, of carrying the destruction of the German people even further than was done through the Versailles Treaty, is taken note of by us, and we shall therefore answer any aggressive action on the part of England with the same weapons and in the same form.” The British government had, of course, never presented to Germany any intentions of Stephen King-Hall, a retired naval officer, whose newsletters were a purely private venture. In fact, Henderson had protested to the Foreign Office against the circulation of King-Hall’s publication in Germany and the British government had requested the editor to desist.

^†
In London at 11:15
A.M
. Halifax had handed the German chargé d’affaires a formal note stating that since no German assurances had been received by 11
A.M.
, “I have the honor to inform you that a state of war exists between the two countries as from 11
A.M
. today, September 3.”

^*
See above, p. 608.

^†
But even after that, it will be remembered, Bonnet made a last-minute effort to keep France out of the war by proposing, during the night, to the Italians that they get Hitler to make a “symbolic” withdrawal from Poland.