The Republic and The Laws (Oxford World's Classics) (13 page)

… (Plato) constructed a state which was desirable rather than feasible. It was the smallest he could contrive, and, though not actually possible, it enabled the reader to see how politics worked. I, however, if I can manage it, while using the same principles as he deduced, will try to show them operating, not in a shadowy country of the mind, but in a very great nation. In doing so I shall touch, as though with a pointer, on the cause of every good and every evil in public life.

When the two hundred years of monarchy were over (or perhaps a little more, if one takes account of the interregna), and
when Tarquin had been expelled, the Romans were gripped with a hatred of the name of king, just as strong as the sense of longing which had gripped them after the death, or rather the departure, of Romulus. Then they could not do without a king; now, after getting rid of Tarquin, they could not bear the word … [
Eight leaves are lost
.]

… that law
*
was totally abolished. This was the mood which induced our ancestors to expel the innocent Collatinus, whom they regarded with suspicion because of his family connection (with Tarquin the Proud), and to banish the other Tarquins on account of the odium attached to the name. In view of this same mood, Publius Valerius for the first time ordered the rods to be lowered when he began to speak at a meeting of the people. Then he moved house to the bottom of the Velian Hill when he realized that he was arousing the people’s resentment by starting to build near the top of the hill, on the very site where King Tullus had lived. He also showed himself ‘the people’s friend’
*
par excellence
by proposing to the people a law, which was in fact the first law passed by the Assembly of Centuries, to the effect that no magistrate should have a Roman citizen flogged or put to death without permitting an appeal.
*
(The pontiffs’ records, however, state that even the king’s verdicts were subject to appeal, and this is confirmed by our augurs’ books. The Twelve Tables likewise indicate in several of their laws that it was legitimate to lodge an appeal against every verdict and sentence. Moreover, the tradition that there was no right of appeal against the decisions of the Ten Men who drafted the laws is sufficient proof that there
was
such a right in the case of the other magistrates. The consular law introduced by Lucius Valerius Potitus and Marcus Horatius Barbatus, men who wisely courted the populace in the interests of peace, laid it down that no magistrate should be appointed unless his rulings were subject to appeal. Finally, the Porcian Laws, which, as you know, were three laws, proposed by three different Porcii, did not introduce anything new, except a clause prescribing a penalty for violation.)

So then, after carrying that law about appeal, Publicola at once gave orders for the axes to be removed
*
from the bundles. On the next day he had Spurius Lucretius elected as his colleague; and he ordered his own lictors to attend Spurius instead, because he was
the older. He also initiated the custom whereby lictors should walk before each consul in alternate months.
*
This was to prevent the symbols of power being more numerous in the free republic than they had been under the kings. It was no ordinary man, in my view, who by granting the people a modest amount of freedom preserved more easily the authority of the leading citizens. You see I do have a reason for warbling on to you about these old outdated things. In those famous figures and times I am noting examples of men and events for use as reference-points in the remainder of my talk.

In those times, then, the Senate maintained the state in the following condition: though the people were free, not much was done through them; most things were done on the authority of the Senate according to custom and precedent. The consuls had a power which, though limited in length to one year, was in its nature and legitimacy equivalent to that of a king. And (a factor that was perhaps the most vital in maintaining the power of the aristocracy) the rule was staunchly retained whereby the people’s corporate decisions were not valid unless endorsed by the Senate’s authority. At this same period, about ten years after the first consuls, Titus Larcius was appointed dictator. That was regarded as a new kind of power, very similar to the regal model. Yet, with the people’s consent, all the power was firmly held in the hands of the leading citizens; and in those times great military feats were accomplished by valiant men who wielded supreme power, whether as dictators or as consuls.

A little later, however, about fifteen years after the Republic’s inception, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius Cassius, the people, now rid of the kings, arrogated to itself a somewhat larger amount of legal authority—a development which, in the nature of things, was bound to take place. There was, perhaps, a lack of calculation in the matter; but then the very nature of politics often prevails over calculation. One must bear in mind what I said at the outset, namely that unless a state maintains a fair balance of rights, duties, and functions (the magistrates
having adequate power, the aristocratic council adequate influence, and the people adequate freedom) its constitutional organization cannot be preserved from change. Anyhow, at a time when the community was in a state of turmoil over debt, the common people occupied first the Sacred Mount and then the Aventine. Remember that not even the system of Lycurgus kept the Greek population under so tight a rein. For in Sparta too, in the regime of Theopompus, five officials called ephors (and in Crete ten, called cosmoi) were appointed to offset the power of the king, just as here the tribunes of the plebs were elected to limit the authority of the consuls.
*

In the case of that widespread debt our ancestors, perhaps, did have available a method of relief which had been perceived by Solon at Athens not long before and which our Senate took note of some time later. (Then, as a result of one man’s sadistic lust,
*
all the citizens’ bonds were undone and were never fastened again. Ever since, on occasions when the common people have wilted and fainted under their financial burden,
*
some relief or remedy has always been devised in order to ensure the community’s stability.) But at that time the Senate failed to take such a step, and so the people were given an excuse for creating two tribunes of the plebs through seditious action, in order to reduce the power and authority of the Senate. This authority, however, remained weighty and far-ranging, because the wisest and most valiant men protected the state by a combination of good sense and military force. Their authority was widely respected, because, while they far exceeded others in prestige, they enjoyed fewer pleasures and were not, as a rule, any richer. Each man’s worth was the more esteemed in public life in that, when it came to private matters, they helped individual citizens most conscientiously by their actions, advice, and financial support.

That was the state of affairs when Spurius Cassius, a man who enjoyed enormous popularity with the masses, was accused by the quaestor of plotting to seize the throne. As you know, when his father testified that he had found Spurius to be guilty, he was put to death with the people’s consent. Roughly fifty-three years after the first consuls another welcome law was introduced by the consuls Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius about fines and forfeits,
*
and was passed by the Assembly of Centuries. Twenty years
after that, because large numbers of cattle had been transferred from private to public ownership as a result of fines imposed by the censors Lucius Papirius and Publius Pinarius, lighter assessments were fixed in penalties involving cattle by a law proposed by the consuls Gaius Julius and Publius Papirius.

Some years earlier, when the supreme authority resided in the Senate and the people were docile and obedient, an idea was adopted whereby both the consuls and the tribunes of the plebs should resign from office and ten men
*
should be appointed. This board was to have very great authority, not subject to appeal. In addition to their supreme power, these men were to have the task of drafting laws. When they had drawn up with great wisdom and fairness a code of Ten Tables, they nominated ten other men to serve for the following year.

The second group has not enjoyed a similar reputation for integrity and fairmindedness. Nevertheless, one member, Gaius Julius,
*
has won great approval. He stated that he had been present when a corpse was exhumed in the bedroom of Lucius Sestius, a nobleman. Yet although as one of the Ten he held absolute power which was not subject to appeal, he simply ruled that Lucius should give bail. He would not, he said, contravene that excellent law which laid it down that no sentence could be passed on the life of a Roman citizen except in the Assembly of Centuries.

A third year of the decemvirate followed. The personnel remained the same, because they had refused to appoint successors. With the government in this situation (which, as I have said several times before, could not last long, because it was not equally just to all ranks of society) the whole country was in the hands of the leading citizens. Ten men of the highest birth were in control, unopposed by any tribunes of the plebs; no other magistrates had been added; and no appeal to the people had been left open against flogging and execution. Therefore, as a result of the board’s injustice, a massive and sudden upheaval took place, followed by a total change of government. The ten men added two
tables of unjust laws, enacting that there could be no intermarriage between plebeians and patricians—a most outrageous measure, since that privilege is normally allowed even between citizens of different states. (The prohibition was later rescinded by Canuleius’ plebeian decree.) In all their official acts they behaved irresponsibly, and they were cruel and greedy in their domination over the people. The episode of Decimus Verginius is, of course, well known, and is related in countless works of literature. He killed his virgin daughter in the forum with his own hand to save her from the lust of one of the Ten. When, in his grief, he fled to the army, which was then on Mount Algidus, the soldiers called off the war on which they were engaged, and, with weapons in hand, occupied first the Sacred Mount, as they had done earlier for a similar reason, and then the Aventine …
[Four leaves are lost.]

(We have now arrived at the form of government which) I believe our ancestors most approved of and were very wise to retain.

After these words from Scipio, when everyone was waiting in silence for the rest of his talk, Tubero said: Since these senior gentlemen have nothing to ask you, Africanus, perhaps you would let me say what I find missing in your talk.

SCIPIO
: Certainly; I’d be happy to hear it.

TUBERO
: You seem to me to have praised our form of government, though Laelius asked you to discuss, not ours in particular, but forms of government in general. Even so, I did not learn from your talk what moral system, what customs and laws, we should employ in founding and preserving the kind of government which you advocate.

SCIPIO
: I think, Tubero, we shall shortly have a more suitable place for discussing the foundation and preservation of states. As for the best constitution, I thought I had given an adequate reply to Laelius’ question. For I distinguished, first, three acceptable forms of government along with their three objectionable counterparts. I then showed that no one of these simple forms was ideal, but that each of them was surpassed by a moderate blend
of the three acceptable types. As for my using our own state as a model, that had value, not for defining the best constitution (for that could have been done without a model), but for illustrating, from the actual experience of the greatest state, what was being described in my theoretical exposition. But if you ask about the nature of the best state in itself, we shall have to draw on the model presented by nature,
*
since you (are not satisfied with) the model of a city and its people which we have been using …
[At least two leaves have disappeared.]

SCIPIO
: … I have long been looking for him, and I am keen to meet him.

LAELIUS
: Perhaps you are looking for the man of good sense?

SCIPIO
: The very man.

LAELIUS
: Well, you can find plenty of specimens in our present company. What about yourself, for a start?

SCIPIO
: Yes. If only one could find the same percentage in the Senate as a whole! Still, take the man who, as we often saw in Africa, sits on an enormous wild beast,
*
controlling it and directing it wherever he wishes and turning the great brute this way and that by a gentle touch or word of command—now
he
is a man of good sense.

LAELIUS
: I know the sort you mean; I often saw them when I was on your staff.

SCIPIO
: Well, that Indian or Carthaginian controls one animal, which is docile and familiar with human ways. But the faculty which lies within the human mind, forming part of it, and is called the reason, tames and controls not just one animal, and one, at that, which is easily broken in—if, indeed, it succeeds in doing so, which it rarely does. For that fierce creature calls for firm handling …

[Two leaves have fallen out, in which Scipio talks about the difficulties of a statesman. See the fragments at the end of the book.]

LAELIUS
: I now see the duty and function which you assign to the man for whom I was waiting.

SCIPIO
: Why, he should have virtually no duty apart from this, for it embraces all the rest—namely that he should never cease
inspecting and examining himself, challenging others to imitate him, and by the splendour of his mind and conduct offering himself as a mirror to his fellow-citizens. Just as with string instruments
*
or pipes or in singers’ voices a certain harmony of different sounds must be maintained (and trained ears cannot bear the effect if that harmony is thrown out or becomes discordant), and as that harmony, though arising from the management of very different notes, produces a pleasing and agreeable sound, so a state, by adjusting the proportions between the highest, lowest, and intermediate classes, as if they were musical notes, achieves harmony. What, in the case of singing, musicians call harmony is, in the state, concord; it constitutes the tightest and most effective bond of security; and such concord cannot exist at all without justice.

[About a dozen leaves are missing. Augustine (De
Civitate Dei 2.
21) says that Philus asked for a fuller discussion of justice in view of the common opinion that no state could be governed without injustice.
]

SCIPIO
: I do agree, and I would stress that what we think has been established so far about the government of the state amounts to nothing, and that we have no basis for further progress, unless we refute the contention that government cannot be carried on without injustice, and, more than that, prove conclusively that it cannot be carried on without the highest degree of
justice.
But, if you don’t mind, we will let that do for today and postpone the rest until tomorrow, for there is still quite a lot to say.

This was agreed, and so discussion ended for that day.