The Pope and Mussolini (79 page)

42.
The demonstration was held on November 10. Ceci 2012, p. 95; Diggins 1972, p. 107.

43.
In a letter to Dino Alfieri, then undersecretary for press and propaganda, the fascist Italian American secretary of the Unione Italiana d’America in New York City stressed how important Father Coughlin’s efforts were there. While most Americans opposed the war in Ethiopia, Italian Americans had given it strong support, which, along with Coughlin’s efforts, had prevented Roosevelt from getting his sanctions bill passed. Much to his disgust, he said, when a newsreel on the war was shown in movie theaters, people jeered and whistled when Mussolini came on the screen but cheered images of the Ethiopians. ACS, MCPR, b. 21.
   Meeting with Pacelli on November 22, Pignatti stressed how crucial it was that oil not be added to the sanctions—as some in Britain and elsewhere were proposing—and how important it was that the United States not join the sanctions. Again he asked Pacelli to activate the Holy See diplomatic network to help the war effort. In pointing out the good that the Church could do in the United States, he praised the work of Father Coughlin. Pacelli reassured the Italian ambassador that the Vatican was doing what it could but added that as Coughlin “has already spoken strongly against England and the sanctions, there was no need to incite him to do more.” ASV, AESS, b.430a, fasc. 362, f. 136. The news that Coughlin played a helpful role in getting the American Catholic clergy to support the Ethiopian war was passed on to the undersecretary for press and propaganda on November 28. ACS, MCPR, b. 21, “Appunto per S.E. il Sottosegretario di stato.” Meeting with Pacelli again on December 6, the Italian ambassador noted with pleasure all that Father Coughlin was doing to inspire the American movement to oppose sanctions. ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 362, ff. 145/146. On the Coughlin story and Coughlin’s relations with the Holy See, see Fogarty 2012.

44.
In 1935 Cardinal Dougherty, archbishop of Philadelphia, complained that Coughlin was “now quite beyond control.” He added that Coughlin had become “a hero in the minds of the proletariat and especially those members of that rabble who are of Jewish extraction or belong to the Socialists or Communists.” Given Coughlin’s anti-Semitic bent, this was a rather peculiar characterization. Fogarty 2012, pp. 108–10. Some of my description is based on the report sent from the Italian embassy in Washington to Rome. ASMAE, AISS, b. 33, “Oggetto: Padre Coughlin,” 22 ottobre 1936.

45.
Luconi 2000, pp. 11–12. Enthusiasm for the Ethiopian war was widespread in the Italian American community. In April 1936 the Italian vice consul in Providence, Rhode Island, dressed in black shirt, distributed more than seven hundred iron wedding rings. So great were the donations of gold wedding rings in that city that the vice consul had to have four hundred more iron rings delivered later. Ceci 2012, pp. 95–96.

46.
Quoted in Franzinelli 1995, pp. 311–12.

47.
De Felice 1974, p. 761. The bishop’s remarks were printed in
Il Popolo d’Italia
, 19 dicembre 1935.

48.
De Rossi dell’Arno 1954, pp. 69–70. The next month the bishop of Ventimiglia addressed the women of his diocese, identifying “the enemies of Italy, the enemies of its greatness and its future,” as “Russian bolshevism, communism, international masonry, English Protestantism” (pp. 105–8).

49.
ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 2, ff. 187r–88v, Tacchi Venturi, “Relazione dell’udienza avuta col Capo del Governo,” 30 novembre 1935. Renzo De Felice (1981, p. 291n85) concluded that Tacchi Venturi had likely helped lead Mussolini to subscribe to the theory of a plot of “international Judaism” against his Ethiopian war effort.

50.
ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 2, ff. 257r–260r, Tacchi Venturi, “Relazione dell’udienza avuta con S.E. Mussolini,” 14 dicembre 1935.

CHAPTER 17: ENEMIES IN COMMON

1.
Quoted in Franzinelli 1998, p. 137; Franzinelli 2008, p. 258.

2.
ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 5, f. 186r, “Memoria d’archivio,” 28 novembre 1935.

3.
Brendon 2000, p. 426.

4.
ASV, ANI, pos. 23, fasc. 7, ff. 24r–27r, Borgongini a Pacelli, 18 dicembre 1935. The meeting had taken place the previous day.

5.
ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 5, f. 201r, “Istruzioni per Monsignor Roveda da impartire verbalmente ai vescovi d’Italia,” 30 novembre 1935.

6.
Cardinal Nasalli Rocca, archbishop of Bologna, was among those who were uncomfortable. “Aside from the fact that giving up my gold rings does not particularly please me,” he wrote Pacelli, “the matter is apparently settled and it only remains for me to ask for instructions for the benediction.” Pacelli brought Nasalli’s letter to the pope, who said it was fine for the parish priests to bless the rings, but the cardinal himself should avoid it. ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 5, ff. 217r–218r.

7.
Ceci 2010, p. 97. In Mantua the local newspaper reported the bishop’s advice: “Those who give to the Fatherland give to God!” With much fanfare, Augusto Ciriaci, national president of Catholic Action, gave Achille Starace, head of the Fascist Party, his gold watch, which the Catholic Action men’s organization had given him on its tenth anniversary. Terhoeven 2006, p. 102. For more details, see Terhoeven 2006 and Ceci 2010, pp. 94–101.

8.
The pope could not have been happy with Schuster, as the idea of an archbishop donating sacred symbols of holy office to the state offended his sense of the rightful position of the Church. According to a police informant, the Vatican supported the collection of gold rings and “the offerings of gold by the Bishops too are viewed positively.… Where the reservations begin is for the pectoral crosses, believing that … they constitute something sacred.” ACS, MCPG, b. 172, informatore, 11 dicembre 1935.

9.
Terhoeven 2006, pp. 102, 104, 105; Ceci 2012, p. 92. Nobili (2008, pp. 271, 275–76) gives other examples of the donations of golden sacred objects by bishops in Lombardy. A popular postcard commemorating the Day of Faith showed an image of a robed, bearded, and long-haired Jesus hovering in heaven over two large hands, one removing the wedding ring from the other. Above were the words, “For the sanctity of the Cause.” Falasca-Zamponi 1997, fig. 20.

10.
The king and queen led the way, depositing their gold ornaments at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Rome’s Vittoriano Monument. Playwright Luigi Pirandello gave away his Nobel Prize gold medal, and other members of Italy’s cultural elite followed suit. Milza 2000, p. 731.

11.
Terhoeven 2006, pp. 118–19. Seeking to make a dramatic gift that day, the Duce offered the gold commemorative medal that the pope had given him when the Lateran Accords were signed. As it turned out, an examination of the papal medal revealed that it was made not of gold but a cheap metal with a thin gold coating. The news caused a crisis at the Roman PNF office, where staffers worriedly discussed whether to let Mussolini know. They decided to ask the national head of the party, Starace, who apparently did inform the Duce. Terhoeven 2006, p. 82.

12.
The Turin diocesan weekly, for one, warned darkly of a Masonic conspiracy allied with Bolshevism and Protestantism, “fiercely united against Italy, wanting to strike together against Italy and also the Holy See and Catholicism.” Quoted in Reineri 1978, pp. 170–71. On April 25 Pizzardo again warned Pignatti of a “Jewish-masonic campaign … that moves in parallel fashion against both the Church and against Fascism.” ASMAE, AISS, b. 81, fasc. 1, sf. 1, Pignatti, “Congresso dei ‘Senza Dio’ in Praga.”

13.
Like the United States, and for similar reasons—the opposition of the majority Protestants—Canada had no official diplomatic tie with the Vatican and so had no nuncio.

14.
ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 5, ff. 129r–131r, Pizzardo a Monsignor Andrea Cassulo, delegato apostolico, Ottawa, 26 dicembre 1935; ibid., ff. 132r–134r, Cassulo a Pizzardo, 11 gennaio 1936. Pizzardo shared the Canadian envoy’s report with Pignatti on February 1, eager to show how much the Vatican was doing behind the scenes to help Mussolini’s war effort. He reminded the Italian ambassador that the Vatican had earlier instructed its envoy to Canada to “support the movement in our favor among these Catholics.” In his later report of the conversation, Pignatti hastened to tell Mussolini something else he thought would be of interest. The head of the Capuchin order in Ottawa had gotten a report from his fellow Capuchins in Ethiopia, complaining that their efforts to win support for the Italian invasion were being frustrated by the “anti-Italian propaganda of Jews and Masons.” DDI, series 8, vol. 3, n. 158, Pignatti a Mussolini, 1 febbraio 1936. Shortly after receiving its Canadian emissary’s report, the Vatican secretary of state office received another message from Ottawa about the conspiracy aimed at the Church and Italy, but this from a surprising source. Mackenzie King, Canadian prime minister, had received a letter “from a certain E. Pound from Rapallo,” informing him that “the sanctions are the work of an international Jewish clique as a means they have devised to provoke a European war.” Until then, the Canadian prime minister said, he hadn’t given much thought to the question of Jewish influence in Canada, but given this new information, he would now study the matter carefully. He added, according to the Vatican note, his belief “that Judaism has extremely powerful elements in England and in the United States, both in government circles and in general in public opinion.” ASV, AESI, pos. 967, vol. 2, f. 396r, “Appunto,” Roma, 4 febbraio 1936. It is not clear from the Canadian prime minster’s comments whether he was aware that “E. Pound” was the famed poet Ezra Pound.

15.
As reported by Italy’s ambassador in Berlin, and copied by the foreign affairs ministry to the Italian embassy to the Holy See. ASMAE, APSS, b. 27, fasc. 1, 9 dicembre 1935. Britain’s envoy to the Vatican was also unhappy. “One of the results of the new cardinal selections,” he reported to London, “and many will think an unfortunate one … is that it readjusts the balance of nationality within the Sacred College in a manner very favourable to Italy.” He added: “The few lingering hopes which may have been entertained here and there of a foreign successor to the present Pope must thus be finally dismissed.” H. Montgomery,
Annual Report 1935
, January 9, 1936, R 217/217/22, in Hachey 1972, p. 322–23, sections 161–64.

16.
Montgomery,
Annual Report 1935
, sections 161–64, 347; MAEI, vol. 267, 61–63, Charles-Roux à Flandrin, 14 mars 1936. In his report on the naming of the twenty new cardinals, Pignatti similarly noted the glaring absence of the archbishop of Westminster, attributing it to the Vatican’s displeasure at the archbishop’s criticism of the Italian war effort and comments about the pope. ASMAE, APSS, b. 25, Pignatti al ministro degli affari esteri, “Concistoro,” telespresso n. 7748/26, 22 novembre 1935. The Sacred College had previously been reduced to only forty-nine cardinals; with the new infusion, it would be within one of the maximum, seventy.

17.
ACS, MCPG, b. 172, Roma, 21 novembre 1935. The Brazilian government sent its ambassador to complain to Pacelli about the lack of a single Brazilian cardinal, even though Brazil had twice as many Catholics as the United States, which had four cardinals. Pacelli responded that he would not accept the government’s request to convey its argument to the pope, for the pope “rightly jealously guards his exclusive right and freedom in the choice of cardinals and therefore could not admit that one spoke of ‘disillusion’ or ‘requests’ in this matter, nor make comparisons to other States.” ASV, AESS, pos. 430b, fasc. 363, ff. 2/3, 3 gennaio 1936. The pope had used the large number of nominations to sneak in one that he had long sought but had not wanted to bring attention to: Monsignor Caccia Dominioni, the fellow Milanese and longtime aide who had literally stood at his side for thirteen years, finally got his cardinal’s hat.

18.
Pius did not tell him that Ledóchowski had urged the pope not to make the appointment. The Jesuit general was upset that Tacchi Venturi’s prestige in the Vatican was eclipsing his own and could not bear to have his Jesuit colleague given such exalted status. Martina 1996, pp. 103–8; 2003, pp. 271–72.

19.
ACS, MI, PS, Polizia Politica, b. 210, informatore n. 35, Città del Vaticano, 26 novembre 1929. The informant, Bice Pupeschi, claimed to have heard Caccia’s complaints directly in a conversation with him the previous evening.

20.
ACS, MI, PS, Polizia Politica, b. 210, informatore n. 52, Città del Vaticano, 21 ottobre 1930.

21.
Ibid., informatore n. 293, Città del Vaticano, 27 marzo 1931. Caccia blamed Pizzardo for his problems, believing he was the one informing the pope. In the summer of 1931, a new round of recrimination followed Caccia’s criticism of Pizzardo’s leadership of Catholic Action. Striking back, Pizzardo dredged up an old story that Caccia—apparently catholic in his sexual interests, at least if this report can be believed—had had a son by a woman who owned a store in the city. As proof of the allegation, Pizzardo claimed that the boy had a nervous tic in his eyes identical to Caccia’s. ACS, MI, PS, Polizia Politica, b. 210, informatore n. 40, Città del Vaticano, 30 agosto 1931.