The Pentagon: A History (36 page)

Bush wanted Somervell himself—who better than the Army’s miracle logistics man to drive the Manhattan Project to success?—but that idea went nowhere. Even had Somervell wanted the job, which he did not, Stimson and George Marshall were opposed to losing the services of their dynamic supply chief, particularly with furious preparations under way for the invasion of North Africa.

Bush’s second choice was Fat Styer, already serving as Bush’s liaison with the Army. Marshall approved, telling Styer that he would have to take the job. But Styer balked at the prospect of leaving his powerful position as Somervell’s deputy to head up a project that was such a long shot. Somervell likewise did not want to lose Styer and tried to talk Marshall out of it. The chief of staff told Somervell he would either have to give up Styer or come up with someone who was “entirely suitable” for the Manhattan Project.

Styer had a suggestion, having already concluded that Groves was ripe to leave the Construction Division. Styer admired Groves for “the fearlessness with which he tackled difficult jobs.” The Manhattan Project, though headquartered in Washington, would keep Groves on the road much of the time, away from the division engineers. It would be a perfect outlet for his forceful energy. “Somervell and I discussed the matter and decided you would be the victim,” Styer told Groves years later.

Yet Groves was not selected simply as a convenient way for Somervell to keep Styer and get rid of a talented but overly brusque officer. Somervell respected Groves’s quick mind, telling Stimson and Marshall that if Groves were assigned to the project, within a matter of weeks he would “understand and have a thorough knowledge of all the scientific and technical matters involved.”

Despite all his speculation, Groves later identified the most important reason Somervell selected him. “Somervell did feel that I was probably more capable than almost anyone he could think of, with respect to seizing hold of new ideas and carrying them forward,” Groves wrote. “[H]e knew that I was one person who would drive the thing forward.”

The Machiavellian considerations Groves identified likely influenced Somervell’s decision. But ultimately, the reason Groves was chosen to build the atomic bomb was precisely what Somervell whispered to him in their hallway conference on September 17, 1942: If it could be done, Groves would do it.

Political dynamite

Groves left Styer’s office, his venom spent. He was resigned to his fate and never looked back. With typical nerve, he wrangled a promise of quick promotion to brigadier general, and he rushed to work.

Formally taking over the Manhattan Project on September 23, 1942, Groves met that afternoon in Stimson’s office with the secretary of war, George Marshall, Vannevar Bush, Somervell, Styer, and other senior officials. Despite being easily the lowest-ranking man in the room, Groves forcefully and frequently voiced his opinions. Then, abruptly, he rose to his feet, looked at his watch, and asked to be excused; Groves told the startled officials he had to catch a train to Tennessee to inspect a possible site for an atomic plant at a place called Oak Ridge. Somervell and Styer exchanged a grin as Groves left. “You made me look like a million dollars,” a delighted Somervell told Groves upon his return. “I’d told them that if you were put in charge, things would really start moving!”