The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (65 page)

Ziegler came to the Oval Office shortly before one o’clock to encourage Nixon to visit with Garment, but the president wanted to wait until he had visited with Bill Rogers.
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Ziegler also had some gossip to share: At the White House correspondents’ dinner, Harry Rosenfeld, Woodward and Bernstein’s metropolitan editor at the
Post
, had spoken with Ray Price, who had once worked for Rosenfeld at the
New York Herald-Tribune
. Rosenfeld told Price that everything they had on Watergate was solidly documented, and that they were not printing everything they knew. They were now working on a story that “will hurt the presidency, the current president and the office.” Price told Ziegler that Rosenfeld was one of the few conscientious people at the
Post
. Speechwriter David Gergen, who had been at Yale with Woodward, had spoken with him at the same dinner and had learned from him as well
that they had much more than they had reported so far. Gergen told Ziegler that he felt Woodward was into something bigger than he could handle. Ziegler observedthat the
Post
seemed to be “hovering on the outer fringes,” waiting to see what the White House did next.

Ziegler then tried to outline the public relations issues the president would need to address: he had learned new information from the attorney general; the situation with me; and the accuracy of the Dean report. He said, “Well, the facts that the president has been told, as at least I understand it in terms of Dean, is that you were forced to make judgments based on only 32 percent of the information that he had available to him. I’m talking now about what will come out later.” (This appears to be based on my having told Ziegler that neither Ehrlichman nor Mitchell was providing the rest of the information about what had provoked the White House cover-up and its operation.) But the president was not concerned about the Dean report and told him that everything had been turned over to the attorney general, and the statement that nobody at the White House was involved in the break-in remained valid. Ziegler, who did not know about my conversations with the president, said his point was that because Nixon was now aware of posttrial information, “which has just now come to your attention,” he had to take “decisive action.” Nixon asked how he should do that, as “making Dean the scapegoat is only going to make things worse.” Before Ziegler departed, Nixon advised him of Petersen’s new role, and he highlighted what Petersen had been told so far.

•   •   •

Henry Petersen himself came to the president’s EOB office early that afternoon.” Over the next few weeks they would have a total of seven personal meetings and twenty telephone conversations,
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during which Nixon would shamelessly attempt to manipulate him, using insider prosecutorial information from Petersen to protect Haldeman, Ehrlichman and himself.
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In this session the president was intent on impressing upon Petersen that he had taken charge. After discussing whether John Mitchell could get a fair trial in Washington (neither thought he could, particular if the Senate proceeded), the president again emphasized his instructions to Petersen: “You understand now, you’re talking only to me, and there’s not going to be anyone else on the White House staff. In other words, I am acting counsel and everything else.”

“I [need to deal with] Dean, what do we do about him?” the president
asked, reporting that he had demanded my resignation that morning. Petersen said that this was a president decision; he did not want to be in a position in which the prosecutors were forcing my resignation, and explained that they were negotiating with Shaffer about what I would do. When Ziegler briefly joined them, the president asked, “How does Dean come out on this thing?” “The decision isn’t made,” Petersen reported. “His counsel says they want a deal. His man was an agent. This man didn’t do anything but what Haldeman—” Nixon finished the sentence: “—Haldeman and Ehrlichman told him to do.” Petersen added, “And Mitchell. And if you insist on trying him, in defense, we’re going to try Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Nixon and this administration. That’s going to be our defense.” With some alarm Nixon asked, “He’d try the president, too?” Petersen answered, “It’s a God damn poker game. Yes, sir.”

After Ziegler departed, Nixon returned to the question of whether the negotiations with me were still open or if I was pleading guilty. Petersen said we were negotiating, and Nixon wanted to understand my argument of having been an agent of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell. Petersen explained that it was a tactical defense, that a jury would not convict a person they believed was “the fall guy.” When Nixon argued that the Cubans had been agents as well, Petersen replied that my position was “much more sympathetic. Dean has performed neutral acts which, in the circumstances they were performed, take on the trace of criminality, and he excuses that with, one, he wasn’t fully informed; two, he was only an agent; and three, he didn’t have enough authority to countermand Mitchell, and Haldeman didn’t countermand. Dean was impotent in the circumstances. That will be his defense.”

“Also he told you that unless you grant him immunity, he’s going to attack everybody, including the president. Is that right?” Nixon asked. Petersen confirmed that and cautioned Nixon: “But you can’t use that.” When the president asked why, Petersen said, “Because Dean didn’t tell us that. His lawyer said it in the course of negotiations. And he doesn’t say that as a threat. He says, this is what I am going to do. This is my defense. You’re taking unfair advantage of this man.” Nixon then claimed, “I [didn’t] see Dean until a month ago, never even saw him.” Later in the discussion Nixon, trying to ascertain that they had not made a deal with me yet, asked, “But you are trying to make a deal, aren’t you?” Petersen confirmed that they were trying. My negotiations came up several more times, and Nixon finally
admitted, “I’m a little concerned about Dean’s or his lawyer’s, that he’s going to attack the president and so forth. Other than that, I mean, Dean above all else—”

“Well, I don’t think the president personally, the presidency as an office of the administration,” Petersen clarified. “Because of Ehrlichman and Haldeman.” He added, “That statement [was] made in the heat of argument. Charlie Shaffer’s a very committed, emotional, able lawyer. He stands up and says, ‘God damn it, I’m not going to plead him. If I have to do this, I do this in return.’”

The other major thread running through this discussion was the president’s probing for information relating to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Responding to his earlier request, Petersen gave the president a written document summarizing the charges against the two aides as of that date, based on the information I had provided in my off-the-record conversations with the prosecutors:
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Gray’s having been given material from Hunt’s safe; Ehrlichman’s instructing me to “deep six” material found there; Ehrlichman’s ordering Hunt out of the country;
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Haldeman’s having been informed of my meetings with Mitchell and Liddy, during which I had rejected Liddy’s plan and Haldeman had agreed. But, Petersen noted, Haldeman had done nothing to “discontinue” Liddy’s activities, and Magruder had told the prosecutors he had delivered to Strachan for Haldeman copies of information from “intercepted telephone conversations.” Nixon, who had far more information about all this than Petersen, began to probe for the weaknesses in his cases against Haldeman and Ehrlichman. He pressed Petersen on his recommendation that they resign, but Petersen did not back down. The president also discussed the material in Hunt’s safe at some length but did not inform Petersen that he knew Gray had destroyed it.
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Two minutes after Petersen departed, Ehrlichman appeared and had barely seated himself when Nixon blurted out, “Gray denied to Petersen that he ever got the bundle. Oh, he’s a dumb son of a bitch.”
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Nixon handed Ehrlichman the document Petersen had brought summarizing the charges
against him, all of which Ehrlichman denied. They then focused on Gray’s denial. The president wanted to know what I would say, and Ehrlichman repeated that I had indeed carried the material to his office for Gray, but as far as what was inside the envelope, Ehrlichman said he only knew what I had told him—that it had come from Hunt’s safe. Ehrlichman said that if Gray claimed he did “not receive a big manila envelope from Dean, then I’m going to have to dispute that.”

Ehrlichman then returned to Petersen’s summary: “Dean doesn’t give them much. Well, gee, did Hunt go out of the country. No.” Ziegler returned and again asked the president if he wanted to see Garment. He did not, and Ehrlichman added—not surprisingly, since Garment wanted him and Haldeman to resign—“I agree totally.” Then, chuckling, he added, “I mean, it’s therapy for Garment, is the reason you see [him].” The president instructed Ziegler to give Garment “a little bullshit” to pacify him.

Shortly after Ziegler and Ehrlichman departed, the president called and requested that I come to his EOB office. I arrived late that afternoon with my revised resignation letter and material for a draft statement being developed for Nixon by Dick Moore, Len Garment and the speechwriters.
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I had spoken with Dick Moore and given them adjustments to one key paragraph, indicating the president had accepted the resignations of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and myself. The president now asked that I speak with Garment about the draft statement and requested that I read him my letter: “You have informed me that Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman have verbally tendered their request to be given an immediate and indefinite leave of absence from your staff. By this letter I wish to confirm my similar request that I be given such a leave of absence from the staff.” “You don’t want to go if they stay?” he asked. I was not interested in being “the scapegoat,” I replied, to which Nixon replied, “Like Magruder’s been a scapegoat for Mitchell.” I agreed with that assessment.

The president did not appear to disagree with my letter, with his most serious comment being grammatical—namely, that “you” was not a polite word to use with reference to the president. He was still preoccupied with Petersen’s charge that Haldeman should have taken action after I returned from the second Magruder/Liddy meeting in Mitchell’s office. The president said that because I gave Haldeman this information, Petersen’s point was “that actually Haldeman, then, did know.” I told him I disagreed with that interpretation and assured the president that Haldeman had also told me he
did not know. What had happened, I explained, was that both Haldeman and I had assumed Mitchell would never approve Liddy’s reckless plan. I had told Haldeman, “They’re talking about bugging, they’re talking about kidnapping, they’re talking about mugging squads, taking people down from San Diego south of the border.” Nixon asked, “You told Bob this? Wanting to know what he said?” “He said, ‘Absolutely no,’” I answered. “So you will so testify, then?” I assured him that I would.

I explained that Haldeman had told me to not do anything: “Just stay away from it, don’t talk to them,” and I had not. Nixon wanted to know what happened next, and I told him that I had no direct knowledge. I said Haldeman and I had been over this, and he recalled my coming into his office and telling him “about this crazy scheme that’s being cooked up.” Rogers was coming over, the president said, noting, “Everybody’s in the middle of this, John.” “All I’m trying to think is how to get you out in front,” I told him. We discussed the possible timing for the release of a statement, and I departed. It was my last personal meeting with Richard Nixon.

When Rogers arrived in the EOB office, he and the president sat at a considerable distance from the recording microphones, so only the gist of their conversation can be discerned.
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Nixon, however, was being less than candid with his old friend, spinning facts and distorting what he had been told. For example, rather than telling Rogers what Petersen had actually said, he used me as a foil, telling Rogers what I thought Petersen believed. When discussing the payment of money to the Watergate defendants, Nixon reported that no one was told not to talk. This recording is not sufficiently audible to know what advice, if any, Rogers offered, but it is remarkable that Nixon solicited Rogers’s advice based on information the president knew was distorted.

Shortly before nine o’clock that evening, still working in his EOB office, Nixon called Henry Petersen to ask if there were any developments he should know about.
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Petersen reported that Fred LaRue had come in and “admits to participating in the coordination and obstruction of justice.” LaRue had provided information about using the $350,000 White House fund to pay the defendants. He said that he had been present with Mitchell [and Magruder] at a third meeting, in Florida, when Liddy’s plan was approved, and while reluctant to say whether electronic surveillance had been discussed, Petersen thought he was coming around. LaRue did tell them that Liddy’s plan could not have been approved without Mitchell. Petersen said LaRue had hired one of Colson’s law partners to represent him, but the prosecutors
objected, and got Sirica to toss the lawyer off the case for having a conflict. So LaRue had to find another lawyer and would be back in the morning.

When Petersen reported, “Liddy confessed to Dean on June 19, and Dean then told Ehrlichman,” the president said nothing, but he later returned to this point and said that Dean should’ve told him this fact, but had not. (In fact, I had informed him that I had spoken to Liddy on June 19, and Ehrlichman had told him I was reporting on a regular basis.) Petersen further reported that I had said Colson had been present in Ehrlichman’s office when Hunt was told to get out of town, and that I had been asked by Mitchell to “activate Kalmbach,” but lacking the necessary authority, I had gone to Haldeman, who authorized it. So Kalmbach was now to be called before the grand jury. Petersen said the prosecutor still did not have a deal with Magruder, because Magruder was worried the Judge Sirica would throw him in jail, and he did not want to go to jail before the others if he confessed. So they were working with the judge see what they could do.